Why Does Seneca Hold That We Shouldn’t Control Anger But Destroy It Entirely? Are There Sound Considerations For Accepting This View?

Introduction

Of all Stoic thinkers, Seneca is most notable for his contributions to the therapy of anger. In his three-part work, De Ira, Seneca calls for the total eradication of anger, to allow for an effective pursuit of Eudaimonia. This essay will explore the merit of this claim. I will begin by outlining Seneca s conception of anger in the context of the Stoic theory of emotions, followed by an exploration of Seneca s main arguments for the eradication of anger. Overall I will claim that whilst there are indeed sound considerations for accepting his view, these fail to coalesce into a convincing whole.

Defining Anger

To understand Seneca s definition of Anger, we should begin with the Stoic theory of the emotions. In short, the stoics subscribe to the idea that emotions are not simply impulses that chance to the move the mind, (Seneca 2010, 36) rather, they involve a cognitive element in which one assents to an impression. By impression, the stoics refer to judgements such as I have been wronged. Thus, emotions begin with involuntary sensations known as proto-passions, which are followed up by a second movement which involves an impression accompanied by an expression of will. In the case of anger, the proto-passion leads to the impression I have been wronged, which via a voluntary assent becomes a desire for vengeance. This forms the third movement which is beyond control a movement that pursues vengeance, (Seneca 2010, 36).

The crucial point here is that the 1^st movement is involuntary, whilst the 2^nd movement is within our control. It is our choice to assent to the impression. The 2^nd movement is thus born from deliberation and eradicated by deliberation. If one assents to the impression, the third movement has already spiralled beyond our control. We desire vengeance come what may, (Seneca 2010, 37) and this is a belief oblivious to reason. This is anger.

This essay will take for granted Seneca s conception of anger. As I will show, the explanatory power of Seneca s arguments rests more upon the consequences of anger rather than a definition. However, it should be noted that some scholars such as Srinivasan (2017) object to the third movement by giving examples where one believes they have been wronged but desires no revenge. Yet Seneca does not deny this, rather, he dismisses it as distinct from genuine anger, (Seneca 1928, 125.) Whether or not one agrees with this distinction is a semantic debate not relevant to this essay. I will thus begin my argument by exploring Seneca s argument, with his definition taken as granted.

Seneca s Argument

Seneca s argument for why we shouldn t control anger but destroy it entirely can be outlined as follows:

P1. Anger obstructs reason

P2. It is easier to destroy anger than control it

C1. Anger should not be controlled but destroyed

P1: Anger as an obstruction to Reason

Before we explore the validity of P1, it is worth mentioning why P1 is of importance. This requires us to turn our attention to the Stoic conception of Eudaimonia.

Eudaimonia, otherwise known as human flourishing, is a central task for Stoic philosophy. It is a pursuit of the good life, and as such comes across as an intuitively plausible aim. Crucially, to pursue Eudaimonia in the Stoic sense, one must pursue virtue, (Annas 1998, 1). By virtue, the stoics refer to the cultivation of excellence in realising one s natural function. To be virtuous, a Stoic would say, is to live a life in accordance with nature, and since humans are inherently rational we must perfect our capacity for rational judgement to live in accordance with nature. This capacity is thus known to the Stoics as reason. In this way reason is virtue, and since virtue is good, the wise Stoic engages in the ethical pursuit of reason, (Annas 1998, 40). We can summarise below:

Reason Rationality Virtue Eudaimonia

In this way, we can understand the importance of P1. If P1 falls, then one fails to be virtuous and thus fails to attain Eudaimonia. Here, an evaluation of reason as virtue is beyond the scope of the paper, and so again, will be taken as granted.

In favour of P1

Seneca describes anger as an ugly and horrible picture of [a] distorted and swollen frenzy, (Seneca 1928, 109). In this, Seneca alludes to the idea that anger is insanity. Indeed, much of De Ira is filled with rhetoric concerning the absurdity of anger. For example, Seneca highlights our propensity to believe what we don t want to hear and [to] grow angry before we judge, (Seneca 2010, 50). This is well illuminated with the story of Hippias a tyrant who upon taking a tyrant slayer prisoner, hears from the slayer that his own friends were accomplices. Hippias then gives way to anger and murders his innocent friends, (Seneca 2010, 50). Through this, we see the distortion and rampant consequences of anger.

Furthermore, Seneca highlights how anger is not useful even in wars or battles: for it is prone to rashness, and while trying to bring others into danger, does not guard itself against danger, (Seneca 2010, 25). In this, we more clearly see how anger clashes with reason, for it is reason which long and carefully considers itself and thus allows for us to slowly and deliberately brings itself to the front, (Seneca 2010, 25). Without this slow deliberation, it is clear to see how anger leads to rash decisions.

However, one may object here, citing Seneca s concern with traditions of old tyrants and battles of sword and shield. Yet, Nussbaum (2016) convincingly points out that there are examples of the modern age. She highlights the case of Mandela, who having been sent to prison for 27 years during Apartheid, was overcome with anger. However, he realised that nurturing his anger [ ] would lead nowhere, (Pigliucci 2017). Indeed, the rational most constructive approach before him was to avoid the destructivity of anger and turn towards building trust and relationships. Nussbaum highlights how this is a gamble that paid off, as he oversaw one of the most important transitions of peace in the 20^th Century, (Pigliucci 2017).

Objection to P1

We can readily see that anger contradicts reason, yet the question remains are there exceptions to this rule? Are there scenarios in which anger finds reason? There are two strong objections to consider here.

Firstly, White points out that Seneca s demands for the eradication of anger have potentially grave consequences for public life. Specifically, White is concerned with Seneca s suggestion that on issues of public concern, anger is not necessary to overcome injustice, rather civic duty can see us through, since civic duty is rational, (White 2012, 6). However, White points out that civic duty has not always been enough. Indeed, history is unfortunately riddled with circumstances in which our civic duty to each other has been completely ignored. Even beyond apartheid and slavery, there are modern cases from the Xinjiang re-education camps (2018) to the Rohingya refugee crisis (2015), and even smaller-scale events such as the Grenfell Tower Fire (2017). It is difficult to see how one can rely on just civic duty and civic love to overcome such injustice.

That being said, one questions whether anger is even able to fill this gap. Lisa Tessman (2005) provides a strong response. She explains that while anger in the Stoic sense (of exacting revenge) may not necessarily cause direct outcomes, it can facilitate the flourishing of others. By this, she refers to the way in which the threat of revenge may lead to fruitful outcomes. She gives the example of Malcolm X, who s angry defiance arguably paved the way for white America to embrace King s vision of a unified, post-racial nation, (Srinivasan 2017, 4). Thus whilst anger itself may not directly deliver justice, the threat of it certainly has a degree of political efficacy.

Interestingly, Seneca is able to escape this objection. Indeed, he seems to agree with the utility of anger as a consequentialist device, but only to the extent that the anger is feigned we may sometimes affect to be angry when we wish to rouse up the dull minds of those whom we address, just as we rouse up horses who are slow at starting with goads and firebrands. We must sometimes apply fear to persons upon whom reason makes no impression. (Seneca 2010, 44). Seneca highlights how we may reap the benefits that anger may induce (whether it be in the public or private sphere) but we must do so without allowing ourselves to succumb to the full throes of the passion. After all, angry is of no more use than to grieve or to be afraid, (Seneca 2010, 44). He thus posits a reality in which civic injustice can be thwarted without the actual experience of anger.

Srinivasan however, comments on the utility of the actual experience of anger. She draws our attention to the utility of experienced anger as a source of moral and political knowledge. She claims that by reflecting on our anger (and thus desire for vengeance) and the reaction of the powerful to our anger, we can come to know something about the existence and structure of previously unrecognised injustice, (Srinivasan 2017, 20). In other words, experiencing anger can have positive epistemic value by uncovering realities of injustice that may otherwise be ignored. She goes on to highlight that for the Stoics, the question ought one ever get angry? was implicitly understood to be about the powerful: free, wealthy men, with the capacity for unchecked violence [and] it was simply taken for granted that women and slaves had no business getting angry, (Srinivasan 2017, 20). Thus, what Seneca may have overlooked is that experiencing anger can empower those without the power of the state or the sword, (Srinivasan 2017, 21) to bring to attention social injustices a) through their own internal reflection and b) by causing others to reflect too.

To conclude here, we are left with an unclear answer as to whether anger truly opposes reason. What is clear, however, is that one may be able to charge Seneca with some exceptions to P1. We are thus left in philosophically deep waters trying to weigh the good effects with the bad. If, however, it can be shown that anger can be controlled, then C1 weakens. For if there is a compatibility between anger and reason than there is an opportunity cost to a total eradication of anger.

P2: It is easier to destroy anger than control it

In contemplating between the two options, Seneca concludes that it is easier to banish dangerous passions than to rule them, (Seneca 2010, 15). For Seneca, it is easier to eradicate anger than control it, for whilst the beginnings of anger may lie in our power, when it is developed it drag[s] us along [ .] and leave[s] no retreat, (Seneca 2010, 15). In other words, Seneca implicitly alludes to the idea that not only is it harder to control anger than banish it, but it is almost impossible. Once we are in the full throes of the passion i.e. the third movement, our temperament has become impervious to reason. An apt analogy can be found in the spreading of wild-fire. As it takes only the sparks of a flame to unleash the roar of a bonfire, so too do the beginnings of anger arouse a destructive and irascible behaviour. One may ask Seneca: How then, does one come to tame this passion? To which Seneca has no reply. Rather, the best plan is to reject straightway the first incentives to anger, [and] to resist its very beginning, (Seneca 2010, 16).

Seneca s example of the wise man further illustrates the difficulty of controlling anger. If, Seneca argues, being angry at wrongdoing is proper for a wise man, then the greater the wrongdoings, the greater his anger will be, and he will be angry often, (Seneca 2010, 38). In other words, given the prevalence of wrongdoing in society, the wise man will frequently be angry, and this is surely absurd as it will lead him to be wrathful by disposition, (Seneca 2010, 38).

A convincing response to Seneca can be formed, however. Firstly, to accept that anger may have value in overcoming injustice does not require the wise man to be angry at all injustice. Rather, the logical conclusion is that a mediated form of anger should be employed by the wise man from which one can derive utility, by employing it in specific circumstances (such as those as laid out in the previous sub-section). The question thus becomes: Should we exercise anger only in specific circumstances? Seneca s reply is likely to be no, for any exercise of anger has the possibility of leaving us no retreat. However, the crucial difference is that if it can be shown that anger can be compatible with reason, and thus anger can be virtuous, we have reason to control anger rather than engage with it blindly. It is precisely this controlled form of anger that Srinivasan alludes to in her essay, and precisely this form of anger that presents a fundamental problem to Seneca s theory.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this essay has looked at Seneca s arguments for a total eradication of anger. In looking at P1, this essay showed that it is possible to justify a controlled form of anger as opposed to a total eradication, given the potential opportunity cost. Whilst Seneca would dismiss such control as futile, this essay has shown that P2 stands on weaker ground if we can recognise a controlled form of anger as virtuous. Thus, ultimately Seneca s argument is unconvincing. Taken independently, there are sound considerations for accepting his view, however, when viewed as a whole they fail to coalesce into a persuasive, ethical argument.

Bibliography

Annas, J. (1998). Virtue and Eudaimonism. Social Philosophy and Policy, 15(1), 37-55.

Pigliucci, M. (2017). Anger is temporary madness: the Stoics knew how to curb it. [online] Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/ideas/anger-is-temporary-madness-heres-how-to-avoid-the-triggers

Nussbaum, M. (2016). There s no emotion we ought to think harder about than anger. [online] Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/there-s-no-emotion-we-ought-to-think-harder-about-than-anger

Srinivasan, A. (2017). The Aptness of Anger. Journal of Political Philosophy, 26(2), pp.123-144.

Seneca, L (2010). On Anger. In Anger, Mercy, Revenge. University of Chicago Press.

Seneca, L. (1928). De ira [Anger]. Seneca`s moral essays (Vol. 1). London: Heinemann.

Tessman, L. (2005). Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles. New York: Oxford University Press.

White, P. (2012). Making Political Anger Possible: A Task for Civic Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 46(1), pp.1-13.

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