The Logical Problem Of Evil No Longer Presents A Challenge For Religious Believers, But The Evidential Argument From Evil Cannot Be Overcome. Discuss.

The logical problem of evil and evidential argument from evil are deductive and inductive arguments respectively. The former aims to disprove theism by showing a priori that its conception of God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil, the latter that theism is improbable given the existence of evil or given the greater probable truth of some alternative explanation for evil that is not compatible with theism. I shall argue that the evidential argument does present the greater challenge and that theists need to provide credible evidence for a theodicy if they are to show their position to be more plausible than atheism. After defining terms and stating assumptions I shall examine J.L. Mackie`s formulation of the logical problem of evil and Alvin Plantinga`s free will defence, and then discuss William Rowe`s evidential argument and the extent to which it can be answered by John Hick`s soul-making theodicy.

Theism is defined as belief in an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God who is the creator and sustainer of the universe. Given this standard definition, if the argument for the logical problem of evil is sound then as a deductive argument it is clearly decisive. As an inductive argument the evidential argument from evil succeeds if its conclusion is more probably true than not, but in order to be insurmountable it is assumed that it will have to show theism to be highly improbable. Evils are identified with bad states of affairs that involve suffering, including moral evils brought about by human actions and natural evils arising out of the physical environment. For the purposes of discussion I shall also grant the assumption that God is subject to moral judgment as if He were a member of our ethical community.[1] This means that the theist must mount a defence to argue that the atheist has failed to show that God could not have morally sufficient reasons to cause or allow evil, or offer a theodicy that suggests possible reasons which may at least be part of God`s justification for causing or permitting evil. In doing so, the theist s response to the evidential argument should account for the quantity, distribution and intensity of suffering caused by both moral and natural evils.

Mackie`s formulation of the problem of evil focusses on the logical incompatibility of God`s omnipotence with the existence of evil. However, before we review his argument and Plantinga`s response, we ought to briefly discuss the concept of omnipotence and whether theism is necessarily disproven if Mackie is successful, since there are two senses in which omnipotence can be understood. Absolute omnipotence is entailed in conceiving of God as a perfect being. Although this may be thought to involve the power to perform any task or bring about any state of affairs whatsoever, absolute omnipotence is typically understood to be power with no non-logical limits, since it is incoherent to claim that an omnipotent agent can bring about logically impossible states of affairs.[2] This is the meaning of omnipotence presupposed by Mackie and Plantinga. There is however another meaning that possibly renders Mackie`s argument moot, that of maximal omnipotence or power greater than that of any other being.[3] In this relative sense, if human beings have free will and are the cause of their own actions, then our power to act beyond divine control would not compromise God`s omnipotence, as long as God has more power than any other agent. One can suppose also that a maximally powerful being might extend the scope of its power indirectly by subordinating agents of lesser power to its will, a function which angels, for example, would perform in a theological context. By contrast, an absolutely omnipotent being can be thought capable of exercising complete power directly without the need for such subordinates. The key issue with maximal omnipotence is whether falling short of absolute power would make God any less worthy of worship. One can suppose that if God has the power to create, destroy and recreate the world, resurrect creatures, and have the omniscience to judge lives justly, then He has more than enough power relative to us to be worthy of worship. Moreover, given that maximal omnipotence precludes the possibility that two or more such equally powered beings might exist simultaneously, since a maximal being must be able to exercise whatever power it has without hindrance whenever it wants, it appears that monotheism`s worship of one God could conceivably refer to a maximally rather than absolutely omnipotent being.[4]

However, there are at least two problems with this view. Firstly, if a wholly good maximal being can only act to bring about good states of affairs, with bad states of affairs possibly arising indirectly out of its limitations, then a morally imperfect being that can directly bring about both good and bad states of affairs may be thought to have more power than this wholly good maximal being. Secondly, what are we to make of a wholly good, omniscient and maximally omnipotent being that creates a world in which evils occur completely beyond its control in full knowledge that this would be the case? Theologically, limiting God`s power makes it less plausible that such a being would have other powers necessary for creedal beliefs, such as the power to resurrect. Morally, it undermines the goodness of this being, since the decision to create such a world rather than not create it at all might be thought to be careless or even callous. For example, if I were to make a children`s game that I know is likely to injure players when they make mistakes, it would be morally blameworthy for me to arrange for a child to play this game in a locked room for which I have no key.

If omnipotence, then, is properly thought of in absolute terms, Mackie`s challenge must be answered. In `Evil and Omnipotence`, he argues that a direct contradiction can be deduced from the set of propositions `God is omnipotent`, `God is omniscient`, `God is perfectly good`, and `Evil exists`.[5] The argument can be made in the following way:

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[1] William Hasker, `D. Z. Phillips` problems with evil and with God`, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 61:3 (2007), 151-160, p.155

[2] Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz, `Omnipotence`, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2012 Edition), <&http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/omnipotence/#2>& [accessed 10 June 2015]

[3] Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz, `Omnipotence`, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, [accessed 10 June 2015]

[4] Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz, `Omnipotence`, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, [accessed 10 June 2015] &

[5] J. L. Mackie, `Evil and Omnipotence`, Mind, 64:254 (1955), 200-212, p.200 &