Explain The Evolution Of Hizballah's Strategy Since 1982.

Q) Explain the evolution of Hizballah's strategy since 1982. (2008)

Hizballah's ability to pragmatically transform its strategy, goals and even, to a more limited extent, its ideology, has been a key reason for the organisation's success and longevity. Formed amidst the backdrop of the Lebanese Civil War, Hizballah's initial concern was the immediate removal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, an aim which still remains the organisation's raison d'être to this day. Moreover, the embryonic organisation sought the more far reaching goal of the total removal of the state of Israel and the foundation of a Palestinian state on the land which Israel occupied. Backed by revolutionary Iran, the infant Hizballah was a predominantly military organisation, using guerrilla tactics to target IDF forces in Southern Lebanon, and lacked much by way of political or social organisation. After the Israeli withdrawal from Beirut in 1985, however, Hizballah was successful in switching its military tactics from suicide bombings and hostage taking to what might be called more 'conventional' tactics, better suited to the more rural environment of Israel's southern security zone. It was not merely the nature of Hizballah's military operations which changed, however and in 1992 Hizballah fielded candidates in parliamentary elections, winning eight seats and signalling a transition from being a purely military organisation to one which would seek to change Lebanese society through political and social means. Moreover, the organisation loosened its links with Iran, relenting in its belief that Lebanon should be subsumed into a federal Islamic republic under Iranian control and focusing instead on purely Lebanese issues, whilst still maintaining Iranian patronage and support. Understanding the reasons behind these changes is not an easy undertaking, with Ahmad Hamzeh arguing quite pertinently that 'Hizballah's oscillation between militancy and political pragmatism in the pursuit of its goals has left most scholars and policy makers perplexed.' Indeed, it is Hizballah's ability to be pragmatic in the pursuit of its goals which not only helps to explain the changes it has undergone but which also helps to account for its ongoing success as an organisation. To better understand how this pragmatism has shaped the evolution of Hizballah's strategy since 1982, three areas of concern will be examined. Firstly, the changes in Hizballah's attitude towards the state of Israel; secondly, the changes in the military tactics employed by Hizballah and finally an account of the increasing political role played by the organisation, especially since the 1992 elections. Hizballah's attitude towards Israel is by no means as clear cut as one may at first imagine. In an interview in 1995, Shaykh Muhammad Hussayb Fadlallah, Hizballah's "spiritual leader" declared that 'We shall continue to maintain that Israel is illegitimate. Israel remains a usurper by virtue of every Palestinian it has expelled from his home and replaced with a Jew... we shall never acknowledge Israel's legitimacy until it surrenders the land and authority it usurped and until the Palestinians... are allowed to choose the system of government they want through elections.' Taken at face value, such an attestation would clearly suggest that Hizballah's stated policy toward Israel, and therefore the one towards which it mobilizes all of its political and military resources, is that Israel has no right to exist as a political entity in its current form, due to the fact that it has usurped the land it occupies from the Palestinians. Indeed, the removal of Israel as a political entity does still remain one of Hizballah's stated aims and a rhetorical goal towards which the organisation works. What is striking, however, is that Hizballah has shown a willingness to moderate its attitude towards Israel in response to contemporary political considerations. Despite rhetoric such as Fadlallah's still being the ideological underpinnings of Hizballah in relation to Israel, it is simply not practical for Hizballah to attempt to destroy Israel in the manner denoted by such rhetoric as it simply lacks the capability to do so. Since 1985, therefore, Hizballah has not been overly concerned with the destruction of the Israeli state but has focused its actions vis-a-vis Israel on the liberation of Lebanese territory only. Amad Saad-Ghorayeb argues that Hizballah's 'paramount function is the liberation of Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation by means of armed resistance.' In a similar manner, Hamzeh writes that Hizballah's military operations were 'primarily aimed at liquidating the foreign presence in Lebanon and building an Islamic order in is areas of control.' In neither case is there any concern for operations against the state of Israel, with the focus instead falling in Hizballah's intent to rid Lebanese territory itself of Israeli presence. Two events highlight this pragmatic change in Hizballah's attitude towards Israel. Firstly, the 1993 unwritten understanding with Israel and the 1996 written version and secondly the continuation of fighting over Sheba farms. The two understandings between Hizballah and Israel facilitated what Augustus Norton has termed a 'Rule Box' under which the fighting in Southern Lebanon would be conducted. The IDF agreed not to target civilians or civil infrastructure and in return, Hizballah agreed explicitly not to target Israeli territory. The significant of this is that, by making an agreement with Israel on the limitations of war fighting, Hizballah was providing tacit recognition to Israel and, moreover, by agreeing not to attack targets in Israel itself, Hizballah in effect limited its actual military efforts purely to the liberation of Lebanese territory and moved away from its original rhetoric of complete destruction of Israel. Military pragmatism emerged triumphant over ideological rhetoric. The second event in question is the continued fighting over Sheba farms. The farms are claimed to belong to families of Lebanese descent but were assigned to Syria when the French divided their mandate territory. Israel, therefore, occupies the farms, claiming that they belong to the Golan Heights. Hizballah has, since the Israeli withdrawal from the security zone in 2000 made the farms their sole military focus whilst still withhold from the use of force against Israeli territory "proper". This shows that Hizballah's rasion d'être remains the liberation of Lebanese territory, rather than the destruction of Israel.

A second strand in the evolution of Hizballah's strategy since 1982 has been the changing nature of the military campaign they have waged against the IDF forces. When first established in 1982, Hizballah's main sphere of military activities was in Beirut, a claustrophobic, densely populated and extremely built up urban area. The tactics employed by Hizballah during this early stage of the fighting were primarily focused on causing maximum casualties and fear for as small a price as possible and were spearheaded by suicide bombings and hostage taking, designed to limit direct engagement with the IDF. Naim Qassem acknowledges the pragmatic need to undertake such operations during the early years of the fighting, writing that 'there was no need for military exposure, which could only turn into a futile show of force not admired by many and would have posed risks as outward exposure was only a clear declaration of targets for the enemy.' The ideological conviction that Israeli forces should be removed from Lebanese territory was pursed through the pragmatic use of force in the manner best suited to fighting in a built up area. Furthermore, the Martyrdom operations carried out by Hizballah were not intended to simply remove Israel through the use of force, but also through the utilization of fear. As Hamzeh writes, 'The purpose after all was to defeat Israel by attrition and demoralization rather than by decisive military confrontation.' Moreover, the nature of such operations was not to defeat the Israeli military in a conventional sense but to 'disorient the psychology of the Israeli soldiers.' Whilst such tactics proved spectacularly effective in driving the IDF from Beirut, Hizballah was militarily savvy enough to realise that their continuation in the rural setting of the southern security zone would be both futile and wasteful. Hamzeh illustrated the move away from the predominance of suicide bombings by writing that 'The terror campaign of Hizballah only served its aim in the initial stage' and that since the relocation of the fighting to more rural areas, 'Hizballah's techniques of armed struggle have become more focused, guerrilla type warfare, particularly after the party secured areas of control.' In military affairs, even more so than in its attitude towards Israel, pragmatism was responsible for the change in Hizballah's strategy, from one based on terror during the urban phase of the fighting, to a somewhat more "conventional" force once the fighting moved into the Israeli security zone.

The shift in military tactics discussed above coincided with an increase in Hizballah's political activities. The emergence of Hizballah as a political force in Lebanese politics is best summarised by Norton when he argues that the organization 'has developed not only into a highly professional guerrilla force, but also into an impressive political organisation with a broad and varied constituency, a dogmatic leadership, and a clearheaded strategy.' Trying to establish exactly why Hizballah developed into a well formed political party is an intriguing challenge, especially given that in the 1980's, 'nothing in Hizballah's actions or statements hinted at any possibility that the party would adapt to the Lebanese political game.' This emergence of a political side to Hizballah can once again be largely attributed to pragmatism, namely the need to gain a social base to legitimise and lend support to its operations against Israel. Hizballah's entry into politics was to a large extend driven by the success it enjoyed in providing social services to the southern Lebanese population as a result of the absence of the Lebanese state during the Civil War. Perhaps the most telling aspect of Hizballah's entry into politics is the organisation's decision to drop its aim of making Lebanon an Islamic state. As Graham Usher argues, 'Hizballah`s basic aim in Lebanon has been less an emulation of the Iranian road toward an Islamic republic than the establishment of a legal party that would support the resistance in the south and seek to abolish all forms of political sectarianism in Lebanon' but that it would do so 'from within the confessional mainstream of Lebanese politics rather than against it.' Hizballah's decision to field candidates in the 1992 national elections showed the organisation's acceptance of Lebanese cosociationalism and a desire to change Lebanese politics from within rather than being a disruptive influence outside of the political sphere. Moreover, by entering into politics, Hizballah was able to provide greater legitimacy to its actions against Israel and therefore to further the pursuit of its aims. As Judith Harik argues, 'Hizballah had become a popular mass movement whose political program guaranteed its staying power and growth regardless of political developments in Lebanon and the region.' The transition from a purely military organisation to one with a broad social and political outlook was, therefore, driven by the need to preserve its stake in Lebanese society and therefore secure itself a position of power from which to further the pursuit of its aims. In politics as in military affairs and its stance against Israel, Hizballah exercised a great deal of pragmatism and this helps explain its change in strategy since 1982.

In all, the central driving force behind the various changes in Hizballah strategy can be seen to be pragmatism. In its attitude towards Israel, its decision to enter politics and its willingness to adapt its military tactics, Hizballah showed an unusual willingness to realise the changing nature of a situation and the change in demands that this placed on the organisation and adapt its strategy as necessary. Rather than adhering fanatically to its rhetoric about destroying Israel, Hizballah showed the restraint necessary to preserve its position whilst still maintain legitimacy. Rather than sticking steadfastly to the practice of suicide bombings, Hizballah did, when necessary, transform its military wing into a more "conventional" force. Rather than ignoring politics out of distain for cosociationalism, Hizballah successfully entered the political arena in order to change the system from with. Pragmatism and concession go a large way to explaining the changes in Hizballah's strategy since 1992 and also toward explaining the remarkable success the organisation has enjoyed. Words: 2,003

Fadlallah, Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn and Soueid, Mahmoud, `Islamic Unity and Political Change, Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Hussayb Fadlallah`, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 25, No 1 (1995), p.75

Hamzeh, Ahmad, In the Path of Hizballah (New York, 2004), p.1

Harik, Judith Palmer, `Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon`s Hizballah`, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 40, No 1 (1996), p.42

Norton, Augustus, 'Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon', Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 30, No.1 (Autumn 2000), p.29

Qassem, Naim, Hizballah: The Story From Within (London, 2005), p.70

Saad-Ghorayeb, Amad, Hizballah: Politics and Religion (Pluto Press, 2002), p.112

Usher, Graham, `Hizballah, Syria and the Lebanese Elections`, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 26, No 2 (1997), p.64