Defences For Mental Disorder

Defences of Mental Disorder

Defences of mental illness is a legal defence by excuse, by which a defendant may argue they should not be held criminally liable for breaking the law because they were mentally ill at the time of the alleged criminal actions.

These could be Insanity, Intoxication, automatism

Insanity

The defence of insanity is a general defence which is available to all crimes. Where a defendant is found to be insane, the jury are directed to give a special verdict of `not guilty by reason of insanity` under s.2 of the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883. This previously meant automatic admittance to secure accommodation. Release was only possible on authority of the Home Secretary. This often resulted in lifetime institutionalisation. Mandatory detention still applies where the penalty for the offence is fixed by law eg murder. In all other cases detention is at the discretion of the judge under s.5 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. The defence of insanity is unique in that it may be raised by the prosecution and judge in addition to the defence. Indeed, it is generally the defence seeking to avoid a finding of insanity and often the defendant will change a plea to guilty to avoid a finding of insanity. The defence has declined in importance and use since the abolition of the death penalty and the introduction of the defence of diminished responsibility in relation to murder. Insanity is relevant at three points: 1. Insanity before trial 2. Unfitness to plead 3. Insanity at the time of the offence

1. Insanity before trial Where the offender is in custody but is obviously insane, the Home Secretary has the power to detain him immediately in a mental hospital. Confirmation from two doctors of the offender`s state of mind is required. 2. Unfitness to plead The question of unfitness to plead may be raised by the defence, prosecution or the judge. A special jury is empanelled to decide if the defendant is unfit to plead under s.4 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964.The jury can make a finding of unfitness to plead if, on a balance of probabilities, any one of six things that was beyond the appellant`s capabilities:

(1) understanding the charges; (2) deciding whether to plead guilty or not; (3) exercising his right to challenge jurors; (4) instructing solicitors and counsel; (5) following the course of the proceedings; (6) giving evidence in his own defence. R v Pritchard (1836) 7 C&P 303

The defendant was deaf and mute. Alderson B set the test to apply in deciding fitness to plead: "There are three points to be enquired into:- first, whether the prisoner is mute of malice or not; secondly, whether he can plead to the indictment or not; thirdly, whether he is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings in the trial so as to make a proper defence - to know that he might challenge any of you to whom he may object - and to comprehend the details of the evidence, which in a case of this nature must constitute a minute investigation."

The jury were directed that there were to find him unfit to plead if in their opinion there was no certain mode of communicating the details of the trial to the prisoner, so that he could clearly understand them, and be able properly to make his defence to the charge.

If the defendant is found to be unfit to plead, a second jury is empanelled to establish if the defendant has committed the actus reus of the crime under s.4A Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. If the jury is of the opinion that the defendant did not commit the actus reus, the defendant is acquitted and that is the end of the matter. If, however, the jury are of the opinion that the actus reus was committed by the defendant, the judge may make an order under s.5 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. The trial under s.4(a) cannot result in a criminal conviction and is therefore outside the scope of Art 6 ECHR. Furthermore, as it is solely concerned with the actus reus of the offence the defence of diminished responsibility can not be raised:

Pierre Harrison ANTOINE v the United Kingdom - 62960/00 [2003] ECHR 709 Antoine v UK - 62960/00 [2003] ECHR 709 European Court of Human Rights

Antoine aged 16 was charged with an offence relating to taking part in the killing of a 15 year old boy. The killing by stabbing had been committed as a sacrifice to the devil. It had been carried out by another who pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. After hearing medical evidence from three psychiatrists, the trial judge with the support of both counsel for prosecution and defence, directed the jury to find the applicant was unfit to plead. A second jury was empanelled for a s.4A hearing, under Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, to determine whether the defendant had committed the actus reus of the crime of which he was accused. The jury found that he had committed the offence and the judge made an order that he would be committed to hospital without limit of time. Antoine appealed on the grounds that he should have been allowed the defence of diminished responsibility at the s.4A hearing. Also that there was a breach of Article 6 & 3 of the Convention as due to his mental condition, he was unable to participate effectively in the hearing. He also claimed breach of Art 6 in that the hearing would not determine conclusively his criminal liability and he could be tried fully for the crime at any time in the future. He also complains under Article 3 of the Convention of living under the threat of a further prosecution and the difficulties this poses to his rehabilitation as he cannot co-operate with those responsible for his care for fear that anything that he says about the events may be used in evidence against him. He claims that his ongoing hospital detention under these conditions amounts to a denial of his right to liberty and security of person under Article 5 and also infringes Article 6 & 2 of the Convention.

Held:

The court unanimously found that the application was manifestly ill founded.

The s.4A hearing could not lead to a criminal conviction and was therefore outside the scope of Article 6. Such hearings are designed as a protective mechanism for the accused to prevent an order where there is no evidence that they have in fact committed any offence. A hospital order may involve the loss of liberty but is not regarded as a mechanism of punishment.

3. Insanity at the time of the offence The question of insanity at the time of the offence is determined by application of the M`Naghten rules. M`Naghten [1843] UKHL J16 House of Lords

Daniel M`Naghten attempted to kill the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, but instead shot and killed Edward Drummond, the Prime Minister`s Secretary. M`Naghten was suffering from insane delusions at the time of the killing. The House of Lords formulated the M`Naghten rules which apply in determining whether a person should escape criminal liability on the grounds of being insane.

Lord Tindal CJ: "In all cases of this kind the jurors ought to be told that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction: and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of commiting the act the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as not to know that what he was doing was wrong." Under the M`Naghten rules, it must be established that at the time of the offence the defendant was suffering from: i). A defect of reason ii). The defect of reason must be caused by a disease of the mind iii). The defect of reason must be such that the defendant did not know what he was doing or, if he did know, he did not know the act was wrong. i). A defect of reason For a finding of insanity, the defendant must suffer from a defect of reason. Mere forgetfulness or absent mindedness is not sufficient: R v Clarke [1972] 1 All ER 219 Court of Appeal

Mrs Clarke, a 58 year old woman, absent-mindedly placed a jar of mincemeat, a jar of coffee and some butter into her bag whilst shopping in a supermarket. She had no recollection of placing the items in her bag. Medical evidence was given at her trial which stated that she was suffering from depression and was diabetic. The trial judge ruled that this raised the defence of insanity. At this point Mrs Clarke changed her plea to guilty and then appealed against the judge`s finding of insanity.

Held:

Short periods of absent-mindedness fell far short of amounting to a defect of reason.

ii). The defect of reason must be caused by a disease of the mind Insanity requires the defect of reason to be caused by a disease of the mind. The courts have interpreted this widely as to include any physical disease which affect the mental functioning will be classed as a disease of the mind. Disease of the mind has been held to include: Arteriosclerosis - R v Kemp (1957) 1 QB 399

A devoted husband of previous good character made an entirely motiveless and irrational violent attack upon his wife with a hammer. He was charged with causing grievous bodily harm. He suffered from hardening of the arteries which lead to a congestion of blood in the brain. This caused a temporary lack of consciousness, so that he was not conscious that he picked up the hammer or that he was striking his wife with it. He sought to raise the defence of automatism.

Held:

The hardening of the arteries was a " disease of the mind " within the M`Naghten Rules and therefore he could not rely on the defence of automatism.

Devlin J:- "It does not matter for the purposes of law, whether the defect of reason is due to a degeneration of the brain or to some other form of mental derangement. That may be a matter of importance medically, but it is of no importance to the law, which merely has to consider the state of mind in which the accused is, not how he got there."

Bratty v A-G for NI [1963] AC 386 House of Lords

The appellant strangled and killed a young woman whilst giving her a lift. He then dumped her body on the side of the road and drove home. The appellant was a friend of the family of the deceased and had often visited their home and given her lifts. The appellant suffered from psychomotor epilepsy and stated that at the time of the killing a terrible feeling came over him and he was not conscious of his actions. He wished to raise the defence of automatism but the trial judge refused to allow this to be put before the jury and directed the jury with regards to insanity. The jury rejected the insanity defence and convicted him of murder. The appellant appealed contending the judge was wrong not to allow the defence of automatism.

Held:

Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was correct in directing the jury as to insanity.

Sleepwalking

R v Burgess [1991] 2 WLR 1206 Court of Appeal

The appellant smashed a bottle over a woman`s head and then struck her with a video recorder whilst she was asleep. The appellant had no recollection of the events and claimed he had been sleepwalking. This claim was supported by medical evidence. He sought to rely on the defence of automatism, however the trial judge ruled that on the evidence the only defence available was insanity. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The defendant appealed contending that the trial judge should have allowed the defence of automatism to be put before the jury.

Held:

The appeal was dismissed. The evidence demonstrated there was an abnormality or disorder, albeit transitory, due to an internal factor, which had manifested itself in violence and which might recur.

Lord Lane CJ "We accept that sleep is a normal condition, but the evidence in the instant case indicates that sleepwalking, and particularly violence in sleep, is not normal." R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287 Court of Appeal

The appellant had stolen a car and was stopped by the police whilst driving it. He was taken to the police station and at first felt well but later taken to hospital because he was unwell. He was a diabetic and was required to take two insulin doses per day. He had not been taking his insulin as he was in an emotional state as his wife had just left him. The appellant had no recollection of taking the car. The appellant raised the defence of automatism, however, the trial judge ruled that the appropriate defence would be insanity. The appellant changed his plea to guilty and then appealed against his conviction.

Held:

Appeal was dismissed. The trial judge was right to rule that insanity was the appropriate defence. The hyperglycaemic state was caused by the disease of diabetes itself and not an outside factor of injection of insulin. - R v Quick [1973] 3 WLR 26 distinguished. Where the defect of reason is caused by an outside source, this will not lead to a finding of insanity, but may give rise to the defence of non-insane automatism. This has lead to an unfortunate consequence in relation to diabetics since if a diabetic commits an offence whilst suffering from hyperglycaemia, a state arising from too much blood sugar as a result of not taking insulin, they will be classed as insane. However, if the diabetic takes too much insulin resulting in a hypoglycaemia state, this will be classed as an outside source resulting in a finding of non-insane automatism. Non-insane automatism is a complete defence leading to the acquittal of a defendant with no hospital order attachments. R v Quick [1973] 3 WLR 26 Court of Appeal

The appellant was a charge nurse in a hospital. He attacked one of his patients whilst on duty. The patient was a paraplegic and suffered a fractured nose, black eyes and bruising. The appellant was charged with assault occasioning ABH under s.47 OAPA 1861. -Continued. Contact for Full notes.