Dignity And Education

Let me start with two oppositional statements concerning the relation between dignity and education.

First, we might say that to respect a child's dignity means to educate her. This could mean, among other things, that the development of her capacity for autonomy should be fostered.

Second, it could be said that educational interferences threaten a child's dignity. Education is often thought of as a form of heteronomy. To educate someone means to control or constrain her behaviour or to mould her values and beliefs. If my wife tried to educate me in the same way that we educate our children, I might feel violated in my dignity.

These statements make clear that the concept of dignity has at least two different functions in educational thought. First, the child's dignity can ground a demand for education. The idea is that the child - or the adult that he will become - is in need of education: without education, she could not live a good, autonomous life and she would be deprived of certain social and economic opportunities.

The problem is, however, that fostering certain valuable capacities might be contrary to the child's present desires. This leads us to a second function of the concept of dignity: it can work as a normative constraint on educational interferences. According to a radical educational anti-paternalism, acting contrary to the child's desires for educational reasons cannot be right. On this basis, one could say that children - like adults - have a "right to autonomy" and that any violation of this right is tantamount to a violation of children's dignity.

The common view, however, is that at least some forms of paternalistic acting towards children are morally justified - or even required. So if respecting the child's dignity is identified with a respect for her autonomy, it seems that her dignity cannot be fully respected in the present educational situation. But the idea of a merely partial respect for a person's dignity is at odds with common uses of the term: the concept of human dignity does not allow doing things by halves. To ascribe a dignity to someone means to grant to him an absolute protection against certain kinds of treatment. It therefore makes no sense to say that partial violations of the child's dignity are allowed if this is likely to bring about positive effects in the future.

We could reply, of course, that the child's dignity is not violated if the restrictions on her present freedom will, in the long run, benefit herself - and not merely others. This leads us back to the first function that the idea of dignity might have in educational thought: A person's dignity grounds a demand for education and this justifies certain constraints on the child's present freedom. In other words, it justifies certain "intrapersonal trade-offs". In contrast to "interpersonal trade-offs" - one person's interests are neglected for the benefit of others - intrapersonal trade-offs seem to yield no moral problem. I think, however, that certain kinds of educational measures are morally wrong independently of their future effects. I take it, moreover, that the notion of the child's dignity is useful to specify this idea. However valuable some educational aim might be, we could say, its realization should never violate the child's dignity in the present. But what exactly can this mean? If we do not want to adhere to the radically anti-paternalistic view, respecting the child's present dignity cannot be identified with respecting her present autonomy.

So to make sense of this basic idea, we have to develop a different understanding of the claim that the child's dignity should be "absolutely" respected. I would like to discuss four proposals and then present my own view.

First, we could state that the child's dignity is respected if specific "childhood goods" are secured. The idea is that there are certain goods that are valuable to children as children. This means, first, that these goods are not valuable to adults in the same way, and second, that their value for children does not depend on the fact that they bring about benefits for their adult life. They are in this latter sense intrinsically valuable for the child. It is interesting to note what Rousseau says in this context. After having stated, in Émile, that the child's present happiness and freedom should not be sacrificed to uncertain future benefits, he says: "Hommes, soyez humains!" (Rousseau 1762/1961, p. 62) Right after this claim to treat children in a humane way, Rousseau emphasizes the specific nature of childhood and says that childhood should be loved for its own sake.2 Treating children humanely, for Rousseau, thus means not destroying the specific goods of childhood.

Speaking of childhood goods, we are concerned with the problem of the good life, in the first place. But it could be said, of course, that to respect a person's dignity means to make sure that she can live a good life. To respect a child qua child would then mean to promote intrinsic childhood goods. But even if the importance of childhood goods is acknowledged, it does not make sense to say that their promotion should have absolute priority. The goods of the future adult life should certainly not be strictly subordinated to childhood goods. If to respect the child's dignity means to promote childhood goods, there can be no absolute protection of a child's "childhood dignity".

Rousseau, of course, would reject this conclusion. According to his view, we best promote the child's future concerns by not interfering with his present affairs. Rousseau's fictitious educator, Jean-Jacques, establishes a comprehensive system of educational control, but he refrains from directly educating his pupil. According to Rousseau, this is the way to deploy the child's good nature.

Against this background, inspired by Rousseau, the "child-centred" or "growth-theoretical" movement in education has formulated the idea that the child should be respected in his individuality.