Examine The Argument In Donovan`s Article: `can We Know God By Experience?`

Examine the argument in Donovan's article: 'Can we know God by experience?'

In his essay 'Can we know God by experience?' Peter Donovan questions whether it is possible to have direct, intuitive knowledge of God. After setting out this question, he considers the views of 20th century theologians and philosophers (like H.P. Owen) who have argued that religious experiences may provide knowledge of God, through intuition. Donovan points out how this idea of intuitive knowledge of God fits with established Christian ways of thinking: God is a personal being who acts in history. He then distinguishes psychological feelings of certainty from actually being right on logical grounds, and associates intuitive awareness of God with the former. Donovan points out that our sense of certainty is often mistaken, an observation he takes from Bertrand Russell. Although he considers the possibility that experience of God might be a type of personal encounter (I-You), Donovan rejects the idea that this is itself a form of knowledge. He does not accept that intuition can provide knowledge of God, but claims that this point does not undermine the value of religious experiences altogether.

Donovan says 'We laugh at the person who says, 'I know I'm right, don't confuse me with arguments'. Although this sounds anti-intellectual it can actually be quite common when it comes to religious belief. In saying such a thing a religious believer is claiming that their belief is based on something different to logical arguments such as the design, cosmological or ontological arguments. It is based on something more immediate and direct and perhaps something more personal. It might be compared to moral intuitionism. Perhaps such a religious belief could be confirmed through arguments, but it is certainly not based on them. Donovan's point here is that even though the person who says this sounds intellectually juvenile they are actually only doing something that we all do on a daily basis when we say things like 'I know I have two hands' and 'I know 2+2=4'.

Donovan then says 'Our experience of being confident that we are right in cases like those is often called intuition. Intuitive knowing seems to be a direct, convincing way of knowing, which needs no further argument'. Here he gives the 'sense of just knowing' a philosophical term - 'intuition' and he defines it carefully. He is keen to point out that it is not a type of argument ('direct') and that it is very hard to doubt it ('convincing'). By defining intuition in this way Donovan is treating it as a possibly genuine way to gain knowledge, distinct from intellectual argument.

Buber, on the other hand, presents the difference of an I-Thou relationship and an I-It relationship. An I-Thou relationship is direct, reciprocal, and person-to-person, containing no reasoning or reflection. The world of I-It relationships, however, cannot be avoided as they include objectivity, reasoning and analysis; humans cannot live without it. Buber takes the same stance of Kierkegaard in that relationships only with the world of It does not make one truly human, instead there must be I-Thou relationships. This idea sits well with traditional Christians who see an encounter with God as extremely personal that cannot be explained to a non-believer; it is, according to Buber, "inexpressible." Whether or not one can actually have an I-Thou relationship with God is debatable. Donovan, however, raises three points of criticism discussed below.

Finally, Donovan asks the question, 'are there such things as intuitions in religious matters too?' This is his key question. Given that he accepts that intuition works on some level he wants to know whether it can be extended to also work on matters of religion, such as whether God exists and if so, what he is like. Donovan wants to explore whether religious experience can be a basis for intuitive knowledge of God. This is unlike Swinburne's argument from religious experience where the conclusion 'God exists' is deduced from premises. Instead it is not an argument at all, but an immediate apprehension of knowledge of God from experience of God.

These are the three key aspects of Donovan's argument in the above passage. Whilst there are no secondary points to explain, the section does link to several key debates in the philosophy of religion. Firstly, in discussing whether religious intuition exists Donovan is contributing to the debate over whether God himself exists. In addition to philosophers such as Swinburne and Paley, Donovan is offering the possibility of an alternative way to gain objective knowledge of God/that he exists - through direct experience/intuition. This is in contrast to the inductive and deductive arguments of the classical theist philosophers but towards the same end - establishing the existence of God as something that people can know.

Secondly, Donovan is contributing to the debate over the status of religious language as if religious intuition does exist it follows that we can talk meaningfully about God in a way that the likes of A J Ayer and Anthony Flew rejected. These two philosophers argued that religious language is meaningless because such language is either not verifiable (Ayer) or not falsifiable (Flew). However, if we can experience God and gain knowledge about him directly through intuition, it follows that we would be able to communicate this knowledge to other people, by saying things like 'God is all-loving'.

Finally, Donovan is contributing to the debate over the status of religious experience. If such experiences can give us genuine intuitive knowledge of God, then such experiences must be authentic. This would support the arguments of Swinburne, who argues that religious experiences should be considered genuine unless there is good reason to doubt them (based on the principles of testimony and credulity) and contributions of the likes of William James who argued that we should consider religious experiences genuine on the basis of the radical change ('saintliness') that often follows such an experience. However, the notion that religious experiences are genuine would be rejected by scholars such as Richard Dawkins who thinks religious experiences are not genuine but the result of our 'simulation software' perceiving things that are not in fact really there, and philosophers like Freud who believed they were mere illusions produced by our unconscious and suppressed desires.

Do you agree with the ideas expressed?

Peter Donovan takes a 'middle way' in that one should not take an "all-or-nothing" approach when it comes to justifying religious experience, contrasting with Ayer's harsher approach that God cannot be proved and cannot even be probable. When it comes to discussions on God, Donovan seems to evade a true answer and I personally accept Bertrand Russell's point of view that our intuition has been proved to be faulty and thus cannot be used as a basis for knowledge claims about God and the world.

Freud claims that religious experiences are hallucinations; much like dreams are caused by deep desires so are religious experiences. How is one supposed to distinguish between individuals experiencing God and individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia? This very critique, however, diminishes any biblical claims of God's encounters and religions that are founded upon personal encounters with a God. For believers, the critique of religious experience can cast doubt on mystics, such as Saint Bernadette who saw visions of the Immaculate Conception, and thus have repercussions for the millions who visit Lourdes every year.

I do disagree, however, with the definition of knowledge that Donovan gives. I agree that we sometimes feel a great sense of certainty, e.g. in the belief that I am alive or that 2 and 2 make 4, but Donovan also calls it a 'convincing way of knowing'. However, the whole point of his text is to explore whether intuition is a good basis for knowledge. He therefore appears to be loading the dice by defining intuition as a type of knowledge and then exploring whether it really can give us knowledge. I agree with what Donovan says later in the text where he argues that so-called intuitive knowledge is in fact often based on argument at some basic level. I also agree that the 'sense of certainty' is never enough to guarantee that a belief is correct and counts as knowledge.

If the ideas in the passage that Donovan presents are correct about the valid use of intuition as a basis for religious matter then the implications for religion and human experience are numerous. It would firstly mean that scholars like Dawkins, who attack religion, are misguided in their atheism and we can talk meaningfully about God. It would also mean that we could talk meaningfully about God and prove that religious language was cognitive and not meaningless as argued by the likes of Ayer and Flew. Furthermore, if religious intuition existed, it would mean that God would not be considered as a purely transcendent being but instead on that is actively engaged with creation, i.e. 'immanent'.

It is clear from this discussion of the implications for religion and human experience that the possibility of religious intuition is a very important issue. I agree with Russell in that feeling certain is never a guarantee that you are right but also I agree with Donovan that religious experience is very important to religious believers, but that it does not give knowledge of God, at least by itself. In a secular world, personal experience is questionable as it does not provide any empirical evidence for the existence of God and this heavily weakens belief in God - Swinburne principle of credulity and testimony, for me, is not sufficient to accept a subjective testimony as sole evidence for existence of God.