Free Will

The above quote sums up the essence of the "Basic Argument" which Strawson presents in the article "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" (1994). In this essay Strawson's argument will first be laid out and then a number of key issues will be raised. I shall then attempt a criticism of Strawson's argument, ultimately rejecting his second premise. My criticism of Strawson shall build upon the work of Wolf in her article "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility" (1987), but I shall argue that alongside being sane, an agent must be non-determined by her motivating reasons and so must be an 'agent-cause' in order to be morally responsible. I shall conclude that such an account of free will at least makes it possible that I can be morally responsible for what I do, even if I am not ultimately responsible for what I am.

In 'The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility' Strawson attempts to present an argument that shows moral responsibility to be impossible, independently of the question of whether determinism is true or false. Strawson argues that:

Nothing can be causa sui - nothing can be the cause of itself. In order to be truly morally responsible for one's actions one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects. Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible. Firstly, it is worth highlighting that underlying Strawson's argument is the issue of motivating reasons for action, which I shall discuss later in the essay. Strawson states:

Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to 'reflex' actions or mindless habitual actions) . When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking.

Strawson appears to hold that actions are always either done for a reason or are random and that those actions that are done for a reason are determined by 'how one is, mentally speaking':

Both the particular way in which one is moved to try and change oneself, and the degree of one's success in one's attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience . Any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous experience . This may not be the whole story, for it may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable not to heredity and experience but to the influence of indeterministic or random factors. But it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors for which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute in an way to one's being truly morally responsible for how one is.

Understanding this helps to clarify Strawson's argument and highlights the use of 'cause' which is central to his argument. Is Strawson talking about causality of production or causality of change? While it is widely accepted that nothing can be causa sui in a productive sense, causality of production does not appear to be the relevant type of causation for the question of moral responsibility, which Strawson appears to acknowledge this when he states:

The claim is only that people cannot be supposed to change themselves in such a way as to be or become truly or ultimately morally responsible for the way they are, and hence for their actions.

Ultimately, Strawson is looking for a causal explanation for one's actions and not for one's existence and is therefore interested in the question: why is it that A did X? As one's actions are "determined by how one already is [mentally speaking] as a result of heredity and previous experience" a causal chain can be traced back from one's action to 'how one is, mentally speaking'. As one always either acts for a reason or randomly, if one's action is not random, it appears that for one to be morally responsible for one's action one must be the ultimate cause of "how one is, mentally speaking" - this seems to be the idea underlying premise (2). The important question then becomes: can one be held responsible for "how one is, mentally speaking?"

Although one may have attempted [and perhaps succeed] to change oneself, Strawson points out that this does not mean that one is ultimately responsible for "how one is, mentally speaking" as one's attempt was itself determined by one's previous mental states:

If one is to be morally responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is mentally speaking - at least in certain respects. But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way . But one cannot really be said to choose, in any conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking, in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, . preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals - in the light of which one chooses how to be.

Strawson thinks therefore that one cannot claim that one was responsible for "how one is, mentally speaking" on the basis that one's past decisions have influenced "how one is, mentally speaking" without entering into a vicious regress. It is for this reason that he holds that "I am not ultimately responsible for what I am" and therefore "I cannot be held responsible for what I do".

Although Strawson's argument has some degree of plausibility - he mentions that it is widely accepted by his philosophy students - I shall argue that there is good reason to reject it. I shall begin by looking at the work of Wolf, and examining her argument against the claim that one must be causa sui in order to be morally responsible for one's actions.

In "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility" (1987) Wolf looks to deal with the problem raised by the title quote - "even if my actions are governed by my desires and my desires are governed by my own deeper self, there remains the question: Who, or what is responsible for this deeper self?" Interestingly, Wolf stresses that we are not causa sui, stating:

Whether I am a product of carefully controlled forces or a result of random mutations, whether there is a complete explanation for my origin or no explanation at all, I am not, in any case, responsible for my existence; I am not in control of my deepest self.

However, Wolf claims that the key to moral responsibility is not being causa sui but being sane. By sanity Wolf means "the ability to know the difference between right and wrong . [being] able to understand and evaluate our characters in a reasonable way, to notice what there is reason to hold on to, what there is reason to eliminate, and what, from a rational and reasonable standpoint, we may retain or get rid of as we please. Being able as well to govern our superficial selves by our deep selves, then we are able to change the things we find there is reason to change." Wolf therefore concludes:

It seems that although we may not be metaphysically responsible for ourselves - for, after all, we did not create ourselves from nothing - we are morally responsible for ourselves, for we are able to understand and appreciate right and wrong, and to change our characters and our actions accordingly.

Despite both agreeing we cannot be causa sui, Wolf's and Strawson's views on moral responsibility diverge here - for Wolf, as long as one can understand right and wrong and are capable of self-revision then one can be held morally responsible for one's actions, while for Strawson moral responsibility is impossible. Why do they disagree?

It seems to me that underlying Strawson's view is the belief that if one acts rationally it is always because one has a motivating reason that determines how one will act - this is what I take Strawson to mean when he says:

Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to 'reflex' actions or mindless habitual actions) . When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking.

When one acts in a certain way it is because one has certain reasons which motivate one to act in that way, and given those specific reasons one has, one could not have acted differently.

With such a view of motivating reasons, it becomes clear why one could think that moral responsibility is impossible - one acts because one has reasons, but one is not ultimately responsible for what reasons one has, and so one is not ultimately responsible for one's actions at all. One's actions are determined by one's reasons, but one's reasons have an external cause or explanation.

I do not think, however, that one has to hold to the same view of motivating reasons as Strawson's argument relies upon. I think that it is at least metaphysically possible that a sane agent may find herself in a situation where she has conflicting reasons (i.e. the [lets assume intrinsically motivating] belief that "X is good" and the sensual desire for ?X), which are so balanced that one is not necessitated by either motivating reason into a specific course of action. In such a situation, the agent is non-determined but is sane (and so appreciates the nature of both her conflicting motivating reasons). If the agent has the power to align herself with either one of her reasons for acting, then I believe that the agent can be held morally responsible for aligning herself with whichever particular reason she aligns herself with - which in turn allows that reason to motivate her into action - if such aligning is done in light of the nature of the different reasons. I think that the best way to understand such a power is according to the 'agent-causality' theory defended by O'Connor his article 'Freedom with a Human Face' (2005).

Let's say that in the above scenario the agent chooses to do X. For what reason does she align herself with one reason above the other? Although it appears that there is no reason that explains why the agent sides with one reason over the other, I do not think that this is strictly true. While it is clear that no reason determines the agent to side with X, she does not do X for no reason. She does X for the reason that "X is good."

Although the above answer may not seem completely satisfying, I believe that such an answer is the only possible type of answer that could provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of free will and moral responsibility. A satisfactory answer must have the agent non-determined by her motivating reasons, otherwise she would not be ultimately responsible for what she does, as her actions would ultimately be the result of her reasons (which she would not be ultimately responsible for). On the other hand, a satisfactory answer must not leave the agent's action totally unexplained but must provide a reason for why the agent acted in such a way - for if not the agent's action would be random. It at least seems to me that the above answer meets both these criteria. The agent was not determined by her motivating reasons, but there still was a reason why she did X - because she believed that "X is good."

In this essay I have explored Strawson's Basic Argument and have presented a criticism of it. I have argued that as long as an agent is sane and is undetermined by her motivating reasons, then she can be responsible for her action. Therefore, even if one is not responsible for what one is, one can be morally responsible for what one does (at least in certain specific circumstances).