Does Democracy Pose A Problem For Liberalism?

Introduction The conjunction of the democratic ideal and political liberalism influences much of modern political thought. I will highlight the tension between these ideas and show how attempts to resolve this tension fail to demonstrate that democracy has inherent merit or that fundamental liberalism will inevitably produce democracy. I will conclude that liberalism does not require democracy, but could utilise some democratic procedures. Liberal and Democratic approaches to Power In early philosophy, freedom was thought to be the democratic aim to distribute power between all the inhabitants of a nation. Today the aim is to keep secure private possessions. Modern thinkers take liberty to refer to the guarantee of these possessions afforded by their institutions (Constant, 1819). Liberalism demands limits to all power including that of the majority, whereas democracy demands that government power is limited only by the majority view (Hayek, 1978, p. 119-151). Are Democratic organisations inherently good? In modern public debates the words 'democracy' and 'democratic' have derived a 'moral and rhetorical force . the conventional wisdom has it that it's universally valuable, good for everybody' (Swift, 2014, p. 187). It is difficult to envisage any modern politicians disagreeing with Swift, but perhaps each defines the word to justify their own preferences. A democratic ideal might be the delegation of power to those ruled by it. Whereas a Platonic meritocratic oligarchy might argue for those most able to make the laws, the most learned or the most experienced to be given the levers of power (Plato, 1994, Books V-VII), democrats would argue that those who are subject to the laws should make them. I will use an example introduced by Barry to demonstrate. He suggests that in a railway carriage, where the choice is between allowing or disallowing smoking, the decision is best left to passengers actually in the carriage rather than involving all train passengers, or even giving the decision to passengers in a separate first-class carriage (Barry, 1965, p. 312). This latter option is analogous to an aristocracy. This scenario suggests that democracy can be realised by giving all passengers affected a voice and vote, implying universal suffrage, and that the decision is made according to the wishes of the majority. There are practical problems that impede the aim of universal suffrage as any nation state includes subjects who are unable to raise a voice and incapable of exercising preferences. These may include infants, senile and insane members, prisoners and some would add animals as well. Although ruled by state decisions their lack of participation entails that universal suffrage is practically unattainable. This raises the possibility of rejecting the democratic ideal as unrealisable. To counter this, the democrat could believe that universal suffrage is best expressed as allowing everyone the right to vote except for certain categories who are incapable, and that those arguing for category exclusion should have to provide proof to substantiate their claim. It might be easy to prove babies and advanced dementia sufferers are not able to vote and should therefore be excluded. The argument becomes more difficult to justify excluding older children, prisoners, and some people with mental health or other forms of insanity from voting, as they may be able to physically enter a polling station and follow the instructions. The argument for excluding these categories might be that they are not competent to make a rational choice. Elster suggests that the right to vote could be linked to performing civic duties or participating in the debate (Elster, 2003, p. 332). This raises another objection, in that if incompetence is to be allowed as an argument for exclusion, how is the difference between incompetence and competence to be decided? There is scope for abuse of power if the dividing line is set too high, and could entail the exclusion of many voters in predominantly youthful states, aging populations or even a large number of non-native speakers or immigrant populations. Further exclusions could be made with a hard-line ruling on Elster's participation idea. The democratic ideal is weakened by changing the focus from allowing all subjects to the law to have a say in the law, to allowing only those competent to do so. Recognising the fact that universal suffrage is not possible as a political goal entails the democrat acknowledging that not all subject to a nation`s laws have a right to participate in that law-making. Majority and the Individual The democratic ideal suffers further from the possibility of incompetent voting. Voting is not merely the recording of preferences about which the voter is absolutely correct, but because it requires thoughtful reflection and political intelligence, an understanding of information around the issue at hand, and recognition of the consequences of alternate action, it is possible for votes to be cast well or badly. It is possible for a majority to make incorrect decisions for a variety of reasons including prejudice, media campaigns, ignorance or self-interest, and thus elect a corrupt self-interested government or support an ill-conceived policy. Democrats may not think this wrong (Walzer, 1981, p. 385). An individual or group working against this majority, for a better-aimed policy or a less corrupt government could be construed as anti-democratic, working against the expressed will of the people. They could also be construed as sensibly championing a better policy. As it appears reasonable to promote a good cause; in this situation, it would appear irrational to be a democrat. A consequence of this conclusion is that it shows that the decisions of the majority can be unwise and that therefore there is no inherently special reason to respect them. Using Barry's smoking carriage example, the fairness of a majority decision becomes less obvious if the effects of the vote apply hardship in different proportions, for example, if one passenger was chronically asthmatic and would suffer disproportionately (Barry, 1989, p. 24-60). The support of the majority does not make a decision more valuable or virtuous by itself, if the majority have made a bad decision. 'To paraphrase Beitz: equal respect is partly a matter of how you are treated, not just what procedures are used to make decisions. Any view that identifies "equal respect" with "majoritarian decision" is unsatisfactory because it leaves out these more substantive concerns'(Eisgruber, 2002, p. 37) (Beitz, 1989). The possibility of this category of conflict has importance to the liberal because it might not involve just opposition to a bad decision, but may also, as in Barry's example, contrast the protection of the individual's rights with those of the majority. There are arguments that suggest some citizens consider casting a vote to be devoid of personal cost, and hence not treat it seriously, giving democracy a tendency to allow individual irresponsibility and therefore create collective mistakes (Brennan and Lomasky, 1997). This tension between individual or minority rights and majority rule damages the idea that democracy intrinsically realises freedom as autonomy. The problem is that regularly outvoted subgroups of society do not rule themselves. They are subject to laws imposed by the majority, not free to follow their own will, but forced to follow the will of others.(Matravers and Pike, 2003, p. 321) In this case the minority democrat has the paradoxical problem of both supporting the decision of the majority and renouncing a policy that they know to be right (Wollheim, 1962, p. 71-87). The answer to this is, perhaps, that democracy is the decision-making process that gives people more autonomy than any other system. It allows people to take part with equality, and even if outvoted, to know that their opinion has been heard, that they had the chance to persuade others and that they were fully involved in the process (Swift, 2014, p. 214). Does Liberalism need Democracy? Without democracy, a liberal administration may well run into difficulties. No matter how benign and liberal the rulers of such a state may be, there is the probability that over time the rulers would feel tempted to put self-interests first. Without the need to share power, or account for the use of it, a government may neglect the rights and needs of its subjects (Rousseau, 2003, p. 44-45). Perhaps democratic accountability helps keep government honest. Additionally, if the institution was truly liberal then citizens used to making their own decisions, ordering their own lives and taking responsibility for themselves are likely to become dissatisfied with exclusion from the exercise of political power. Barry explained that once society develops sufficiently to provide education for all, relief from poverty and reasonable working practices there are two choices. They are either repression including imprisoning critics, suppressing publications and restricting assemblies, or a system of representative government (Barry, 1989, p. 56). A liberal state that stresses the importance of equal respect for citizens as autonomous ends in themselves and has laws and actions, which have an intended effect on those citizens and their interests, must surely allow them to have a participation in deciding those laws since the respect for autonomy demands it. The right of each competent society member to participate in collective deliberation and law-making is a concomitant extension of the right for individual choice in personal decisions. Waldron observed that as liberalism and democracy came into being at about the same time they share a common basis despite the tensions between them. As people understood that they had rational capacity for self-determination as recognised by liberalism, they also realised that they were sufficiently rational to take collective responsibility for themselves, which may suggest democracy is the best system for political decision-making rather than the alternatives of monarchy or aristocracy (Waldron, 2001). Liberal Aristocracy or Democracy One answer to Waldron is that in a non-corrupt liberal aristocracy, which constitutionally respects citizens as autonomous ends, there is no reason to suggest that democracy is the only system able to endow the citizen with political influence. Democracy is not a necessary condition because the liberal aristocracy could devise systems to gather opinions and political desires of the populous and incorporate these causally into political decision-making thus giving citizens a voice. Although there would not be voting rights, Barry has shown that the possession of a vote does not always translate into power (Barry, 1980) (Barry, 1989, p. 301). A persistent minority may be unable to affect law-making if a strong majority opposes within a democratic system therefore showing that democracy is not a sufficient condition for political power (Cohen, 1997, p. 166). A further opposition to the argument that respect for individual autonomy entails a right to political participation is that, even though individuals are free to make their own mistakes in a liberal system and cannot commit a wrong against themselves, a democratic decision can allow the collective will to commit a wrong against an individual. Therefore, mere political participation does not equate to fully determining the outcome. If a state violates the legitimate freedom of a citizen as a democratic decision then the liberal could oppose the idea of democracy for negating the ability of that citizen for self-determination. The democrat could argue that real democracy would facilitate equality in distribution of power and responsibility, perhaps by using public funds to even out advantages of wealth (Cohen, 1997, p. 168), but the example of stable majorities consistently outvoting minorities shows that in practice this may not happen. Conclusion I have shown that, despite the modern popularity of democracy as an ideal, the liberal does not require democracy to allow political power and self-determination for individuals, and that there are arguments that show democracy conflicts with liberalism in some respects. In modern pluralistic and multicultural nations there are likely to be persistent minorities who feel alienated from the political process which democracy may not address. It also does not follow that an undemocratic system may be less liberal; it is conceivable that it might be more liberal in allowing individual citizens' self-determination. Whilst liberals may wish to use some aspects of democratic decision-making, there is no fundamental connection of liberalism with democracy. It may well be that developments in deliberative democracy can bring together elements of the democratic ideal and some advancement of liberal aims but I have not had space to consider these here. Bibliography(Graham, 1992) Barry, B. (1989) Democracy, power, and justice: essays in political theory. Oxford?: New York: Clarendon Press?; Oxford University Press. Barry, B. (1980) 'Is it better to be powerful or Lucky?', Political Studies, 28(2), pp. 183-194. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1980.tb01244.x. Barry, B. (1965) Political Argument: A Reissue with New Introduction. University of California Press. Beitz, C. R. (1989) Political equality: an essay in democratic theory. 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