Conflict Map Of The Russo-chechen Conflict

Analyse a conflict of your choice since the end of the Cold War, identifying the main parties (direct and indirect actors) and issues, explaining the conflict and relating it to its social or international context and how these factors have evolved over the life-cycle of the conflict.

This should be done with a conceptual underpinning of the type of conflict being examined and within the organisational framework of conflict mapping.

The Russo-Chechen conflict is first and foremost one about territory. This has been an asymmetric conflict between the independence of traditional peoples and the territorial integrity of an imperial/neo-imperial power. Since it was all fought on Russian territory, it is classed as an intrastate conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 02/11/2016, 16:53). It is a conflict that has seen state, non-state and one-sided violence being committed by both sides, with the vast majority of deaths being civilian ones. It can be described as a conflict which was once intractable but then became tractable. The details of this transformation will be subsequently explored. This conflict map will broadly follow Wehr s model with priority given to the parts that are most relevant to the development in the life-cycle of this conflict.

The Actors of the Russo-Chechen Conflict

Primary Actor One: The Russian Federation

Wehr s model classifies a primary actor as one who interact[s] directly in pursuit of...goals (Wehr). Russia s significant stake throughout the life-cycle of the conflict is ensuring the territorial integrity of the Russian state. In May 1994, Boris Yeltsin proclaimed that he would defend the territorial integrity of the Russia Federation (Breslauer, 197) in March 2003, following the constitutional referendum in Chechnya, Vladimir Putin declared that Russia had dealt with the last serious problem connected with [it s] territorial integrity (Sakwa, 36).

Due to this firm stance displayed by the Russians, there was very little dialogue between Moscow and Grozny. On the part of the Russians, there was a genuine dismissive attitude given to the conflict before the First Chechen War and after it. It is this attitude that led to a lack of understanding on the aims of the opposing sides (Dzokhar Dudayev did not actually want outright independence, merely autonomy). This is a prime example of how facts-based issues are misconstrued by one side and how judgements can be misinformed due to a lack of communication.

The First Chechen War influenced the dynamic of the wider conflict. It is revealing that due to the loss of support for Yeltsin of the Russian public, the former went for peace but not resolution to achieve victory in the upcoming presidential election his victory of which saw the Chechen issue fade into the background of Russian politics. This is an example of polarization within the Russian camp. The conflict was used as a ploy in order for Yeltsin to consolidate his position as leader. This led to a simplification of the conflict between the Russians and the Chechens, but the situation became more complicated inside Chechnya. According to Galtung, this is a prime example of negative peace. There was a cessation of armed hostility but the major issues of the conflict were in no way resolved.

Ignorance of the deteriorating situation in Chechnya persisted in Moscow until September 1999 following the terrorist attacks across Russia. Putin immediately jumped at the opportunity to blame the Chechens. Putin saw it as a way to ensure territorial integrity and to boost his ratings in the polls in time for the presidential election. The dynamic of the Putin administration was more brutal than its predecessor.

This is in line with Wehr s conflict map where it refers to how a conflict can spiral out of control. The added Islamic factor in the form of religious fundamentalism gave Putin the tools with which to justify a new invasion of Chechnya, which had implemented Shari ah Law in 1998 giving it an Islamic feature pronounced more so than in any other part of Russia. The upward spiral seen in the conflict was pushed by the stereotyping of the Kremlin and the Russian public of the Chechen cause for independence as terrorist , both of whom vehemently endorsed the Second Chechen War and cemented themselves into this mould and this has not changed to any significant degree since.

Primary Actor Two: Chechnya/Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

Chechnya presents a more complicated actor and must be separated into smaller actors to truly understand the make-up the larger one.

Players: 1991-96

Government of Dudayev

The first semi-independent authority of Chechnya following the USSR collapse. He was not trusted by the Chechen people, although publicly committed to the autonomy of Chechnya. Furthermore, he engaged in criminal activity which created a new elite who were economically detrimental to the Chechen population. This type of actor corresponds to Johan Gultung s idea of greed influencing a conflict (Galtung, 618).

Criminal mafia/armed groups

These groups are too numerous to list, but they played a major role in constructing a social split in Chechen society. They were involved with the Dudayev leadership and served to destabilise Chechen society and to disillusion the people with the leadership. The intricacies of the situation within Chechnya are nowhere better exemplified by the involvement of all these groups.

Chechen Actors 1997-99

There has been a lack of unity within the political leadership of Chechnya. After the First Chechen War, there was lawlessness within Chechnya. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism further destabilized the government s power. However, there were those inside Muskhadov s government who criticized him for not securing full Chechen independence after the war. This instability led to the build-up on Russian forces on the border with Chechnya and Russia and clashes in neighbouring Dagestan. Therefore, the conflict has the potential to spill into neighbouring republics and have a destabilizing effect (Sakwa, 31-4).

The controversially elected Maskhadov leadership in January 1997 further exacerbated the economic and political problems of Chechnya. No economic improvement saw the polarization of the Chechen people and the government. The implementation of Shari ah Law served to destroy the cultural link between the leadership and the Chechen people, which the latter saw as alien to them.

Other armed groups, including military generals from the recent war tried to remove Maskhadov from power destabilising the government whilst retaining national wealth for themselves worsening the lot of the Chechen population.

Chechen Actors 1999-2009

The scale of the military assault during the Second Chechen War served to destroy the will of the Chechen population on the topic of achieving independence from Russia and instead simply desire peace and a normal life. The war led to a transformation of issues in the eyes of the Chechen people.

Leadership of Chechnya

The implementation of direct rule from Putin has led to the governments of Chechnya acting as his puppets. Akhmad Kadyrov maintained a personal relationship with Putin and this is what kept him in power. The situation in Chechnya has improved under his leadership, especially as he negotiated the disengagement of the Russian military in Chechnya, a move welcomed by the Chechen people. Following his assassination by Chechen separatists on 9^th May 2004, Alu Alkhanov became president in an election surrounded by the terror of separatist groups. He enjoyed the same support from Putin as his predecessor did. Ramzan Kadyrov maintains a highly personal relationship with Putin and maintains a strong anti-Western stance, yet the Chechen republic has stabilized to some extent.

Primary Actor Three: Religious Fundamentalists (Wahhabism).

The issue of religion only emerged in the aftermath of the First Chechen War and had disastrous consequences for the cause of Chechen independence. The period between 1996 and 2009 saw the rise and fall of Wahhabism in Chechnya. Many armed groups which were formed in the chaos that engulfed the territory in this time sought legitimization through Wahhabism. In 1996, acting President Yanderiyev abolished the secular courts and implemented Shari ah Law putting the Wahhabists in power. This further contributed to the destabilization of the region as the Chechen population rejected the authority of the Wahhabists.

Therefore, the dynamic of the Chechen character transformed during this period to reflect a strong Islamic identity to the outside world, especially to one Vladimir Putin who would exploit the activities of the jihadists within the region come September 1999. Putin s rhetoric blaming the Chechens in combination with the coinciding 9/11 attacks in September 2001, the Chechen cause has been categorized terrorist making the divide between Russians and Chechens even wider than before. Religion moved from a social issue to a political one (Abrahms, 63).

The role of Wahhabists presented itself in the form of one-sided violence against the Russian population with attacks in North Ossetia and Moscow. The cause for Chechen independence became lost in the quagmire that the Islamic factor has brought to the conflict.

Peaceful Conflict Regulation?

Wehr s conflict mapping cannot be applied to the Chechen conflict as it stands today. Putin s masterful achievement of managing to synonymise the cause for Chechen independence with terrorism effectively ruled out any sort of peace negotiation between the two sides and destroyed the possibility of any third party mediation. Furthermore, the main goal of the Chechens was to achieve outright independence. Directly opposing this was the Russian fear of losing its territorial integrity. The two goals were polar opposites and neither side could be dislodged from their stances.

Having said this, Wehr s conflict map assumes that two conflicting parties can compromise on the goals that they have. However, the Russo-Chechen conflict has shown this to not always be the case. The peace treaty signalling the end of the First Chechen War did not address the underlying issues, it only allowed Chechen autonomy and this was only because Yeltsin wanted to win the next election. The territory of Chechnya made has been allowed to act seemingly independently, yet it was only at the will of Yeltsin and his own political goals. Similarly, Russia made no progress on resolving the problem of their territorial integrity in the region as Chechnya virtually acted apart from the rest of Russia. And so, with no progress made on the goals of both sides and with the growing radicalisation and complication of the conflict due to the entrance of Islamic insurgents into Chechnya, the conflict essentially became a boiling pot.

There was a lack of concern for the conflict on the international stage. There was very little effort on the part of any major world power to try and help resolve it. The potential for third or neutral party intervention completely dried up with the September 1999 attacks. Putin quickly blamed the Chechens for this and by doing so he completely eradicated any chance of a peace settlement. Against the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks, Putin created a new dynamic which effectively ruled out chance of negotiation.

According to Wehr, internal or external limiting factors (Wehr) would be the starting point of trying to regulate the conflict. However, these became irrelevant as the anti-terrorist rhetoric associated with the War on Terror was to not negotiate with terrorists. Russia would not negotiate with what it regarded as the terrorist regime present in Chechnya because it saw that it had no common ground with a leadership that was given a label that people associated with barbarism and evil. The Chechen cause was aligned with the causes of groups such as al-Qaeda and so fell on the wrong side of the War on Terror. Conflict mapping has no scope to deal with terrorist groups as there are very rarely people willing to negotiate with terrorists.

Furthermore, this ruled out any chance of third parties being able to intervene in the conflict to try and facilitate communication simply because there was none (or very little) during the Second Chechen War. Professor Richard Sakwa, said that the basic conditions for peace, among others, were based on trust, the international climate and the presence of skilful mediation (Sakwa, 286). Putin s approach of hammering the Chechen insurgency into submission (Sakwa, 287) made these basic conditions impossible.

Wehr s mapping model does not consider how a conflict may re-emerge between two warring parties, as theorized by Edward Azar. It does not take into account how one conflict actor will completely disregard the other as evil and uncivilized as did the Putin administration to the Chechens. Putin s policy of eradicating the Chechen resistance with force cannot be placed within it. Officially, the conflict has ended but the issues have not been resolved and it is only a matter of time before tensions resulting from a long history of violence emanating from both sides comes to the fore and becomes destructive once again. Wehr s model does not account for the resurfacing of a conflict.

Conclusion

As things stand today, the Chechnya conflict has effectively been frozen by the direct rule of Putin over the government of the territory. Furthermore, the substantial use of force beginning in the Second Chechen War until 2009 served to neutralize any armed resistance to the power of Kremlin. At the same time, the violence dispelled any visions of Chechen independence or autonomy. It bore the characteristics of a protracted social conflict, but then became tractable due to the scale of violence produced by one side. In addition, it is clear that Wehr s conflict map model only fits parts of the Russo-Chechen conflict and so more development is needed to try and find a suitable end.

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