Between Kingship And Servitude: Faisal I Of Iraq`s Relationship With The British Colonial Power From 1921-1930

"The history of the modern Near East has often been written as though the states were driftwood in the sea of international affairs, their destinies shaped by the decisions of others (Yapp, 1991: 3).

Few would refute that the mandate system, brought into existence by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the Great War, was a means by which former colonisers extended control over Middle Eastern states. Yet too often the mandated states and their populations are viewed as passive vassals of an ever-dominant Western regime. The reality was in fact a lot more complex, with power dynamics between coloniser and colonised in constant flux as Britain and France attempted to balance competing priorities and placate various constituencies. This essay seeks to investigate the relationship between the offices of British colonial administration and King Faisal I of Iraq, the man chosen by the British government to facilitate their policy of indirect rule (McNamara, 2004: 140). A central concern of the study is to ascertain how far Faisal was simply a stooge of British imperial interests, or to what extent he dissented from British directives to pursue his own nationalist project. The essay begins with a necessary contextualisation of the environment in which Faisal found himself as king of Iraq so soon after having lead a rebellion against the French as king of Syria. This background to Faisal s accession to the throne sheds light on the motivations behind some of his key policy moves and ultimately demonstrates the Arab nationalist ideology driving his motivation to have a kingdom of his own. The essay subsequently divides into two time periods, following broader themes in the dynamics of control between British levers of government and Faisal. The first thematic period commences with the Cairo Agreement of 1921 and British preconceptions of Faisal being shattered through the agonising negotiation of the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Over the next four years to 1926 a more aggressive and direct form of British rule ultimately secured their key objectives but at a much higher cost than they previously imagined. The second period begins with the new 1926 Anglo- Iraqi Treaty and concludes with the Treaty of the same name in 1930. I argue that in this phase of British indirect rule, Faisal did not become less assertive but the British position became considerably weaker. The 1929 change of government in Britain will be stressed as a key event that changed the balance of power in Faisal s favour, with the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty guaranteeing most of Faisal s core interests in his relations with the British. However until 1929 he was operating in a very specific structure, one that required intense patience, bargaining, and compromise against a powerful colonial administration. The way in which he successful navigated the traps and snares of colonial domination affirms him as a visionary state builder who s project was cut short only by ill health and premature death.

To fully understand the complexities and intricacies of the relationship between King Faisal I and his British patrons, the environment immediately preceding his accession to the throne must be understood. Faisal came from the prominent Hashemite family of the Hijaz, and was the third son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca. He was thus not Iraqi, and the throne of Syria appealed far more to Faisal as a seat from which to build a pan-Arab nationalist project. Faisal fought with T.E. Lawrence in the 1916 Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in return for instigating the rebellion he was promised (along with the other Hashemites) an Arab kingdom by Britain. Faisal was briefly proclaimed king of Syria by an Arab nationalist congress, but after the French secured the League of Nations mandate they rejected his anti-colonial agenda, and ousted him after defeating his forces at the battle of Maysalun (Masalha, 1991: 679). Concerning Iraq, the 1920 Iraqi Revolt against British occupation persuaded many within the colonial administration in London and Baghdad that direct control was too costly (Fontana, 2010: 6), and detrimental to Britain s image in an increasingly anti-colonial world order. This forced a revision of British strategy in Iraq, a territory located on the vital supply route to India. Consensus was eventually reached within the British government that indirect rule was the best policy to pursue. This was to be facilitated by a ruler installed by the British who was ostensibly independent, but was in fact subject to the advice of a High Commissioner in the British Residency. The factors at play were many both internally and externally, Britain had a tortuous mix of promises, claims, alliances, interests and ambitions to balance against one another (Allawi, 2014: 349) both with the various constituencies in Iraq but also with the French in Syria. Faisal was but one piece in this complex mosaic of British power relations and commitments, and a convenient choice since he was desperately looking for a second throne. This being said, Faisal had his own balancing to do. He was well aware that the Iraqi population- initially at least- saw his monarchy as a British creation, and was anxious to justify his rule beyond British patronage. Faisal arrived in Iraq aboard a British ship, was greeted by a British officer, and received a hastily arranged British welcome (Sullivan, 2014: 147). The symbolism should not be lost as to their intentions for how Faisal was to act as king of Iraq, and who was really in control behind the veneer of autonomy that he was granted.

Faisal was officially selected as the British choice for king of Iraq at the Cairo Conference of 1921. The Conference saw the creation of an Iraqi army and witnessed the beginnings of what would later become a major struggle between Faisal and his patrons. The army for Faisal was to be a socialising device for a heterogenous population, unifying the Iraqi people around a common national institution to the British, the army was to be little more than a domestic police force to reduce the crippling costs of maintaining a large British garrison in Iraq (Dodge, 2003: 137). London s intentions for Faisal and its Iraqi policy more broadly were summed up in Winston Churchill s statement that even under the guise of an alliance , Iraq would be governed much like an Indian state (Gilbert, 1978: 1553-54). On 23 August 1921 Faisal was crowned king of Iraq. He was under no illusions that he owed his position entirely to the British, that he could not survive without their support, and that to push against their directives would invite forced abdication (Shikara, 1987: 30). Yet having been ousted from one throne already, he was acutely aware of the dangers inherent in being entirely reliant on the colonial power. He understood that to enjoy at least some domestic support would be to strengthen his hand in dealing with the British. An opportunity to demonstrate that he was more than a tool of British imperial control came in March 1922 when Wahabbi tribesmen from the Arabian Peninsula attacked southern Iraq, killing over seven hundred people. These tribes came from territory that Ibn Saud, a British ally, apparently controlled. The lukewarm response from the British to this atrocity- who under the mandatory agreement were responsible for the defence of Iraq s borders- brought Faisal to suspect that they were afraid to upset their delicate relationship with Ibn Saud. In order to alleviate the outcry from the Iraqi population, Faisal acted rapidly. Without consulting the opinion of British High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox, he accepted the resignation of the cabinet ministers blamed for enabling the attack to happen. Cox was furious that Faisal had acted without his blessing, as was Churchill. Less than a year after his coronation, Churchill already suggested to Cox that Faisal be forced to abdicate should he step out of line again (Allawi, 2014: 388). This incident can therefore be regarded as the first tussle for control between Faisal and the British, with the latter surprised at his nonconformity so soon after his coronation. Whilst the young king may have been eager to prove to Iraqis that he was no imperial agent, he was totally reliant on British patronage at this juncture since few people in Iraq had even heard his name before his coronation. This incident was formative in convincing Faisal that he needed a coercive institution of his own, loyal to him, with which he could repel future external attacks and quell domestic challenges to his position should the British prove unreliable.

The attack by the Wahabbi tribesmen and resulting fallout between Faisal and the British was a harbinger of things to come. The Residency realised by 1922 that it had gotten more than it bargained for in Faisal Erskine, writing in 1933 about Faisal s early years on the throne, complained that there was always an element of distrust and opposition to any form of dependence on British advice (1933: 158). The most intractable deadlock between client and patron was to come later in 1922 however, over the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty negotiations. Whilst Faisal may have shown defiance earlier in the year, the British were very much in a dominant position and sought to codify this dominance into a contractually binding arrangement. Faisal insisted on the term treaty , as it signified a mutually ratified agreement between two sovereign nations. This was scorned by some British Members of Parliament who asserted that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was to be nothing more than a colonial-style mandate, pandering to French pressure to legitimise their own Syrian mandatory arrangement (Ireland, 1937: 380-40). Faisal once again had to react strongly in order to counter fury from the nationalist camp- this was compounded by the fact that the draft Treaty did indeed seem to indicate British control dressed in a facade of independence. Britain reserved the right to veto appointees to the civil service, legally oblige the King to take the High Commissioner s council on a host of matters, and staff all ministries with British officials. Economic development and defence arrangements were also heavily subjected to British oversight and control (Allawi, 2014: 395-6). Faisal was genuinely surprised by the content of the draft Treaty, and it clearly meant different things to both parties for Faisal, it was to be a segue into complete Iraqi independence for the British, it was to maintain and expand mandatory levers of control (Shikara, 1987: 69). He subsequently passed the draft back time and again to Cox for amendment, leading Cox to muse that Faisal aspires with the rest of his entourage to become an irresponsible autocrat (quoted in Fontana, 2010: 9), namely one that was not responsive to British directives. To Cox it may have been a worrying sign that Faisal had a state building vision of his own, but Faisal was under no illusions as to the weakness of his position beneath his posturing. He confided to his friend Amin Rihani: Can t you see that our enemies are everywhere and that we have no allies except the British? Yet even if I accept that fact and try to make the best of it, I stand guilty of being partisan to Britain and a servant of their interests (Rihani, 1934: 126-7).

Faisal was under intense pressure from the Shi a Watani and Nahda nationalist parties to reject the terms of the treaty since no significant concessions had been forthcoming from Cox. Faisal to some degree even encouraged anti-Treaty sentiment to try and strengthen his hand in negotiations with Cox (Tripp, 2005: 53), which left him locked into an increasingly dangerous game of brinkmanship. Churchill quipped that there would be no third throne for Faisal (quoted in Sluglett, 2007: 51), which characterised a British administration seriously considering a move to depose him in 1922. A fortuitous bout of appendicitis incapacitated Faisal during the summer of 1922 which allowed Cox to step in, suppress opposition to the Treaty, and ultimately compel the king to sign an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in October 1922. Even in Faisal s intransigence there is evidence that he was aware of increasing British inclinations to depose him, and thus a need for appeasement. Encouraged by Faisal s apparent opposition to the Treaty, a group of nationalists had approached the king requesting that he personally sign a telegram to be sent to capitals around the world stating that Iraq would accept nothing less than total independence in 1922 (Allawi, 2014: 98). Faisal refused, knowing that such a move would likely spell the end of his reign whilst eager to court nationalist constituencies he did not have anything approaching the social capital required to instigate a popular rising against the British establishment.

The 1922 Treaty provided for a constituent assembly of ninety nine members, thirty four of whom were pro-British tribal sheikhs. The Residency had worked assiduously to ensure the loyalty of this constituency by granting selected tribal leaders vast amounts of formerly Ottoman land (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2008: 4). The balance of power within the assembly was engineered specifically to bring rural opponents of the monarchy into the central structure (Walker, 2003: 33), lending British checks to Faisal s movements a popular veneer. Cox again displayed his authority over Faisal in December 1922 when he required the king to court pro-British rural tribes rather than the decidedly nationalist religious establishment (Fontana, 2010: 11). This was part of a wider strategy to prevent Faisal putting down genuine roots in the Iraqi nationalist camp who might support him in a future clash with the British. Whilst the Residency s domination was eventually established around the 1922 Treaty, it raised broader questions about the use of coercion to achieve objectives. Even with the king relatively compliant after 1922, the Treaty was ratified only with great difficulty and a slim majority by parliament in 1924- resistance came therefore not just from Faisal but rather was expressed through a multitude of social strata (Sluglett, 2007: 54-55). Towards the end of 1924 Faisal still required British support to maintain his position and was formally subjugated to their influence through the 1922 Treaty. Yet the difficulty with which the 1922 Treaty was ratified highlighted the broad popular opposition to British influence. The colonial establishment in Baghdad became cognisant that their hand might be weaker than they had previously thought. The discovery of oil in large quantities around 1925 made Britain s commitment to Iraq even greater and increased the incentive to work with the devil they knew- Faisal- rather than depose him and strike out with another altogether unknown quantity.

The question of oil ushered in a renewed desire between the Residency and Faisal to co-operate rather than compete with each other. Turkey had long laid claim to the oil-rich province of Mosul, and this was finally settled in 1925 by a League of Nations committee which awarded the province to Iraq. Whilst resenting the British influence, the king and Iraqi parliament understood that they needed Britain s financial, military, and diplomatic clout to secure Mosul for Iraq, the loss of which would be an enormous blow to the health of Iraq s economy (Sluglett, 2007: 91). Yet Britain also felt pressure to secure Mosul for Iraq because if not it could be accused of failing its duties as mandatory power. The mandate, or Treaty , was in the first place approved and legitimised by the League, and could also be revoked by the League (Mejcher, 1977: 352). Britain could thus conveniently declare that without Mosul, Faisal would be left with an unviable state and to ensure Iraq s eventual independence, Mosul must be included in Iraq. That Britain would have access to Mosul s vast oil reserves went unmentioned but implicitly understood. As a condition of its decision, the League required a new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to be negotiated (Tripp, 2005: 59). The new 1926 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, amongst other amendments, would last for a period of twenty five years or until Iraqi independence if it was achieved in the meantime. Crucially, the Treaty would be reviewed every four years and in this review the British administration would decide whether Iraq was ready to be recommended to the League for independence (Sluglett, 2007: 86). The Treaty was ratified with minimal resistance in 1926, showing that for many Iraqi nationalists independence through the League was now the most attractive method for ousting the British. The Mosul question demonstrated an issue in which Iraqi political elites had witnessed perhaps for the first time a benefit of having British influence in the international arena. For Faisal however, the Treaty represented more than this it was an opportunity to gain real power and build his own political project. From November 1926 until mid-1927, Faisal was rarely in Baghdad. He was instead touring the country, preferring to see problems for himself rather than hearing about them from his advisors. He wanted to get a feel for the issues facing the local population, whether this be visiting Mosul to inspect efforts to counter a plague of crop-eating locusts, inaugurating the first oil field in Kirkuk, or taking a tour of Basra province for a general inspection. He developed a refined understanding of the mechanics of both local and national government, and made sure to court different constituencies on his travels. This clear effort to engage in nation building beyond the reach of the Residency provoked a furious reaction from the new High Commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs, who stated that Faisal is eluding my grasp (quoted in Allawi, 2014: 475). This was a far cry from the Cairo Conference and Churchill s statement that Iraq would essentially be another India.

The most serious confrontation between Faisal and the British was yet to come however. It was grounded in the very foundations of the Cairo Conference, and symbolised a clash over the future of Iraq and how soon independence would be achieved. The issue was conscri ption into the Iraqi army, and at its root was important to Faisal because he had no coercive structure of his own, loyal to him, that he could rely on to support his nation building project. On a second level, the army was in Faisal s view to be an institution through which all Iraqis would have to pass, and thus be imbued with a unified sense of Iraqi nationality. And finally on a third and more pressing level, Faisal believed that conscri ption was necessary to persuade the League that Iraq was capable of defending itself as an independent state without British support in 1927, the fledgling Iraqi army was manned by a paltry nine thousand men (Rayburn, 2006: 33). Britain had stated at Cairo in 1921 that Iraq would be required under the future Treaty to take on a increased share of its own defence (Ireland, 1937: 312). For Faisal, a conscri ption law would be to honour this obligation. For High Commissioner Dobbs and the wider British administration, conscri ption meant upsetting an intricate web of carefully nurtured alliances with rural tribes who did not want any sort of centralising push from Baghdad Iraq taking a greater share of its defence clearly only went as far as reducing British financial commitments (Paris, 2003: 125). The rural tribes on which the British depended for maintaining order in the countryside made it clear that they would forcefully resist conscri ption the Shi a religious establishment vowed to oppose it as effectively as they had previous Ottoman conscri ption policies, and the Kurds also vehemently opposed the idea (Fuccaro, 1997: 563). Thus from a British perspective there was very little incentive to pursue this policy. Their strategic interests were not affected by a lack of conscri ption, and the resources and troops needed to enforce it would far outweigh any foreseeable benefits. For Faisal however, this policy was a hill worth dying on. The current military agreement with Britain was due to expire in 1928- his goal was to get Iraq recommended for independence at this juncture before a new agreement could be implemented and immediately pass his conscri ption bill. Iraq would be independent and he would be the statesman who had achieved it. In addition, he would posses his own coercive structure with which he could set about consolidating his domestic rule and implementing a pan-Arab state building project. The social capital gained in the nationalist camp by pushing this issue was significant- one admiring source states he did not neglect for one second a pursuit taken in service of his people regarding a more pressing matter: the unification of the Arabs in one nation. (Mud yat al-Di yah wa-al-Idh ah al- mmah, 1945: 127). Conscri ption was a vital issue standing between Faisal and a much wider field of opportunity to undertake a political project beyond the confines of British restrictions.

1922 had represented a tussle for the terms on which the Faisal-British relationship was to be governed. The issue of conscri ption in 1927 however opened the possibility for the client-patron relationship to be terminated altogether if independence was achieved, and something altogether more egalitarian placed in its stead. In June 1927 a conscri ption bill was introduced to parliament at the behest of Faisal and his band of former Ottoman military cadres. It was met with so much opposition from the Kurds, Shi a, and rural tribes that in December 1927 the bill was quietly dropped (Allawi, 2014: 478). Faisal s defeat in passing the conscri ption bill in 1927 represented not a failure in his struggle against the British but rather a key check of his power by domestic constituencies who would not be subjugated to his agenda. This setback did not stop him in his quest to secure Iraqi independence in 1928 however. Directly after his failed conscri ption bill in December 1927, Faisal demanded that Britain recommend Iraq to the League for independence anyway. Dobbs became increasingly frustrated with a king who seemed to sense that independence was an achievable reality, describing him at this point as a Dangerous Neurotic who had promised his constituents a recommendation for Iraqi independence and would now accept nothing less (Sluglett, 2007: 101). An air of brinkmanship came to characterise Faisal s relationship with Dobbs in 1927, with Faisal warning of an uprising if his demands were not met, and Dobbs retorting that Faisal could never maintain the throne without British support. Faisal did not become less assertive after 1926 than he had been in 1921, 1922, and thereafter. Rather the British position became weaker, and so Faisal seemed to secured greater concessions in a shorter space of time. The increasingly important issue of oil security compelled Britain to maintain its position in Iraq, but under the terms of the 1926 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty it seemed independence would come sooner rather than later. With growing appeals from the nationalist constituency to the League of Nations, Faisal sensed that time was on his side and that the British could not seriously follow through on a threat to make him abdicate when independence had been all but promised.

In the event, Britain made some minor concessions to the 1926 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that relaxed oversight in some areas but maintained overall control. Faisal was clearly attempting to push the boundaries of his relationship with the British, confident that with Mosul secured for Iraq and the likelihood of a Turkish invasion drastically reduced, the immediate threats to an independent Iraq had been resolved. Faisal and his clique of Arab nationalist associates were convinced that Britain would not abandon Iraq completely after independence, thus ensuring continued protection in certain key areas of foreign policy and diplomacy. This was an accurate assessment. The web of Royal Air Force bases and supply dumps set up across Iraq in particular were too strategically valuable to abandon, and in a statement to the British parliament then Colonial Secretary Leo Amery had already stated that they would certainly not be disbanded altogether if we left Iraq (Amery, 1926: 2176). Yet in this context of increased leverage, Faisal s relationship with the British was still constrained by the various stipulations of the 1926 Treaty and subsidiary agreements, compounded by his failings regarding conscri ption and Iraqi independence in 1928. What he needed was a structural change, which had not been forthcoming until 1929 with a turnover of government in Britain.

Almost immediately, the new Labour administration declared that it would be recommending Iraq to the League for independence at the next available revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1932 (Tripp, 2002: 64). This was part of a wider evaluation of British colonial relations in the Middle East, reflected in a revised Anglo-Egyptian Treaty signed 1929 (Ireland, 1937: 412). Faisal sensed that this was his moment independence had been promised, he was dealing with a new administration in London, and the likelihood of him being forced to abdicate so shortly before independence was very low. Thus the threat to Faisal s position from 1929 was much less the British and more his domestic opponents, of which he had many. He became anxious therefore to use a British presence in Iraq after independence to safeguard against domestic opponents, but first he needed an official commitment for Britain to do so. This more conciliatory approach to the Residency was reciprocated. The new British administration s relationship with Faisal in 1929 was satisfactory to them the 1920 Revolt had not been repeated, and costs to the British taxpayer had been reduced. They had a much fainter recollection of the vociferous rows between Faisal and the previous administration, and he was much preferable to any other unknown quantity (Paris, 2003: 139). Britain now looked to secure its core interests in Iraq before independence came. The outgoing High Commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs had frequently been engaged in the most bitter of struggles with Faisal over issues such as conscri ption, and a pervading sense of mistrust characterised their relationship by 1929 (Silverfarb, 1982: 232). The incoming High Commissioner was one Sir Francis Humphrys, who was intent on having a good relationship with Faisal (Allawi, 2014: 518). Humphrys understood the changing nature of the interchange between Iraq and Britain, and that Iraq would very likely become independent in 1932. His approach to securing key strategic and economic objectives for Britain was therefore taken in a decidedly less confrontational approach than either Cox or Dobbs. The transfer of genuine authority from British to Iraqi civil servants from 1929 signified that the British were serious about Iraqi independence in 1932 (Ireland, 1937: 417). The fruits of this detente were represented in the negotiation and ratification of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The Treaty contained an affirmation of British commitment to recommend Iraq for independence in 1932 and also preserved British privileges in Iraq after independence came, principally regarding oil exploration and military bases. A key tenet was the provision of arms and advisors to the Iraqi army after 1932, as well as a twenty-five year British-Iraqi alliance (Tripp, 2002: 66). This arrangement was mutually beneficial to both parties, but was especially a victory for Faisal. Whilst claiming to have delivered Arab liberation from colonial rule, he could also use the continued British guarantees to counter major internal and external threats. Thus he saw the Treaty not only as a solid indication that the country was on the verge of political emancipation, but as a signal that, once again, he would be able to pursue his dynastic aspirations in the Arab world. (Shikara: 1987: 88). This was clearly a selfish endeavour, and was not a vision shared by many parts of Iraqi society- the 1930 Treaty was unpopular in many domestic constituencies because of economic and military concessions given to the British (Dawisha, 2009: 17). 1930 was for Faisal the year that he could resume in Iraq where he had left off in Syria a decade earlier he had secured his throne, guaranteed his position through an alliance with Britain, and taken the credit in the nationalist constituency for delivering Iraq from its colonial oppressors.

To conclude, this essay has sought to trace the complex and dynamic relationship between Faisal I of Iraq and the British colonial administration from 1921 to 1930. Becoming king of Iraq by way of a British treaty in 1921 was Faisal s only option to gain the throne he had been promised. From the outset he demonstrated his desire not to be seen as a stooge of the British but as a leader under his own authority. The case of the Wahabbi tribal raids in 1922 and Faisal s swift action to appease enraged rural tribes caught the British off-guard they had not expected their appointee to be so assertive given his recent experience with the French in Syria and subsequent loss of his throne. This incident set the scene for deadlock surrounding the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and demonstrated Faisal s desire to possess his own coercive force. The 1922 Treaty itself was specifically designed to codify British domination into a binding arrangement, and despite Faisal s vigorous opposition, his ultimate deference to British authority characterised an uneven contest. The primary sources included in this study show however that the British were affronted by the upstart king, and seriously considered having him removed if he deviated again after 1922. The discovery of oil in large quantities was a crucial moment. Iraq suddenly became much more important to Britain in and of itself, rather than simply a geo-strategic location on the air route to India. The omnipresent threat of a Turkish invasion to seize Mosul before 1925 demonstrated to Faisal the necessity of having the backing of a superpower in the international arena. He thus encouraged a conciliatory approach to the 1926 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and it was ratified without incident. The most bitter struggle of the 1926-30 period was characterised by the deadlock over conscri ption. It was here that Faisal started to push the boundaries of what was permissibly disobedient, and see some success. That Faisal was able to even propose a draft conscri ption bill in 1927 demonstrates the changed nature of the relationship. Had he done this in 1922, against the expressed wishes of the Residency, he could well have been forced to abdicate. Faisal may have overstretched by demanding independence in 1928, but time was on his side. The change of British administration and subsequent turnover of High Commissioner in 1929 tilted the balance of power significantly in his favour. Ultimately, Britain was always trying to save the remnants of an empire fast disappearing, whereas for Faisal the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty represented a major consolidation of his power vis- -vis the British. Herein lies the paradox however. It was exactly at this moment, when he seemed to have bested the British, that he became anxious to secure at least some form of British presence after independence in anticipation of the domestic battles to come. The relationship was therefore not one characterised purely by either submission or dissent, but a curious blend of the two at different points between 1921 and 1930. Faisal s constant chafing against British control however testifies to a man who had a clear vision of what he wanted to achieve. Despite facing enormous structural constraints, Faisal I of Iraq must be seen as a monarch who successfully walked a tightrope of competing demands for the entire decade covered by this essay. His sensitivity to the usefulness of British support in certain situations versus his open dissent in others shows a remarkable judgement rarely found in Iraqi leadership after his death in 1933.