Should I Be Howard Hughes Or Mother Theresa?

Introduction This question raises several lines of enquiry that need investigation, including what it means to be equal, what defines how well a life goes, and whether comparisons with others should be made. Perhaps this can be illustrated by asking who was more amply rewarded, Mother Theresa in Calcutta or Howard Hughes in America? The former was materially poor, but rich in social rewards and happiness by the end of her life (McCarthy, 1997), the latter was fabulously wealthy but unhappy at the end of his.(Barlett, 1979). What does it mean to be equal? Rawls described the distribution of assets, natural resources, talents and the incomes thus derived as 'arbitrary'(Rawls, 1999, p.88). He argued that if a society was being created from scratch, rational individuals under the 'veil of ignorance'(Rawls, 1999, p.118) that is unknowing of their own social status, class, particular talents, intelligence, strength or personality traits, would aim to create an equitable distribution with compensatory elements for differing talents. In this sense, I therefore do not know if I am Mother Theresa, Howard Hughes or someone in between! Rawls draws out three principles. The Principle of Greatest Equal Liberty states that 'each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme . for others'(Rawls, 1999, p.53). This will include an equal right to the freedoms of conscience, speech, political participation, private property, etc. without infringing others' similar rights (Wellman, 2002, p.65). In respect of this principle, perhaps Mother Theresa and Howard Hughes had equivalent rights to worship, participate politically, choose careers, act with conscience and take their emotional and spiritual rewards accordingly. The objection here is that the right does not necessarily entail the ability. Entering the airplane business in America seems to require comparative material wealth, whilst caring in the slums requires the desire to do without, but with almost limitless compassion. The second is the Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity, which 'requires that offices and positions be genuinely open to all'(Wellman, 2002, p.66). This principle should allow individuals to compete without discrimination for jobs and political positions. There are three main interpretations of this principle. 1. The right-liberal interpretation is to allow applicants to compete at face value, be evaluated for skills, competencies and qualifications so the most qualified achieve office regardless of race, gender or other attributes. This, on the surface, seems almost unarguable, as presumably the most efficient system. If the best people are in the best positions then society may be considered as maximising the natural and human resources, thus creating the maximum wealth, whether economic or social. This creates the largest possible 'pot' to distribute, and therefore the possibility that each individual will receive more. There may still be inequalities in distribution, but each may be better off in absolute terms. 2. The left-liberal interpretation would add a requirement to 'level the playing field' by taking steps to eradicate differences of social background. Parfit's(1997, p.220) Telic Egalitarians, viewing inequality as intrinsically bad, fall into this category. Swift(2014, p.104-5) explains that this interpretation may lead to positive discrimination or even excessive interference in family autonomy, in extremis 'abolishing the institution of the family'. Whilst I appreciate the state may wish to redistribute resources to close the 'natural lottery' gap,(Rawls, 1999, p 64) the complete correcting for social background might well provoke the levelling down objection which 'claims that there is no respect in which a situation is normatively improved merely by levelling down a better-off person to the level of someone who is worse off.'(Temkin, 2003, p.776) 3. The socialist or radical interpretation would go still further and additionally compensate individuals for differences in talents and abilities as well. This could result in the apparent absurdity of legislating for equality of opportunity even for individuals with little or no talent. Should a selfish, arrogant and covetous male youth have as much opportunity and right to run Mother Theresa's Mission as she did even if the results would have a devastating effect on the Charity? The third principle is the Difference Principle, which requires that, after each citizen is given the same set of basic liberties, social inequalities be organised to allow the most disadvantaged to benefit most over time. This assumes that citizens are risk averse and would seek to maximise the worst position 'for fear they may end up in it themselves'.(Swift, 2014, p. 26) One reasonable objection to this is that in fact people may try to maximise the overall position, thus improving the average position. Perhaps Howard Hughes could be allowed to get ever richer, as in doing so he improved the welfare of his employees, and the recipients of his philanthropy. Rawls believed that his formulation of the difference principle was compatible with the incentives argument suggesting that without inequalities of outcome, people will not have the incentive to choose a socially 'useful' career that may require hard graft and individual talent rather than a self-fulfilling career that may be personally pleasanter but require little effort. Swift(2014, p.28) uses the example of brain surgeons and poets. If this lack of incentive is extended across a whole economy, stagnation and ultimately recession will ensue leading everyone to be worse-off. Cohen( 2008, p.300-312) argues persuasively that Rawls was wrong, and the difference principle is not compatible with incentives. His position, described by Anderson (1999, p.289) as 'luck egalitarianism', explains that Rawls creates a tension by expecting that each individual acts out of a sense of justice informed by the principles of justice whilst also expecting that talented people expect high salaries reflecting high demand for their talent. Some versions of Parfit's(1997, p.209) Deontic Egalitarians believe that this inequality is unfortunate but not necessarily unjust if there has been no wrongdoing. Cohen denies that the difference principle is satisfied by self-seeking behaviour in a market even if so structured that the worst off are at least as well off as any other scheme can make them. Instead he insists that people would mention 'norms of equality'(Cohen, 2008) when negotiating pay. Rawls maintains that this situation allows the dignity of the worst off to be respected since they know they are as well off as possible. Cohen's argument is that this is not correct, and that their status is reliant on the self-seeking nature of the better off. In this case the better off have not fully realised their moral nature, and could still develop further, leading to a more equitable distribution. Hughes could have further dispersed his fortune whilst making it, allowing his employees a better standard of living throughout his lifetime. Cohen has shown that whilst the difference principle may be applied in public policy, it is not a basic principle of justice. Rawls validates giving to those who already have as necessary to a just society. Cohen allows it is expedient, but not necessarily just. What does it mean for a life to go well? There are probably as many definitions of 'the good life' as there are people to live them, but perhaps material wealth, happiness, self-respect and social status might be measures. Utilitarians would maintain that the system that promotes maximum overall happiness is preferred, and that no-one's well-being is more important than another's (Bentham, 1996). This initially suggests the equal distribution of resources, because diminishing marginal utility requires more monetary resources to be taken from Hughes than from Mother Theresa. A million dollars from him might feel the same as a couple of rupees from her in terms of utility. Anderson summarises the difference of views between egalitarians such as Dworkin who prioritise equality over assets (Dworkin, 2002), Van Parijs preferring legal rights and the means to achieve one's end (Parijs, 1991), Arneson's equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989) and Cohen's version of equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989). 'Luck egalitarians (separate) into two camps: one which accepts equality of welfare as a legitimate object of egalitarian concern, and one which only equalises resources. All parties accept an analysis of an individual's welfare in terms of the satisfaction of her informed preferences.'(Anderson, 1999, p.293) Thus, Mother Theresa could be seen as satisfied by being allowed to use her resources of time, labour and compassion in a non-economically productive but emotionally and socially rewarding way whilst requiring only the bare minimum of economic goods for her personal use. She may have as many riches as Howard Hughes in the areas she values most. Sen (1995, p.39-42) defined a persons' well-being as being a measure of their capability to achieve their valued functionings, which may include physical abilities and health, but also personality, hobbies and secure social relationships. An egalitarian approach that secures the 'social conditions of their freedom in terms of capabilities` sounds utopian, but practically impossible. Anderson addresses this by limiting the capability space to those necessary for citizenship and participation in civil society. She affirms the need for access to physical necessities of food, clothing, shelter, and access to the basic conditions of human agency. This forms the basis of her version of democratic equality that also promotes individual responsibility, answering the objections of Parijs.(Anderson, 1999, p.328). If Mother Theresa had sufficient for her personal needs then in this way she was as rich as Hughes, and possibly with greater riches in the social space, particularly when Hughes was suffering misery, ill health and reclusiveness. Should comparisons with others be a basis for an egalitarian theory? Frankfurt argues that sufficiency is important. 'If everybody had enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others.'(Frankfurt, 1987, p.21) He suggests that the inequality between millionaires and billionaires is not as outrageous as that between the poor and millionaires. 'The fact that some people have much less than others is morally undisturbing when it is clear that they have plenty.'(Frankfurt, 1987, p.33) The implication is that the concern should be with a level of sufficiency being enjoyed by the maximum population. He argues that the only morally compelling reason to redistribute to the poor is if their lives are 'bad'. However, the economically worse off, like Mother Theresa, may not be having 'bad' lives. Shields(2012, p.112-114) proposes a level of sufficiency after Casal's (2007) Shift thesis whereby it is defined as fundamentally necessary, satiable, at a reasonable threshold, non-egalitarian, and for an important economic or social good. This can be seen as '"enough" control over one's life, "enough" autonomy or "enough" to avoid appearing in public without shame'(Shields, 2012, p.116 quoting Sen,(1983, p.159-163)). Rawls' difference principle implies that some comparison with others is needed to fulfil the maximin or trickle-down egalitarian requirement. However, he also labelled self-respect as a primary good, and this may be affected by the stigma of receiving redistribution. It may also be affected if the relative economic difference to the majority in the community impinges significantly on participation.(Swift, 2014, p.120) Conclusion This discussion and the comparisons between Mother Theresa and Howard Hughes show that egalitarian theories, whilst they partially rest on comparative welfare assessments, do not wholly rest on them. Therefore, the title claim is true below the level of sufficiency and my life depends on the achievements and well-being of others. Egalitarian theories, based on Rawls' work, give a strong basis for political policy to raise the worse-off up to and including the level of sufficiency. After that level, I concur with Cohen that the difference principle does not accord with incentives, but that it is politically expedient. I have shown that above the sufficiency level the claim is false and thus there is merit in developing an ethos and policy which values and promotes the equality of an individual's capability space at least as much as their narrow economic level of resources. Above sufficiency, my well-being depends more on my choices than the well-being of others. The result of this policy may lead to a fulfilled and satisfied populace with economic differences but a sense of comparable satisfaction. Perhaps my life would be better as Mother Theresa than as Howard Hughes! Bibliography Anderson, E. S. (1999) 'What is the point of equality?', Ethics, 109(2), pp. 287-337. Arneson, R. J. (1989) 'Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare', Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 56(1), pp. 77-93. Barlett, D. L. (1979) Empire: the life, legend, and madness of Howard Hughes. 1st ed. New York: Norton. Bentham, J. (1996) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation (1789). Oxford?: New York: Clarendon Press?; Oxford University Press (The collected works of Jeremy Bentham). Casal, by P. (2007) 'Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough', Ethics, 117(2), pp. 296-326. doi:10.1086/522257. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', Ethics, 99(4), pp. 906-944. Cohen, G. A. (2008) Rescuing justice and equality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Dworkin, R. M. (2002) Sovereign virtue: the theory and practice of equality. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press. Frankfurt, H. (1987) 'Equality as a Moral Ideal', Ethics, 98(1), pp. 21-43. McCarthy, C. (1997) 'Mother Teresa, 1910 - 1997', Washington Post, 6 September, p. A17. Parfit, D. (1997) 'Equality and Priority', Ratio, 10(3), pp. 202-221. Parijs, P. V. (1991) 'Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20(2), pp. 101-131. Rawls, J. (1999) A theory of justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Sen, A. (1995) Inequality reexamined. New York: Harvard University Press. Sen, A. (1983) 'Poor, Relatively Speaking', Oxford Economic Papers. (New Series), 35(2), pp. 153-169. Shields, L. (2012) 'The Prospects for Sufficientarianism', Utilitas, 24(01), pp. 101-117. doi: 10.1017/S0953820811000392. Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: a beginners' guide for students and politicians. Cambridge, UK: Polity press. Temkin, L. S. (2003) 'Egalitarianism Defended', Ethics, 113(4), pp. 764-782. Wellman, C. H. (2002) 'Justice', in Simon, R. L. (ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers Ltd, pp. 60-84.