Was The First World War Won At Sea?

The theory that I intend to put forward in this essay is in two parts. Firstly, I propose that the First World War was not won at sea, but rather relied upon the effective use of sea power to back up land power. In other words, I argue that it was not entirely won at sea. Secondly I intend to propose that while the First World War was not won wholly at sea, it could have been lost wholly at sea, or to put it another way "although sea power alone cannot win a war in Europe, a war cannot be won without it"1 It is important for me to note here that when I talk about using sea power "appropriately" or make reference to success or failure, I am talking about alliance, rather than axis, powers. Additionally, I intend to make the overall point that Naval Power, and its influence on the outcome of the First World War depended on overall command of the sea.

In the opening part of my argument, I intend here to put forward evidence to back up the point that Sea Power in World War One was used mainly, and appropriately, to back up land based combat. Firstly, as has been noted many times, Germany and Austria-Hungary were predominantly land-based continental powers, while Britain, being an island, was a Naval one. Therefore the first point I wish to put forward is that Britain had a major geostraegical advantage, and that this allowed Britain major naval advantages which contributed to its success.

As I have said above geography plays great part in a nations ability to apply successful naval power. As Geoffrey Till has noted "Island states ...are in a (fortunate?) minority...the fact of having land borders means balances have to be struck between protecting them on the one hand and exploiting maritime opportunities on the other"2

In this regard Britain had and continues to have major geo-stratigic advantages, especially over continental powers and especially over Germany. In my opinion one of the reasons for some of the failures in German use of naval power in the first world war was due to an inability to recognise and deal with geo-stratigic issues. Rear-Admiral Wolfgang Wegener was critical of the German Navy in the first world war for precisely this and reminded them that "Strategy is the doctrine of strategic-geographical positions"3

Britain`s geo-strategic advantages in the north sea and north Atlantic are numerous but perhaps the most important is that unlike many other continental powers and being an island it has only one coastline to defend where as to take the most extreme example in Western Europe "The existence of Portugal and Gibraltar means that Spain has the difficult task of defending three separated coasts with one fleet"4 Colin Gray has noted "The geographical particulars are critically important. It matters greatly whether preponderant sea power is based on an island only 20 miles at the nearest point from Europe"5 and in this we can see the other great geographical advantage Britain has. Critically it is but 20 miles from Dover to Mainland Europe in addition it has a large coastline facing both in-towards mainland Europe and out-towards vital Atlantic shipping routes and the rest of the world whereas Germany, to take but one example, has only a small stretch of coastline to utilise. In order to utilise its coastline for both military and economic purposes it must navigate past other nations which may (And in the case of Britain in the First World War, were) enemies. Germany`s small coastline geographical disadvantages and continental location made it easy for Britain to execute a blockade, which I shall address in the next paragraph and also to obtain general command of the sea.

Above I stated that geography has a large part to play in naval warfare. A naval blockade has been defined as A war measure that isolates some area of importance to the enemy "6. The effects of a blockade were, of course, extensive, but in particular its purpose was to "prevent the enemy intervening in a substantial way with the blockading navy`s ability to use the sea as it wished"7. In simpler terms, blockading the enemy fleet into its own ports affords general command of the Sea. Mahan, writing before the outbreak of the First World War, but when Britain was in preparation for it noted that utilising the Navy heavily around German points "commands Germany`s sea routes"8. To a country so dependant on trade with its own empire to supply and maintain its own war machine as Britain, it was unthinkable for the opposite to happen: to allow German naval forces in the North Sea to command British trade routes. A blockade which secured command of the sea and its vital trade routes all over the world, and especially in the north sea was vital. While blockading German ports could not with the war on its own, not blockading them could lead to losing the war through a loss of general command of the sea. It is also worth noting that blockading the ports of your enemy also has one other major advantage, it did in the words of Mahan, "(confer) one major advantage: knowing where your enemy was"9.

Another point that I wish to bring up, which rather than giving a reason for general command of the sea, is one of the reasons it is useful, is the ability for naval power to "provide direct support to (the) land campaigns"10. This point is of particular importance to the theory I proposed at the start of the essay. I have already examined have wars may be lost through use of the sea (by being Blockaded, by having a disadvantageous geographical position, or by (as I shall examine later) a reliance on improperly protected sea routes. It is my opinion as stated at the beginning of this essay, to put forward the theory that wars cannot be won solely by naval force alone. This is especially obvious in a situation such as World War One where an island power (Britain) is facing a Continental power (Germany) and must use its naval power in tandem with land based forces to achieve success. In other words "Naval strategy has to be seen not as a separate entity but simply as part of the art of war...Sea Powers could not defeat land powers on their own but, in conjunction with allies on land, they could determine the outcomes of wars"11. To put it simply it is futile to be able to flatten the enemies capital from sea if you then have no troops with which to capture it.

Particular examples of sea power being used to back up land forces in the First World War are numerous. An example of this would be the Royal Navy`s defence of the Suez Canal in 1915. The Suez canal is, obviously, a major pipeline in the British Empire. The Commander in Chief, writing back to Britain after a period of heavy fighting and rebuilding noted that "I am very greatly indebted to Vice-Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., and the naval forces under his command for constant assistance and active co-operation"12 I believe that this is a fine example of the ability of naval force to co-ordinate with, deploy and then support land forces. The consequences of losing the Suez Canal, and its impact upon trade, and through trade the war machine as a whole, would have been unimaginable. To sum up the ability of the Allied Naval power to support its land based forces, Colin Gray writes that :

"It`s ability to keep Britain in the War indefinitely, to provide Britain and her allies with secure access to the world beyond peninsular Europe, as well as to all except the most well defended littorals of Europe (and to deny the same to the enemy) meant that the central powers were unlikely to win the war"13.

Throughout this essay I have constantly referenced what I believe is the one central issue which backs up my theory: Command of the Sea. Command of the Sea has been defined as "the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes"14. This definition, while slightly vague, gives a good basis on which to define Command of the Sea, and explain why it is so vital to winning a war, especially one involving naval powers. In the First World War the British admiralty seemed to know only too well the dangers of losing overall Command of the Sea, and about a year after the Battle of Jutland the Secretary of State for war wrote that "The state of affairs now existing is really very bad indeed, and we have lost control of the sea" 15. Put another way, for the state of affairs to be so bad, control of the sea had to be lost.

Command of the Sea has many uses, one of those I noted with Julian Corbett`s definition presented above is that is it Economically useful. It is in looking at this that we can see one of the most dangerous and economically portentous consequences of losing Command of the Sea: the threat to maritime commerce (which during the time of the First World War and indeed for long periods afterwards was very large indeed) from submarines. The potential of submarines to disrupt shipping to a large extent is, I believe, one of the primary reasons why losing control of the sea can be so dangerous, and can starve a nation into losing a war.

Gray notes that "Convoying , the most basic tactic for the protection of shipping the days of sail, was believed by the Royal Navy... to be be impractical for an age of steam"16. However, clearly, this was a mistake, as is shown by the raw figures: "Bearing in mind the German Navy`s objective to sink 600,000 tons a month, it is sobering realise that the tonnage actually sunk was as follows (February 1917) - 464,599, March- 507,001, April-834,569, etc"17.

On a nation such as Britain that was so heavily dependent on maritime trade, and therefore shipping, for the maintenance of its empire and war machine, these losses were considerable, crushing and dangerous. One of the disadvantages of being an Island, rather than a continental power (which rather offset the advantages I gave in the first paragraphs of this essay) is that you become heavily dependent on maritime (and in the modern age Air) trade for your economic and therefore national survival. A loss of command of the sea, and the implications it had for the damage done on shipping through submarines could, and indeed nearly did, starve Britain out of the First World War.

In conclusion therefore, it is my theory that while The First World War, and indeed any war, could not be entirely won through sea power, it could be entirely lost through it. I began the essay by explaining the role that geography plays on strategy, and how vital Britain`s role as an island became to its sea power. I then explained how a Blockade is a vital tool, especially for Island nations, and especially for Britain - which has the capability and position to command all the sea routes out from peninsular Europe into the Atlantic and the wider world.

I then attempted to explain how appropriate and proper use of Naval power to back up, support and deploy land forces can turn the tide of a battle, using the example of the Suez can. A shutting down of the Suez canal would have been massively destructive to British trade and therefore its ability to survive. Finally I examined Command of the Sea, a central aspect of strategy at sea, and after defining it gave the example of submarines to explain how a loss of it could have starved Britain into the War, while gaining it did not automatically confer victory.

These arguments, I hope back up my argument that Sea Power cannot exclusively win war, but improper use of it could easily result in wars lost or constantly fought on the back foot. Central to the argument is Control of the Sea, a maritime principle that ,while only developed comparatively recently theoretically, has been central to the British was of conducting naval warfare for centuries.

Bibliography

Books and Journals

Corbett, J "Some principles of Maritime Strategy", New York: Dover (1911) P94

Fayle, E "History of the Great War, Seabourne Trade" : Vol 3, London: John Murray (1924) Diagrams 12 and 13

Gray,C:"The Levearge of Sea Power", Maximilian: New York 1992 P198

Hall, C: "Wellington`s Navy: Sea Power in the peninsular war" Barnsley: Chatam (4) P1

Hanks, R et all. "The European Political Environment and NATO Maritime Strategy: The Future Role of Naval Forces in the Forward Defense of Western Europe" Vol 3, 1984

Roskill, S "History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol 1:The Defensive", London:HMSO (1954) P3

Till, G:"Sea Power" Bodmin: MPG(2004) P47-48

Websites

Author Unknown: "Webster`s Online Dictionary", http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/Blockade?cx=partner-pub-0939450753529744:v0qd01-tdlq&cof=FORID:9&ie=UTF-8&q=Blockade&sa=Search#922 Accessed 29th November 2010

Murray, A J "Egyptian Campaign: Army Dispatch", Dated 1 June 1916. Accessed through http://www.naval-history.net/WW1Battle1502SuezCanal.htm on 07/12/2010.