Assess the significance of Indian Nationalism in the period 1845-1947 in changing Britain’s relationship with its empire in India

Indian nationalism changed Britain’s relationship with its Empire in because it showcased India’s transformation from a British colony to a unified political force. The need for Nationalism was born of a repressive British policy what Lahiri states as one of [1]“Surveillance, control and restriction”, which Britain shamelessly executed,” under the cloak of paternalism and protectionism”. Despite the economic factor and Britain’s attitude the prevailing factor was still Nationalism because it was more through political fervour than anything else, that India seized autonomy thus, Sen is accurate in stating that Indian Independence was [2]“no mere change of leadership, but a veritable revolution”.

British policy was essential in changing Britain’s relationship with India because it illuminated the fact that the British were ruling exclusively to further their own economic and political agenda. Viceroy Curzon’s Partition of Bengal, in 1905, is something Kumar describes as [3]“undoubtedly, an ugly specimen of the British Policy of ‘Divide and Rule’”, boldly exposing the cynical nature of British policy. Curzon claimed the partition aided [4]“administrative convenience”, but more obviously it served to enfeeble the ever-growing nationalist clamour. The partition granted Muslims a Muhammadan province thus, [5]“foment[ing] communalism and religious disharmony” according to Rutherford, the verb “fomenting”, too weak, for it does not convey the extent to which the British manipulated the Hindu-Muslim divide. The Morley-Minto Reforms in 1909 reinforce this, granting Muslims and Hindus separate electorates, policies that Kumar describes [6]“strengthened the foundations of communalism”, showing that Britain did not merely foment, but but they actively engineered the Hindu-Muslim divide. In 1919, Britain again provoked an uproar by passing the Rowlatt act whereby one could be arrested and imprisoned without trail. This was an extremely repressive measure, Collet saying it was [7]“imposed unnecessarily” however, this is almost laughable because the word “unnecessarily” implyies that any cases exist in which such a measure would be required, but being such an impingement on the civil liberties of the Indian people, the bill was simply unacceptable. India held a justifiable “resentment” against the bill as it exhibited that the ‘relationship’ that Britain and India had was in fact a dictatorship, India constrained to abide by the rules of their repressive coloniser. British Policy changed Britain’s relationship with India because they had demonstrated that they had no intention of relinquishing power, but that they would continue to govern India so as to fuel their own self interest, keeping India firmly a subordinate.

The economic partnership retains very little significance in the changing of Britain’s relationship with India because it developed into so much more: It was about power. India was the boast of the British Empire, the ‘Jewel’ in its crown. James states that [8]“Britain had ceased to be a commercial asset of any kind”, yet Das is more accurate as he mentions the [9]“creeping economic decline of India in the nineteenth century”. Whilst Das recognises that India no longer held the same economic value, unlike James, he outlines that it was a gradual process. Thus, the argument is not whether India had ceased to be a commercial asset, for that is something with which I simply cannot disagree, but that it had ceased to be a commercial asset long before india was granted independence in 1947. Originally Britain enjoyed huge economic growth in India, with [10]“revenue swelling from L 33 to L 52 million a year during the first thirteen years of Crown administration”. Moreover, by 1900 Britain was sending over 150 million pounds worth of finished goods to India. However, the extent of the decline is illustrated by the fact that in 1929 their exports stood at 83 million pounds and in 1936 it was a mere 39 million pounds. Throughout a period where India’s economic value was only going to decrease, Britain still went through great pains to keep India. Britain was even willing to provide an annual grant of £1.5 Million to the Indian army in 1933 a sign that Britain, knowing its economic partnership was no longer as fruitful, still thought it a worthy investment. The £1.3 billion debt Britain incurred during WW2 has been described by Axlerod as the point where India turned from a [11]“debtor nation to a creditor”, as if it was no longer of use. However, the figure also represents how much India contributed to the war effort in the form of agricultural goods, guns and ammunition thus, rather than a potential burden, India could be perceived as a vital resource, worth holding on to. Britain’s exploits in India begun out of the desire to make money but as the relationship evolved it was also a source of pride and a mark of Britain’s power. Thus, if economic factors were the most significant in changing Britain’s relationship with India, the British would have left a long time before.

Britain’s attitude to Indian rule was significant in changing the relationship with India because its reactionary approach corroded all faith Indians had in British intentions. The Amritsar Massacre, occurring in the April of 1919, was what Mann calls, a [12]“brutal act of British barbarity”, encapsulating the horror of the event perfectly. Furthermore, Mann proceeds to explain that Britain had “lost its credit as a civilised and civilising nation”, and that Amritsar was essential in exposing British pretentions that their relationship was mutually beneficial. However, the massacre shows Britain, the dictator, in fear of losing its most prized possession: India was being held captive, at the mercy of an oppressive British rule. Britain’s crimes extended further than just Amritsar and it chose to descend savagely on yet another peaceful protest: Ghandi’s Salt March of 1930. Nojeim’s response to the Salt march is similar to Mann’s in that he alludes to the fact that Britain [13]“eroded its moral position in India”, and Mattaini claimed that this was point at which [14]“the colonial government lost all legitimacy among the population”. This event completely undermined the racial arrogance of the British and with such a violent reaction to a peaceful movement, Indians could assume a sort of moral invincibility. The British reaction showed that it was a country unable to pacify protest without violence and thus, not fit for rule over India. In contrast, after Churchill lost the election of 1945, it welcomed in a labour government more sympathetic to Indian self-rule, accompanied by a [15]“gentle pressure” from Roosevelt in the U.S. As an independent factor, the anti-colonial view espoused by Labour and the U.S was not all that significant but it helped bring to the inevitable conclusion the relentless force of nationalist movement. In many ways it was the last piece of a puzzle that needed British cooperation to finalise Indian independence. Britain’s attitude towards ruling India changed the relationship because although Britain’s change in attitude ultimately secured Independence, Britain demonstrated a complete lack of value for Indian life and India exhibited to the world that it would morally, rise above its oppressors.

Nationalism changed the relationship between Britain and India because Britain was confronted with a focused and determined political force. Indian Nationalists were hail bent on self-rule and the size of the movement grew to the extent in which it could not be ignored by the British Government. Cries of Indian Nationalism were first heard during the Indian mutiny of 1957 however, it would be better to describe feelings at this point as anger, for nationalism hadn’t really taken shape yet. Rothermund remarks that whilst in the process of trying to ‘civilise’ the Indian Population, the British’s [16]“Ideology of perfect assimilation was shattered by mutiny of 1857”. Here, Rothermund alludes to the dissatisfaction of the Indian people, displayed in the rumour that the gun cartridges of Indian Seypoys, were lined with Pig and Cow grease. The rumour itself is not hugely significant, but the Indians’ willingness to believe such a rumour represented that they would no longer stand for their beliefs and values to be trampled on by the racial arrogance of the British. Herb explains that the mutiny was a [17]“political and nationalist uprising”, a view stronger than Rothermund’s, but a statement between the two would be most accurate, for it was out of British ignorance that Indian outrage was spawned and they expressed their anger in the form of a mutiny. Even though a political tone to this rebellion was in its embryonic stages, the only logical conclusion was Nationalism. In 1885, the National Congress was formed and it gave India a platform from which to voice both its political desires and grievances, and as Johnson describes, it manifested into the [18]“main vehicle of Nationalism in India”. Whilst rallying for India’s vested interests, Congress developed a hunger for more administrative power and as the British resisted, Politicians such as Tilak, Chandra Pal, and Ghose embraced Swaraj (self-rule) in order to emancipate India from British control. The need for self-rule had been established and so had a body to represent nationalism but it had not yet mobilised into a mass political opposition.

After WW1, nationalism was revitalised because Indians thought that that their enthusiastic aid, would be rewarded with steps towards Independence. This looked to be the case with the Government of India act in 1919, creating a national parliament of two houses and giving 5 million votes to the wealthiest of Indians. Despite this being quite a conservative measure, it was cause of optimism and foresaw more concessions being made. However, the Amritsar Massacre triggered a wave of nationalist sentiment and gave birth to Ghandi’s non cooperation campaign, India’s first real act of civil disobedience. Bandyopādhyāẏa exclaims that the [19]“Success of the non cooperation campaign would not give Ghandi total satisfaction”, and although this may be true, Sen summarises that it [20]“ushered in a new era in India’s struggle for freedom”. This captures the significance of the movement more holistically in that, whilst it may not have caused any material damage to British administration, activities such as the boycott of educational institutions, elections and foreign goods demonstrated the mobilisation of effective political opposition. Furthermore, it saw supporters of the movement extend beyond the middle classes. This political momentum carried on into the next decade which occurred in the form of Ghandi’s Salt March. Nojeim lauds this as Ghandi’s [21]“greatest triumph in politics”, “galvanis[ing] the Indian population. Ghandi had created a protest which transcended the Indian caste system and religious divisions, in an overt defiance of British rule. The power of this movement resided within the sheer numbers in the march, with 60,000 being arrested and its peaceful nature reinforced its political tone: nationalism now had a distinct entity.

As India began hurtling towards self-rule, the quit India campaign emerged in response to a speech that Ghandi gave to a mass of 60,000 demanding immediate Independence. Unfortunately, it ended in failure as a result of British repression and the majority of Congress were imprisoned until the War ended. But Copley is still adamant that this was Ghandi’s [22]“most supreme effort” to Indian self-rule. This is strong but the campaign highlighted a turning point in Indian nationalism demonstrating that India was essentially ungovernable. Britain had been reduced to arresting the whole of Congress to supress their desire to be independent, a sign that a relationship no longer existed. Britain had finally realised that it could not simply hold a whole a whole country captive. This idea is reinforced by the occurrence of the Calcutta day of Action in 1946. The scale of insurrection was unprecedented to the extent in which it saw the British powerless in an empire that they owned. This did not stress unity but it was clear that Britain had completely lost control of India thus, Bailey is justified in saying that [23]“Britain could no longer force colonies to obey”.

Nationalism was most significant in changing the relationship between Britain and India because it forced Britain to recognise India as a separate political entity. It was a movement that highlighted that India’s interests needed to represented and that only the Indian people were in the position to do. Furthermore, it gave rise to a battle on the political stage and proved that India could, morally, rise above a repressive British rule. The poisonous effect of British Policy was essential in arousing the cries for self-rule, but Nationalism was the crucial element that forced Britain to surrender India to its People.

96

Normal 0 false false false EN-GB JA X-NONE

. Style Definitions . table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal" mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0 mso-tstyle-colband-size:0 mso-style-noshow:yes mso-style-priority:99 mso-style-parent:"" mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt mso-para-margin:0cm mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt mso-pagination:widow-orphan font-size:12.0pt font-family:Calibri mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin}

 

Bibliography

1. nbsp nbsp Shompa Lahiri, Indians in Britain: Anglo-Indian Encounters, Race and Identity, 1880-1930, (New York, Routledge, 2013)

 

2. nbsp nbsp S. N. Sen, History of the Freedom Movement in India (1857-1947), (New Delhi, New Age International, 1997)

 

3. nbsp nbsp Ravindra Kumar, Problem of Communalism in India, (New Delhi, Mittal Publications, First edition 1990)

 

4. nbsp nbsp Stuart Rutherford, The Pledge: ASA, Peasant Politics, and Microfinance in the Development of Bangladesh, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2009)

 

5. nbsp nbsp Nigel Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer, (London, Hambledon Continuum, 2007)

 

6. nbsp nbsp Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India, (London, Hachette Digital, 1997)

 

7. nbsp nbsp Binod Sankar Das, Changing Profile of the Frontier Bengal, 1751-1833, (New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 1984)

 

8. nbsp nbsp Bhimasen Hantal, http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/economics/indian-economy-during-british-rule/39741/ , Your article library

 

9. nbsp nbsp Alan Axelrod, Jack A. Kingston Encyclopedia of World War II, Volume 1, (New York, Infobase, 2007)

 

10.  Carey Anthony Watt, Michael Mann, Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia: From Improvement to Development, (London, Anthem press, 2011)

 

11.  Michael J. Nojeim, Gandhi and King: The Power of Nonviolent Resistance, (Westport CT, Praeger, 2004)

lt;/span>

12.  Mark A. Mattaini Strategic Nonviolent Power: The Science of Satyagraha(Canada, AU Press, 2013)

lt;/span>

13.  Keith D. McFarland, David L. Roll, Louis Johnson and the Arming of America: The Roosevelt and Truman Years, (Indiana, Indiana University Press, 2005)

lt;/span>

14.  Dietmar Rothermund, The Routledge Companion to Decolonization, (New York, Routledge, 2006)

lt;/span>

15.  Guntram H. Herb, David H. Kaplan, Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview: A Global Historical Overview, (Oxford, ABD-CLIO, 2008)

lt;/span>

16.  Gordon Johnson, Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism: Bombay and the Indian National Congress, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973)

lt;/span>

17.  Śekhara Bandyopādhyāẏa, From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India, (New Delhi, Orient Longman, 2004)

lt;/o:p>

18.  Antony Copley, Gandhi: Against the Tide, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987)

lt;/o:p>

19. Andrew Bailey, The Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought - Volume 1: From Plato to Neitzsche, (Plymouth, Broadview Press, 2008)