The Tito-stalin

The Tito-Stalin split represented the end of the Federation of Yugoslavia s status as a follower and ally of Stalinist Soviet style communism. Described by Jeronim Perovic as the first schism within the Communist bloc. [1], the end of close relations between the two communist states was officially announced in Soviet state press on the 29^th of June 1948, with Tito and the Yugoslav state being placed outside the united Communist front, and consequently outside the Cominform. [2] The basis for the split is often contested within the historiography of the subject, with one fundamental argument being that Stalin and Tito were destined to clash due to their differing goals for their respective nations being incompatible. Examples of Tito and his policies being in direct conflict with those of Stalin and the Soviet un ion can be easily found, such as the antagonising of the allied powers both during and after the Second World War. Through the Yugoslav intent to provide military intervention in the Greek Civil War, Tito and Yugoslavia undermined both Stalin and the Soviet un ion by creating the threat of western military intervention by threatening their own military intervention on the side of Greek communists. In addition, other attempts to increase Yugoslav influence over the Balkan regions were also at odds with the Stalinist policy of Soviet domination of the Communist Eastern sphere of influence. Historians such as John Lampe acknowledge this argument as containing elements of truth, with Lampe himself describing Yugoslavia as the only post-war Communist nation in Eastern Europe which was even capable of falling out with the Soviet Union. [3] This argument can certainly be seen as containing elements of truth and can be attributed as at least part of the basis for the Tito-Stalin split. Although this theory of entirely opposing visions can be challenged by the reaction of Tito to Soviet withdrawal of military and political advisers, as well as his belief in this worsening of relations being a temporary misunderstanding [4], which highlights the clear ideological similarities between the two dictators, as well as Tito s desire to repair these severed relations.

However, more modern historiography places a focus on the expansionist aims of Yugoslavia and Tito within the Balkan reasons as being Stalin s primary cause for concern regarding Tito and his foreign policy. Historiography such as the work of the aforementioned Perovic utilise previously unused Russian state sources to confirm that Stalin s dismay at Tito s continued expansionist foreign policy against the advice of Moscow was the primary reason for the collapse in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.[5]

The aims of Tito and the Yugoslav nation were without doubt incompatible with that of the Soviet Union, making the Tito-Stalin split an inevitability, with Tito s attempted undermining of both Stalin and the Soviet un ion with attempted expansionism within the Balkan region. However, the internal fear and desire to return to positive relations in the wake of the split challenge this idea of the split being destined to happen, due to the apparent surprise and shock felt by both Tito and the senior party members as a result of the split.

Furthermore, additional evidence can be found within the historiography supporting the argument that the Tito-Stalin split was in-fact instigated by Stalin in an attempt to oust Tito from his position of power as punishment for Yugoslavia s independent actions regarding involvement Albania and Greece.

Additional information regarding the Tito-Stalin split can also be found when examining primary sources related to the severing of ties between the two nations. More specifically, the letters sent between Tito and Stalin during the month of March 1948 provide extremely useful insight in to both Yugoslav and Soviet issues and disputes in the months leading up to the split.

Overall, the Tito-Stalin split can be primarily attributed to Stalin s disagreements with Tito regarding Yugoslav expansionist foreign policy, as well as to fundamental ideological differences regarding both socialism itself, as well as the Soviet Union s standing as the undisputed leader of the communist bloc.

The Tito-Stalin split is also often described as an affirmation of Yugoslav nationalism. When examined from an internal party perspective, there is indisputable evidence that the Tito-Stalin split was utilised by the Communist Party (CPY) as a tool to strengthen internal Yugoslav nationalism through the elimination of political opponents to the Yugoslav national movement within the party itself, with Carol S. Lilly describing how post-split, purging of the party began under the veil of removing conformists ,[6] when in reality the conformist label was used to expel and purge non-desirable, non-Yugoslav believers from the party. An alternative argument can also be made through examples of anti-Yugoslav, pro-federal nationalism becoming more prevalent after the Tito-Stalin split in place of pro-Yugoslav nationalism. Overall, it is clear that an increase of Yugoslav nationalism was a key result of the Tito-Stalin split. The primary focus of this essay will be on examining the primary causes of the Tito-Stalin split, with the assessment of the split as an affirming factor of Yugoslav nationalism being a secondary focus.

A prime example of the Tito-Stalin split being a result of the incompatible aims of Tito and Stalin can be found when examining Soviet reaction to Yugoslav interest in the Greek Civil War. Perovic argues in his article The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence that the Soviet interest in preventing Yugoslav intervention in the Greek Civil War was two-fold, with both reasons providing excellent insight in to the differing aims of Stalin and Tito. The primary reason cited for Stalin s frustration regarding the joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian intervention in the Greek Civil War was the fear of international intervention in the war as a counter to Communist intervention and the potential resulting conflict with the western powers, with Perovic describing how Stalin and Molotov argued that Yugoslav and Bulgarian actions in Greece could have led to dangerous international complications. [7] However, Perovic also cites the opinion of Leonid Gibianskii, who believed that the actual reason for Stalin s frustration was not risk of international intervention, but the the independence of the actions themselves. [8] meaning that the true frustration felt by Stalin was caused by Yugoslavia s refusal to consult the Soviet un ion with regards to foreign policy decisions. Perovic supports this claim by citing an example of Stalin s willingness to support the Czech Communists in February of 1948 with more than just diplomatic means [9] furthering the argument that Stalin s true frustration lied not only with the threat of international intervention, but with the idea of Yugoslav foreign policy independence, with these independent actions challenging the Soviet Union s unquestionable position in charge of the actions of the Communist bloc. The disagreement between Stalin and Tito regarding the Greek Civil War encapsulates perfectly the argument that Tito and Stalin s ideologies where incompatible and that their differing opinions led directly to the Tito-Stalin split. The independent actions of Yugoslavia regarding the Greek civil war threatened Stalin s ideology of a united Communist bloc under the guidance of the Soviet Union, as Tito prioritised his goals regarding the success of the Greek Communists, specifically a claim to Slavic-Greek lands and a strengthened presence in neighbouring Albania.[10]

Additionally, Perovic also cites how Yugoslav expansionist policy regarding Albania was a key factor in the worsening of relations between the two communist states. Perovic describes the key feature of this Tito policy as regional hegemon. [11], a desire to maintain control over the entire Balkan region and maintain his forces status at the centre of the Balkan countries in military as well as political respects. [12] Perovic also describes Soviet issues with the attempted absorption of Albania into Yugoslavia as two-fold. Firstly, Perovic describes how early precursors to unification, such as the ratification of a Mutual Assistance Agreement of 1946 were met with worry from Moscow over fears of the provocation of western intervention.[13] Secondly, Perovic also describes how the independent actions of Yugoslavia regarding moves to further links between Albania and Yugoslavia. Citing a letter sent by Minster of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, Perovic describes Soviet frustration at the proposed merger of the Albanian and Yugoslav armies without consulting the Soviet un ion was a violation of the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of Mutual assistance,[14] as well as providing a challenge to the unquestioned authority of the Soviet un ion in matters in matters regarding the eastern bloc. It is clear that Yugoslavia s expansionist policies regarding Albania were a key factor in the Tito-Stalin split, as the actions taken by Yugoslavia in order to advance their potential merger with Albania proved to strain relations with the Soviet Union. This strain occurred as these actions created the potential for western intervention, whilst also ignoring the pre-established Soviet domination of foreign policy, challenging Stalin s hegemony over eastern-bloc policy.

However, the idea that the relationship between Tito and Stalin was bound the fail and that Tito was staunchly anti-Stalin which is showcased in the case of the Greek Civil War can be challenged through evidence provided in other examples of the subject s historiography. John Lampe s work Yugoslavia as History details Tito and the CPY s reaction to the measures put in place by Stalin, including the withdrawal of both political and civilian Soviet advisors from Yugoslavia. Lampe describes Tito s response as a pained letter of surprise and protest. [15] This apparent surprise and worry implies that Tito was indeed not glad to be free of the shackles of Stalin and that the Tito-Stalin split was not what had been intended when partaking in non-Soviet approved policies. Furthermore, in Jasper Ridley s Tito: a Biography, Ridley describes how in a letter sent by both Tito and Kardelj on the 17^th of May 1948 in response to a letter sent by the Soviet un ion accusing the Yugoslav leaders of Trotskyism and belittling the achievements of the Yugoslav Partisan Movement, contained assurances that Yugoslavia would be truly loyal to the Soviet Union and to the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. [16] This furthermore provides evidence for the argument that the Tito-Stalin split was not the result of an inevitable clash of ideology, as even after the initial withdrawal of Soviet advisers which represented the beginning of the severing of ties between Tito and Stalin, Tito remained intent of rebuilding relations between the two Communist states and intent on following the ways of Stalin. This ideological link which remained relevant post-split can be seen as an example of why it is difficult to assign blame for the Tito-Stalin split on the ideological differences between the two dictators.

The aforementioned page in Lampe s Yugoslavia as History also contains relevant information regarding Yugoslav nationalism resulting from the Tito-Stalin Split. Lampe goes on to describe a later correspondence between Tito and Stalin which detailed Tito s love for socialism and the Soviet Union whilst also stating that an honourable party member could in no case love his own land less. [17] Lampe connects this statement to the resulting first arrests on party members with suspected ties to the Soviet Union. This removal of supposed non-patriotic political enemies of the state can certainly be seen as an example of Yugoslav nationalism gaining relevance and being affirmed by the Tito-Stalin split, as the Yugoslav state utilised this political division to help create a link between Yugoslav identity and Yugoslav politics by removing enemy forces in the form of pro-Stalin party members.

Returning to the notion of the Tito-Stalin split being an inevitability as a result of unavoidable conflicts regarding their respective aims, further evidence can be found that this was not the case when examining the policies of Tito and the Yugoslav Party in the immediate aftermath of the split. Carol Lilly describes in her work Power and Persuasion how modern scholars in the field of the Tito-Stalin split often characterise the post-split era from mid-1948 to 1950 as being a intensification of the earlier Stalinist era. [18], supporting this argument with evidence of the party s attempts to collectivise agriculture and its brutal treatment of ideological enemies [19]. John Lampe also describes how in the immediate aftermath of the split, Tito and Yugoslavia made immediate efforts to address the criticisms levelled at Yugoslavia by Stalin and the Soviet Union, who described their policies as anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist-Leninist. [20] Lampe describes how the split prompted the regime to rededicate itself to the Soviet practice of socialism. [21] As evidence, Lampe cites the rushing through by Tito of the law to nationalize the service sector in April 1948, a blatantly socialist style manoeuvre which can be interpreted as a potential apology or message of unity to the Soviet Union, as well as Tito s speech to the CPY congress in July 1948 which Lampe describes as being resound with praise for Stalin and the great Soviet Union . This evidence of both the implementation of traditional socialist laws, as well as the praising of Stalin and the Soviet un ion can be seen as evidence of the ideological similarities between Stalin and Tito, even after their worsening of relations in March of 1948, which in turn can be used as evidence against the argument that the Tito-Stalin Split was an inevitable result of clashing ideologies, as Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party maintained on the Soviet-Path after the split.

However, further evidence can be found which highlights both ideological differences and similarities between Tito s Yugoslav Party and the traditional Soviet path to Socialism. Perovic refers to the aforementioned similarities between Yugoslav and Soviet socialist foundations, describing the Yugoslav constitution of 1946 as a copy of the Soviet Constitution Soviet Constitution of 1936. [22], highlighting further the apparent similarities between the Yugoslav and Soviet visions of Communism. However, Perovic contrasts this similarity with a number of key divergencies from the Soviet model within Tito and the Yugoslav Party s vision of communism. Perovic describes how senior figures in the CPY understood that not all aspects of the Soviet Model suited Yugoslavia s particular needs. [23] Providing specific examples, Perovic cites Melissa K. Bokovoy in describing how the CPY leaders felt that a less violent method of collectivisation was needed in Yugoslavia,[24] highlighting a clear divergence from traditional Soviet-style communism. Additionally, Perovic also cites Carol Lilly and her argument that party leaders also were doubting Soviet educational and cultural policies and their appropriateness for Yugoslavia.[25] These examples of differing ideologies favoured by Tito and Stalin can be seen as useful evidence when examining whether or not ideological differences were the primary reasons for the Tito-Stalin Split, as the evidence provided does show some clear differences between Yugoslav and Soviet ideas. However, the similarities which are visible in the constitutions of the two states can be seen as evidence limiting the true ideological differences between Titoism and Stalinism and therefore making the placing of blame on the split solely onto ideological differences difficult.

An alternative basis for the Tito-Stalin split can be found when examining further John Lampe s Yugoslavia as History, which describes how the miscalculations of Stalin with regards to Tito s popularity and stability led to his choice to sever ties with Yugoslavia, with the aim of forcing Tito s disposition and replacement with a more pro-Soviet, less ambitious leader. Lampe describes how Stalin viewed Tito and his leadership as easily disposable, firstly describing how Stalin confidently expected that Yugoslav party would quickly find a new set of more compliant leaders. [26] Additionally, Lampe also makes reference to a letter sent by Stalin which referred obliquely to Trotsky s murder by Stalin s agents. , with Lampe implying that this is a thinly vailed threat of assassination. However, Lampe also describes how this perceived weakness of Tito due to the reverence in which Stalin was held by Yugoslav revolutionaries turned out to be untrue. Lampe describes how membership to the CPY nearly doubled during 1948 from 285,000 to 483,000. [27] In the immediate aftermath of the split, describing this as the politburo of Yugoslavia s interpretive evidence for popular support. Although Lampe is unable to provide an accurate indication of public opinion, he describes how within the CPY, Stalin and the Soviet un ion were nowhere near as revered as he clearly felt. He describes the fundamental reasoning for this to be the Partisan belief that the Soviets had done very little to assist the Partisan Movement during the Second World War, a point which is also mentioned by Perovic when he describes how Tito s own forces had freed the majority of the country before the Red Army helped liberate Belgrade in 1944,[28] In addition to providing little assistance post-war.[29] This meant that Stalin and the Soviet un ion were held in nowhere near as high regard as Stalin felt with Yugoslav revolutionaries as he had implied with his threats regarding the removal of Tito from his position of leader of Communist Yugoslavia. These examples of Stalin s apparent overconfidence with regards to the weight of his support for Tito can be seen as useful when assessing whether Stalin s attempts to have Tito replaced with a more compliant leader through his withdrawal of Soviet support was the basis of the Tito-Stalin split.

However, evidence can be found that counters the argument that Stalin s goal with regards to the Tito-Stalin split was the removal of Tito from power. Perovic sites documents from the Russian presidential archives which appear to clarify that Stalin s actual goal with regards to the withdrawal of support to Yugoslavia was not actually the removal and replacement of Tito, but instead the isolation of Yugoslavia as a punishment for its independent actions. The source used by Perovic is a letter sent to Czechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald on the fourteenth of July 1948 by Stalin after the Cominform meeting which took place without Yugoslavia. In said letter, Stalin writes that We in Moscow are not counting on the early defeat of Tito and have never counted on it. We have achieved the isolation of Yugoslavia. [30] This source works to undermine the potential argument that Stalin s instigation of the Tito-Stalin split was an attempt to remove Tito from office with a more pro-Soviet leader being installed in his place, due to this reputable source from Stalin stating the direct opposite. Perovic goes on to describe Stalin s thought process regarding the split as one of sacrifice for the greater good of Soviet control over the Communist bloc, describing the isolation of Yugoslavia as a way of strengthening Moscow s grip over the rest of the socialist camp. [31] The argument that the Tito-Stalin split was instigated by Stalin as an attempt to utilise his influence over Yugoslav politicians to have Tito ousted and replaced by a more easily controlled Stalinist leader contains some compelling points supported by some indirect circumstantial evidence. However, when examined alongside other contemporary sources which greatly contradict this argument, it is clear that the basis of the Tito-Stalin split was not a result of a misguided Stalin attempt to have Tito deposed internally. A clear and obvious motivation for the split with regards to Stalin was isolation of Yugoslavia within the socialist sphere as a method of punishment for Yugoslavia and their foreign policy independence, as well the tightening of control over other communist bloc countries, with influence over Yugoslavia being sacrificed to achieve this. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the Tito-Stalin split was a product of Stalin s desire to have Tito removed and replaced.

Returning to the question of Yugoslav nationalism being affirmed by the Tito-Stalin split, some evidence can be found within the subject s historiography that the split in relations between the Soviet un ion and Yugoslavia resulted in an increase in federal nationalism instead of Yugoslav nationalism. Carol S. Lilly cites Slovenian interior minister in 1949 Boris Kraiger s descri ption of the reaction in the Yugoslav state of Slovenia as being filled with protests that were getting out of hand. , with the petty bourgeois deviations developing under the slogan of independence. Lilly also comments how the Tito-Stalin split led to the revitalisation of state-society relations in Yugoslavia [32] When examined at face value, this descri ption of rising non-Yugoslav nationalism can be seen as an example of the Tito-Stalin split weakening the Yugoslav nationalism movement, rather than acting as an affirmation of the movement. However, Lilly goes on to describe how the potential renewal of state-society relations through effective coercion, specifically the Stalinist methods of repression such as arrests and assassinations of political enemies, both state-nationalist and pro-Soviet dissenters. Therefore, it is difficult to describe the Tito-Stalin split as an affirmation of non-Yugoslav nationalism

Furthermore, Yugoslav partisan historian Vladimir Dedijer commented that the Tito-Stalin split was the cause of profound excitement for Yugoslavs in exile as they believed it would result in the downfall of Tito, allowing them to return to their countries.[33] However, it is difficult to describe any work by Dedijer as credible with regards to the Tito-Stalin split, as his status as a member of the Yugoslav Party s central committee[34] make his opinions regarding the rise of threats to the Yugoslav state extremely unreliable. This account was written in the aftermath of the split when Tito and the Party had affirmed political control, meaning that it would be beneficial to the perception of the party to create the illusion of unrest and discontent in the post-split years which were then overcome by the party, creating the illusion that Tito and communist Yugoslavia overcame an external threat. Furthermore, this descri ption of the Tito-Stalin split as motivation for anti-communist Yugoslavs can be seen as effective anti-Soviet propaganda, as associating Yugoslav dissenters to pro-Soviets could tar supporters of the Soviet un ion as unpatriotic, creating a link between pro-Yugoslavs and anti-Soviets. Therefore, it cannot be argued effectively that the accounts of Dedijer describing exiled Yugoslav joy following the Tito-Stalin split accurately portray a rise in federal nationalism in Yugoslavia, meaning that his account also cannot be used as a counterargument to the rise of Yugoslav nationalism as a result of the Tito-Stalin split.

An extremely useful source when assessing the Tito-Stalin split are the official records of correspondence between the leadership of Yugoslavia and the Soviet un ion in the months of March and April of 1948. The usefulness of these letters when assessing the basis for the Tito-Stalin split can be seen through both the time-period in which they were sent, as well as the content of the letters. The first available letter sent by the Soviet un ion is dated March 27^th, 1948, with the reply from Yugoslavia being dated April 17^th 1948, meaning that these letters represent the feelings of both nation leaders during the breakdown of relations. Furthermore, the contents of the sources show the opinions of both Tito and Stalin regarding Soviet-Yugoslavia relations, which can be seen as extremely useful information when assessing the basis of the Tito-Stalin split.

The first useful pieces of evidence which can be found when assessing the Tito-Stalin correspondence is a Soviet explanation for the withdrawal of military advisers from Yugoslavia, a move which represented the escalation of tensions between the two nations.[35] In the 27^th of March correspondence, the Soviet representatives claim that these withdrawals were due to insulting comments made by Djilas describing the Soviet military advisers as morally inferior to the officers of the British army. , describing this as an anti-Soviet statement which received no opposition from the CPY. [36]. The descri ption of this statement as anti-Soviet can be seen as evidence for the basis of the Tito-Stalin split being a Soviet fear of Yugoslav independent thought which deviates from the Stalinist idea of Soviet superiority in all facets of political and military structure, with any divergence from this school of thought being classified as traitorous and anti-Soviet by Stalin and Soviet policy makers, with the goal of this policy being to maintain total Soviet control over the socialist sphere. Further evidence supporting this argument can be found later in the Soviet letter when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet un ion (CPSU) claim to be aware of anti-Soviet rumours circulating among leading comrades in Yugoslavia. [37] which is described as creating an anti-Soviet environment . It is clear and obvious that this accusation citing rumours cannot be described as reliable. However, the accuracy of the statement with regards to the source s relevance to the Tito-Stalin split is irrelevant, as the accusation of anti-Soviet behaviour itself can be seen as a further example of Soviet paranoia regarding the standing of Stalin and Stalinism in Yugoslavia, which is undoubtably a key factor in the Tito-Stalin split

Moving away from Soviet paranoia regarding the vague anti-Soviet nature of, the letters of correspondence from the CPSU to the members of the CPY also detail further transgressions from Tito and his Central Committee. The letter details how in the view of Stalin, Tito and Yugoslavia were defying the science of Marxism-Leninism by having a People s Front which was considered the chief leading force [38] of the nation, rather than the party. This criticism, unlike the general claims of anti-Soviet criticisms has its basis in the fundamentals of Marxism and it the desire to maintain positive relations with the Western powers, as Stalin s frustration at the Popular Front from below could be justified by a desire not to undermine the Churchill-Stalin alliance.[39] Therefore, the details of the March 27 letter sent from the CPSU to Tito and the can be seen as evidence of significant ideological differences between Tito and Stalin which could be seen as a key factor in the Tito-Stalin split. The two leaders showcased diverging opinions on both true socialism , with Stalin describing Yugoslavia s popular front as an anti-Socialist entity, as well as the desired relationship of the eastern Communist bloc and the western powers, with Stalin being critical of the risky Yugoslav policy of disregarding agreements with the western powers in order to peruse their own aims.

A rebuttal to the Soviet accusations can be found in the CPY Central Committee s reply to the aforementioned Soviet letter, which is dated as being sent on the 13^th of April 1948. This letter provides an alternate interpretation of the relationship between the two Communist states, with the Yugoslav leadership describing themselves as surprised by the letter s tone and contents. [40] The contents of the Yugoslav-sent letter can be seen as useful when assessing the causes of the Tito-Stalin split, as it allows us to gauge the Yugoslav reaction to the accusations in both tone and content, showing insight as to whether the split from Stalin was desired by Tito or whether the severing of relations was initially regrettable.

The first relevant piece of information can be found in the letter s first page, as Tito and the CPY attempt to explain the anti-Soviet rumours which Stalin described in the previous correspondence. Rather than accuse the Soviet un ion of lying and slandering the Yugoslav party, Tito opts to place the blame squarely on the heads of Andrea Hebrang and Sreten Zujovic, describing them as the main culprits of in providing inaccurate and slanderous information to the Soviet representatives [41]. Both Hebrang and Zujovic were expelled from the Communist Party in April 1948 before being arrested at a later date. This placing of blame on suspected betrayers of Yugoslavia can be interpreted as simply as a way of deferring blame away from both the majority of the Yugoslav party and from the Soviet s themselves, showcasing a desire from Tito and the Central Committee to maintain good relations with Stalin and the Soviet un ion by both refusing to accuse the Soviet un ion of simply lying, whilst also deflecting blame away from all good and reputable Communist Party members. However, some sources cite that the reason for Hebrang s purging from the party was, ironically, due to his status as a prime candidate to replace Tito [42] after his removal of power by Stalin himself, suggesting that his removal from the Yugoslav Party was more due to his pro-Soviet stance, rather than his supposed spreading of rumours. Regarding Yugoslav attitudes towards the Tito-Stalin split, this evidence suggests even after the March withdrawals of military and civilian advisors, Tito and Yugoslavia were keen to repair relations with the Soviet Union, refusing to disparage them in any way and partially accepting blame for allowing ex-members to spread their anti-Soviet message and exaggerate rumours of discontent with the Soviet model. lt;/p> Furthermore, the Yugoslav-sent letter provides further examples of Tito and the CPY s dedication to the Soviet cause. Tito rebuffs the Soviet accusation of Yugoslav party being full of anti-Soviet personnel, describing how the people who in 1941 organised the uprising against the fascist invader, deeply believing in the Soviet Union would not blacken the Soviet system. [43]. This statement furthermore affirms Tito and Yugoslavia s belief in the Soviet un ion and its style of socialism, but this rebuttal is more aggressive than the aforementioned deflection of blame, as the letter goes on to describe these accusations of being two-faced as being really terrible and insulting. [44]. Therefore, this can be seen as an example of Yugoslavia and Tito challenging the authority of Stalin and the Soviet Union, with the letter directly challenging the authority of Stalin to criticise the Soviet socialist tendencies of the CPY members. This can be seen as an example of an indirect instance of an ideological disagreement between Tito and the Soviet Union. In spite of Tito and the CPY s dedication to Soviet-style socialism, this aggression shown towards accusations of anti-Stalinism can be seen as a direct challenge to the authority of Stalin himself over the eastern bloc, furthering the potential argument that ideological differences where a primary factor in the 1948 Tito-Stalin split.

However, the letter soon returns to a slightly more even-handed evaluation, as it describes how the socialist movement in Yugoslavia is inspired by the Soviet model, whilst also implementing some specific Yugoslav ideas, countering the previously made point regarding Yugoslavia s supposed divergence from the Soviet path to socialism. The letter claims that we study the Soviet system, but we are developing socialism in our country in somewhat different forms. [45] Although this quote acknowledges the importance of following the Soviet model, it also affirms that the Yugoslav party is keen to divert on its own by implementing Yugoslav-specific policies which differ from those found in the Soviet Union, creating its own evolution of socialism. Although this element of the source is not as blatantly disrespectful as the previous divulgences from Soviet policy, this statement clearly showcases a clear difference in policy between that of Yugoslavia and the Soviet un ion which is representative of the differences which partially resulted in the Tito-Stalin split.

This source can be seen as extremely useful when evaluating the causes of the Tito-Stalin split. Firstly, the time period in which the letters were sent means the source provides time-relevant contextual information regarding issues between the two states. Additionally, the two-sided nature of the document allows for the assessing of both Soviet and Yugoslav and Soviet opinions, allowing a historian to gauge the argument from both sides. Finally, the content of the letters perfectly showcases the numerous issues held by both nations regarding their relationship, with the letters directly addressing the political and ideological conflicts which arose during this period.

It is impossible to assign any single factor the status of being the basis of the Tito-Stalin split. Due to the complicated, multifaceted nature of the dispute, describing any one factor as the sole key factor would simply be inaccurate and an example of poor history. It however can be argued that numerous factors combined together led to the split.

One useful way to understand the motivations behind the split is examining the reactions to the split itself. When examining the historiography, a clear consensus can be found agreeing that the Tito-Stalin split was seen as regrettable originally by Tito, as numerous examples can be found of the Yugoslav leader attempting to reconcile with the Soviet Union, showing regret at the downturn in relations and also employing Soviet-style policies in the years following the split, limiting the argument that a fundamental ideological difference between the two leaders resulted in the Tito-Stalin split. Furthermore, other historians such as Robert Lampe argue that

Stalin s motivation for severing ties was ultimately the removal and replacement of Tito, which has been disproven by later revealed sources which describe how Stalin s goal was simply the isolation of Yugoslavia, rather than the removal of Tito. Overall, it is difficult to describe ideological differences between the two leaders as the sole basis for the split, even though some examples of Yugoslav policies show clear divergence from the Stalinist method of thinking, as there is too much evidence showcasing how the CPY both regretted the split, and maintained majorly Stalinist policies following the split. However, more modern historiography, exemplified by the work of Perovic, places an additional focus on Russian frustration at Yugoslav independent actions such as the potential absorption of Albania into Yugoslavia and the sending of military aid to Greek communists during the Greek Civil War. These actions by Yugoslavia acted to threaten Soviet eastern-bloc hegemony through both creating the potential for western interference in Albania and Greece, as well as by ignoring the expected status-quo of discussing foreign policy with the Soviet un ion before acting. It is clear that a greater focus should be placed on Soviet anger at Yugoslav independent actions as a basis for the Tito-Stalin split, as when examining both the historiography and primary sources, it is clear that this challenge to Soviet superiority and authority was a major factor in the Soviet decision to severe ties with Yugoslavia and therefore on the split itself.

[1] Jeronim Perovic, The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence (The MIT Press Volume 9, Number 2, Spring 2007), p .32

[2] Giuliano Procacci, Annali della Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli (1994). The Cominform. Minutes of the three Conferences (1947-1949) (Feltrinelli Editore, 1994), pp. 610-621.

[3] John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 245.

[4] Lampe, p. 249.

Perovic, pp. 34-35.

Carol Lilly, Perovic, p. 53.

Leonid Gibianskii,History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 10) (March 1998), p. 116. Leonid Gibianskii referenced in Perovic, p. 54

Perovic, pp. 46-47.

Perovic, p. 42.

Leonid Gibianskii,

Perovic, p. 44.

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Lampe, p. 250.

Jasper Ridley, Lampe, p. 249.

Lilly, p. 163.

Venko Markovski, Perovic, p. 58.

Lampe, p. 250.

Leonid Gibianskii, Perovic, p. 37.

Melissa K. Bokovoy, Lilly, pp.137-160, cited in Perovic, p. 37

Lampe, p. 249

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Dmitrii Volkogonov, Sem vozhdei: Galereya liderov SSSR v 2-kh knigakh, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), Vol. 1, p. 246, cited by Perovic, p .60.

Perovic, p. 61

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Vladimir Dedijer, David Binder, Lampe, p.149.

Stephen Clissold, (ed.) Clissold, p. 14

Clissold, p.16

Sara Bernard, (Accessed Clissold, p .18.

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Croatian Post: 'lt;i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal'gt;100th Anniversary of the Birth of Andrija Hebrang (accessed 08/04/19)

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