"is Metaphysics A Major Part Of Al-farabi`s Philosophical Project?"

The central contention of this question is the extent to which we consider Farabi s philosophical project in terms of a metaphysical exposition and exploration of the works of Aristotle or whether we see it, primarily in Straussian terms, as a work that emphasises political philosophy and a particular reading of Plato. Answering this question has to take in to account the balance of emphasis on particular texts within his body of work and which ones we consider primary I suggest, however, that the Attainment of Happiness and the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle while representing a decidedly political approach do illuminate the central characteristics of Farabi s approach to philosophy in terms of its relationship to religion and the role of both in the life of the community, and furthermore the elements of the classical tradition he appears to privilege, and therefore it can be said that politics, rather than metaphysics, is a more major part of Farabi s philosophical project.

The two central critical perspectives on Farabi s work argue that he is on hand a metaphysical philosopher who attempts to comment on and incorporate Aristotle into Islamic perspective, and on the other hand that he is a political philosopher following an esoteric reading of Plato and trying to present a comprehensive philosophy of religion incorporating the influence of the revelation of Islam in to a wider political schema CITATION Mah01 l 2057 (Mahdi 2001). This secondary reading hinges on a Straussian perspective both in its approach to the writing and interpretation of texts and in the particular reading of Plato found in Farabi s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

Leo Strauss s essay Persecution and the Art of Writing presents a specific approach to the interpretation of texts in light of the ever present potential for retributive persecution of the author across cultural and historical lines. He understands authors to exist in a socio-political milieu of public opinion with or against which they can take a stand, and in which their work will be interpreted. Those whose works comport with this dominant public discourse as propagated by the powers that be need not fear persecution, at least at the time of their popularity, but those whose writings run counter to the views of the prevalent social and intellectual norms run the risk of persecution ranging from social ostracisation as a soft option to actual imprisonment or execution CITATION Str41 l 2057 (Strauss 1941). Authors who wish to continue to expound their views in this condition of perpetual threat develop techniques to disseminate their views that are not initially obvious, writing between the lines (ibid), and consequently the readers of these texts must develop an esoteric technique of reading to uncover their hidden or inferred meaning.

Alongside this esoteric approach to textual reception Strauss also advocated for an understanding of philosophy that sees philosophical speculation as corrosive to the fabric of society, a danger to the city, and argues that this approach is also found in the writings of the classical Greek philosophers themselves. Strauss is critical of the pretence of Western philosophical development away from the religious underpinnings of the polis in favour of a preference for purported rational self-interest, as the dominant ethic and believes instead that society cannot function without a transcendent religious dimension to enforce social cohesion by way of values. He finds justification for this view in an esoteric reading of Plato, particularly in the Republic.

Farabi s approach to Plato s work mirrors this understanding of the Republic. Farabi appears to believe that Thrasymachus, rather than Socrates, is the authentic voice of Plato s philosophy in the Republic and that his approach to the ethical life characterised by a dogmatic belief in the justness of laws created by the powerful, who sees the good life as a life led in accordance with the strictures of socially created roles and authorities, whereby power is the dominant feature of consideration is the most philosophically valid. In his division of the kinds and capacities of human reason and the notion of the elect as a distinct social group from the vulgar peoples, and his assertion of the superior position of princes, imams and teachers, Farabi underwrites a profoundly Thrasymachian approach to political philosophy. He believes as Plato and Aristotle do that man is a naturally political creature but asserts fundamentally that most people do not consider the necessary things to lead a truly political life and therefore must themselves be led. Power is exercised by the elect who have apprehended the truth through philosophical reasoning. Farabi s approach is Straussian in that it emphasises this element of Plato s work as opposed to the more obvious and prevalent sense of the virtue of Socrates position, but also in his understanding of the role of religion and its relationship to philosophy.

The insights of Philosophy for Farabi are fundamentally restricted to the life of the elect and those with the power and intellect to comprehend them, and as with al-Kind he believes that philosophy and religion have the capacity to speak to the same fundamental truths, but where Kind valourises the role of the prophet and the unassailable truth of prophetic insight, Farabi appears to subjugate religion to philosophy as a kind of representative tool. Religion is the technique through which the fundamental truths of philosophical reasoning can be imparted to the less educated with more persuasive or coercive force through images, emotive discourse, and ritual. Farabi, like Strauss, believes this function of religion is central to the cohesion of the city.

With these positions in mind, it appears the contribution of Farabi to his contemporary philosophical discourse is best understood in terms of incorporating the classical philosophical tradition in a way that preserves the pre-eminence of philosophy in the context provided by revealed religion CITATION Mah01 l 2057 (Mahdi 2001), primarily in political terms concerning how philosophy can rationally govern the polis alongside the structures proposed by revealed religion.

However, there are numerous problems with both this reading of Farabi specifically and the Straussian technique more generally. Texts are certainly influenced by contextual factors shaping their content, and authorial position can at times be central, but the extent to which any kind of authorial intent can be determined is always questionable and the question of whether we would want to uncover authorial intent is a moot one. Regarding the esoteric reading of Plato specifically it seems highly unlikely that Thrasymachus view is truly the intended take-home message for Plato s students, given its marginalisation in the text and the continual dismissal and rejection of his philosophical co-conspirators the Sophists present in virtually all of Plato s other dialogues.

Farabi s first and most influential recipient certainly did not read him in Straussian terms Avicenna engages with Farabi as first and foremost a metaphysical philosopher who comments on the categories and conclusions of Aristotle. In his treatment of the work of Aristotle he appropriates and replaces Kindi s definitions and in a historical sense opens the realm of metaphysical philosophy to the Arabic tradition. The areas of investigation that Farabi approaches in his philosophical work deal more fully than Kindi did with the actual scope of Aristotle s philosophy, in light of his improved access to texts, and he is not limited in his understanding of Metaphysics as solely concerning God his real concerns are common concepts like beings in themselves, unity, and causation, including but not limited to the common cause of all things. Where Kindi seems to solely practice a special metaphysics, Farabi s is more of the general kind.

Engaging with the philosophical content of Farabi s work appears to reveal as in the work of Druart three general stages to his project where he begins with Aristotelian texts by way of commentary, as in the Philosophy of Aristotle, then progresses in to what are referred to as programmatic works, like that in the Attainment of Happiness, and then as his thought develops further in to the emanationist works, like the Virtuous Regime. This would appear to privilege the development of Farabi s metaphysics and its role in his philosophical work over and against the prevalence of more overtly political treatise.

However, in light of the differences that exist between Farabi and al-Kindi s metaphysical work, it could be argued that Farabi s political emphasis is still visible. The categories of rational investigation and technical knowledge proposed by Farabi commenting on Aristotle which open the door for his consideration of general metaphysics rather than special specifically theological metaphysics form part of the notion of superior rationality and the body of the elect that underpins his political scheme. In the Attainment of Happiness, it is impossible to separate Farabi s metaphysics from his epistemology or his pedagogical programme, and therefore the political implications of his project. The other central point of departure that positions him firmly within the auspices of a political rather than metaphysical characterisation of his project is his philosophy of religion. Maintaining a model of religion that actually adopts the Sophistic tools of Socrates opponents and sees the role of religion as to present with compulsion the dictates of the privileged philosophical class to the vulgar masses, puts his thought firmly within Straussian grounds, and therefore privileges politics over authentic metaphysical philosophy.