Schreck And Schadenfreude: Hitler, German Alliance Priorities And The Abyssinian Crisis, 1935-6

Schreck and Schadenfreude:

Hitler, German Alliance Priorities and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935-6

The Abyssinian crisis of 1935-6 is widely perceived as a seminal development in the international history of the 1930s and a significant marker on the road to the outbreak of war in 1939.[1] Quite apart from its impact on the local balance of power, with all its implications for Britain s deepening strategic dilemma, Mussolini s African enterprise had profound repercussions on relations between the major powers which manifestly facilitated Hitler s later outrages. The catalogue of benefits derived by Germany from the crisis is indeed formidable: it was the decisive factor in the collapse of the Stresa front it administered the fatal blow to collective security and destroyed what remained of the League s credibility it imposed strains on Anglo-French relations additional to those already generated by the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement it enabled Hitler to reoccupy the Rhineland at least one year ahead of schedule it indirectly compromised the integrity and independence of Austria and it was, at least according to the Nazi and Fascist propagandists, a critical moment in the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis. These major considerations aside, the Abyssinian imbroglio also served the Third Reich in less obvious ways: it furnished Hitler with a convenient excuse for declining negotiations on troublesome issues such as arms limitation and multilateral security arrangements it stimulated the recently initiated campaign for the return of the former German colonies it opened up lucrative opportunities for the development and expansion of German trade, notably in South Eastern Europe and it served as a welcome and timely distraction, diverting world attention from its apparent preoccupation with German rearmament. Gerhard Weinberg would thus appear to have ample justification for his contention that as a result of the Abyssinian crisis the whole world situation had changed greatly, to Germany s advantage .[2]

The consolidation of Germany s international position which was effected during the Abyssinian crisis is all the more striking in view of the precarious situation which had confronted the Reich in the spring of 1935. At that time Hitler had been faced with a range of awkward proposals which were palpably designed to restrict his freedom of action, a seemingly burgeoning Franco-Italian rapprochement, the emergence of Soviet Russia as a major factor in continental affairs, uncertainty over the future direction of Polish policy following the death of Pilsudski and, most alarmingly, the Anglo-French-Italian front formed at Stresa where the three powers had not only engaged in a collective denunciation of unilateral German rearmament but also reaffirmed their interest in the maintenance of Austrian independence and the Treaty of Locarno. These were worrying times for the Nazi leadership. On 2 April, with the Stresa conference looming, the Reich Propaganda Minister found Hitler beset by anxieties, very serious and reflective , tormented by issues of foreign policy.^[3] Sensing an impending crisis, Goebbels himself confessed to harbouring great anxieties for the fate of the country .^[4] Small wonder, therefore, that twelve months later he should rejoice that the Reich had emerged as the laughing third from a dispute which, although nominally involving Italy, Abyssinia and the League of Nations, had rapidly assumed the character of an Anglo-Italian confrontation as Mussolini s dreams of empire clashed sharply with Britain s own imperial interests and broader international commitments.^[5] Equally, the catastrophic consequences of the Abyssinian crisis for Britain and France explain why Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office and a key player throughout the affair, should pass so damning a judgment on the bungled policies which had been pursued, partly at his insistence, by the democracies. We lost Abyssinia, he lamented, we lost Austria. We formed the Axis. We made certain of Germany s next war. ^[6]

It would nonetheless be misleading to suggest that the Germans were mere passive observers as events in Africa unfolded inexorably to their advantage. Indeed, when viewed from the perspective of Hitler s broader foreign policy objectives in 1935-6, there is much to be said for the assessment of the insightful French Ambassador in Berlin, Andr Fran ois-Poncet, that the German authorities followed Mussolini s fortunes with sentiments which were complicated and often even contradictory .^[7] From a narrow power-political perspective it was obvious that Germany alone stood to gain from a quarrel which threatened simultaneously to implode the Stresa front and to expose the contradictions inherent in the notion of collective security, but the Duce s imperial adventure also posed significant problems for Hitler in three crucial and inter-related areas: the future development of German relations with Britain and Italy, the potential collapse of the Fascist regime, and, not least, his long-term aspirations against the USSR.

Hitler himself was fully alive to the prospective gains that might be made from the Abyssinian crisis,[8] and in many ways he shaped his policy towards it accordingly, but he became increasingly concerned in the autumn of 1935 about a hitherto unanticipated contingency: the prospect of a serious confrontation between Britain and Italy, the two powers which, according to the thesis of Mein Kampf, were to have served as the principal continental allies of a National Socialist Germany.^[9] During the 1920s Hitler had eagerly anticipated what he held to be an inevitable conflict between France and Italy, but he had entirely discounted the possibility of an Anglo-Italian conflagration, largely on the assumptions that Britain and Italy shared a common interest in the struggle against French continental domination and imperialism, and, moreover, that Mussolini s grasp of the realities of power was such that he would never be so foolish as to antagonise the British.^[10] By the late summer of 1935, however, these calculations had been turned on their head for not only was Italy now bound to France by political and military agreements, but she was also squaring up aggressively to the British in the Mediterranean. Given the importance which he continued to attach to forging close friendships with both Britain and Italy, from this perspective alone there was simply too much at stake for him to adopt a passive attitude. During a visit to the Obersalzberg on the eve of the Italo-Abyssinian war, Albert Speer observed how the F hrer was wrestling with his dilemma:

he said that he had to make a final decision whether to side with the Italians or the English. He considered this a fundamental decision. Even then he emphasized, as he frequently repeated later on, that he was ready to place the Reich with its Wehrmacht [armed forces] at the disposal of the British Empire as a guarantee , if England would give him a free hand in the East. He was much preoccupied with this question at the time, especially since he realized the inadequacy of Italy as an ally .In the days of the Abyssinian conflict, therefore, he was distressed by the fact that the situation as he saw it called for German-Italian co-operation directed against England.^[11]

War between Britain and Italy would inevitably weaken both parties and, as Hitler s advisors were quick to point out, most probably result in an Italian defeat with potentially catastrophic consequences for the future of the Fascist regime.[12] Mussolini s disappearance would not only deprive Germany of a potential ally, it would also raise the alarming prospect of Bolshevism taking hold in Italy thereby providing the Soviet un ion with a dangerous advance platform in Western Europe. This could have a devastating impact not least in view of the political instability and economic weaknesses of the South-Eastern European states moreover, it also evoked the nightmare vision of Bolshevism at the Brenner. The fate of the Duce thus became a highly important factor in German calculations as the crisis gathered momentum. Indeed, as early as August 1935 the F hrer had revealed his anxieties in this regard to the Polish Ambassador, Josef Lipski. Mussolini was running a tremendous risk by provoking the democracies, Hitler averred, and, although he had previously shown himself to be hostile to Germany , his defeat in Abyssinia would be catastrophic because it would constitute too great a blow to their common Fascist-Nazi ideology .[13] The following month he reiterated the point. Germany had for fundamental reasons no interest in the collapse of Fascism, the F hrer told the Hungarian Minister President, Gyulia G mb s indeed, she was in the nature of things, interested in the preservation of right-wing European States .[14] Moreover, as disastrous as the fall of Fascism would be for reasons of foreign policy, there was a further consideration at work. As Sir Eric Phipps pointed out, while Hitler would perhaps enjoy some discomfiture of Mussolini he would not welcome the complete collapse of the latter. Such things are catching .[15] These disturbing prospects were only part of the problem, for, however undesirable an Anglo-Italian war might be, were any such contingency to arise German rearmament and military planning were not yet at a sufficiently advanced stage for the Reich to take maximum advantage of the situation. Appearing to base its forecasts on the prospect of Italy becoming deeply mired in an East African war which would distract but not directly involve the other powers, German military intelligence had forecast a campaign lasting approximately three years.[16] However, Britain s apparent determination to mobilise the League against Italy threatened fundamentally to disrupt this calculation. It was presumably for this reason that in mid-October 1935, as Geneva moved towards the implementation of sanctions, Hitler told his senior associates that, from this perspective at least, events had unfolded three years too early for us .^[17]

A further dimension to German anxieties related to Hitler s future ambitions against the Soviet Union. Having initially conceived of alliances with Britain and Italy exclusively on the basis of common opposition to France, these plans had in the interim experienced a significant evolution as a result of developments in the USSR. Hitler had been alarmed at the prospect of the rapid modernisation of Russian industry as foreshadowed by the first Five Year Plan which, he believed, would significantly hasten the date at which the Red Army would constitute a serious threat to Germany and the continent.[18] In the unpublished Secret Book he had already registered the point, itself a significant departure from the ideas articulated in Mein Kampf, about the need for the European nations to stand together to meet external challenges.[19] As the 1930s opened it became clear that the planned association with Britain in particular had taken on a different emphasis and that the prospective Anglo-German alliance was now to serve as the cornerstone of a European movement ranged in the first instance against Bolshevik Russia.[20] Italy, too, was to have a significant role in the future mobilisation of the continent against Moscow, not least in view of its own victory over Jewish internationalism which in his earlier writings and orations Hitler had singled out for special approbation.[21] Indeed, it has been suggested that there was room in this scheme even for a suitably subdued France which, in return for accepting German continental domination, disinteresting itself in the fate of Eastern Europe and associating itself with Hitler s putative combined international front against Moscow ,[22] would be permitted, for the interim at least, to function as an essentially second-rate European power with its energies concentrated almost exclusively on its colonial empire.[23]

Thus, while contemporary observers understandably believed that the Abyssinian crisis was, as Ribbentrop himself would describe it, nothing less than a gift from heaven in view of the numerous possibilities it afforded for the advancement of German interests, it was not without some potentially serious complications and risk factors in the eyes of Hitler and his associates.[24] To be sure, the F hrer would skilfully exploit the divisions it created amongst the powers in order to improve Germany s diplomatic and strategic position during 1935-6, with the most significant advances being made over Austria and in the Rhineland, but behind the repeated insistence that the Reich was completely detached from the Abyssinian affair there lurked some fundamental questions which rendered Mussolini s imperialist undertaking much more than simply a magnificent opportunity to fish in troubled waters .[25]

Perhaps the most significant of these questions related to how the crisis would impact on Hitler s long-standing aspirations for friendship with Britain and Italy. Since assuming the chancellorship he had given numerous indications of his desire to co-operate with London and Rome, most notably in the armaments question where he had repeatedly endeavoured to enlist British and Italian support in the cause of Gleichberechtigung and German rearmament.[26] Although the results of these initiatives had been generally disappointing, the signature of the Anglo-German naval agreement in June 1935 suggested to Hitler that he was on the verge of a major breakthrough in his pursuit of an understanding with Britain. Having already clearly signalled his desire for co-operation against the Soviet un ion in a series of revealing interviews with British dignitaries earlier in the year,^[27] the German Chancellor could hardly contain his delight at the naval pact. Spurred on by what he and others perceived as a political advance of the first order,^[28] the F hrer now looked forward to an everlasting alliance with Britain.^[29] Moreover, the purpose of that alliance was hardly difficult to fathom. On 17 June, sure in the knowledge of his impending success, Ribbentrop told Aubrey Kennedy that he wished to bring the British Prime Minister to Berlin in order to hear at first hand Hitler s ideas about Western European solidarity against Bolshevism .^[30] Seeking to capitalise on the naval agreement the Germans now redoubled their efforts to cultivate ties with London on all levels.[31] Meanwhile it had already been intimated to Pierre Laval that a direct understanding with Germany could be had at the price of the recently concluded Franco-Soviet Pact.[32] As Ribbentrop told a British acquaintance that summer, properly handled there was never a better opportunity for France and Britain to come to a permanent and satisfactory agreement with Germany .^[33] Coupled with the intensification of anti-Bolshevik propaganda, partly inspired by the proceedings of the Seventh Communist International, the vilification of the USSR and its doctrines at the 1935 Nuremberg rally and the significant advances which were being made in the clandestine negotiations with the Japanese Military Attach in Berlin which would eventually produce the Anti-Comintern Pact, German diplomacy after June 1935 had a discernible anti-Soviet bent in which a British alliance loomed large.[34] There was thus clearly considerable substance to the conclusion drawn by G mb s who returned from a visit to Berlin on the eve of the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian war with the impression that a clash with Bolshevism was becoming the focal point of Germany s foreign policy and that consequently for the Germans, good relations with Britain at present took precedence over everything else .^[35]

By contrast the prospects for any improvement in Italo-German relations at that juncture could hardly have been less auspicious. Although recent research into Fascist foreign policy has highlighted a long-standing desire on Mussolini s part for a revisionist association with Germany, the Italians were further away than ever from realising that objective.^[36] To be sure, Mussolini had welcomed the advent of the Nazi regime and had even supported some of its revisionist aims in the hope of wringing concessions from the British and French, but it had rapidly become apparent not only that the ideological similarities between Fascism and National Socialism were at best superficial but also that the new strident nationalism of the Third Reich, which had immediately manifested itself in Austria, was more a source of concern than satisfaction to the Duce. A disastrous meeting between the two dictators at Venice in mid-1934 had been followed by the R hm purge, which horrified and alarmed the Italians, and the failed Nazi putsch in Vienna which prompted Mussolini to stage his famous military demonstration at the Brenner. The Germans, he subsequently pronounced, were world experts in faithlessness and cynicism .^[37] Over the following months a complete frost descended on relations between Berlin and Rome whose mutual recriminations were played out in a bitter press war.[38] Moreover, alarmed by the Saturday surprises of March 1935, and concerned by reports of alleged secret German assistance to Abyssinia, Mussolini took the lead at the Stresa conference, a development which, as the German Ambassador in Rome noted gloomily, marked the climax of the Italo-German estrangement.^[39] The hostility was heartily reciprocated on the German side. Goering, for example, was sharply critical of the Italians, telling Lipski that Mussolini was trying everywhere to act against the Reich ^[40] and when in the course of a speech to the Fascist Senate the Duce rolled out the familiar platitude that Austria was the only issue that separated Rome and Berlin, Goebbels noted acidly that he might also have mentioned the notorious Italian faithlessness, which we will now never forget .^[41]

The new air of expectation in Anglo-German relations which had been fostered by the naval agreement thus contrasted sharply with the dire state of the Reich s relations with Italy and this factor inevitably impacted on German policy towards the evolving Abyssinian crisis. Hitler not only considered Mussolini s undertaking an act of supreme folly,[42] he also appears to have evinced no great interest in it at first, preferring to leave the conduct of the matter squarely in the hands of the Wilhelmstrasse. To be sure, he would do nothing that might distract the Duce from his African visions, for the potential benefits that might accrue were only too obvious. The Austrian question in particular would continue to be kept in abeyance throughout 1935 and in the course of his speech to the Reichstag on 21 May, clearly with an eye to Rome, the F hrer had already affirmed that he had neither the desire nor the intention to mix in Austrian internal affairs or to consummate the Anschluss.[43] The following month he said much the same to Mussolini s emissary, Guiseppe Renzetti.[44] By the same token, as tensions between Britain and Italy mounted that summer, there was no hint of any possible support for the Duce s enterprise. Indeed, if anything, all the signs pointed in the opposite direction, for not only had Hitler already given moral encouragement to Haile Selassie, with whom he had corresponded about Italian designs on Abyssinia in late 1934,[45] but in July 1935, acting on the advice of Neurath, he approved the granting of a credit of 1.2 million Reichsmarks to the Abyssinians for the purchase of armaments.[46] There thus appeared to be absolute clarity as to German alliance priorities vis- -vis the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. Seeking to capitalise on the naval agreement, and in anticipation of lively favours to come ,[47] Hitler was clearly intent on further consolidating his relations with London in pursuit of his broader anti-Soviet designs. As for Italy, while she was quite welcome to embark on her colonial adventure, however ill-conceived it might be, it was clearly hoped that Mussolini would slide into an Abyssinian quagmire which would not only prevent him from thwarting German ambitions in Europe but also force him to pay dearly for Berlin s friendship following the likely demise of the Stresa front.

In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Germans were utterly unmoved when, conscious of his failure to reconcile the British to his designs on Abyssinia, Mussolini suddenly sought an improvement in his relations with Germany. The transparency of the Italian overtures provoked only contempt in Berlin where the urgency now attached to putting the Austrian question on ice, communicated by Cerruti to the German Foreign Minister on 2 May, was dismissed as nothing more than an attempt by the Duce to free his rear in Europe for his adventures in Abyssinia .[48] Germany, Neurath subsequently noted, had no cause to extricate the Italians from a predicament which was entirely of their own making, and, while the Reich was naturally prepared to promote an improvement in relations, the initiative in that area clearly lay with the Italians. I am the last man to underestimate the advantages of maintaining good relations with Italy, he concluded sardonically. On the other hand, I have had enough experience of Italian politics not to overrate those advantages. ^[49] In the German Foreign Ministry, where the Italians were roundly despised, there was not only an air of Schadenfreude at the foolishness of Mussolini s actions and the ineptitude of his diplomacy, but also a malevolent admiration for the Duce s ability to have manoeuvred himself into such a hopeless position in so short a space of time.[50]

In any case, the signals from Rome were not only transparently self-serving but confusing, if not contradictory, amply substantiating Grandi s view that it had become impossible to rely on Mussolini s policy from one week to another .[51] Indeed, the Germans had been receiving mixed messages from Rome ever since the Duce had resolved to move against Abyssinia. It was, for example, difficult to reconcile his assurance to the German Air Attach that he looked forward to the fullest possible co-operation with Germany once the Austrian question had been settled with the signature only a few days later of the Franco-Italian agreements,[52] still less with Mussolini s alleged talk of a possible war with the Reich following the reintroduction of conscri ption.[53] Similarly, although Hitler may well have been delighted at Mussolini s decision to remove the despised Cerruti as Italian Ambassador to Berlin, there was unlikely to have been any rejoicing at his subsequent posting to Paris where he would obviously find a receptive audience for his suspicions of German intentions.^[54] These inconsistencies smacked of improvisation and were in part the product of a rapidly deteriorating diplomatic position which the Anglo-German naval agreement and the failure of Eden s visit to Rome in late June only served to accentuate. As Hassell noted, the Duce and his advisers were beginning to feel the chill of isolation, for they could hardly have missed the marked indifference displayed towards them by the Germans who now seemed to be betting on Britain, to be striving in connection with the carte blanche which Britain has given her for rearmament, to reach an understanding with France on the basis of the new balance of power, and to be deliberately leaving Italy on one side .^[55]

Over the coming months Mussolini, increasingly alienated from the British, unsure of his friendship with France and conscious of his rapidly diminishing options, duly intensified his efforts to ingratiate himself with the Reich authorities, seeking to draw ever sharper distinctions between the dictatorships and the Western powers, the beati possidentes , as he termed them, and insisting on an Italo-German community of interests against common rivals .[56] For his part, Hitler obviously wished to exploit the situation in order to stimulate the developing tensions between the Stresa partners, but, as much as he may have continued to articulate his desire for Italy s friendship, the F hrer s words were hardly matched by actions. Indeed, it is surely revealing that the only real progress in Italo-German relations in which Berlin seemed actively interested at this juncture was in an area which not only dovetailed with Hitler s basic anti-Soviet objectives but also complemented his aims in Anglo-German relations: anti-Bolshevism. Here too Mussolini was obliged to make most of the running. The Italian leader had long harboured reservations about core aspects of National Socialist ideology, notably anti-Semitism, and he could hardly be said to have embraced Hitler s notion of a world conspiracy hatched by Jews and now being orchestrated by Stalin and his acolytes. Indeed, quite the contrary. For some time after the advent of the Nazis, the Duce had enjoyed cordial relations with the Soviet regime, so much so that one commentator has spoken of a Bolshevik-Fascist rapprochement directed against Germany during the early to mid-1930s.[57] Stalin s support of sanctions against Italy, however, coupled, one suspects, with the added opportunity it provided for Mussolini to edge closer to Berlin, led in the late autumn of 1935 to a further volte-face in Italian policy which eventually produced a secret police agreement signed in March 1936 outlining joint measures for the combating of Bolshevism and freemasonry.^[58]

These developments, however, lay in the future. As the East African meher rains began to subside in September 1935 the attention of the international community was riveted on Abyssinia. The extensive Italian military build up, the breakdown in negotiations between the two directly interested parties, Mussolini s defiant speeches and the British failure to broker a negotiated settlement either directly with Rome or via Geneva all pointed to an imminent conflict of major proportions. The essential question upon which all else now seemed to turn had been posed by Alfred Rosenberg four weeks before the outbreak of hostilities. For all the committees, arbitration procedures and legal proceedings, he had written on 1 September, the only thing that really mattered was whether Britain was ultimately prepared to fight in order to prevent an Italian military conquest of Abyssinia.^[59]

When on 3 October 1935 Mussolini finally unleashed his armed forces against the Abyssinians the Wilhelmstrasse could barely contain its delight.^[60] With any notion of German participation in sanctions discounted from the outset, and with relations between the Stresa powers worsening by the hour, Neurath and his advisors waited calmly on events.[61] As Hassell noted, although German policy towards the dispute was strictly non-participant , that certainly did not mean that we are not interested .[62] Meanwhile the Nazi press had a field day congratulating the regime on its timely withdrawal from Geneva and pointing to Germany s helpfully correct attitude towards recent developments.^[63] Speaking at Saarbr cken on 12 October Wilhelm Frick piously declared that while the world was echoing with the noise of war`, Germany was a nation at complete peace , seeking only to combat hunger and cold.[64] Hitler had already spoken in similar vein at the Harvest festival on the B ckeberg where he had announced that in a troubled world Germany represented a quiet island , free from alien interference, intent only on mastering its internal problems.[65] Several days later, in what a senior German diplomat admitted was an indirect reference to the situation in Africa, the chancellor had made an implicit criticism of Mussolini, announcing to the Reichstag on the occasion of the launching of the Winterhilfe campaign that while Germany battled against privation and distress others had elected to wage different kinds of wars .^[66]

Precisely how the authorities in Berlin imagined the crisis might subsequently develop is difficult to determine. One thing, however, was obvious to all: German interests would best be served by a protracted conflict which would banish forever the prospect of a reconstituted anti-German front, expose the frailties of the League and furnish the Reich with opportunities to advance its interests. As Esmonde Robertson argues, if the Germans were to make the most of the situation it was important that the crisis should simmer but not boil.[67] As long as the major powers confined themselves to mutual recriminations and paper protests at Geneva the Fascist regime would hardly be exposed to any significant risks. In any case, judging from their public pronouncements and private utterances, the Germans believed the League to be an unworkable sham, maintained by appalling hypocrites, and riddled with contradictions which would soon reveal themselves.[68] It was thus all the more surprising when in an unanticipated display of firmness the British took the initiative in pushing for the application of sanctions against Italy. Hitler was clearly taken aback. Two weeks after the opening of hostilities, he summoned his ministers and numerous high-ranking military personnel to an urgent conference in Berlin where he described Mussolini s position as desperate . Indeed, so concerned was he at the prospects for his fellow dictator that should an opportunity present itself, possibly if and when Britain made enquiries in Berlin about the German position on sanctions, he was considering offering his services as mediator in the dispute.[69]

Goebbels was similarly seized by the gravity of the situation. Things are going badly for Mussolini, he noted within days of the Italian invasion. The entire anti-Fascist world [is] against him. The Up to this point the Nazi press had been under instructions to maintain a strictly neutral attitude, but, despite repeated directives to this effect, several newspapers had carried articles which were critical of Italy s policy and mocking of her military capabilities. In so doing they had largely reflected the state of popular sentiment in Germany which until the turn of 1935-6 was staunchly anti-Italian. Whereas previously Goebbels had effectively turned a blind eye to this blatant disregard of his own directives, he now acted swiftly and decisively in order to give moral support to the Fascist regime. At the same time, conscious of the importance that Hitler attached to the cultivation of good relations with London, it was essential to do nothing which might alienate the British. What was required, noted the Reich Propaganda Minister, was an elegant shift that could be accomplished almost imperceptibly without treading on British toes . Sure enough, a change in tone was soon evident in the German press which, while obviously taking pains not to offend the British, began to discuss Italy s policy and prospects in a more positive light.

While Goebbels began to steer the Nazi press into channels more favourable to Italy, Hitler found it difficult to conceal his own anxieties. On 18 October Fernand de Brinon found the chancellor preoccupied with the situation in East Africa. It was highly desirable in the interests of Europe, he announced, that an end should be put to these disturbing Anglo-Italian tensions. One week later Hitler told the Belgian Ambassador of his concerns about the hostility that had been had generated between Britain and Italy which was dangerous and might cause all sorts of unfortunate repercussions throughout the world . The following month the F hrer spoke in similar terms to Fran ois-Poncet who found him profoundly anxious at the current situation. While it is perhaps tempting to see nothing but bluff in Hitler s demeanour and rhetoric in his utterances, his alarm seems to have been genuine enough given the fact that he considered the possibility of German mediation in the dispute on several occasions during October and November 1935. Two days after Hitler s interview with the French Ambassador, for example, Goebbels noted: The F hrer is anxious about Mussolini. Also about Fascism. England seems determined to push things to the limit. The Fuehrer would like somehow to get involved, but there is no opportunity.

It was in these fraught circumstances that the first reports of the Hoare-Laval proposals began to filter through to Berlin. This ill-fated scheme, a last ditch attempt by Britain and France to conciliate Mussolini in the hope of retaining his friendship, was greeted by a wave of nervous excitement in the German capital. On the one hand, the initiative not only further compromised the position of the League, it also suggested that the British, despite their fine words at Geneva, were most reluctant to fight Italy. Thus, should the Italians reject the plan, a solution to the crisis would be more distant than ever. On the other hand, if the proposals were accepted and a compromise found, it was not inconceivable that an Anglo-Italian reconciliation might result in an early reconstitution of the Stresa front. As became evident during his interview with Sir Eric Phipps on 13 December, at which point the fate of the Hoare-Laval plan was still unclear, Hitler appeared to share these anxieties, a fact which, in the ambassador s view, went some way to explain his ill-humour throughout the meeting. Nevertheless, Hitler could not resist the opportunity to ridicule the principles of collective security which the proposals had so fatally compromised. Recent developments had given him furiously to think. Supposing East Prussia were overrun by Russia .The League would then presumably impose sanctions in a leisurely manner and would then, after some time had elapsed, subsequently propose to hand over not only East Prussia but also part of Silesia to Russia. Hitler also used the opportunity to admonish the British for their policies during the crisis. He had no reason to love Italy, he assured Phipps, but he was nonetheless uneasy at the anti-Fascist behaviour of Great Britain , for if Mussolini fell from power chaos and bolshevism [sic] would ensue in Italy and would certainly spread .

Even so, as anxious as Hitler remained about Mussolini s prospects, it was obvious that Germany had already derived considerable advantage from his African adventure. Hopelessly alienated from the democracies, the Duce continued to advertise at every turn his interest in a further improvement of Italo-German relations, even to the point of offering to lift the ban on Christmas trees for the population of the South Tyrol. In early 1936 he insisted that the Reich and Italy shared the same enemies and were bound together in a community of fate . Although Italian efforts to encourage German hostility towards the British appear to have made no appreciable impression in Berlin, where the desire for British friendship remained as lively as ever, the crisis had produced a tangible improvement in the atmosphere between the two regimes, a development which for a variety of reasons Hitler could only welcome. In contrast, the prospect of an Italo-German rapprochement weighed heavily on the minds of the authorities in London where the Foreign Office was deeply engaged on a detailed review of its policy towards Germany in the hope of finding a formula that might induce Hitler to make a meaningful contribution towards European pacification. The conclusions of the Berlin Embassy s annual report for 1935 did not augur well in this respect, not least in view of the remarkable consolidation of Germany s international position that had taken place over recent months. As Sir Eric Phipps noted:

In the field of foreign affairs the situation of Germany has much improved, partly owing to events quite outside German control. The deep concern with which Herr Hitler viewed the Franco-Italian rapprochement followed by the formation of the Stresa Front was dramatically and for him providentially dissipated when the Stresa friends fell out over Abyssinia....The end of the year finds Germany in a more favourable position than she has enjoyed since the war. She is fast becoming the most powerful military nation in Europe, and her strength, it is felt here, will eventually attract friends. In the meantime her enemies, or potential enemies, have their hands full with a problem which may take years to settle. The traditional Anglo-Italian friendship has been dissolved and Anglo-French relations have been put to a test which may strain them. Whatever the future may hold in store, whether Italy emerges strong or weak from the African adventure, Germany, it is hoped, will be in a position to turn events to her advantage.

In fact, Germany s position was stronger than Phipps imagined for on the very day that he despatched his report to London, Mussolini famously demonstrated the close interplay between the fortunes of his imperial war and the situation on the Brenner frontier by assuring Hassell that he had no objection to Austria becoming a German satellite provided that she remained an independent state. Although this overture aroused immediate suspicion in the Hitler took note of it with calm satisfaction for not only did it mark a clear departure from the Duce s previous Austrian policy, it was also a vindication of his own decision to keep Austrian issues out of the international spotlight. Nevertheless, the initiative can hardly be interpreted as a significant concession to Berlin for the simple reason that Italy, deeply committed in Africa and clearly suffering under the weight of sanctions, was no longer in any position to mount a successful defence of Austria against a rapidly rearming Germany.

The importance of this development lay much more in the confirmation it provided of the gulf that now separated the Duce from Britain and France with whom he had previously concerted his Austrian policy. Coupled with the fact that the Hoare-Laval proposals were now redundant, Hoare s resignation having been forced shortly before Christmas, a reconstitution of the Stresa front now seemed most unlikely. Fortified by this favourable turn of events, and confident in the belief that the course of the crisis was slowly untying his hands ,

If Mussolini had expected his accommodating attitude over Austria and Locarno to ease his path towards an ever more intimate association with Germany he was to be sorely disappointed. Sure enough, his relations with the Germans had undergone a considerable transformation since the dark days of April 1935, and this was a development which both dictators had encouraged and welcomed, but, as the Italians were soon to discover, Hitler remained much more interested in exploring the prospects of a partnership with Britain. As Goebbels later implied, Italy s abandonment of her Locarno commitments prior to the reoccupation of the Rhineland was the least Mussolini could do in view of Germany s accommodating attitude towards the Abyssinian crisis. Mussolini has helped us, and we him , he noted tersely in mid-April. Moreover, the Germans were nothing if not candid with the Italians with regard to their intentions. Thus, when in late July the new Italian Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, took umbrage at the fact that the German proposals that had accompanied the Rhineland coup had been so obviously slanted towards London, he was told that this had been intended to attract England increasingly towards the group of anti-Communist countries at the moment when the Bolshevik menace was casting a deeper shadow over Europe .

Hitler s sustained pursuit of the British should not obscure the fact, however, that Mussolini s defiance of the League, the boldness of his Abyssinian policy and not least his willingness to court grave dangers in the face of what had initially appeared to be strong British opposition had elevated the Italian dictator in his esteem. Shortly after the Hoare-Laval debacle, the F hrer wrote at length to Lord Rothermere criticising the folly of sanctions and describing Mussolini as one of the rarest and most important personalities of world history . Two months later he told Leni Riefenstahl that the Duce was the most powerful figure of our age who enjoyed his entire sympathy as a human being .

Herr Hitler again professed to be bewildered by British policy. While professing the desire to checkmate Mussolini, England publicly told the Duce that she had no army to fight him and could not even find recruits for her tiny peace-time army, chiefly because the press and the Churches, which are equally anxious to foil him, will not allow it. Was this not a reductio ad absurdum of the parliamentary system? A small country, ready, like Italy, to shed its blood, would always, he remarked, be superior to any number of enemies who were not prepared to do more than shout insults or shed money.

Yet the F hrer still remained committed to the idea of a partnership with Britain, and, parallel to the overtures which he continued to make in pursuit of that goal, he now hoped to excite and exploit British resentment of Italy in order to hasten its realisation. In the calculations of the German leaders the rift which had opened up between London and Rome, the mortal blow that had been struck at collective security by Mussolini s triumph, and the recent appearance of a popular front administration in France, would now effectively force the British into an accommodation with Germany. To some contemporary British observers this prospect seemed neither distant nor objectionable. A series of factors, including daunting images of German military strength, Hitler s strident stand against Bolshevism, and not least the deplorable impression made by French and Italian policy during the recent crises, converged in the spring of 1936 to produce a perceptible swing in British public opinion in favour of a rapprochement with Germany which influential British luminaries urged the Germans to exploit. At the same time the Nazis convinced themselves that the lesson of the League s failure over Abyssinia would not be lost on London and that consequently a sensible arrangement with Germany should now be Britain s first priority. A few days later, when Hitler spoke with Sir Eric Phipps, the ambassador was struck by the chancellor s insistence on the greatness and genius of the Duce which we in England had never sufficiently realised . Goering employed similar tactics in his correspondence with British acquaintances. Writing to Lady Londonderry on 16 May, he warned earnestly of the Italian threat to the British position in Africa and the Mediterranean while taking pains simultaneously to disclose the extraordinary efforts Italy was currently making to secure German friendship. In view of the utter bankruptcy of the League, and the disturbing signs of an increase in Bolshevik agitation, notably in France and Spain, it was to be hoped that the two great Germanic nations , might unite in order to guarantee world peace, or rather, as Goering cryptically put it, peace between our two countries . Meanwhile, as the Italians knew full well, Ribbentrop s agents were at that very moment active in London seeking to persuade the British Prime Minister to visit Germany for conversations

Although the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War seemed to point the way towards further collaboration between Germany and Italy, Mussolini was inevitably perturbed by Hitler s sustained interest in cultivating the British. In order to combat this trend, the Duce and his associates sought at every possible turn to sow doubt in German minds about the prospects for Anglo-German friendship, increasingly using the argument, a variant of which had first been floated in the autumn of 1935, that Britain s opposition to Italian designs in Abyssinia was only the dress rehearsal for an inescapable showdown with National Socialism.

Even if the two events were unconnected they were nonetheless symptomatic of the fundamentally divergent strategies now being adopted towards Britain by the parties to the embryonic Axis . For while the Italians were intent upon doing everything in their power to blacken the British in German eyes, Hitler still wished to cultivate close relations with Rome and London with a view to incorporating both in a projected United States of Europe under German leadership .Ciano visited Germany in October 1936, for while the Italian Foreign Minister did his best to incite his German hosts against the British, Hitler spoke at length about forcing them into an accommodation with the Reich under the banner of anti-Bolshevism .

In April 1937, almost a year after the fall of Addis Ababa, Sir Eric Phipps reflected in the following terms on the significance of the Abyssinian crisis for Germany and for Europe as a whole:

If any one event may be said to have influenced the course of German policy decisively during recent years it was the imposition and subsequent failure of the League sanctions against Italy. It was the cause, direct or indirect, of the reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, of the gradual deterioration of Anglo-German relations, and of the Italo-German rapprochement . Moreover, it led the German Government to pursue more boldly than ever the policy of economic self-sufficiency and to commit the country to the Four Year Plan of General Goering and to claiming the return of the German colonies. These developments were all closely connected and affected in their turn Germany s situation in Europe and in particular her relations with Austria. In addition the failure of sanctions finally destroyed in Germany whatever slight influence those moderate elements may have enjoyed who deprecated economic autarchy, advocated a return to the League, and opposed a policy of naked force.

During 1935-6 Germany s international position had indeed undergone a remarkable transformation as Mussolini s African venture played directly into Hitler s hands. As a result of the collapse of the Stresa front, the failure of collective security and, in particular, the lasting tensions that had been generated between Britain, France and Italy during the Abyssinian imbroglio, the diplomatic and strategic initiative now rested firmly with Berlin. The Rhineland coup had not only sealed Germany s western frontier, it had also gravely undermined the security of France s allies in Eastern Europe, and thus of France herself, while Mussolini s sponsoring of the Austro-German agreement, though by no means intended as a green light for the Anschluss, marked in German eyes further important progress towards that goal. In broader terms the Abyssinian crisis had created the conditions for an improvement in the relations between the Fascist and National Socialist regimes, a development which had appeared extremely remote at the time of the Stresa conference. Moreover, as his policy towards Britain moved from one of friendly gestures and concessions to one of pressure and cajolery, the new German friendship with Rome could be used together with the colonial campaign and the imminent conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact as a means of levering Britain into a more accommodating stance towards German

Germany was thus certainly the only power to reap any measureable reward from Mussolini s imperial campaign. Nevertheless, the crisis had not simply provided Hitler and his acolytes with an opportunity to celebrate the demise of the Stresa front. As the foregoing has sought to illustrate, it had had implications which were at times highly alarming for the Nazi leader who was still seeking to implement an essentially anti-Soviet alliance strategy which had been formulated and refined in the years before he came to power. The Anglo-Italian estrangement resulting from the Abyssinian conflict was thus a considerable blow to his plans.

In later years, particularly in the company of their Italian allies, the Germans were wont to describe their policy during the Abyssinian crisis as one of benevolent neutrality. Indeed, as early as January 1936 Mussolini himself had seen fit to refer to it in those terms,

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See as representative examples: Frank Hardie, (Manchester, 2001) pp. 60ff Philip M. H. Bell, (New Haven, 1978) p. 142.

Gerhard. L. Weinberg, Ibid., 9 April 1935.

Ian Colvin, (London, 1958) pp. 514-5.

Documents Diplomatiques Fran ais 1932-39, 1re S rie (1932-1935) ed. Maurice Baumont, Pierre Renouvin et al. (13 vols, Paris, 1964-1984) [hereafter DDF, 1] vol. xii, no. 410, Fran ois-Poncet to Laval, 10 October 1935.

See, for example, his alleged statements on the subject in September 1935 as recorded in On the role assigned to Britain and Italy in Hitler s Richard J. Overy, (London, 1971) p. 71. See similarly Hitler s remarks to the Polish Ambassador on 18 December 1935 as recorded in Jedrzejewicz (New York, 1968) p. 240.

See, for example the opinion of the German War Minister, Werner von Blomberg, recorded in The National Archives, London, [hereafter TNA], FO371/18850/C6983, Phipps to FO, 10 October 1935. Hitler s anxieties were presumably compounded by reports from his ambassador in Rome to the effect that Mussolini was in no mood for compromise and would prefer to go down fighting against a mighty adversary viz. The British Empire . See DBFP, 2, xv, no. 241, Phipps to Hoare, 22 November 1935.

Elizabeth Wiskemann, Churchill College Archive, Cambridge [hereafter CCA] Phipps Papers, PHPP, I, 2/17, Phipps to Vansittart. 5 October 1935.

Esmonde M. Robertson, TJG I, Band 3/i, 19 October 1935. According to Sir Eric Phipps, the possibility that the conflict might spread to Europe was causing genuine consternation in the Wilhelmstrasse by late September, not least because in that event Germany would be caught in the midst of her military reorganisation . See DBFP, 2, xiii, no. 502, Phipps to Hoare, 21 September 1935.

See Otto Wagener, (Yale, 1985) p. 173.

See (M nchen, 1994) Dok. 1, Interview with The Times, 2 October 1930 Wagener, pp. 51-3, 157-9, 167, 173-4, 230.

See Franz Knipping, Frankreich in Hitlers Aussenpolitik, 1933-39 in Manfred Funke, Hrsg., (London, 1989) pp. 121ff. Ribbentrop described the Abyssinian crisis in these terms to Hjalmar Schacht in November 1935. See Hoover Institution, Stanford University, [hereafter HI], Lochner Papers, memorandum by Ribbentrop for Hitler, 12 November 1935.

DDF, 1, xi, no. 417, Fran ois-Poncet to Laval, 7 August 1935.

See, for example, Axel Kuhn, See especially Hitler s remarks to Lord Lothian during the latter s visit to Berlin in January 1935 as reported in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde [hereafter BBL], R901/60976, Ribbentrop to Neurath, 4 February 1935. As Goebbels intimated, Hitler s plea for Anglo-German friendship made during the subsequent Berlin visit of Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden in late March 1935 was also made with the Soviet un ion in mind. See TJG I, Band 3/i, 28 March 1935. See, for example, the Marineleitung s view of the political character of the naval agreement in DGFP, C, iv, no. 275, unsigned memorandum, 28 August 1935 see also TJG I, Band 3/i, 19 and 21 June 1935 Erich Kordt, TJG I3/i, 19 August 1935.

The ink was no sooner dry on the naval pact than Ribbentrop broached the possibility of further agreements. See DBFP, 2, xiii, no. 356, memorandum by Sir R. Vansittart on an interview with Herr von Ribbentrop. Ernest Tennant, one of Ribbentrop s principal British contacts at the time, later recalled that the German envoy never doubted when he returned from London that the signing of the Naval Agreement was but a first step along a fairly smooth road which would lead to an Anglo-German Agreement . See Trinity College, Cambridge, Butler Papers, Tennant to Butler, 28 March 1938. For unofficial German initiatives in pursuit of British friendship at this juncture Geoffrey Warner, TNA, PREM 1/335, Mr. E. W. D. Tennant s Relations with Herr von Ribbentrop .

On these issues see Helmut Michels, DGFP, C, iv, no. 337, Mackensen to the Foreign Ministry, 7 October 1935. See also the illuminating analysis of German attitudes towards Britain and Italy provided by Fran ois-Poncet in DDF, 1, xii, no. 410, Fran ois-Poncet to Laval, 10 October 1935. During his visit to Berlin in early July 1935 the Polish Foreign Minister, Josef Beck, similarly derived the impression, p. 224.

See especially MacGregor Knox, pp. 113ff .

Richard J. B. Bosworth, , p. 502.

Jens Petersen, (T bingen, 1973) pp. 361ff.

DGFP, C, iv, no. 61, memorandum by Hassell, undated, but written after 6 April 1935.

Jedrzejewicz, ed., TJG I, Band 3/i, 27 May 1935.

See Andr Fran ois-Poncet, Max Domarus, 1932-1945. Kommentiert von einem deutschen Zeitgenossen. Band I. Triumph. Zweiter Halbband, 1935-1938 (M nchen, 1965) p. 511. Weinberg, pp. 234-5.

Petersen, p. 389.

Manfred Funke, TNA, FO371/18860/C8198, Phipps to the Foreign Office, 10 December 1935.

DGFP, C, iv, no. 63, memorandum by Neurath, 2 May 1935. Goebbels drew similar connections DGFP, C, iv, no. 166, Neurath to Hassell, 24 June 1935.

Martel, ed., DGFP, C, iii, no. 406, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, 2 January 1935. The Germans were presumably similarly perplexed by the evident inconsistencies in the Italian attitude towards the Franco-Soviet Pact. DGFP, C, iii, nos 559, 563, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, 26 and 29 March 1935. For further evidence of Italian belligerence towards Germany in early 1935 see also Breckenridge Long to Roosevelt, 8 February 1935, in Edgar. B. Nixon Funke, DGFP, C, iv, no. 194, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, 5 July 1935.

See DGFP, C, iv, no. 206, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, 15 July 1935 BBL, R901/60956, Bergen to Neurath, 3 July 1935.

See J. Calvitt Clarke III, On Mussolini s sudden desire for collaboration with the Germans against Bolshevism see (London, 2007) p. 102 Robert H. Whealey, Mussolini s Ideological Diplomacy: An Unpublished Document , The Journal of Modern History, 39/4 (1967): pp. 432-7. Note also Litvinov s remarks on the Duce s sudden appreciation of the international communist danger in BBL, NS 8/42, Rund um Abessinien , 1 September 1935.

William L. Shirer, On the German position towards sanctions see DGFP, C, iv, no. 334, note by Renthe-Fink, and note 6 thereto.

Ibid., no. 360, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, 17 October 1935.

TNA, FO371/18850/C6910, Phipps to FO, 7 October 1935.

TNA, FO371/18850/C7040, Phipps to FO, 14 October 1935.

TNA, FO371/18850/C6928, Phipps to FO, 8 October 1935.

TNA, FO 371/19144/J5951, Phipps to FO, 10 October 1935.

Esmonde M. Robertson, Hitler and Sanctions, Mussolini and the Rhineland , European Studies Review, 7 (1977) p. 411.

See TJG I, Band 3/i, 27 July 1935, and the press commentary on the League in TNA, FO371/18850/C6910, Phipps to Hoare, 7 October 1935. See also Sauckel s comments in his Weimar speech on 31 October, TNA, FO371/18860/C7512, Phipps to Hoare, 7 November 1935.

TJG I, Band 3/i, 19 October 1935.

Ibid., 13 October 1935.

For Goebbels attitude prior to the outbreak of hostilities see, as representative examples, ibid., 5 July 1935, 23 August 1935, See Bundesarchiv Koblenz [hereafter BK]ZSg. 101/5, Presseanweisungen 1141, 1346, 27 February and 25 May 1935 ZSg. 101/6, Presseanweisung 1580, 23 August 1935. See also DGFP, C, iv, no. 124, B low to Funk, 1 June 1935.

On the German public s attitude towards the dispute and the widespread hostility towards Italy see DDF, 1, xii, no. 410, Fran ois-Poncet to Laval, 10 October 1935 TNA, FO371/19142/J5749, Phipps to FO, 5 October 1935 St Clair Gainer to Phipps, FO371/19144/J5963, 8 October 1935. In German press circles it was estimated that in the event of a referendum on the dispute 99% of the votes cast would favour Abyssinia. See BK, Sammlung Brammer, ZSg. 101/28, Aufzeichnung ber Deutschlands aussenpolitische Lage, 17 October 1935.

TJG I, Band 3/i, 13 October 1935.

See DDF, 1, xiii, nos. 12, 194, Fran ois-Poncet to Laval, 16 October and 7 November 1935 TNA, FO371/20187/J561, St Clair Gainer to Phipps, 6 January 1936.

DDF, 1, xiii, no. 46, Fran ois-Poncet to Laval, 19 October 1935 BK, Sammlung Jacobsen, ZSg. 133/36, Rintelen to Koester, 29 October 1935.

TNA, FO371/18860/C7352, Phipps to FO, 25 October 1935.

DDF, 1, xiii, no. 265, Fran ois-Poncet to Laval, 21 November 1935. According to Phipps, Hitler had condemned the policy of sanctions during his interview with Fran ois-Poncet as a blind and ruthless machine compelling those bound by it to make war on States for whom they only had feelings of friendship . DBFP, Ser. 2, xv, no. 241, Phipps to Hoare, 22 November 1935.

TJG I, Band 3/i, 23 November 1935. See also Petersen, pp. 443, 468.

DDF, 1, xiii, nos 397, 454, Fran ois-Poncet to Laval, 12 and 19 December 1935. DBFP, 2, xv, no. 383, Phipps to Hoare, 16 December 1935.

TNA, FO371/19550/R7061, Phipps to FO, 13 December 1935. At the same time the Italian authorities also lifted the ban on the circulation of German newspapers in the South Tyrol.

BBL, NS8/116, memorandum by Strunk, 5 February 1936.

See, for example, DBFP, 2, xv, no. 471, Phipps to Vansittart, 22 January 1936 no. 474, Phipps to Vansittart, 23 January 1936 no. 505, Phipps to Eden, 10 February 1936. The Marquess of Londonderry, , p. 193.

CCA, Phipps Papers, PHPP I, 1/16, Phipps to Eden, 6 January 1936.

DGFP, C, iv, no. 485, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1936.

Ibid., no. 487, memorandum by Altenburg, 9 January 1936.

For a discussion of the impact of sanctions on Italy see Funke, DGFP, C, iv, no. 288, unsigned memorandum, 6 September 1935.

The approximate turn of events had in fact been predicted in the British Foreign Office several months earlier. Commenting on reports that Hitler s references to Austria in his speech of 21 May might open the door to an Italo-German rapprochement, Carr noted: I do not think that Signor Mussolini will come to terms with Herr Hitler unless he gets into such a mess in Abyssinia that he is virtually compelled to abandon his hold on Austria. In that case he might well try to save what he can from the wreck by a face-saving agreement. TNA, FO371/19950/R3327, minute by Carr, 24 May 1935.

TNA, FO371/18860/C8198, Phipps to FO, 10 December 1935.

Mussolini had already described Stresa as over and done with in mid-November 1935, adding that the future of Locarno seemed to him problematical . See DGFP, C, iv, no. 414, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, 16 November 1935.

TJG I, Band 3/ii, 19 April 1936.

For a revealing indication of Ribbentrop s brief for the negotiations see John L. Heineman, TNA, FO371/18821/C8521, Hitler to Rothermere, 20 December 1935, enclosed in Morison to Vansittart, 23 December 1935.

HI, Scapini Papers, Box 4, Entrevue de L ni Riefenstahl avec Adolf Hitler (Notes personelles), 24 February 1936.

TNA, FO371/18860/C8198, Phipps to FO, 10 December 1935.

TJG I, Band 3/ii, 18 April 1936.

For an indication of the general impression created in Germany by the inconsistencies in British policy during the crisis see the extract from the Leipzig Consular Report for May 1936 in TNA, FO371/19906/C4233, Phipps to Eden, 5 June 1936.

CCA, Phipps Papers, PHPP I, 1/16, Phipps to Eden, 24 April 1936. See similarly DBFP, 2, xvi, no. 326, Phipps to the Foreign Office, 14 May 1936. The following year Hitler told Lord Lothian that in Baldwin s position he would have done one of two things, he would have sent two or three British battalions to Lake Tana, and defined spheres of influence in Abyssinia, or he would have refrained from taking any action. To do neither of these things but on the contrary to mobilise the League of Nations with Bolshevik Russia as a leading member, was to court certain failure . See TNA, FO371/20735/C3621, memorandum by Lothian , 4 May 1937, enclosed in Henderson to Vansittart, 10 May 1937.

See for example, House of Lords Records Office, London, Lloyd George Papers, Lloyd George to Ribbentrop, 27 June 1936 DGFP, C, v, nos 359, 367, memoranda by Dieckhoff, 5 and 12 June 1936. On the upswing in public opinion in favour of Germany see Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right. British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 1933-39 (London, 1980) pp. 191ff.

See TNA, FO371/19906/C4136, Phipps to FO, 6 June 1936. See also the commentaries of the German press on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Anglo-German naval agreement recorded in TNA, FO371/19907/C4409, Phipps to FO, 18 June 1936.

TJG I, Band 3/ii, 11 May 1936.

DBFP, 2, xvi , no. 326, Phipps to the Foreign Office, 14 May 1936.

TJG I, Band 3/ii, 15 May 1936.

Anne de Courcy, Jones, p. 197. On Italian knowledge of this German initiative see Funke, Sanktionen und Kanonen, p.168.

DBFP, 2, xiv, no. 666, Drummond to Hoare, 1 October 1935.

Weinberg, p. 234.

Shortly before his departure for London Ribbentrop requested Hassell s assistance in dispelling the widespread rumours in Italian governing circles that he was anti-Italian andSee HI, Lochner Papers, Ribbentrop to Hassell, 11 October 1936. For indications of Ribbentrop s attitude towards Italy in 1936 see DGFP, C, iv, no. 575, memorandum by Hassell, 20 February 1936, and Kordt, p. 151. DBFP, 2, xv, no. 195, Phipps to Hoare, 7 November 1935 John Gooch, Italian unease at the appointment is clearly evident in Mussolini s statements to Hans Frank in September 1936. TJG I, Band 3/ii, 29 May 1936. In this connection see also Hitler s remarks to Guido Schmidt in November 1936 in Muggeridge, ed., Ciano s Diplomatic Papers, p. 58.

See Robert Mallett, in June 1937 in an attempt to sabotage Neurath s planned visit to London. Indeed, Mussolini would himself refer to intelligent torpedoes during a conversation with Vicco von Hitler in particular appears to have been acutely aware of this aspect of the Axis relationship. See in particular his remarks about the potential implications of Mussolini s disappearance at the Hossbach Conference in DGFP, D,

See, for example, the agreement over Austria proposed by Mussolini prior to his visit to Germany in September 1937 in DGFP, C, vi, no. 453, memorandum by Neurath, 7 July 1937 no. 458, memorandum by Neurath, 12 July 1937 no. 461, Neurath to Hassell, 13 July 1937. Following Hitler s meeting with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden in mid-February 1938 the Duce toyed with the idea of sponsoring Austrian membership of the Anti-Comintern Pact in order to prevent her absorption by Germany. See (Westport, 1993) p. 190.

DBFP, 2, xviii, no. 399, Phipps to Eden, 13 April 1937.

DGFP, C, iv, no. 485, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1936.

See for example TJG I, Band 8, 21 April 1940, 25 June 1940, 3 July 1940 DGFP, D, xiii, no. 263, memorandum by Hewel, 16 October 1939 (3. Auflage, Bonn, 1993) pp. 144ff.

Sommer, p. 32.