Why Have Authoritarian Regimes In The Middle East Proven Exceptionally Resilient?

The remarkable resilience of authoritarian regimes in the region (including North Africa) have stood in contrast to the democratisation that many developing nations have undertaken in the last two decades, Much work on regime longevity has thus centred around the idea that the Middle East lacks certain political and cultural prerequisites needed for democratisation. However, the diversity across and within countries in terms of institutions and socio-political circumstances makes it difficult to suggest that all such contingents do not exist overall. Instead, the active role of regime actors themselves in ensuring the longer-term entrenchment of statehood provides for better general trends to be drawn out about the effective dampening of democratic impulses. Indeed, by examining the past successes of regimes in countries like Egypt and to an extent, Syria in maintaining a support base through strong civil-military relations, preventing the wider mobilisation of opposition by simultaneously co-opting and coercing dissenting groups, and fiscally supporting their repressive policies by exploiting the economic benefits of oil rents, it is clear that whilst authoritarian institutional frameworks and leaders have grown stronger, they have sought to make opposition structures weaker. Combined with the vital role of Western and foreign interests in supporting and aiding regimes as a lesser evil and a tactical measure, therefore, the resilience of authoritarianism can be credited to the strategic advantages that many executives of countries in the Middle East have enjoyed.

Clearly, the historical role of the security forces in setting up existing governments and as such, the careful fostering of their support in order to strengthen the `legitimate` base of a regime and its coercive apparatus has been particularly significant. Ellin`s military `patrimonialism` seems to apply (Posusney, Enduring Authoritarianism 2004) to a number of countries across the region, wherein the power of the armed forces is maintained by minimal civil institutional involvement and greater symbolic resonance. The revolutionary fervour and the coups characterising the 1960s and 70s were primarily channelled through military action, and leaders political consolidation started with ties to the army itself, using both fiscal and political incentives to secure the foundations of the new state. Asad, for example, managed the military-civil balance by carefully promoting both pre-eminent Alawites and military commanders to key government and security positions but ensured that complete military institutionalization into the political framework was not necessarily an end goal. Instead, he focused on political control by expanding the military budget to over 15% of expenditure in 1986 from less than 10% in the 1970s (Selvik and Stenslie 2011), and by using `crisis maximisation` to emphasise the centrality of the armed forces in tackling Syria`s enemies (Israel, in particular).

As such, a government`s ability to use forces as a guarantor of internal security became significantly stronger when their main base of support reaped the benefits of financial prosperity and powerful political relevance. Furthermore, the use of security forces to demobilise opposition and to work alongside the government machine at regional levels (with the Regional Commands in Syria and Tikrit - biased apparatus in Iraq) in order to centralise power and remove all internal political pluralism allowed for a cyclical system (Seale 1988) that entrenched the regime itself. By providing a strong purpose for security forces, leaders like Asad and indeed, early leaders like Qasim and Sadat, both helped maintain `support` by suppressing opposition forces to marginalise their threat, and strengthened the coercive apparatus needed to do just that. This `double-edged` process would thus make it difficult for the character of a regime to mediate naturally towards democratisation.

But it is clear that opposition has existed and now exists in a more diverse form, especially in countries like Egypt and in Syria, and that the role of Islamism as well as `banned` parties in calling for the rejection of governments and leaders has been vital in stirring dissent. Therefore, the power of regimes coercive apparatus in preventing the mass mobilisation of opposition, it seems, ironically relies on something other than just its ability to oppress or coerce. Indeed, as Lust-Oskar has drawn out, opposition groups (Posusney, Enduring Authoritarianism 2004) that are entirely unified in terms of universal oppression or universal inclusion are more likely to mobilise in order to challenge the status quo, whether through the system or against it. On the other hand, situations where opposition groups are divided by both oppression and inclusion have resulted in the reduced possibility of a united widespread movement. This model is certainly applicable to regimes in the Middle East, and the simultaneous co-option and coercion of Islamists in Egypt and in Syria, for example, whether through limited electoral inclusion, responsive political reforms or government crackdowns ensured that any regime institutions and powers remained unchallenged as a whole.

In Egypt, the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood through a limited party system as well the greater use of religion in political language and action to placate an increasingly `Islamic` base both moderated the views of a powerful group by involving them in mainstream politics as well satisfying some of their demands. Furthermore, by enforcing bans against other parties alongside laws allowing independents to stand, Mubarak weakened opposition by legitimising the regimes apparent accommodation of pluralism, confining groups operating completely outside the political sphere to marginal support bases as the existing system became a channel through which to gain ground instead. In Syria, too, Asad`s inclusion of opposing socialist elements post-coup in the People`s Assembly, constitutional adjustments with Islam`s political prominence emphasised, and the brutal crack down against Islamists after the Hama uprising in 1982 sought to both placate opposing groups through adjusting their perception of regime legitimacy whilst allowing coercive agencies and structures to be more effective in dampening any chances of real, popular mobilisation. Whilst the recent uprisings and protests in these countries do demonstrate that opposition continues to exist and that other conditions leading to mobilisations are not out of the question, this trend of co-option and coercion has still been highly successful for authoritarian leaders. Many regimes guarantee of support from security elites, strengthening of coercive powers and machinery, as well as a significant lack of mass mobilisation have been underpinned by the common role of economics, or specifically, some sense of economic prosperity and stability alongside tactical oppression. As both King and Hudson draw out, (King 2009, Hudson 1977) the importance of oil rents as a substantial source of income has provided governments with the means to garner support, co-opt and coerce, as well as setting ideal conditions for their longevity. Indeed, a study of rentier economies sand democratisation potentiality reveals that countries that have experimented with electoral pluralism and faced contestation (Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, for example) are relatively oil poor, whilst those that are hydrocarbon exporters have seen extraordinarily little change in political restrictions. The reasons for this phenomenon, it can be argued, lie in the distributive patronage undertaken by leaders and elites as well as little need to leverage tax or put more emphasis on domestic industrialisation.

Policies of liberalisation as pursued by Egypt and (to an extent), Syria have allowed the core elite to fund military projects (Syria`s troops rising from 300 000 to over 500 000 between 1983 - 5 alone) whilst keeping the support of soldiers and military leaders by providing them significant stakes in industries (Seale 1988) associated with rentier economies. Combined with less incentives for middle classes to mobilise (a prominent factor in democratic transitions) due to low taxation and greater opportunities in terms of achieving status, authoritarian frameworks have financed a more effective coercive system and co-opted potential dissenters and supporters in a climate imminently inclined towards stability and lower levels of dissatisfaction amongst groups which could truly damage their power structure. Whilst there are differences between monarchies like Saudi Arabia (Richter 2007) which have cultivated popular apolitical support, and regimes like Syria and Iraq, which have relied on their military base, it is clear that the benefits of oil income and implemented policies of economic liberalisation have generally been exploited by leaders and governments of regimes in order to fiscally support their methods of survival. The role of fiscal funding, managing the potential risk of popular mobilisation and a `robust` coercive apparatus in ensuring the oppression of opposing voices ties crucially into another key, perhaps fundamental, factor in explaining why Middle East authoritarianism has been so resilient, and indeed, why it now faces a significant challenge. The importance of international actors in supporting regimes or undermining them is a common factor for monarchies and `republics` alike. It is clear that two concerns have shaped foreign influence in the region: the stability of oil supplies for OECD countries and more recent concerns about violent Islamist threats in a globalised world. Countries like the USA have provided aid and arms to regimes that seem to be the lesser evil solution when it comes to uncertain energy supplies and the spread of Islamism. By funding governments and selling equipment (40% of world arms trade flowed through countries like Iran, Syria, Egypt and in 2000), (Posusney and Angrist, Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance 2005), the security risks for external nations are minimised in comparison to the problems of transition or reform, which would benefit powerful Islamist groups or those with Islamist leanings (as in Egypt today) and could disrupt oil supplies through conflict or internal upheaval.

Unpremeditated effects matter too. It is clear that the role of sub state actors also contributes to the entrenchment of regimes by providing an alternative method of civil involvement (King 2009) through NGOs and transnational civilian bodies. The attractions of foreign funding and support in Egypt and elsewhere formulate opposition on the basis of single or specific issue focus and methods of protest outside the political arena. As such, government coercion and co-option can be more effective in dampening dissent overall, especially as traditionally `civil` groups are weak in political credentials and have little interest in interacting other with political-religious elements of opposition. Opposition thus exists, but may not be right kind needed for regimes to be politically and socially challenged. Both intentional and unintentional international actions, it seems, have contributed to the ability of governments and elites to entrench their positions and to dominate.

Yet, the second point regarding the negative impact of international actors and influences has become increasingly relevant, and the effects of internationalisation undermines as much as secures authoritarian states. Regimes like Syria and Egypt have eagerly embraced different elements of `modernisation` and external support in order to compound their own power. But in doing so, they have also exposed themselves to the pervasiveness of the freer flow of ideas, technology and external information that characterises globalisation. Whilst they have been successful in their resilience, they still laid the conditions for popular dissent (Posusney, Enduring Authoritarianism 2004) on a more intense, violent level- even all out civil war. True, these regimes continue to hold on because they have created powerful systems of oppression and shown little willingness to allow the conditions for real political challenges. But they are now threatened because of international support for opposition as much as they were bolstered before. International actors lend significant legitimacy to both sides of the argument, and a regime`s resilience is thus affected as much as it affects itself.

In conclusion, it is clear that authoritarian regimes have been singularly successful in the Middle East, both because governments have created an effective system of oppression and coercion when it comes to controlling opposition, as well as benefiting from favourable conditions that allow them to do so. Patrimonial links with militaries provides a wider and more stable support base as well as powerful tools for oppression of opposition groups. Furthermore, coercion has been reinforced by co-option of certain groups and the exclusion of others, making the chances of widespread dissent less probable whilst allowing coercive apparatus to be much more effective in the face of weaker opposition groups. Underpinning this are the benefits of rentier economies, both in terms of fiscal support for policies as well as emphasising the role of international actors in propping up regimes a crucial factor for many countries in the Middle East. But by embracing international involvement, regimes have also embraced a greater loss of control. As current events show, international pressures are becoming increasingly important in challenging governments despite domestic policies. The resilience of authoritarian states depends both on their own actions as well as combination of favourable external factors too.