Does The Existence Of The World Need An Explanation? Discuss With Reference To Any One Version Of The Cosmological Argument.

Cosmological arguments aim to show that the universe is a contingent thing the existence of which is explained by a necessary being identified by theists as God. The version of the argument discussed here is the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) of William Lane Craig which I will argue does not succeed in establishing theism as more rational than atheism. After outlining the rationale of cosmological arguments, the essay will evaluate Craig`s version of the KCA, focussing on the philosophical rather than scientific arguments he uses to support his main premise that the universe began to exist.[1]

The cosmological argument is an answer to the question `why is there something rather than nothing?` It infers from the apparent contingency of the universe an explanation for its existence in a necessary being. The principle is that if something does not contain its own reason or cause for existing, then it must be explained or caused by something else, and something else again, until we arrive at a necessary being that carries within itself the explanation for its existence and the sufficient reason or cause for the existence of all contingent things. By `factual necessity` such a non-contingent being is `eternal, uncaused, indestructible, and incorruptible`.[2] While theists have identified this necessary being as God, atheists have held that there always has been `something` rather than nothing and if a thing does exist by necessity then it is the universe itself. If the cosmological argument can establish the contingency or finiteness of the universe, and by implication its dependence on a necessary being, the case for theism is strengthened. The Kalam Cosmological Argument of William Lane Craig aims to do so from the premise that the universe has a beginning in time. As the KCA is a posteriori, synthetic and inductive, the argument succeeds if it is `formally and informally valid` and `its premises are known to be more plausible than their denials`.[3] It runs as follows:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

2. The universe began to exist.

2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite.

2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.

2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition.

2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
2.22 The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.

3. Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence.[4]

Premise 1), which Craig sees as `relatively non-controversial` due to the `metaphysical intuition that something cannot come out of nothing`, should be granted.[5] Hume argued that the causal principle is not true a priori, but his conceivability to possibility argument is suspect, since even if something is logically conceivable, such as events not having causes, it does not follow that it is metaphysically or factually possible, as Anselm s ontological argument shows.[6] Indeterministic interpretations of Quantum mechanics notwithstanding, the success of science appears to show a posteriori that the causal principle is a true indication of how the world works.[7] However, it could be wondered whether there is possibly anything other than God that might not begin to exist, raising the suspicion that premise 1) is merely a convenient device. For example, Craig`s clarification of the meaning of `cause` as `something which brings about or produces its effect` suggests that he could have opened with the claim `every effect has a cause`, an analytically true statement that takes his argument nowhere.[8]

Premise 2) invites another Humean objection that the universe is not known to be a thing in itself separate from its parts and so should not be thought of as something which has a beginning. Here Hume strays into an unhelpful anti-realism when he argues that thinking of a `whole` is an `arbitrary act of mind` we project onto a set of parts.[9] A bat and a ball can be things in themselves, a bat a weapon for self-defence, a ball a means to exercise the dog, but taken together they can also have a separate ontological status as parts of a game. Similarly, if all elements in the universe are contingent on one another then the totality of interrelated contingent things is reasonably thought of as one thing just as combinations of atoms make up a molecule. It could be objected that unlike its parts the universe is not an observable thing as there is no place from which to view it since it is space-time itself.[10] However, it is not clear why observability makes something a thing in and of itself and it is perfectly comprehensible that this universe might be discernible if not to God then to inter-space travellers on the multiverse hypothesis.

Craig`s substantiation of premise 2) with arguments 2.1 and 2.2 aims to show that an infinitely old universe is a metaphysical impossibility and so must have a beginning. The arguments rely on a distinction between actual and potential infinites ..

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[1] William Lane Craig, `The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe`, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-existence-of-god-and-the-beginning-of-the-universe [accessed 20 March 2015]

[2] William Lane Craig, `The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe`, [accessed 20 March 2015]

[3] William Lane Craig, `A Swift and Simple Refutation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument?`, Religious Studies, 35 (1999) 57-72, p.57

[4] William Lane Craig, `The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe`, [accessed 20 March 2015]

[5] William Lane Craig, `The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe`, [accessed 20 March 2015]

[6] Bruce Reichenbach, `Cosmological Argument`, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#3.4 [accessed 20 March 2015]

[7] Bruce Reichenbach, `Cosmological Argument`, [accessed 20 March 2015]

[8] Michael Lacewing, `The Cosmological Argument`, http://documents.routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A2/Religion/CosmologicalArgument.pdf [accessed 20 March 2015]

[9] Bruce Reichenbach, `Cosmological Argument`, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#3.4 [accessed 20 March 2015]

[10] Dan Crawford, `The Cosmological Argument, Sufficient Reason and Why-Questions`, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11(1980), 111-122, p.116