Soviet Foreign Policy 1921-1933

`Despite all appearances to the contrary Soviet foreign policy remained revolutionary.` Discuss with reference to the period 1921-1933 For our purposes we will take a revolutionary foreign policy to be one that has revolution as an expressed aim. While this point may seem self evident, in this turbulent period of ambiguities and waverings from left to right , it is vital to keep in mind that a revolutionary policy is exactly that. Moreover, we will take `Soviet` foreign policy to mean the activities of both the Comintern (or Third International) and the People`s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (or Narkomindel). Despite the fact that Soviet foreign policy at the time was partly based around the fallacy that the Comintern was a private international organisation not linked to the Soviet government , the fact that Lenin, Trotskii and Zinoviev sat on the executive means that its policies must be considered as part of the wider foreign policy. We shall look in turn at Soviet foreign policy by region, broadly western Europe and China, to see that whilst there were wide oscillations in policy, nonetheless it remained revolutionary. The duality of Soviet foreign policy, on the one hand trying to promote a world revolution, on the other trying to protect the fledgling Bolshevik revolution, symbolised by these two authorities , is in many ways the dominating narrative of the period. Understanding this dualism is central to understanding Soviet foreign policy 1921-1933 . Whilst historians have often been hasty to dismiss a policy as pure Realpolitik or firebrand revolutionary, the truth in many cases lies in a mixture of the two.`Machiavelli, more than Marx ...inspired Stalin`s foreign policy, ` is typical of this classification, whereas it is vital to remember that all the Bolshevik leaders worked within a Marxist conception of history. Thus, Stalin, never really believing in the chances of revolution in the west , was perfectly legitimate, following Marxist lines, to play off western social-democracies against the fascist states of the 1930s. The very specific circumstances that the Soviet Union faced upon victory in the Civil War in 1921 meant that a peculiar line or compromised position had to be taken on nearly every question of foreign policy. The initial expectation of world revolution which had informed the earliest Bolshevik foreign policy, resulting in Troskii`s famous phrase, `All that has to be done is to publish the secret treaties; then I will shut up shop,`was not met. Thus, with a similar mentality to that of the NEP, a policy of coexistence and `normalization` was officially expounded. This is not to say that the Soviet Union became a `normal state ,` slotting in to the diplomatic position of Tsarist Russia, rather we see the development of an ideological framework which was to continue throughout Soviet history. We will now look, in relative depth, at two key areas of Soviet foreign policy in the period in order to establish to what extent it could be considered revolutionary. The immediate threat in 1920s concerning Soviet security emanated from the far east , in the form of a belligerent Japan, although temporarily checked by America in 1922, and the chaotic situation in China. The Chinese policy is paradigmatic for considering wider Soviet foreign policy as, similarly to Germany, the mix of formal `Soviet` diplomacy, Comintern policy and the Soviet leaders personal posturing (in the wake of Lenin`s death) all play a major role. In effect for six years from 1922 until 1928, Soviet policy in China was a completely divergent one. At the same time as the Comintern representative, Yoffe, was advising the Kuomintang command in establishing a new Chinese state, the Narkomindel diplomat Karakhan was pursuing diplomatic recognition from the beleaguered official Chinese government in Peking. The Comintern successfully ingratiated itself into the framework of the Kuomintang with an obscure Soviet advisor, Borodin, effectively becoming the chief policy maker . As the Kuomintang successfully gained more power and influence, it became extremely problematic to exert the Soviet influence to the desired extent. As the Soviet advisors attempted to fracture the various nationalist groups into workable forces, it became clear to the Kuomintang leader, Chiang Kai-shek, by 1927 that it was only a matte of expediency that kept Soviet support. In Stalin`s own words, `They [the nationalist Chinese leadership] have to be utilized until the end, squeezed out like a lemon, and then thrown away .` Having realized his fate with continued Soviet collusion and having captured Shanghai, the Kuomintang proceeded to massacre the local Communists, decimating the party. The relatively strong position of the Chinese Communists had thus been destroyed as they were suppressed into mere pockets of power in isolated areas . This apparent disaster for the world revolution, caused in Trotskii`s retrospective opinion, by Stalin`s lack of a belief in a world revolution and support for cynical power grabbing tactics, was framed in rather different terms by the vozhd himself, `We were right, and we were following in Lenin`s footsteps, for the struggle of Canton...weakened and overturned imperialism, and thereby facilitated the development of the home of world revolution. ` From this, it can be seen how despite a bewildering array of Soviet foreign policies, at times in China four separate lines of diplomatic activity were pursued , Soviet policy had remained revolutionary. It is true that the promotion of nationalists with little interest in Marxist theory or interest in the proletariat may seem to run contrary to this but within the Marxist dialectic model, the overthrow of imperialism will then be followed by further stages in the progression to communism.