Does Evil Require The Transgression Of Psychological Barriers?

The problem of evil is one that remains without consensus among philosophers and psychologists alike; what constitutes evil, what causes it, and how it is dealt with being of fundamental concern. Traditionally, negative actions and thoughts perceived to be counter-constructive to humanity's progression, have typically been categorised loosely together under the umbrella of 'evil'. In the broadest sense, evil can span from adversities such as war and massacre to natural occurrences such as drought and plague. This axiological comprehension has given rise to a sense that evil is the absolute antithesis, or simply lack of, good. These binary oppositions have provided a framework for organising thought and action throughout human history; however recent theoretical developments (Midgely, 1984: Kekes, 1997: Morton, 2004: Formosa, 2007) lend their attentions to the extent to which this mode of thought is beneficial for unravelling one of humanity's greatest ills. This essay will focus on a critical analysis of Adam Morton's (2004) work On Evil, with specific reference to the barrier theory of evil. Drawing significantly on the work of Robert Blair's violence inhibiting mechanism (VIM), Morton suggests that 'normal' individuals possess a set of inhibitory psychological barriers, the willing transgressions of which constitute an act of evil. He writes; "A persons act is evil when it results from a strategy or learned procedure which allows that person's deliberations over the choice of actions not to be inhibited by barriers against considering harm or humiliating others that ought to have been in place." (Morton, 2004:57) This argument will be expanded on through the development of this essay, and evaluated in terms of its holistic ability to bridge gaps in the existing theoretical efforts on evil. In contrast to this, will be the employment of Claudia Card's (2002) The Atrocity Paradigm. Conversely to Morton, Card contests that regardless of the mechanisms that have lead to the conduction of an act, and no matter how or why an individual inflicts intolerable harm on others, said act is indefinitely evil. These arguments will form the structural basis of the following discussion, interjected with opposing and corroborating authors respectively. Interestingly, it will be seen that the failures of these analyses constitute a more coherent solution to the problem than their successes, and together formulate a basis for which further investigation must occur. Finally, utilising infamous psychological theory and studies such as Philip Zimbardo's (1971) Stanford Prison Experiment and Stanley Milgram's (1974) Obedience to Authority, as a further dimension of analysis, will embody the concept of the transgression of inherent barriers. Morton's (2004) barrier theory holds that the default setting for all 'normal' individuals is peaceful, and conceives that evil is embedded in the moments when innate, inhibitory barriers are overcome with ease. (Formosa, 2007) He holds that individuals have a 'threshold' level at which these barriers are naturally overcome, passing from peaceful to violent, perhaps through provocation. Inevitably, individuals differ in the limit to which they can be provoked without response. For some, the need to elicit violent behaviour presents itself rapidly, and for others it may take significantly longer. However, for most, the notion of turning to violence is incomprehensible. Morton suggests that individuals become violent not just as a natural response, but also unnaturally, resultant of learnt procedures and coping strategies that promote an end conducive with the individual's needs and wants. He terms this as "violentization". (2004:36) Violentization marks the beginning of Morton's narrative of the development of evil. Requiring less than average provocation to make the transition from peaceful to violent, he argues, is a discovery "usually made as the result of occasions on which crossing the threshold pays off dramatically". (2004:36) Given a suitable early history, Morton suggests that any individual has the propensity to become violentized, most obviously through the use of violence in family life, and more subtly through the initiation into an atmosphere of fear, coupled with the availability of specific sets of images. He goes on to describe these images, or perceptions, may declare 'others' as evil or corrupt in an attempt to justify manipulating the moral rules against harm. He writes "violence [then] can be seen as a defence...in something like the position of a child who has suffered at the hands of powerful adults and is beginning to reshape itself as someone who cannot be pushed around." (2004:37) These early psychological and moral abrasions underpin the violentization process that has "done its work" (2004:37) when the individual formulates their adult personality. This notion explicates the reasons why some require less provocation than others. Morton summarises "suppose that a person is in an aggressive state...and so he reacts aggressively to the situation. Suppose it pays off. Then he may learn to be aggressive given less provocation than previously." (2004:40) Thus, counter-constructive reactions may occur in response to increasingly mild provoking situations as a result of early psychological priming. Here, Morton is quick to note that he has "not yet described anyone as evil" (2004:38) but indicates that processes such as violentization provide a strong platform for the transgression of barriers, which can ultimately lead to the 'doing' of evil. He goes on to suggest that the ability to traverse the distance between peaceful and violent isn't necessarily always fatalistic, noting that is of great importance to keep the potentiality "in reserve for when it is needed." (2004:40) Generally speaking, however, most of the time it is in the interests of humanity's holistic progression that individuals conduct themselves in a non-violent manner. Examining Elliot Turiel's (1983) studies on children, Morton concludes that deeply embedded in the human psyche is a knowledge of whether liability to violence is contextually appropriate. He argues that this stems from a deep and serious identification with social and behavioural norms possessed by all 'normal' individuals. Turiel's study of pre-school children discovered that they were able to explicitly distinguish between two kinds of behaviour that should not be elicited; one for reasons of social convention - Morton gives the example of a boy wearing a dress, something the children think shouldn't happen, but that is allowed by rule - and secondly for more crucial reasons, eg. a child hitting an innocent 'other'. Morton jests that "part of the interest of Turiel's discovery is that small children have no problem with a distinction that philosophers and social psychologists have difficulty recreating." (2004:41) This notion gives rise to a sense that the barriers, and ability to distinguish right from wrong, are biologically based. For Peter Formosa (2007), this concept is significantly problematic. He contests that barriers cannot be biological, and rightly cites Morton as suggesting that "many of the barriers that ought to be in place are learnt." (2004:45) Formosa goes on to argue that "given that at least some barriers that ought to be in place must be learned, it follows that it is possible that some of those barriers that ought to be in place may not in fact be in place at all" (2007:50). He goes on to use the example of sociopaths, defined by Morton as individuals who lack the capacity to feel sympathy for others. Morton extends this by suggesting that sociopaths, although inherently lacking psychological barriers, experience "no pleasure at harming or humiliating others, simply an indifference when the individual's pursuit of her own ends results in harm or humiliation to another." (2004:49) For Formosa (2002), this explanation fervently undermines Morton's entire argument. He uses the example of the character Hannibal, a perpetrator of incomprehensible crimes and murders, and notable sociopath, writing; "Hannibal's acts can never count as evil on Morton's conception, because Hannibal's acts do not result from a learned procedure for overcoming barriers against harming and humiliating others that ought to be in place. Hannibal did not need to overcome such barriers for the simple reason that no such barriers where there in the first place...This implies that someone, like Hannibal, who acts in violation of barriers that ought to be in place, but where those barriers are not in fact in place, can literally do no evil. This is deeply counter-intuitive. Thus if we wish to judge the acts of sociopaths like Hannibal to be evil, as Morton rightly seems to, then we must reject Morton's conception of evil." (2002:50) It is effortless to see the legitimacy in Formosa's critique. Following Morton's argument logically, even with a consideration of his analysis of sociopaths, these behaviours do not fit his theory. In fact, there is little attempt on behalf of Morton to explain this, or justify his reasoning for where this social group 'fit', and thus it must be regarded that a significant proportion of theoretical integrity is lost as this impasse of an otherwise strong argument. To extend this, Formosa (2002) continues, would carry the consequence that wrong-doings of trivial amount - such as stealing resultant of learnt transition mechanisms - are considered evil, while enormously harmful and humiliating acts are not considered so. Further, he advocates that this implication is endemic of not just Morton's thesis, but to all conceptualisations of evil that "focus solely on the perpetrator's psychology of process of deliberation." (2002:41) In an attempt to reverse the symptomatic failures of accounts such as these, ethicist and moral philosopher Claudia Card's (2002) effort, The Atrocity Paradigm, shifts the focus away from the psychological deliberations that precipitate an act of evil. For Card, an evil act is define as any whereby "intolerable harm is brought about, seriously risked, sustained, aggravated or tolerated by culpable wrong-doing." (2002:17) To contextualise, on this conception, natural disasters are not regarded as evils, however human failures to prevent disasters when possible, are. The emphasis on prevention represents the backbone of Card's thesis, however the central focus lends itself to a discussion of the victims of atrocity. In contrast to Morton, Card seeks no interest in debating the complex mechanisms of the human psyche, instead suggesting that it is something localised to the victim of an atrocity that renders that act not just harmful, but irrefutably evil. Requiring that evil must be the result of culpable wrong-doing ensures that an evil act can never happen accidentally, and thus must be intentional. Paradoxically, on Card's conception, evil acts need not be underwritten by a deliberate motivation to harm. For an act to be categorically suited to the definition of evil, the perpetrator must possess the power to do 'right' yet still choose otherwise. Ultimately, then, it is suggested by Card that evil acts are a two stage process; first of culpable wrong-doing, and second the eliciting of intolerable harm. This, Card contests, is the capability of any individual - not just those with a programmed ability to transgress their innate barriers. However, Card's analysis is not without its flaws. Similarly to Morton's failure to represent the behaviours of certain social groups, her theory of evil allows certain acts to slip through the metaphorical net, a problem which Hryhorowych (2009) views as potentially dangerous. 296 He suggests that viewing evils in this way allows for the interpretation that no intent - without proceeding into action - can be considered evil. Logically, this is an understandable argument. For example, an individual creates a bomb capable of killing thousands of innocent civilians, however for some reason, production is ceased or the bomb fails to detonate, thus no-one is harmed. Hryhorowych (2009) states that for Card, the creation of the bomb would be bad, but not inherently evil, as no harm was caused. A numerous list of examples could be exhausted to elucidate this problem, however, to avoid digression, it is of use to note that this is something not within the scope of this work, nor is a discussion of the boundaries between 'bad' and evil. To summarise thus far, and to refer to the beginning of this work, it is effortless to see that the failures of Morton and Card's work alike embody a further dimension to the problem of evil. This is concluded once again by Formosa (2007), who writes; "The failures of Morton's conception of evil suggest that evil acts are distinct from wrongs acts on the grounds that the former necessarily inflict significant amounts of harm. The failures of Card's conception of evil, in contrast, suggests that it cannot be only the infliction of enormous and serious amounts of harm that makes evil acts distinct from wrong acts." (pg.51) He goes on to address these issues by asserting that perpetrators and victims of evil are not located to homogenous sets; they span across humanity from the banal to the abhorrent and commit acts of evil in "all sorts of ways for all sorts of reasons". (2007:51) Formosa's logical and beautifully simplistic unravelling and rebuilding of the inherent flaws in accounts of evil cannot be disregarded. The key implication for Card and Morton, as identified here, is the pervasive inability to represent thus far unclassified social groups or actions. To further contextualise the varying accounts discussed through the progression of this essay, it is of significant use to consider the work of Phillip Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment. Conversely to Morton's contention of a default 'peaceful' setting, social psychologist Phillip Zimbardo has infamously held the view that evil is an inherent trait residing in all members of the human race, a contention reiterated in his later (2008) work The Lucifer Effect. This postulation formulated the basis of the Stanford Prison Experiment, conducted in 1971. Zimbardo's team carefully selected 24 middle-class male participants, deliberately chosen because of their absence of mental illness, criminal convictions, and psychological instabilities. By all intents and purposes, these individuals were perfectly 'normal.' Held in the converted basement ('prison') of Stanford University, participants were randomly ascribed roles of 'prisoner' or 'guard', and adorned with clothing and tools conducive with their novel identities. Ultimately, Zimbardo wished to seek an exploration of the extent to which legitimised ideologies, coupled with reinforced roles and the powerful structure of a social institution, could influence the emergence of evil traits and actions. (Zimbardo, 1973) Calling the experiment to an abrupt halt after just six days perhaps represents an indication of how 'successful' Zimbardo's hypotheses were. Within hours, Zimbardo (1973) reports that the mentality of the 'guards' had phenomenally transgressed from 'normal' to "pathologically and genuinely sadistic" (pg.94). He continues to write that conditions of degradation and subordination were exacerbated by the actions of the guards, which included forcing 'prisoners' to refer to themselves and others by number, removing luxuries such as mattresses, forced and gruelling exercise sessions, forcing the 'prisoners' to strip naked, and refusal to empty sanitation buckets. Arguably, these acts are, at the very least, bad, and would warrant the moral condemnation of many 'normal' individuals. Certainly, to follow Card's logic, these would be defined as wholly evil, given the degree of culpable wrong-doing and the reprehensible incitement of intolerable harm. However it is of central importance to examine where barrier theory would stand among these atrocities; how Morton would conceptualise such acts. Depending on one's theoretical swing, the Stanford Prison Experiment could be seen to equally support and undermine Morton's conceptions. To begin at the former, Morton does suggest that the early process of violentization has the propensity to occur in later life; that adults can experience the same form of reward and enjoyment from manipulating moral barriers as can children. For the 'guards', reward emerged in the form of superficially heightened power and importance, and moreover in the submission of the 'prisoners' at their hands (Zimbardo, 1973). Even compressed into such a small time-scale, Morton would suggest that the groundwork for a bridge across the barriers had been solidly constructed through the intensification of Zimbardo's deliberately placed factors - clothing, weaponry, institution etc.