Drilling In The Arctic Wildlife Refuge

As the reality of increasing oil scarcity ushers in of an era of 'extreme oil' - oil extracted from increasingly remote and inaccessible sources - many areas once thought off-limits to drilling have become possible sites for oil extraction. Among these is the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), a part of which is thought to contain up to 896 million barrels of conventional oil, as well as some natural gas. (Wikipedia, 2012) This area - an ecologically unique Alaskan coastal plain, home to approximately 200 species of birds and mammals, including a large herd of Porcupine Caribou - has consequently become an area of increasing controversy in the latter half of the 20th century. Although issues of rights are potentially at stake - many indigenous groups in Alaska have opposed drilling based on the threat is poses to their way of life and well-being - for the purposes of the paper I will be focusing on the ways in which the possibility of drilling in the ANWR and particular on the coastal plain (commonly titled Section 1002) highlights the difficulty in negotiating value systems that can be applied to the natural world. In this essay, I will argue that assigning final value to the 1002 - that is, a kind of intrinsic value - rather than an instrumental or economic value is the necessary way of arguing for the preservation of the wildlife refuge. I will begin with a discussion of why it is necessary to think of nature in terms of intrinsic value - namely, a kind of final value - and then turn to how final value itself can be characterized. Finally, I will turn to two possible objections. Resolving questions of value, at least partially, is an essential step in determining an ideal course of action. Understanding the ANWR in terms of its final value shows that drilling in the refuge could compromise individuals' ability to pursue their sense of the good, and is therefore indefensible.

Final Value

In an attempt to move beyond value systems that rank the natural world exclusively through its usefulness for human projects, many theorists of environmental ethics have turned to a notion of intrinsic value, taken particularly to mean non-instrumental value. Following Joe Mazor, I understand intrinsic value as having two main variants: final and fundamental. (Mazor, 2012) In this understanding, nature has final value, meaning value that is distinct from its usefulness to humans, even as nature's flourishing is a final good for individuals and central to their understanding of the 'good' life. Therefore, it is value that is independent of usefulness though not distinct from human valuing. (Sciberras, 2012) Final value is unlike instrumental value in that an object with final value, though contributing to an individual's notion of the good life, cannot do so at its own expense. Therefore, it cannot be used to further some human good; rather, its unimpeded flourishing is that good. In this way, it is possible to see why an instrumental conception of the value of the natural world is inadequate to the task of protecting it. For example, one could perhaps argue that the ANWR should be protected as a site for recreation and tourism, as the ancestral territory of indigenous groups, or as a buffer against oil, the extraction and burning of which could exacerbate existing problems with climate change. Nevertheless, ascribing utility to nature in this way ignores the instability in instrumental arguments, which can easily be turned around and used to justify the degradation of nature. In the case of the 1002, instrumental arguments or could eventually be used to support drilling, as the very nature of a refuge means that it is protected against the kinds of activities - recreation, residential development - that could challenge the instrumental benefit of oil extraction. Subject as it is to contextual realities, instrumental value cannot provide a stable basis for a cohesive value system.

While final value may entail a kind of environmental perfectionism, it is a perfectionism that involves considerations not only of what individuals should do, but also what they are. As Robert Goodin points out, the natural world has final value because of its contextual function. (Goodin, 1994) But the natural world is not merely a passive context; it actively intercedes in our existence, reinforcing by its presence the fact of the natural roots of human existence. In inculcating a respect for the natural origins of human beings, final value simultaneously involves a respect for others, both as natural beings and as ethical beings capable of making value judgments. Therefore, the natural world is both context and basis of human life, and to ignore the final value of nature is to deny this element of human nature as well, thereby preventing a full human existence. The destruction of the natural world is harmful as it alienates the individual from themselves and others. Similarly, final value in the context of nature is essentially relational, concerning not just nature's flourishing but how we help or hinder that flourishing. I argue that our valuing of nature is tied to our treatment of it; an ecosystem that has been destroyed by humans will negatively affect an individual's sense of the good life more than an ecosystem that is naturally decaying. In this way, the natural world has final value in that acting in accordance with commitments to it, including the responsibility to protect it from harm inflicted explicitly for human gain, adds to a meaningful existence. A sense of agency is therefore important in either developing a relationship to the context that frames our existence or destroying it and making it other to and alien from human ends. In the case of the 1002, questions of value exist in the context of potential destruction caused by human hands to further human ends. Final value has a necessarily prescri ptive element, as it asserts the desirability of some states - namely, states of flourishing - over others. (Sciberras, 2012)

Objections

To the positing of the final value of nature, it could be objected that it is but one conception of the 'good' life. Miller compares the valuing of nature to different strains of religious belief. Demanding the protection of the natural world is therefore akin to members of a congregation asking for public funds to build their place of worship. (Miller, 1999) Therefore, those who endorse the concept of liberal neutrality require that people endorse the final value of protecting the ANWR rather than having it imposed on them. (Miller, 1999) As Miller points out, environmental goods are nevertheless essential to social justice (understood in terms of final distribution of benefits and costs to individuals), and their protection should be ensured - or rejected - through a deliberative public forum. (Miller, 1999) In this way, the protection on environmental goods does not interfere with people's own autonomy and subjective sense of the good, for if enough people oppose protection it would then be rejected. Nevertheless, Miller's model for environmental protection fails in two ways. First, it ignores its own value-assigning function, by positing free choice and autonomy as paramount. (Mazor, 2012). It is possible to imagine a society in which protecting natural environments and living in harmony with nature, rather than autonomy and liberty, is the lens through which policies are understood and evaluated; the precedence of autonomy is an outcome of a certain political system. Second, it ignores the importance of safeguarding natural sites as undisturbed units. While a dearth of public funding could necessitate members of a congregation to worship in a smaller or less ornate church without fundamentally compromising their faith, allowing drilling in one part of the ANWR would affect the refuge's role as an object of final value. Final value is tied up with nature's flourishing, especially where that flourishing goes on unimpeded by human intervention. Such an approach is doubly valuable, as it also necessitates a comprehensive valuing of ecosystems, rather than just those parts - sentient, interest-possessing - with which we more easily identify. In the context of the 1002, drilling in one part indicates a disrespect of values in that an established agreement is revealed as being flexible, with the terms unilaterally dictated by one party. Therefore, drilling violates those relationships of trust - and more broadly, social cohesion - that make communal existence possible. Final value both conveys and is dependent on relations of mutual respect between individuals.

Nevertheless, one could point out, being forced to use inadequate places of worship could be seen as damaging to those practices. While this may be true in some respects, it is nevertheless true that a spartan place of worship does not preclude the possibility of religious life. Valuing the environment, by contrast, is a necessarily communal activity, done in conjunction with those bodies that can actually protect it. Even if different religious communities fail to reach complete agreement on matters of belief, they can coexist all the same - at least in the context of liberal democracies. Provided no one religious group has access to public funds, preventing all groups from accessing public money does not necessarily imply disrespect. Those who value the environment for its final value, however, have their beliefs actively challenged and undermined by groups that see the environment as a source of profit. Just as respecting the right of members of other congregations to practice requires recognizing the validity of their beliefs and values, respecting those who place final value on the environment means acknowledging the legitimacy of the source of their values.

Even while acknowledging the potential importance of the 1002, it could be pointed out that human activity is constantly compromising natural systems. If we believe that the environment has final value, why do we not protect those meadows paved over to build suburban neighborhoods and those forests transformed into lumber? What this objection fails to acknowledge is the role that particular natural sites play in a conception of the good life. Where these sites are unique and are known to exist nowhere else in their particular configuration their continued survival becomes intrinsically valuable. This is not necessarily equivalent to instrumental value, however, as such sites may serve no directly useful function. As an analogy, it is possible to think of architectural sites of great cultural importance. For example, a church that is a pristine example of gothic architecture is valuable to the community for two reasons. First, it may be the only structure of its kind, or at least so exceptional so as to render it of unique value. The Notre-Dame-de-Paris Cathedral, as an example, may not be the only gothic cathedral in existence, but its exceptionality is such that is warrants special valuation for the beauty of its construction. Similarly, although there are magnificent gothic cathedrals scattered throughout Europe, they cannot easily be replaced (either physically or in value systems) one for the other. What this illustrates is a kind of irreplaceability, where characteristics of an object - either a cathedral or a wildlife refuge - assign to that object a special position in our conception of the good. It is important to note that though this is a kind of uniqueness, the uniqueness resides in the value itself and not its empirical characteristics; that is, it does not require that the uniqueness be empirically proven. A gothic cathedral can be seen as irreplaceable and of particular value despite the fact that other gothic cathedrals exist. Similarly, the existence of multiple wildlife refuges does not make one a substitute for another. Rarity alone does not assign value, but rather does so in conjunction with other characteristics. A building is not valuable simply because it is unique, but because it is a unique example of a particular tradition, other elements of which have been naturally or intentionally lost over time. Taking agency to protect those species or ecosystems that would otherwise be completely lost is an important part of living a meaningful life, as protecting an imperiled resource reinforces a sense of self-awareness - of self-control - and awareness of others.

Second, heritage buildings are valuable for the role they play in contextualizing our shared existence and providing a reminder of the historical roots of contemporary intellectual and artistic traditions. This could resemble an instrumental value, insofar as culturally valuable sites are used to point beyond themselves to the traditions that created them. Nevertheless, these sites are themselves the traditions; they are not simply representative of a shared past but are rather key elements of that past, making them valuable as final goods where a conception of the good involves a sense of historical roots. We accept the razing of some kinds of buildings to make way for new development, but baulk at that new development when it puts heritage buildings at risk. This is not out of respect for the fundamental value of these buildings, but rather their final value in providing an architectural context for past and present communal existence, as well as the protection of these buildings so that future generations may have the same access to their own history. In a similar way, the natural world provides a context and connection to past, present and future generations in that protecting it requires an acknowledgment of a non-subjective reality. Therefore, as with the preservation of heritage buildings, protection of the environment performs the function of reinforcing respect for the existence and values of others.

Conclusion

In Goodin's paper "Selling Environmental Indulgences", he suggests that what is troubling with thinking of the environment in monetary terms (in his case, green taxes and the polluter pays principle) is the pervasive sense that the environment is that to which a monetary value cannot be assigned; namely, that it has a necessarily intrinsic value. (Goodin, 1994) Negotiating the dimensions and applicability of this intrinsic value is thus a foundational issue in environmental ethics, and developing a viable value system is an essential step in developing environmental policy. In this paper I have argued that final value - the sense that the flourishing of nature is tied to our own flourishing, where the latter flourishing is related to a sense of context and embedded-ness in our natural surroundings. Understanding the ANWR in terms of its final value shows that drilling in the refuge could not only compromise some individuals' abilities to pursue their sense of the good life, but also deny others the opportunity to explore those values, and is therefore unjustifiable.