“the Township Revolts Of 1984-87 Posed A Significant Threat To The Apartheid Regime.” To What Extent Do You Agree With This Statement?

South Africa witnessed steadily increasing violence during the 1980s, which particularly impacted the residents of the Townships. The new waves of violence and protest were led by the United Democratic Front (UDF), an organisation founded in August 1983 by 575 anti-apartheid groups with the goal of coordinating and improving internal opposition to the South African government. When assessing the threat these revolts posed, it is crucial to not only consider the protests themselves (both violent and peaceful), but also evaluate government and security services responses. Ultimately, the apartheid regime brutally suppressed the township revolts effectively negating any immediate threat from the UDF. Despite this, the township revolts posed a more significant long-term and indirect threat to the regime, with violence and economic problems providing the backdrop and rationale to both Botha s reforms and De Klerk s New Course.

The UDF s ultimate goal was a new South African Government (based on the tenets of the 1955 Freedom Charter), in addition to the abandonment of the Bantustans system. Around 2 million people supported this organisation a massive percentage of the population as a whole posing a significant threat to the apartheid regime. The UDFs tactics largely followed from the ANC, and encompassed peaceful protests and strikes (aided by the Congress of South African Trades Unions COSATU) as well as petitions such as the million signatures campaign of 1983-4, and demonstrations against poor housing conditions. Of particular importance was the number of strikes, which massively increased during the 1980s. The number of working days lost grew from 1,000,000 in 1986 to 6,000,000 in 1987 a carefully targeted measure realising that a fully functioning economy was central to the stability and support of the South African regime.

Despite these peaceful and highly effective forms of revolt, violence increasingly grew out of control threatening both the government and the unity of the opposition movement itself. The UDF began a programme of People s Organs, People s Power in the townships, utilising local organisations and courts to oversee their own communities. In many instances, these courts descended into violence, with alleged government collaborators being lynched or necklaced (a particularly brutal punishment where lit car tyres were forced over the victim s head). Originally peaceful acts of rebellion also turned deadly, with 175 people losing their life during the 1984 Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging rent increase demonstrations. This violence did pose a threat to government control (putting a strain on financial and police resources), but it also led to the fragmentation of opposition with new parties appearing. The Inkhata Freedom Party was founded in 1990, claiming to fight for national liberation but increasingly responsible for much of the (government supported) violence against ANC and UDF members.

In light of this extreme unrest, the South African Government (led by PW Botha as President in 1984 after serving first as Minister for Defence) responded brutally. The revolts were initially difficult to deal with as there were no clear leaders to arrest, and even though the UDF was banned in 1987, its activities continued. At this stage, the government saw the revolts as part of Total Onslaught by Communist Forces which threatened the very existence of the South African Regime. As a result, Botha s Total Strategy saw the establishment of a State Security Council which arranged many clandestine operations and assassinations (for example the murder of anti-apartheid critic David Webster in 1989). Their ruthless response was highly effective at minimising the threats posed by the revolts however largely due to the two-pronged strategy of Adriaan Vlok (Minister of Law and Order). This aimed at removing activists whilst simultaneously addressing grievances, with both hard intelligence (i.e. knowledge of plots) and soft intelligence (i.e. concerns of the population) playing a crucial part of the government response.

In line with Vlok s approach, the government perpetrated both overt and covert attacks on opposition groups and members resulting in the effective elimination of the immediate threat posed by the township revolts. Security forces were openly willing to fire on demonstrators, demonstrated by the fact that in 1986 alone, 500 blacks were shot dead by police. This unconcealed violence was reinforced by organisations such as the Civilian Co-operation Bureau (est. 1987) which identified and dealt with individual enemies of the state. Entire organisations were not safe either, evidenced in the bombing of COSATU headquarters, which also took place in 1987. The ensuing climate of fear meant that the seriousness of the opposition threat was minimised, with less people willing or able to participate in anti-government activities. The security forces additionally carried out over 40 clandestine assassinations, with many members of the ANC and UDF simply being arrested and dying in prison (often under suspicious circumstances, such as the earlier death of Steve Biko in 1977).

In conclusion, the township revolts of the 1980s resulted in a massive amount of violence and hardship for the black population of South Africa but posed a limited immediate threat to the apartheid regime. Power structures remained intact, the 50,000-strong police force stayed loyal to the regime, and the security services increased their control over the populace. The brutal suppression was also strengthened by the legalising of control the 1980s, with the Internal Security Act (allowing investigation and bans without providing a reason) and the Inquest Act (outlawing criticism of the security forces) both of 1982. Ultimately however, the township revolts created a far larger long-term threat to the regime. The economic problems and civil unrest engulfing the country provided a key part of Botha s rationale in seeking reforms desperately aimed at maintaining white supremacy. The fact that violence continued into the late 1980s and 1990s combined with the subsequent decline of support for the National Party, were also crucial to De Klerk s New Course and the eventual democratic elections of 1994.