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The Survival Of Contextualism: Method Or Heuristic?

Here I examine an approach to studying history called contextualism, often used by intellectual historians. I argue that, despite various criticisms levelled at contextualism over the years, it is still useful to use in combination with other approaches.

Date : 05/10/2020

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Robbie

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Uploaded on : 05/10/2020
Subject : History

The Survival of Contextualism: Method or Heuristic?

In this essay I aim to demonstrate that contextualism is still a viable and useful tool for the study of history, and has withstood and benefited from the criticisms levelled at it over the past fifty years. My understanding of contextualism draws most heavily from Quentin Skinner and this will frame most of my discussion. I aim to show that the methods put forward by Skinner for studying past texts are still relevant and helpful for historians albeit in a modified form. His most important contributions to the method and theory of contextualism were his speech act theory and his emphasis on researching and establishing context for an idea or a text. The various critiques of two core aspects of contextualisation over the years have shown this method is not without its shortcomings. Indeed it is not my intention to argue that contextualism, even in a modified and potentially less problematic form, is the only tool the historian needs to approach texts and study the past. It is one helpful but limited approach to history. A common criticism of contextualism is that it tends to deal in restrictive absolutes. One must stick to a strict context, or a strict method, to do contextualism. This often limits the parameters of what can be studied, and holds back its potential as a tool. I argue, using Robert Lamb s terminology, that we should use contextualism as a heuristic, not as a method. Heuristic claims are reflections on the art of interpretation and involve no such arguments about necessary and sufficient conditions while methodological claims are claims about the necessary and sufficient conditions for correct interpretation .[1] Using contextualism as a heuristic means we can use it without being too strict with its conditions, definitions, and arguments. I maintain this allows us to reap the benefits of this tool without being restricted by its conditions. In order to demonstrate how contextualism is still viable for historians, I will put forward three main points of argument. I will begin by analysing speech act theory and the function of the author, which I will split into three parts. In the first part I will begin by showing that speech act theory is useful for historians so long as we do not argue that all meaning comes from the author. In the second part, I will argue that studying the author remains viable and helpful despite epistemological attacks from the linguistic turn . Lastly for this section, I demonstrate that the function of the author also survived deconstructionism, and historical study benefits from the debates it raised. For my second argument, I aim to show that studying the context is helpful for historians, despite the critiques, and I will argue this in three parts. Firstly, I aim to show that examining context should help us attain, but not necessarily determine, meaning. Secondly, I argue that we should not restrict ideas to a local context, but should allow for the perennial or temporal movement of ideas. Lastly for this section, I argue that global intellectual history has shown that spatial and temporal provincialisation of ideas and texts is problematic, so we should be mindful about the temporal and spatial movement of ideas in our study of history. Finally, and for my last argument, I aim to demonstrate that we should recognise the subjective role the historian when using contextualism as a tool of enquiry. By the end of this essay I hope to have demonstrated that, by using contextualism as a heuristic rather than a strict method, contextualism is still a viable and useful tool for the study of history.

The study of speech acts is useful for helping us understand the intentions of the author but it should not be seen as the only way to attain meaning from a text. Quentin Skinner popularised this notion of speech acts and brought them into the realm of contextualism, building on J. L Austin s How to Do Things with Words and Wittgenstein s Philosophical Investigations.[2] In order to gain a greater understanding of a work, we must not only examine the text for meaning. We must consider what the author may have been doing in what was said. This theory suggests that, by writing with an intention, the author is performing an action. It may be to convince someone, to warn someone, and so on. This is called an illocutionary act.[3] This intention has a bearing on how the text should be read. If we discover that the author was being ironic, then we will interpret the text differently, and its meaning will change as a consequence.[4] In order to determine the illocutionary forces with greater accuracy, we should analyse the contemporary context of the writer. This will help us see what arguments they are responding to, and what works and events may have influenced their writing. Speech act theory is useful for historians because it encourages us to consider why the author wrote what they did, and what arguments they were responding to. It may not reveal all the answers, but it remains important to consider the intentions of the author. Some academics, like E. D. Hirsch and Peter Juhl, have taken this process further.[5] They argue that in order to understand what a text says, we must recover the illocutionary acts, or the intentions of the author. Hirsch, for instance, argues that we must recover the saying of the author in order to discover the meaning of a text.[6] The verbal meaning of a work requires determining the will of the author, and this must be the focus of the investigator if they are to attain the meaning of a text.[7] Hirsch and Juhl require the historian to uncover speech acts as a necessary condition for uncovering the meaning of a text, and therefore advocate for a stricter model of speech act application than Skinner. I find this problematic for several reasons. In many cases, the context we collect for a text can only help us determine an approximation of the author s intentions. We can make a solid claim based on contextual evidence, but it is only ever a suggestion of the author s intent it is arguably never confirmable unless the author explicitly states it. There may be cases where the context is not recoverable, and we will have to rely entirely on the content of the text for meaning. We can arguably still understand a text and get a good approximation of its meaning and the intention of the author through the text itself, or its perlocution. We should instead view speech acts as a heuristic rather than a strict model. It should be a tool to help us uncover meaning, rather than one that is used to determine meaning. Skinner supports this kind of restraint, arguing the theory does not tell us, nor do I believe, that the intentions of speakers and writers constitute the sole or even the best guide to understanding their texts or other utterances .[8] Attempting to uncover the intentions of the author therefore remains useful and helpful for understanding the meaning of a text. We need not think of an author s illocutionary force as the sole determiner of meaning, but as an avenue to explore for greater appreciation of a text.

The study of speech acts remains useful despite criticism from the linguistic turn . These criticisms attempt to displace the author as the locus of meaning. For clarity, I will try to generalise and separate these criticisms into two related but distinct types: one called the linguistic turn , and the other deconstruction . Neither of these critiques targeted contextualism as a methodological practice specifically, but their displacement of the author affected its epistemological foundation. Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault challenged the notion that words can be understood according to the intention of the author in the linguistic turn .[9] Their general arguments were that language constitutes the world, rather than reflecting an independent world or reality.[10] Understanding, they argue, is found in forms of discourse or linguistic paradigms .[11] These forms of discourse can be temporal blocks, or periods of time. The author does not control how their utterances and acts are understood, for meaning is firstly constructed in forms of discourse.[12] Authors are not important for creating the meaning of a text as meaning comes from the paradigm to which that text belongs.[13] Foucault claims the function of the author is irrelevant since authors merely follow discursive practices.[14] Barthes went as far as to declare this the death of the author .[15] Some, like Cambridge School member J. G. A. Pocock, give authors limited relevance as mere creators of a work, but reject the author as a function of meaning in favour of this linguistic framework.[16] Skinner s reply to such criticism is that we should continue to acknowledge that texts do still have authors and authors have intentions in writing them .[17] We can try and reconstruct the context for that time to better understand how an argument constituted a retort to a particular argument while also maintaining that the author intended the utterance to constitute such a retort .[18] The linguistic turn helped us think about how language was and is constructed, and how it was and is received. By reconstructing the context (as I shall examine later), we can better understand their contemporary discourse but that does not mean the author is irrelevant. The author is the parent of the work and more. Their arguments, while existing within a discourse, may respond to specific contemporary arguments or topics, and uncovering this can help with our reading of the text. By refusing the more restrictive almost author-less model of Pocock, Skinner allowed for a contextualism that could benefit but not be constricted by the linguistic turn . I maintain, therefore, that contextualism can and has survived the linguistic turn because it can demonstrate that the author is still helpful for understanding a text.

Another attack arguing against the function of the author comes from deconstructionism. Deconstruction implies that the author and the motivation of the author does not determine the meaning of the text at all. This argument, developed by theorists such as Jacques Derrida, builds on the work of linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.[19] Unlike for the linguistic turn , Saussure did not find value in looking at historical context or discourses for meaning. Meaning was to be derived in purely analytical terms, from the relationship between the sign, the signifier, the signified, and the referent.[20] This is relevant to contextualism because, using this theory, the author could not control the free play of the signifier .[21] Consequently, the author could not control how a work was meant to be read, or control its illocutionary force. If this were true Hirsch argued, then any reading of a text would be valid .[22] If a piece of text could be interpreted in any number of ways, then what the author argued seems unimportant for attaining meaning. If texts have meanings other than those intended by the author, then words can do things despite their author .[23] The meaning one reads in a work might be significantly different from what [the author] intended to do in speaking or writing .[24] I maintain that this critique is useful to our application of contextualism, and does not succeed in displacing speech acts. The intentions of the author and the effect it has on the reader are two related but distinct things according to Skinner. The illocutionary act is the intention of the author the illocutionary force is the effect it has on the reader.[25] This means we can acknowledge that speech acts can be interpreted in different ways (illocutionary force) without it discrediting study of the authors intentions (illocutionary act). Derrida argued that any attempt to fix meaning, through the intentions of the author for instance, is doomed to failure because the writing can be interpreted in many different ways.[26] He argued the failure of the reader to take on the illocutionary act of the author was the normal condition of writing, so the author is irrelevant for meaning.[27] I disagree with Derrida s conclusion. I agree that texts can be interpreted in many different ways, and I agree we sometimes may never know what the author means in certain cases. However, I do not think that every interpretation of a text is of equal value. As Hirsch says, Validity of interpretation is not the same as inventiveness of interpretation .[28] Some readings are more relevant than others, and they can be informed by historical research and, importantly, attempts to uncover the intentions of the author. In doing so, the seemingly endless ways to interpret a text become less expansive as we begin to consider the contemporary arguments and events the author may have been responding to. The author remains relevant for helping us limit the range of unintended illocutionary forces a text can bare. Deconstructionism helped us consider the relationship between the production and consumption of meaning, but debate over the illocutionary force does not negate the importance of studying the illocutionary act. The study of the author remains helpful and relevant to the study of history.

The study of context should help us uncover meaning of historical texts or arguments, but should not necessarily determine their meaning. Establishing the context for a text is incredibly important. It allows us to gain a greater understanding of why a text was written, and what arguments, if any, the writer was responding and contributing to. As Skinner emphasises, it is important to view texts a series of arguments. Investigating the local context, and the contemporary discourses, can help elucidate these arguments. This is no easy task, and requires extremely wide-ranging as well as detailed historical research .[29] Skinner, however, is not entirely clear about the emphasis we should place on context for establishing the meaning of a text. It is not certain whether he proposes a method or a heuristic for examining context. For instance, he argues that if we wish to understand... utterances or arguments, we shall have to find some means of identifying the precise nature of the intervention constituted by the act of uttering them .[30] Saying we shall have to suggests that we must establish a context if we want to understand arguments in a work, which implies a method. Moreover, instead of arguing we may be able to attain some knowledge of how an argument or text intervened in contemporary arguments, he says we should attempt to uncover the precise nature of the intervention. This implies there is one and not many ways of interpreting the nature of an intervention. At times he is even more narrow and objectivist in his assertions. Michelle Clarke points out that Skinner suggests that once context is established, we can simply attain the intention of the author.[31] There is plenty of evidence for this. For instance, Skinner declares if we succeed in identifying this context with sufficient accuracy, we can eventually hope to read off what it was that the speaker or writer... was doing in what he or she said .[32] Later he argues texts embody intersubjective meanings that we can hope to read off .[33] I agree that studying context is helpful for attaining meaning. I do not think, however, that we can simply read off their intentions in such a clear-cut way. However, at points Skinner appears not to argue for such an objectivist method, and leaves room for subjectivity and interpretation. He argues that there is only a sense in which we need to understand why a certain proposition was put forward if we wish to understand the proposition itself .[34] This instead seems to suggest that Skinner advocates for a heuristic rather than a method. It is not entirely clear if Skinner advocates more for one over the other throughout his works. Robert Lamb certainly feels strongly that Skinner s philosophy of history comprises a method rather than a mere heuristic , although my above discussion shows there is room for nuance.[35] Regardless, establishing and examining the context of a work can prove highly valuable to historians, but we should be careful in assuming this allows us to read off a meaning, and we should acknowledge that texts can be understood to an extent without establishing context. We should approach context as a tool to help us, but not definitively attain or determine, meaning.

Contextualism has been critiqued for relegating the exploration and meaning of ideas to a limited local context. Skinner, when describing the context that will help us better understand writers utterances, argued it would be whatever context enables us to appreciate the nature of the intervention constituted by their utterances .[36] The aim, he argues, is to see such texts as contributions to particular discourses and thereby uncover how these texts followed or challenged or subverted the conventional terms of those discourses themselves .[37] To better understand a text, therefore, we must study the contemporary context, conversations and discourse. I argue this is quite agreeable and uncontroversial, and is practiced regularly by intellectual historians today.[38] The issue, however, stems from Skinner s assertion that we cannot apply the philosophical ideas of past texts to the present day because their meaning is contained within temporally specific contexts and blocks of discourse. He argues that we cannot learn from the perennial wisdom contained in the classic texts and we would be inherently misguided to do so.[39] Robert Lamb and Peter Gordon have both strongly spoken out against this provincial theory of meaning.[40] Gordon, for instance, argues that historical practice should involve two types of time. One focuses on time as a series of moments, which can be called a series of synchronic or punctual times. The other is the extension between these moments, called diachronic or differential time.[41] To properly reconstruct history, he argues, we should examine historical moments as well as change over time. This is entirely reasonable and agreeable. By studying only one moment in history, we may uncover much about that time, but we will fail to consider how that moment relates to us, and how ideas change over time. Lamb argues that Skinner s argument here advocates more of a method than a heuristic, which I agree with.[42] He argues Skinner is too strict with his conditions, definitions and too limited in his arguments.[43] There is no reason, it seems, for arguments made in the past not to have relevance to us today, despite the differing contexts. We should allow ideas to travel past their local temporal discourse and move beyond provincialisation. In doing so, we mitigate an absolutist method in favour of a more fluid heuristic. In doing so, contextualism remains a relevant and incredibly useful tool for the historian.

Recent approaches to global intellectual history have shown that such provincialisation of context both spatially and temporally is problematic. If we are to consider how ideas move across time and space, from one nation to another, or from person to person, we should consider spatial and temporal movement. By provincialising context both spatially and temporally as Skinner seems to do, contextualism in this form fails to account for movement on a large, trans-national scale. Matthew Specter briefly address this. He argues that neither culture or context in itself confines and stifles the movement of ideas .[44] Ideas can be produced within these confines but they are not restricted to them. Writing on global intellectual history has also addressed the eurocentrism of intellectual history and political thought the approaches to history most associated with contextualism.[45] If contextualism is meant to progress in the present day and indeed it is it needs to shake this European focus and account for histories of political thought outside of the European sphere. How exactly this is to be done is a matter of debate, but members of the Cambridge School, such as Pocock, seem to welcome the challenge.[46] The restrictive provincial contextual model offered by Skinner shows he shares some common beliefs with Pocock, despite Bevir s assertion to the contrary. Bevir categorised Skinner as a soft linguistic contextualist , distinguished from the hard linguistic contextalists by his belief in authorial intentions. The hard linguistic textualists like Foucault and Pocock derive meaning from blocks of discourse and paradigms. But by advocating for this closed discursive system, we can see that Skinner shares characteristics with Bevir s hard contextualists. When practicing contextualism, therefore, we should resist such restrictive practice that fails to leave room for the movement of ideas. We should learn from global intellectual history and consider how ideas travel both spatially and temporally, and not restrict context to a single spatial-temporal period. We should therefore use contextualism as a heuristic, allowing us to investigate the context of a work without failing to consider the spatial and temporal transformation it can undergo.

Contextualism has also been criticised for down-playing the role of the historian in determining the meaning of a text. Skinner first wrote about and advocated contextualism as part of a critique of textualism.[47] This, he describes, was a methodology that saw value in the role of the interpreter s judgement for understanding a text. He argues against this as the interpreter cannot help but make subjective and faulty judgements when assessing historical materials. Our findings, he argues, will always be mediated by the concepts available to us for describing what we have observed , so we would be using our range of concepts instead of attempting to understand the contemporary contexts of the text.[48] By studying the context of a historical argument, Skinner hopes to repair the defects of textualism by minimizing the role of judgement in interpretive practice .[49] I agree that we should try to be as objective as possible in our accounts of history. However, I maintain that Skinner fails to consider many of the subjectivities present in contextualism. For instance, when seeking to reconstruct the context of a work, the historian has to decide what elements of contextualisation are relevant. I take issue with his claim that there is one precise nature of intervention that a text contributes to.[50] The historian has to decide the nature of the intervention, or the context, based on their research. It is only ever a construction and therefore we cannot claim to have attained the precise nature , or have entirely and faithfully reconstructed the context for a text. I maintain the best we can hope to do is a close approximation of the context and the nature of the intervention, which is still valuable for the historian. Clarke takes this argument further. She argues that even if we fully reconstructed an author s linguistic context, we do not necessarily have all the information we need to determine what an author actually meant to do with it .[51] The author s illocutionary acts are not so much discovered as they are argued for. If we want to argue that an author intended to do a certain thing, then we are making a subjective (but by no means necessarily incorrect) argument based on the evidence we have gathered. It is not as simple as claiming to understand the author s intention when we establish context. This is another element of Skinner s work that Clarke criticises. She rightfully takes issue with Skinner s assertion that the interpreter can simply read off the illocutionary acts of the author. Skinner, for instance, argues if we succeed in identifying this context with sufficient accuracy, we can eventually hope to read off what the author was doing with their argument.[52] I have previously demonstrated how this reading off suggests something absolute and objective rather than something relative and subjective, and here I argue that the historian has a role in establishing its subjectivity. I therefore agree with Clarke s assertion that interpretative judgement plays an indispensable role in Skinner s version of contextualism and therefore cannot escape the types of mythologies Skinner describes in his 1969 work.[53] By recognising the role the historian plays when practicing contextualism, we avoid assuming we have definite answers and solutions to our historical inquiries. By using contextualism as a heuristic instead of a restrictive method that achieves objective and absolute aims, we can gain greater understanding of past texts without making incorrect and inflated claims about the truth of the past.

Contextualism therefore remains a relevant and helpful tool for historians, and the best way to use it is as a heuristic. Analysing speech acts can help us uncover greater meaning in a text, but it should not be the only thing to determine meaning. The linguistic turn helped us think of the effect of blocks of discourse and the effect language has on understanding but texts still have authors, and it remains useful to understand their intentions. Deconstructionism helped us consider the relationship between the production and consumption of meaning, but debate over the illocutionary force does not negate the importance of studying the illocutionary act. Establishing and examining the context of a work can prove highly valuable to historians, but we should not assume this lets us read off a meaning. We should acknowledge that texts can be understood to an extent without establishing context. We should allow ideas to travel past their local temporal discourse and move beyond provincialisation to use contextualism more effectively. We should learn from global intellectual history and consider how ideas travel both spatially and temporally, and not restrict context to a single spatial-temporal period. Finally, by recognising the role the historian plays when practicing contextualism, we avoid assuming we have definite answers and solutions to our historical inquiries. The fact that contextualism continues to be used fifty years after its inception and indeed thrives as a tool in intellectual history today shows the core concepts of speech acts and establishment of context have remained beneficial for the study of history. It has only grown stronger over the years, adapting to and fighting against various critiques that appeared to sound its death knell. The most recent development of global intellectual history shows its continuous adaptability. The members of the Cambridge School, often seen as synonymous with contextualism, have gone on to study quite different aspects of history and history theory, and can no longer really be considered a school .[54] That is assuming they could even be called a school in the first place.[55] Even as contextualism proves itself to be a heuristic worthy of the historians attention, we should not end our search for tools of investigation here. Contextualism should have a place in the historian s toolkit alongside other useful techniques that help us recover our past and tell our history.

[1] Robert Lamb, Quentin Skinner s Revised Historical Contextualism: A Critique, in History of the Human Sciences 22, no. 3 (June 2009), 54.

[2] J. L Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

[3] Quentin Skinner, Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts, in Visions of Politics 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 103-105.

[4] Skinner, Interpretation, 111.

[5] Ibid, 110.

[6] E. D Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (Yale: Yale University Press, 1967), 13 Skinner, Interpretation, 110.

[7] Hirsch, Validity, 27 Skinner, Interpretation, 110.

[8] Skinner, Interpretation, 110.

[9] Annabel Brett, What Is Intellectual History Now?, in What is History Now?, ed. David Cannadine (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 120.

[10] Ibid, 120.

[11] Mark Bevir, The Errors of Linguistic Contextualism, History and Theory 31, no. 3 (October 1992): 278.

[12] Brett, What Is Intellectual History Now?, 120 Peter Gordon, Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas, in Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 41.

[13] Bevir, The Errors, 277.

[14] Ibid, 278 Michel Foucault, "What Is an Author?," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, transl. D. Bouchard and S. Simon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 113-138.

[15] Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in Image, Music, Text, tr. and ed. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill Wang, 1968), 142-148.

[16] Bevir, The Errors, 278.

[17] Skinner, Interpretation, 119.

[18] Brett, What Is Intellectual History Now?, 121.

[19] Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976).

[20] Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (1915), in Modern Literary Theory: Third Edition, eds. Philip Rice and Patricia Waugh (London: Arnold, 1989), 8-15.

[21] Brett, What Is Intellectual History Now?, 121.

[22] Hirsch, Validity, 10.

[23] Brett, What Is Intellectual History Now?, 121.

[24] Ibid, 121.

[25] Skinner, Interpretation, 109.

[26] Ibid, 121 Brett, What Is Intellectual History Now?, 122.

[27] Brett, What Is Intellectual History Now?, 122.

[28] Hirsch, Validity, 10.

[29] Skinner, Interpretation, 116.

[30] Ibid, 115.

[31] Michelle Clarke, The Mythologies of Contextualism: Method and Judgment in Skinner s Visions of Politics, Political Studies 61, no. 4 (December 2013): 770.

[32] Skinner, Interpretation, 116.

[33] Ibid, 120.

[34] Ibid, 115.

Lamb, A Critique, 54.

Lamb, A Critique, 58. A Critique, Gordon, Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas, 32. Ibid, 34. Lamb, A Critique, 54. Ibid, 54. Matthew Specter, Deprovincializing the Study of European Ideas: A Critique, in History and Theory 55, no. 1 (February 2016): 128. Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, Approaches to Global Intellectual History, in Global Intellectual History, ed. Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015)

Pocock, On the Unglobality of Contexts, 1-14. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969): 3-53 Clarke, The Mythologies of Contextualism, 767-768.

Clarke, The Mythologies of Contextualism, 767.

Clarke, The Mythologies of Contextualism, 772.

Clarke, The Mythologies of Contextualism, 767. Pocock, On the Unglobality of Contexts, 2. Specter, A Critique, 112-113.This resource was uploaded by: Robbie

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