Sectarian identities
have been viewed as fundamental as part of Lebanon, and especially in the light
of the civil war. Firstly to define sectarian identities or sectarianism, a
sectarian is: (a person) strongly supporting a particular religious group,
especially in such a way as not to be willing to accept other beliefs
1
Sectarianism would be an extension of this and this definition according to the
Cambridge dictionary should be something to bear in mind in regards to the
situation in Lebanon.The area of Lebanon
has long been a refuge for religious minorities, seeking to escape into the
mountains which accounts for its high amount of diversity of religious groups
and sects. Under the Ottoman rule the main political players were the Maronite
Christians and the Druze. But when the French mandate was established it was
expanded to create Greater Lebanon in order to create a viable state as the
Maronites felt the area too small and vulnerable without the coastal cities and
fertile hinterland,
2 this led to a greater diversity of religious
groups and Lebanon became a composite of many large and small religious
groups.
3At this time roughly
half the population were Christian and half belonging to Islam, these were
divided into further divisions with Catholic Maronite, Greek, Armenian and
Syrian and eastern Orthodox divided into Greek, Armenian and Syrian.
4The Muslims on the
other hand were also divided into the Sunni and Shi`a, in addition to the large
minority of Druze, who with heterodox beliefs would be hard to place within the
Muslim community.
5Under the rule of the
Ottomans, religious confessions were part of the state with the millet system
whereby the different communities such as Christians would manage its own
affairs, the Druze and Shi`a as heterodox Muslims were under Sunni law, but in
practice living in the mountains they had as much autonomy as their neighbours.
6It shows that under
the Ottoman empire in the region of Lebanon, the idea of communal identity was
built into the political structure. However it also has
to be noted that in discussing sectarianism in Lebanon, political identities
also played a role in addition to religion. For example communism was identified
by the Russophile Greek Orthodox, the Druze with socialism, liberalism with
Maronites and Pan-Arabism with the Sunni Muslims, thus adding a different
dimension to sectarianism.
7Under the French
mandate from 1920 it inherited the system of confessional law in terms
marriage, divorce and inheritance but also maintained confessional
representation in the parliament, in 1943 when it became independent it kept
the system with the presidency reserved for a Maronite and the assembly with a
ratio of 6 Christians to 5 Muslims.
8In addition because
each religious community had the ability to administer law, each Lebanese for
legal reasons had to belong to a confession.
9However the idea of
Lebanon as a state was first put forward by the Maronite community during the
mid 19
th century with their ideology of the mountain , Mount
Lebanon and a state with the co-operation of the Sunni elites and the Druze.
10But the ideas for the
identity of the state differed, with the Maronites wishing for a non-Islamic, non-Arabic
and Hellenistic identity, looking back into the mythology of the Pheonicians
for their identity, while the Muslims took a different stance and looked to the
ideals of Pan-Arabism.
11Both agreed that
Lebanon should be a liberal, democratic republic, non-aligned and independent,
but it was to be the communal identity of the state which led to disagreements.
12The solution was to
compromise with the 1943 National Pact, Lebanon was given an Arab face but no
clear identity, but it was not to become part of the greater Arab nation nor an
eastern bridge-head of the
Christian west, it was not an exclusive homeland for the Maronites and
Christians but also not an Arab country for the Sunni Muslims.
13The National Pact of
1943 also institutionalised the confessional system with the allocation of
places in the parliament, judicial and administrative positions by confession,
according to Article 95, which also continued with the 6 Christians to 5
Muslims ratio in parliament. This was based on the size of the communities from
the 1935 census, the last official census to be conducted.
14Some posts were
reserved for certain sects for example the army commander and head of secret
service would be Maronite.
15In addition the
Lebanese state received legitimacy because it was based on various sectarian
identities which it gave authority to and its non-assimilationist policy, the
communal autonomy gave the system legitimacy
16Thus when Lebanon
became independent in 1943, sectarian identities were the basis of the National
Pact and so in turn sectarianism was central to the foundations of the state of
Lebanon. However was sectarianism central to the collapse of the Lebanese state
in 1975? In a way sectarianism
was central to the foundation and collapse of the state, the confessional
system worked to a certain extent in keeping stability at times by balancing
the groups, but it failed to develop a common identity as a nation, the
Lebanese defined loyalty to family and confession first rather than the state.
17As
a state is a social community it is supported by a common culture, values and
symbols, but in the case of Lebanon, the sectarian divides meant that the
separate groups prevented national unity from occurring.
18So that while the
system worked to a certain extent during periods of calm, during times of
crisis the various groups would feel loyalty to their confession rather than
any state. An example of one of
the failings of the confessional system is in education, the state failed to
provide a unifying educational system that would promote community cohesion,
but as the schools were divided by confession it encouraged the mentality of
separation. A way of showing this is that illiteracy rates differed by
confession, student enrolment in public or private school also differed by
confession and the general educational levels in regions of Lebanon also varied
by confession.
19 lt;br>
lt;br>
In 1958 illiteracy
among the various groups were : Shi`a-79%Sunni-59%Druze-51%Greek Orthodox-50%Maronites-42%
20Because of the
sectarian foundation of the state, Lebanon failed to develop a single Lebanese
identity as the system reinforced the sectarian divides and increased loyalty
to various groups rather than the state.
21On the other hand the
gap between the communities was narrowing, government policies were inadequate
but still helped to narrow the gap between the confessional groups, on the eve
of the civil war, all groups had benefited and were better off than they had
been two generations ago.
22In addition the
sectarian structure of the state meant that it was inflexible to changes in
Lebanon, the Maronite and Sunni elites controlled and shared most of the power
in the system due to the allocation of posts by confession. The Shi`a on the
other hand were generally ignored by the leaders, they were officially
recognised by the 1932 census and at the time the 3
rd largest
community and was allocated the position of speaker in parliament, but
generally they were powerless. However with demographic changes taking place in
Lebanon, the Shi`a community 50 years after the census became the largest, but
still were not fairly represented in the inflexible political system.
23While
at the start power was meant to be shared according to the census, it was not
able to adapt to change and those in power were unwilling to give it up to
others, which led to dissatisfaction with the system and hastened the collapse
of the Lebanese state. In my opinion the
sectarian foundations of the Lebanese state did not simply lead to its
collapse, if this was the case then surely the state should have crumbled as
soon as the 1958 crisis instead of 1975? in addition if the sectarian nature of
the system was purely responsible for its collapse then why was Lebanon in the
70s much less confessional then in the 50s ? before the 1958 crisis Lebanon was
much more divided confessionally than before the 1975 civil war and the state`s
collapse.
24It has to be taken
into account that other factors were also responsible for the collapse of the
state in 1975. The economy of
Lebanon in the pre war period was open and liberal and attracted a lot of
foreign investment, and the government helped Beirut to become a banking and
commercial centre.
25At the same time as
other Arab states were turning towards socialism which made Lebanon attractive
for investment from overseas, and as a banking hub and a tourist haven in the
Middle East.
26However there were some problems to come, firstly one
of the leading banks in Lebanon was the Intra Bank, founded by Palestinian
businessmen it was the pride and glory of the Palestinian community in Lebanon.
However this was unacceptable for the Lebanese elite to have one of their
leading banks to be owned by Palestinians and they engineered a run on the bank
in 1966. It was refused help by the Central Bank of Lebanon and it collapsed
which was firstly a blow to the growing economy and to the Palestinians of
Lebanon.
27Adding to the
economic problems were the effects of the 1967 Six Day War on the Middle East
which meant that tourism declined, millions of lira were transferred out of the
country to Europe and the US and the Arab oil money which had been invested in
Beirut was diverted for investment elsewhere.
28 The decline showed
the weakness of the service based economy of Lebanon, where employment
prospects for the majority of the population was low. There was also a rise in
inflation which was caused by land speculation and created a rise in rents
which affected the middle classes a well, the elites had made a good profit but
the majority of the population felt a decline in living standards.
29The
uneven economic growth had created problems for Lebanon, the growth had
resulted in migration to the cities and in particular surrounding Beirut were
new slums populated by peasants from the countryside, or Palestinian refugees.
30The
effects of this uneven development could be seen during the war when youths
from the slums burnt the Hotel District and the old souks, showing their
dissatisfaction at being left out of their share of Lebanon`s prosperity.
31While the economic
issues and uneven development of Lebanon had some effect on the start of the
war leading to collapse of the state it seems unlikely to be the main reason
and merely a contributing factor, after all there was nothing that unusual
about the economic issues facing Lebanon and say for example that the
government had implemented a socialist command economy would that have
prevented the war and collapse of the state? The country was facing issues that
couldn`t be contained by either socialist or capitalist economic measures.
32Other factors also
played a role in the start of the civil war and collapse of the state, the
direct intervention in Lebanon by other states such as Syria and Israel, in
addition to the indirect role of Saudi, Iraqi and Libyan financial backing of
various militias. As well as the role of the Palestinians and PLO in Lebanon.
33The situation in
Jordan in 1970 was that the Palestinian movement in the country had grown so
strong that the monarchy felt threatened by its existence and started to crack
down on the Palestinian commandos which resulted in Black September and
caused the movement to be expelled from Jordan.
34The PLO moved to
Lebanon where it was able to recover from the conflict with Jordan and create a
base there, it managed to build a powerful influence which had an effect at
political, diplomatic and military levels and so it was inevitable that the
Palestinians would become involved in the political scene in Lebanon.
35The
PLO required a base in Lebanon from which to put pressure on Israel, as well as
other Arab states to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, it needed to
create a state within a state and to create this it needed to exploit sectarian
tensions in order to keep the Lebanese state weak and to complete their
project. At the same time it only increased mistrust from the Maronites and
Christians and the Sunni and Shi`a Muslims too.
36The growing PLO
presence in Lebanon also gave reason for Israel to intervene in Lebanese
affairs, for example in 1968 after PLO raids from southern Lebanon, Israel had
a pretext for operations against Lebanon and sent in commandos to Beirut
airport, blew up 13 civilian airliners and after 40 minutes returned to Israel.
37For Israel a stable and unified Lebanon was not in its interest,
especially as part of its strategy against Syria, on the other hand sectarian
conflict was, to keep everybody continue to fight each other and prevent unity
from occurring.
38Competing with the
Israelis the Syrians too were involved in Lebanon which they viewed as their
backyard. And their policy was to prevent Israeli, American and other Arab
interventions there and to prevent a division of the country on sectarian lines
in order to create a political hegemony on its neighbour. But in order to
dominate the country the Syrians also used the confessional system and
exploited sectarian divides to play regional states against one another.
39By 1989 after
seventeen years of civil war came the Ta`if accords which attempted to reform
the Lebanese political system and end the war.
40Firstly it changed
the structure from a hierarchical communal partnership to a inter-communal
collective partnership, in effect there was a three-headed body of the
state giving more power to the Sunni and Shi`a. As well as a more equal
representation of groups in the parliament and abolishing confessional
appointments in the lower ranks of administration.
41Also in a way
the collective experiences of the civil war helped to shape a national
consciousness that was not there before, and helped to give legitimacy to the
Ta`if accords.
42However this does not
mean that sectarian identities were written out of the state`s foundations with
Ta`if as they still play a role as before, but they helped to reform the
political system with sectarianism still playing a part. To conclude, in my
opinion, sectarian identities were central to the foundation of the Lebanese
state, and it carries on from the Ottoman era, through the mandate to
independence and post Ta`if. But to a certain extent the collapse of the state
during the civil war happened for reasons other than sectarian identities being
central to the state although it played a big part in shaping the conflict. The
economic situation of Lebanon and the uneven development had its role too in
making the situation worse, but it seems unlikely to be the main cause. The
political situation Lebanon was in and various actors played a bigger role,
with the PLO needing to create their state in a state project, had to weaken
the Lebanese state by exploiting sectarianism, Israel and Syria viewed Lebanon
as a backyard to fight proxy battles and also exploiting sectarianism, in
addition to the other Arab states such as Saudi, Iraq and Libya who backed
various militias which destabilised Lebanon. The blame for the collapse of the
state cannot just be laid at the centrality of sectarianism to the state but
the other factors must also be taken into account.
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