Reagan And The Aids Crisis

Part A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources

This IA will investigate To what extent did the Reagan administration ignore the AIDS crisis? This issue is significant because it assesses if a government ignored an epidemic due to the personal biases of its members. The first source used to conduct this investigation is Deadly AIDS policy failure by the highest levels of the US government by Donald Pinkston Francis, published in 2012 in the Journal of Public Health Policy. The text is an expert analysis of the standard procedure of epidemic control, and how the Reagan administration failed in the implementation, which has the purpose of assigning blame on Ronald Reagan. The second source used to conduct this investigation is Reagan s Disciple by Carl M. Cannon published in 2014. Cannon, a published professional in the field of politics, presents a conservative rebuttal to the blame put onto the Reagan administration, and refutes Reagan s alleged homophobia.

Deadly AIDS policy failure by the highest levels of the US government is a critical essay, a primary source written by an eyewitness. One value of the origin is Donald P. Francis was the director of the CDC AIDS Laboratory Activities at the time of the AIDS crisis. One value regarding the origin is that it provides an intimate glimpse into the effects of historical events and the lives of individuals experiencing them first-hand, and it offers a daily record of events occurring in history. A value of the content is that it provides important historical evidence about people, especially minority groups like the LGBT community, who might have been excluded from mainstream publications. However, the source has some limitations relating to its origin and purpose. A limitation of origin is that it is a personal essay written 30 years after the event, it is possible that Francis has forgotten some aspects, or that some events have taken on greater importance, especially because he is writing in 2012 during the Obama Administration. One limitation of origin, is that as a primary source, the author, had attachment to government agencies and personnel involved in investigating the AIDS crisis, and may be leaving out crucial information due to a conflict of interest.

Author of Reagan s Disciple, Carl M. Cannon, was executive editor for multiple newspapers. One value of the origin is the benefit of hindsight, and the access to new evidence that was released and was declassified by the CIA under Executive Order 12958 only in 1999 (Clinton). Furthermore, a value of the origin is that the style of the content suggests an objective approach in use of language and analysis. However, the source has some limitations relating to its origin and purpose. One limitation in the purpose is that the focus and the content of the book is on Reagan and his administration, and therefore the text may not fully address the victims of the AIDS crisis. A limitation in the origin is that Cannon received Gerald R. Ford Journalism Prize in 1999 for White House coverage of the Clinton Administration, so Cannon might have political ties with such administration and staff, and might exclude information or diffuse a particular ideology.

Part B: Investigation

This IA will investigate To what extent did the Reagan administration ignore the AIDS crisis? AIDS is a syndrome (set of symptoms) caused by the HIV virus, it consists of the time period in which the immune system is unable to fight off infection and it is an advanced stage of HIV ( What are HIV and AIDS ). The AIDS epidemic started in the late 1970s, by 1980 between 100,000 and 300,000 people were infected (Mann). In 1984, after nearly 4,200 people had died from AIDS, Larry Speakes, Reagan s press spokesman, laughed in response to the following question regarding the AIDS crisis, Over a third of them have died. It`s known as "gay plague." (...) And I wondered if the President is aware of it? (LoGiurato). Historians disagree upon the extent to which Ronald Reagan and his administration failed to address the AIDS crisis perhaps due to a homophobic bias or consciously delayed the response to the epidemic.

One perspective in this discussion is that Reagan deliberately ignored the AIDS crisis at the moment when government response was most crucial, and that therefore Reagan was responsible for the deaths. This perspective is greatly supported by American historian Larry Kramer and Cleve Jones in his memoir When We Rise an LGBT and AIDS activist. In his editorial written in 2007 Reagan and AIDS he argues, Ronald Reagan (...) allowing the plague of AIDS to grow from 41 cases in 1981 to over 70 million today (Jones and Kramer). Kramer cites as evidence, He was, in the words of his domestic policy adviser, Gary Bauer, irrevocably opposed to anything having to do with homosexuality (personal communication with me in his White House office in April of 1983) (Kramer). Paul M. Cannon wrote in 2008 directly in response to Kramer s claim, in his book Reagan s Disciple, that he utterly disproves Kramer s affirmations. That first of all, in April of 1983, Gary Bauer did not have an office in the White House, at that time he worked as deputy in the Department of Education, therefore could not possibly had a conversation with Kramer in his White House office . Cannon directly points towards the idea that Kramer s evidence of Bauer s testimony was utterly falsified. Therefore, there is no clear indication that Ronald Reagan himself had homophobic tendencies and purposefully ignored the AIDS Crisis.

Professor of Sociology in the University of Delaware, Mary Bernstein indirectly supports Kramer s claims in her article Identities and Politics. She states, The organized opposition was only too happy to portray the epidemic as evidence of God s wrath against gay people (Bernstein 556-558). Bernstein proves her point with the fact that the Reagan Administration turned against homophilic social justice non-profits like NGTF (National Gay Task Force). This claim is also proven by the Reagan Administration itself. Gary Bauer in a report to Ronald Reagan on June 30th, 1987 expresses, homosexual are generally not our friends (Bauer). Then Patrick Buchanan, White House Communications Director, made this statement on May 24th, 1983, The poor homosexuals. They have declared war on nature and now nature is exacting an awful retribution (Buchanan). Perhaps Ronald Reagan himself was not homophobic, but it is hard to argue that this members of his administration were not. Bauer declaring homosexuals enemy of the State definitely had an impact in the administration s decisions in supporting the cause to counter AIDS.

Another perspective similar to the one of Kramer s is Donald P. Francis. He testifies that when the CDC sent their AIDS solution to Washington, the response was, they rejected the plan. They said, look pretty and do as little as you can. He believes that the Surgeon General at that time, Dr. Everett Koop was forbidden to say anything about the disease for five and a half years of Reagan s term (Francis 291-299). This is where Francis entered in disagreement with Cannon. Cannon on the contrary states that on February 6th of 1986 in Reagan s visit to the Department of Health he announces that, He had tasked Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to prepare a major report on the disease (...)Reagan dragged Koop into AIDS policy (Cannon). Due to both historians biases and lack of a third source, there is no way of knowing if Reagan tasked Koop to write the report, or Reagan had once forcibly stopped him from releasing it. For this reason, it is unclear if Ronald Reagan deliberately blocked the diffusion of information to alleviate the AIDS Crisis.

Another perspective sustains that not only did Ronald Reagan not ignore the AIDS Crisis but he did everything in his capacity to resolve it. New York Times journalist Philip Boffey insists that Reagan defended financing for AIDS, citing government expenditure statistics, Total health research spending (...)$4.96 billion in 1985 and is to rise to $5.20 billion in 1986 (Boffey). Harlon L. Dalton who is a progressive liberal Professor of Law at Yale, published in Daedalus MIT s Journal in 1989 in complete disagreement. He maintains that within their own halls, the Reagan administration maintain that federal health agencies should be able to meet the growing AIDS threat without extra funds (Dalton 222 and Francis 299) establishing the idea that really the administration never put in an extra effort to solve the issue of AIDS. A limitation regarding the content of Boffey s government expenditure statistics is its total vagueness, the spending did not necessarily go to alleviating the AIDS crisis at all, and Dalton s testimony seems more convincing. Ronald Reagan himself, in his speech at the AIDS Research Awards Dinner of May 31, 1987. Reagan swore that he was fighting the disease, with every breath I have, and that he wanted all Americans to firmly oppose discrimination against those who have AIDS (Reagan). To not fall into the political rhetoric of Reagan did everything he could, it is reasonable to conclude that the Reagan was not homophobic and the administration did not completely overlook the situation.

Another defense to Reagan s administration is historian Craig Shirley. He argues that, During Reagan s presidency, 237,428 individuals died (...) During Bill Clinton s (...) 3,328,978 people died (...) Clinton was far more indifferent to AIDS than Reagan (Shirley). However, Shirley commits a tu quoque fallacy in his reasoning. The Clinton administration being more indifferent about AIDS does not justify why Reagan s response was indifferent about AIDS. The biggest issue with this argument is that it does not account for the compounding nature of the spread of diseases, most epidemics have exponential outbreaks, obviously the numbers increased by the time of Clinton s presidency.

With all the perspectives in consideration, Cannon s is most compelling, in stating that Nonetheless, the Reagan administration moved more slowly in the battle against AIDS than gay activists and the nation s health officials wanted although more swiftly than liberals recalled afterwards (Cannon 311). He had more access to documents that were once classified, and as a conservative historian aiming to write a rebuttal to all the false claims made in this issue, he presents a relatively more objective point of view. He manages to point out flaws in the heart of Jones s and Kramer s argument in proving that Bauer s testimony was falsified. Then with additional information he has, he attempts in refuting Dalton s and Francis s claim that Reagan ignored Surgeon Koop s wishes to publish about AIDS. He successfully disproves Bernstein s allegations of Reagan s homophobia. He also does not take a extreme right-wing bias, in attempting to transfer the blame on to Clinton or forcibly manipulates facts to favor Ronald Reagan. To no extent did the Reagan administration ignore the AIDS crisis but many members of the administration had homophobic biases and did not put the AIDS crisis as their top priority, which is why many historians argue that the administration did not do enough.

Part C: Reflection

The investigation has enabled me to gain an insight into some of the methods used by historians. I had to sort through the possible cognitive biases that the participants of the events of the past might have had, and understand that there is always uncertainty in an eyewitness s recollection, since witnesses like Francis writes 26 years after the events described. I came to the realisation that any record left was interpreted by each historian which made a selection of the information and placed emphasis on some of it to assimilate the past with their own biases. For instance the same event, the issuing of the Surgeon General Everett Koop s report in 1986 is interpreted by Canon as Reagan dragging Koop into AIDS, and interpreted by Francis as Koop breaking rank and acting against Reagan s will. Reagan s intentions regarding the Surgeon General s report is critical to understand the extent of his indifference towards the AIDS Crisis. I recognized the challenge that a historian faces when there is two conflicting interpretations of the same incident, but there is a lack of a third source to complete corroboration, therefore historical truth frustratingly can not be established.

I experienced the process of evaluation of historical information, and had to perform what is epistemologically named coherence check for truth. Finding points of overlap and consensus, to piece together an idea of the past, namely finding agreement in the eyewitnesses Dalton and Francis that within federal health agencies AIDS was not the financial priority. Due to the ongoingness of the AIDS issue, it is hard for academia to maintain distance from the subject matter since all historians are discussing events that occurred within their own lifetimes. There is a lack of hindsight, which calls into question the accuracy of historical knowledge. Many sources even seem to have a professional connection to the administration examined, for example Francis seems as if it was difficult for him to separate the historical and personal experience in the CDC, and it was challenging to dissect truth from this not necessarily reliable source.

Works Cited

"A Timeline Of HIV And AIDS". HIV.Gov, 2018, https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/history/hiv-and-aids-timeline. Accessed 6 May 2018.

Bernstein, Mary. "Identities And Politics: Toward A Historical Understanding Of The Lesbian And Gay Movement". Social Science History, vol 26, no. 3, 2002, pp. 531-581. Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1215/01455532-26-3-531.

Boffey, Philip. Reagan Defends Financing For AIDS. 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/18/us/reagan-defends-financing-for-aids.html. Accessed 29 May 2018.

Buchanan, Patrick Joseph. "AIDS". New York Post, 1983, Accessed 29 May 2018.

Cannon, Carl M. Reagan`s Disciple: George W. Bush`s Troubled Quest For A Presidential Legacy. Publicaffairs, 2008.

Clinton, William J. Executive Order 12958. Washington D.C., 1995.

Dalton, Harlon L. "AIDS In Blackface". Daedalus MIT Press, vol 118, no. 3, 2018, pp. 205-227. JSTOR, Accessed 29 May 2018.

Francis, Donald P. "Deadly AIDS Policy Failure By The Highest Levels Of The US Government: A Personal Look Back 30 Years Later For Lessons To Respond Better To Future Epidemics". Journal Of Public Health Policy, vol 33, no. 3, 2012, pp. 290-300. Springer Nature, doi:10.1057/jphp.2012.14.

Jones, Cleve. When We Rise: My Life In The Movement. 1st ed., Hachette Books, 2016.