To Whom Is Terrorism A Threat?

To begin it would be useful to establish how terrorism will be defined in this essay. The definition used will be the definition used by the U.S government who define terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against none-combatant targets by sub-national or clandestine agents." The reasoning for this is that it is a definition which has real implications in terms of terrorism policy and is also the definition that is used by the national counter terrorism agency is their compelling of terrorist attack statistics, some of which will be utilized in this essay. This essay will predominately focus upon the threat that terrorism poses to those living in certain states, and to a lesser extent will analyse the threat posed to certain religious groups within the states. In order to properly investigate the threat that terrorism poses this essay will analyse the statistical trends relating to attacks in various states and to various groups, as well as analyse factors that may influence the future threat of terrorism. This essay will attempt to argue that the domestic threat terrorism poses to advanced industrialized states such as the U.K and U.S.A is minimal, and warrants low level concern, this includes both conventional forms of terrorism which are generally small in number and low in impact, and C.B.R.N weapons terrorism which for capabilities and resource reasons does not pose a serious threat. The group which merits the greatest concern is the inhabitants of countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, were conventional terrorism is an ever present threat, and C.B.R.N terrorism warrants genuine concern, within these states religious groups such as Shia Muslims are in even greater threat and are often the targets of Sunni militant groups.

Those living in western states such as the U.K and U.S.A will be relieved to know that the likelihood that they will fall victim to a conventional terrorist attack is very small. Just to take the United States as an example, last year the United States suffered 6 terrorist attacks which resulted in 0 casualties . The numbers fluctuate slightly year on year but usually stay approximately the same; the average number of attacks over the last five year is 5 . The vast majority of these attacks are committed by animal rights groups and environmental groups, and as such they have very low to nonexistent casualty rates. The frequency of Islamist attacks within the United States is very low. The number of attacks that take place in the U.K is far higher but the vast majority of attacks are politically motivated attacks by groups such as the R.I.R.A. All but 1 of 26 attacks that took place last year were of this nature. The vast majority of these attacks result in 0 deaths and very few casualties. Although it would be unwise to say that attacks by extremist groups; especially Islamic groups should not considered at least to some extent a security concern. Although the frequency of these attacks is very low, their potential to cause harm is much higher. In the case of the United Sates the number of attacks from Islamic extremists is very low, but over the past five year they have accounted for 15 out of the 20 deaths caused by terrorism , their willingness to inflict mass casualties sets them apart from other groups, as well as their disregard for self-preservation. It is also important to consider not only the domestic threat faced by developed states but also threats that terrorist might pose to international interests. It is clear that terrorism poses a threat to U.S and U.K interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is fundamental that effective counter-terrorism measures are taken in these states otherwise the U.S and U.K militaries will suffer. There are also small scale threats from attacks on diplomatic buildings and military bases e.g. incendiary attack on U.S embassy in Tanzania May 2010 . It worth keeping in perspective that the actual threat posed to U.S and U.K citizens is small, Islamist groups may be motivated to cause great harm but the evidence suggests that they are by and large failing to do so. This relatively low threat level with regards to terrorist attacks is partly rooted in an effective counter-terrorist force, limited incidents of domestic radicalization, and limited political and social influence of the terrorist groups in western societies.

However in states Such Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq extremist Islamic groups they not only have the willingness to inflict mass casualties but unlike in the U.S and U.K they also have the capacity to inflict these attacks. Last year alone Iraq suffered 3,364 deaths from terrorism almost all of the attacks perpetrated by Islamic extremist groups. The chronic lack of adequate security, the inadequate counter-terrorism measures, and the far greater social influence these groups have means attacks are of far greater frequency and inflict far more harm. Extremely high death rates are shared by Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Understanding the nature and motives of these groups is fundamental in understanding the nature of the threat that they pose. The new terrorism is characterized by a willingness to use indiscriminate and large scale violence which is rooted in a change of motive, that being that they are no longer concerned about gaining large public or political support due to their focus on divine rather than material rewards. "It is characterized by vaguely articulated political objectives, indiscriminate attacks, attempts to achieve maxim psychological and social disruption (new terrorism)" The implications of this are that when answering the question to whom is terrorism a threat, in the context of states such as Afghanistan and Iraqi, one is tempted to say anyone. Although it is not the case that everyone living in these states is equally under threat. The vast majority of the Terrorists groups operating in these states are Sunni extremist groups; as such Shia Muslims are often the preferred target of their attacks. These groups are perfectly willing to kill members of their own denomination, but by and large will attempt to target Shias rather than Sunnis. This is supported by statistics which show that in 2010 the number of Shia Muslims that were victims of terrorist attacks which were known to be deliberately targeted against them was over five times greater than the number of Sunni Muslims who were deliberately targeted in attacks . This disproportionality is relatively static, and likelihood is that it is even greater given that deliberate targeting often takes place but is often not recorded. It seems that the threat of terrorism in states such as Afghanistan is unlikely to diminish in the near future. Attacks have been increasing year on for the past five year and there is no reliable reason to think that this trend will not continue, or at the very least terrorist attacks are likely to remain at high levels especially seeing as there will be a diminished troop presence in Afghanistan and Iraq in the near future, and the Pakistani support of the Taliban is likely to be sustained. Equally there is very little evidence to suggest that the targeting of Shia communities will become less severe, given that their does not appear to be any significant reduction of the power of Sunni militant groups. There is no reason to think that the terrorist threat in advanced industrialized states such as the U.K and U.S.A is going to get worse, the threat is likely to remain minimal or decrease.

In order to construct a serious model of terrorism threats it is fundamental to incorporate the potential of C.B.R.N weapons terrorism into the calculus. Any honest attempt to judge the relative threat of C.B.R.N weapons terrorism must attempt to answer a number of questions. Firstly what are the motivates of the terrorist groups and do these motives mean that they will be willing to use C.B.R.N weapons, secondly can these groups gain access to these weapons or are they able to manufacture them, and thirdly are they able to deploy these weapons effectively in order to inflict high death rates. As Alex Schimd says "when ones tries to address the risk of nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism on deals with an issue where one has to walk a fine line between fear and paranoia on the one hand prudence and disbelief of the other." As to whether terrorist are motivated to the use C.B.RN weapons it comes down to what is rational given their objective. For those wishing to gain public support it would be irrational to use C.B.R.N weapons, for those who wish to influence the policy-making process it would be irrational to use C.B.R.N weapons, but for those who wish to gain a spot in paradise it would be perfectly rational to use C.B.R.N weapons, as it also would be for those who aim to kill as many people as possible. Many have argued that the new terrorist has brought with it a new motive for terrorism and this motive is perfectly compatible with the use of C.B.R.N weapons. "For religious terrorists the world is divided into the sacred and the dammed, and the dammed must be destroyed." Gavin Cameron argues that "It seems unlikely that, given the option Al-Qa`eda would not avoid using W.M.D`s to cause mass casualties" The question still remains as to whether terrorist actually have access to them, or the ability to manufacture these weapons. The terrorist`s options are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The likelihood that terrorist groups would be able to acquire a functioning biological or chemical weapon is extremely unlikely, seeing as this would have to come from a state and it is quite self-evident that even a rogue state would not be foolish enough to give a terrorist group a biological weapon capable of mass destruction, the alternative is to manufacture the weapon. In order to manufacture the weapon two things are needed materials and knowledge. Knowledge is more available than ever to a modern terrorist. "The information revolution has increased the likelihood of people getting access to critical information about how to produce, not only explosives but also poisons." The biological toxins themselves are in some cases very easy to acquire, the toxin Ricin in present in the castor plant and can be easily obtained. The difficulty arises in trying to weaponize the toxins. "The problem for the terrorist lays not so much in acquiring most of the key ingredients, but in the process of manufacturing an effective agent from those ingredients." The other major problem for the terrorist is the deployment of the weapon. Ineffective deployment can render a weapon useless. The Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 would have been far more devastating if an alternative method of deployment was used, rather than releasing the Sarin from plastic bags. The technological disadvantage of none-state groups means deployment will always be a major difficulty. S. Gorka argues that "The technical challenge of delivery is one of the most significant hurdles in the way of production of a biological weapon cable of inflicting mass casualties." The alternative for a terrorist is either a nuclear or a radiological weapon. The ability to acquire a functioning nuclear weapon is essentially none existent given that they would be unable to steal it because of security, and not even a rough state would give them one, for economic reasons if nothing else. Their ability to manufacture a functioning nuclear weapon would also be essentially none existent due to the lack of technology, finance, and knowledge that would be necessary. However the ability of groups to manufacture radiological weapon is not beyond the realm of possibility. All that is required is low-grade radioactive material and some form of explosive. G. Cameron argues that "The relatively easy access to the required material and the scope for distribution makes radiological terrorism a plausible threat." Although the extent to which a radiological bomb could inflict mass casualties is questionable, the effects would likely be a relatively large number of injuries but very few fatalities, if any; it would not be a WMD by any measure. Also "radiological weapons offer significant hazards for terrorists unable to contain radiation until employment."

When talking of the risk of C.B.R.N terrorism in terms of whether they will be used on particular states one can say that, with regards to states such as the U.K and the U.S.A the likelihood is negligible. As mentioned earlier the frequency and the impact of conventional terrorism in states such as the U.K and the U.S is minimal and there are two explanations for this, either terrorists do not have the willingness to commit these acts, or alternatively they do not have the capability to commit them, if they do not have the willingness to commit conventional terrorism then they are unlikely to be willing to engage in C.B.R.N terrorism. If they are incapable of committing conventional acts of terrorism then they would be even less likely to engage in the C.B.R.N terrorism given the greater cost, logistical challenges, security boundaries, and the greater knowledge that would be required. As for states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq C.B.R.N terrorism is more of a threat but still unlikely to be used by terrorist groups. Alex Schimd argues that "for super terrorism one does not need a nuclear weapon." Meaning that a group does not need to use C.B.R.N weapons to inflict large numbers of casualties, a suicide bomb attack in crowded marketplace is likely to kill more people than any rough and ready chemical of radiological weapon. The substantial difficulty and cost of acquiring a C.B.R.N, coupled with its limited advantages means it is simply not worth the effort for most terrorists. It is often difficult to judge the threat of terrorism from a rational position, one is always walking the line between paranoia and prudence and it often is difficult to keep good footing in the midst of war on terror rhetoric and the constant reminder of events such as the September 11 attacks and the London bombings, but despite this it is essential to maintain an empirical attitude to the issues involved. It seems clear that terrorism in this country and the majority of the advanced industrialized world is not a major threat, conventional forms of terrorism are relatively low consequence events resulting in few casualties, and the number of attacks is comparatively small. As mentioned previously C.B.R.N terrorism also merits very little concern for these states. The group`s that merits by far the greatest concern are those living in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq who are threatened severely by conventional terrorist attacks on a daily basis and are always aware of the very real threat of a C.B.R.N attack. Those that are exposed to an even larger threat are Shia Muslim communities who fall victim to far more terrorists attacks than their Sunni countrymen. It seems quite clear that they are the group to whom terrorism is by far the most severe threat.

Bibliography

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