Sankhyan Dualism

How coherent is the S khyan doctrine of the teleological evolution of an insensate universe, without God, for the liberation of the self?

The Sankhyan doctrine posits a teleological evolution of an insensate universe that is coherent until the matter of free will and the path of liberation is considered. I will first begin by addressing the concern that by positing a theory of substance that renders events inherently contained in, and thus determined by, their causes the inquiry into terminating (Moore 1967) suffering is in fact fruitless. By establishing such determinism it is impossible to consider the self as a moral agent that can accumulate karmic merit, or demerit, autonomously. From there it will be appropriate to assess how it is the Sankhya School solves this dilemma by expounding the two ontological units of prakrti and purusa. That is, how is it the substratum of experience can account for a chain of causal events in which the self can embark the particular karmic path it wishes, whilst respecting the claim that with every event the effect exists in the cause to which it follows. It will become apparent that the analogies proposed to demonstrate such a relationship between the self and the universe are untenable when liberation is considered. Namely, the concept of a moral agent is entirely incoherent where the agent is unproductive. Having assessed pivotal analogies I will offer an analysis to why the analogies, a key form of argumentation for the Sankhyan position, fail to provide a substantial motive to accept their ontology.

As stated in the introduction it will be necessary to examine the relation between the ontological units proposed by Sankhya in order conclude whether such entities can exists harmoniously without contradiction. Granted verse 9 such that the effect is existent in the cause, concerns regarding free will are unavoidably raised. How can it be such that the totality of an effect is contained within its cause, in one form or another, and yet we are able to seek liberation with what could be considered to be our own moral choices. It may be argued to the contrary, that this particular notion of causality advocated does not necessarily instantiate determinism. However, until it is clarified otherwise, to say the effect is inherent in the cause is to admit to a form of determinism argued for in A. J. Ayer s Freedom and Necessity (Chalmers 2002). The belief that every event is determined by its cause attributes my decision to meditate, through which I will be able to instantiate the dissolution of nature, to the initial conditions of the universe not to whatever can be considered to be the self. In other words, it will be the initial cause in which all following effects will inhere in. It could be claimed that the Sankhya doctrine implicitly adheres to a compatibilist view of free will and determinism. That is, the doctrine accepts a deterministic view of the universe in which the initial conditions wholly dictate the outcome of the system, and yet reserves a definition of free will which can be ascribed to individuals, who although are determined by prior circumstances, can be still accredited with free will. As long as one is not constrained from engaging in what would be considered to be what they are designed to do they are not bound but free. Whatever the criteria might be for such a compatibilist free will, it still nonetheless comes into contradiction with their first verse which claims the inquiry into liberation is not fruitless . Why embark upon the path of liberation when it has already been determined from the very moment the universe began whether one will be released from bondage or not. In fact, with accordance to the deterministic outlook suggested by verse 9, one s decision to even embark on the path has been decided for him. With the moral path of the individual, although unknowingly, laid out ahead in concrete how can one act as a moral agent wholly responsible for his actions. In order to reconcile verse 9 with their conception of karma the Sankhyan doctrine must establish a system of causal interactions which allows room for whatever is considered to be the self to make an autonomous judgment and decision. To assess whether a successful move is made to establish a system coherent with the concept of liberation we must next examine the units of which the universe is claimed to constitute of.

The groundwork of the Sankhyan metaphysics are expressed in verses 10 and 11. The former introducing the distinction between manifest and unmanifest nature, both modes of nature, and the latter introducing purusa, an entity considered to be the self. Taking verse 10:

The evolved is caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, mobile, manifold, dependent, mergent, conjuct and heteronomous the unevolved is the reverse of all these

The distinction the Sankhyakarika intends to expose can be summarised to that of permanence and impermanence hence the evolved and unevolved. Whilst manifest nature is under evolution, which we grasp with every qualitative experience, including the blueness of the sky, the greenness of grass and even the thought and feelings that accompany such perceptions, the unmanifest is not. Unmanifest nature, or prakrti, is eternal and thus non-changing. For something to be eternal, according to Sankhya, it cannot undergo any form of change, otherwise that entity cannot be claimed to be what it originally was. So with this distinction somewhat explicated unmanifest nature can be understood to stand as the ultimate cause of the continually evolving universe, or manifest nature. In other words, the prakrti exists as the independent cause from which manifest nature arises. However, they should not be confused as distinct entities. They are in fact one and the same thing, nature, and yet they are the two different modes through nature is to be expressed. The unevolved being the substratum, or the uncaused, and the evolved being everything which essentially is derived from the substratum, nonetheless both exist as one Nature. Although this distinction is important in clarifying the properties of prakrti, the manifest plays a somewhat less pivotal role in the discussion for the telic evolution of an insensate universe. So it will be unnecessary to compare it to the other fundamental constituent of our conscious experience, purusa, even though it is still referred to in verse 11, which claims:

The manifest is with the three attributes, undistinguishable, objective, common, insentient and productive. So also is Nature. The spirit is the reverse, and yet also similar.

Purusa, or the spirit as it is referred to in the text, is said to be the reverse of the properties attributed to Nature. By doing so the Sankhyakarika invites us to draw a dichotomy between purusa and prakrti. Whilst prakrti exists as the underlying cause to the objective nature of the universe, purusa exists as the subject which comes to experience this productive, and therefore efficient, prakrti. Prakrti is known by purusa, and not vice versa. It can be seen how this thus implies insentience to prakrti and sentience to purusa. With the dichotomy between the object and subject falling along the lines of knowing and being known, it must then follow that the subject must possess some form of sentience to come to know what is capable of being known. However, there are aspects of which they share, as suggested by verse 11. That is eternality, independence, and all the properties that prakrti is said to possess in opposition of manifest nature as expressed in verse 10.

With the fundamental constituents of the metaphysics laid out, our concerns pertaining to causality can now be addressed. So where the spirit is deemed to constitute the self, undifferentiated and partless, it seeks liberation, which is claimed by the Sankhyakarika to be achieved through discriminative knowledge of what is in fact the self, purusa, and what is not, prakrti. This discriminative knowledge, obtained through practises reflective of such an attitude, dissolves the apparent bondage between the knowing subject and the known object. A spirit devoid of the attributes associated with prakrti in verse 11 would suggest that although effects are existent in the cause, it is not the same causality that we observe in nature which manifests itself to us from which a moderate form of determinism could be established. That there is an essence in which the effect inheres in the cause for the distinctive purusa, but not necessarily one that resembles the strict physical laws we see to be exhibited by nature. Therefore, dissolving any concerns that free will is rendered illusionary with the initial conditions of the universe determining every event to have ever passed. However, to conclude with such a line of argument would be to construe the relationship between purusa and prakrti without care. Sankhya, although a form of dualism, is not positing a mind-body dualism reminiscent to that of Descartes. It is not the theory of two substance where one if freed from strict correlations observed, and thus freed from determinism, by merely existing as a non-physical entity, whatever that may mean. It is necessary to refer to verse 42 to really come to terms what is in fact this knowing subject that Sankhya speaks of:

Formed for the sake of the spirit s purpose the subtle body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of causes and effects and by un ion with the all-embracing power of Nature

So where the subtle body does not form the self, but acts under the all embracing power of prakrti, it can be understood to be the entity in which mental events, which are also subjected to the connection of causes and effects , inhere in. Verse 41 elucidates the claim that cognitive apparatus cannot exist without structure to inhere in. Although somewhat unintuitive we can take this granted as this is not our aim to differentiate between the different forms in which Nature exists but further break down this notion of the self. So with the cognitive apparatus and the subtle body in which it inheres in understood to be nature, we are left with only a single thing to which we can attribute the self consciousness. This should not be misunderstood to be anything but the I that knows. Where emotions such as anger are instantiated by angering sights, for example a personal attack on one s perceived body, the causal events that lead to that particular emotion are brought about by modifications of nature. The emotion, being instantiated by nature, can thus be deemed to be also part of nature in that it follows the causal chain of modifications of manifest nature rendering it non-eternal. Whereas the self, undifferentiated and unproductive, sits as an eternal spectator to the drama of the subtle bodies, only moved by its actions until the veil of apparent bondage is lifted.

In light of the self being eternal, such that it is not subjected to the modifications of cause and effect present in nature, concerns regarding the constraints that determinism poses are absolved. There, however, now exists a greater concern. It might well be that the determinism nature is deemed to possess does not directly affect the self, but if wholly unproductive and inefficient how is that the self can seek salvation. Verse 20 states:

Thus from the union, the insentient evolute appears as if sentient and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the attributes, the spirit, which is neutral, appears as it were active

Which gives us some insight into the relation between the self and prakrti, the very medium through which one can attain liberation. That is, by considering that some sort of un ion does exist between the seer and the doer maybe it is possible to see how liberation can be attained by the self. However, no substantial explanation is offered from Sankhyan camp. Only that the body, which the self pertains a special relationship to, appears to be sentient. The appearance of sentience does not allocate any causal power to the self, and again we are faced with the problem of how a mere spectator can instigate the dissolution of the apparent bondage. The following verse attempts to shed light on this matter with an analogy of that of a blind man and a lame man. Where the blind man acts as the doer and the lame man as literally the seer all that can be established is the dichotomy between the object and the subject nothing is clarified in regards to any relationship that may exist. As the blind man navigates through the world, performing actions unknowingly much like the insensate prakrti, he surely cannot function without some prior instruction to how it is he ought to act. No such relationship between the two men can be claimed to exist until some sort of causal process between the two entities is instantiated. This direct means of causality between purusa and prakrti is exactly what the sankhyan doctrine is trying to refute so an analogy concerning two sentient creatures does a disservice to the sankhyan doctrine the teleological evolution of an insensate universe for liberation of the self. So although the analogy proves useful in cementing the polar nature of prakrti and purusa, it would be useful to look at verse 57:

As the insentient milk flows out of the growth of the calf so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the spirit

This verse seeks to clarify the manner in which prakrti evolves, that is, to serve the spirit towards the end goal of emancipation. Whilst the milk, insentient and without motivation, is produced unconsciously in the udder of the mother, it then without effort, or reasoning, that it moves to the tip to nourish the calf as it places its mouth on the udder. Prakrti evolves in the same fashion. It does so without conscious effort for the sake of the spirit. It could be claimed that conscious motive is needed for the dramatic actor to be moved to seek salvation for the spectator. However, this would be to assume that every directed goal must be underpinned by some conscious motive, which is exactly what the analogy is trying to refute. It must be remembered that subtle body in which the dramatic actor inheres is not sentient, but in fact only appears to be sentient. So there still exists a motive, which is the liberation of the self, albeit an unconscious one.

But to grant the Sankhyan position with this concept of a teleological universe without examining what is in fact exactly occurs when the milk flows to the mouth of the calf would be rash. So the milk is first produced unconsciously by the evolutionary drive of the mother to satisfy her young such to ensure they become healthy adults a position from which they can continue the cycle of gene propagation. The series of causal events can be taken even further back to say the existence of the calf instantiates the production of milk in the mother. When the calf performs the action of bringing its mouth to the tip of the udder it is only then the milk begins to flow. Otherwise, the milk would be continually flowing. With the calf assumed to be conscious by the analogy, it is thus demonstrated that the milk does not flow, goal directed and yet unconscious, without any influence from that of the calf. That is, the decision of the calf to seek milk renders the milk to flow. Conversely, it could be argued that it is the presence of the milk that draws the calf to milk. So it may seem that calf conjures a conscious effort to seek the milk, but this seeking is in fact brought about by the presence of the milk. That without any conscious effort the milk begins a causal process in which the calf is drawn to the udder by it s very own potentiality. Although the analogy serves well in showing that the notion of a goal, such as the nourishment of the spirit, being performed by an unconscious entity is not wholly incoherent, it still fails to stand on solid ground. That it certainly depends on too many contingent factors dependent on what one considers to be a goal directed action. That is, at what point does the milk serve the purpose of the calf. Is it the moment it flows or is it the moment it attracts the calf to the udder. By positing mere potentiality as a goal one is warranted to take the chain of causal events even further back. That is the systems in the cow that instantiated the presence of the milk, or in other words, produced the milk, can be accredited with the goal of nourishing the calf. Systems belonging to the cow, for example its drive for reproduction, which allows the possibility of the production of the milk can also be then deemed to possess the goal of nourishment. It is those very systems that brought about the milk which can then be deemed to bring about the potentiality of milk. It now becomes clear that by claiming anything more than conscious action to be goal directed would to be fall into an infinite regress. It may seem somewhat unfair to break down the analogy so vigorously as they often simply serve metaphorical purposes in philosophical discussion. However, it is must be noted that analogies, according to the Sankhyan system, serve as one of the fundamental means of knowledge as states in verses 4 to 8. When inference from perception is unavailable, in the case of the supernatural for example, analogy can be used to infer conclusions.

Even though the one substantial analogy used to argue for the teleological nature of the universe stands rather unconvincing, we can still take this point for granted to see how the system still runs into problems concerning the path to liberation. So an insensate yet teleological universe forces us to reconsider our intuitive notion of free will. Such that we have to construe a form of free will that claims that others can seek salvation for us and that these actions of others would in itself constitute a righteous path. Although initially this may seem profoundly counter-intuitive, verses 60 to 66 explain how such a relationship underpinned by the search of liberation for the other can exist by use of analogy. The analogy proposed Prakrti be considered as a dancer, whilst purusa as a spectator. The dancer performs, in the same way as the dramatic actor is suggested to do in verse 42, for the spectator, that is, for the goal of enjoyment achieved through the liberation of the spirit. The performance of the dancer preoccupies the spectator, a metaphor seeking to elucidate the state of ignorance we live in consumed by common experiences which we believe to define to us. It is only once the dancer is uncovered for what she is, that is, only being sentient in appearance, that the spectator becomes aware of this misidentification of the self with nature. Then with her self exposed does the dancer only then desist. Verse 66 explains how although there still exists a connection between prakrti and purusa, in that the subject comes to continually know the object through the experiences of the subtle body, this connection, however, becomes unproductive in producing this misidentification. That prakrti ceases to evolve in that its purpose to liberate the soul has finally been achieved. This analogy does well to demonstrate how such a misidentification can exist. It also clearly explains the relationship between the two entities, where one is wholly productive in bringing about the effect in question, in this case that of misidentification, and the other can still absolve the effect through acknowledging its existence. This is portrayed by the fact that it is the dancer that shows herself to the spectator, not the spectator undressing the dancer. Shedding much needed light on how it is that this misidentification can be dissolved the analogy is most certainly helpful. However, when compared with the

literal means of ridding oneself from bondage, as exemplified in verse 64, this analogy breaks down. If one is merely the knowing subject, how can he decide upon reading the Sankhyakarika to embark on a path of devotion the repeated study of truth. Nature s evolution only exists for the liberation of the spirit and yet the spirit does not instantiate it. So, to claim that this evolution can be brought to a halt with action from the knowing subject is to contradict the very nature of the spirit.

The root of the problem with the Sankhyan system essentially lies in its acceptance of analogy as a valid means of knowledge. The purely metaphorical nature of these analogies, although greatly helpful in conceiving of the proposed concept, often fail to grasp what is trying to be established with the precision required to render it tenable. They merely facilitate the reader in understanding what is being suggested, but do not grasp the truth in its entirety. This is not to deny that we couch our scientific beliefs in impersonal idioms that act as metaphors. For example, to claim that an electron exists as it is modelled in scientific theory, as a colourless sphere resembling something like that of a billiard ball, is to take its quantifiably observed properties and to assemble with them a concept we already possess and see most fitting in this case a colourless billiard ball. It could be argued that the whole point of these analogies is to capture supernatural entities impossible to conceive of precisely with the language concepts that we have at our disposal. It certainly makes sense to say something outside of this world cannot be defined with concepts that pertain to this world, but to posit entirely unquantifiable abstract entities even in the first place which can never have their evolution empirically verified seems wholly superfluous. It may be because the Sankhyan system considers the evolution of nature as purely a supernatural matter, but I think this is done out of choice rather than logical necessity. For example, the evolution of nature from verses 22 to 38 certainly provide a self-consistent and somewhat poetic way in which prakrti evolves teleologically for the sake of the spirit, but not a single step, or even the order in which it occurs, is verifiable. To wholly capture the lack of methodological pragmatism preached by Sankhya we simply need to refer back to verse 20 in which the subtle body is claimed to appear sentient. This argumentation is rife in the doctrine, that is, the line that everything is not what it in fact appears to be. Empirically untouchable the doctrine is difficult to refute outright, but then again what reason do we have to accept it if it can only be explained with vague analogies within a self-consistent metaphysical system resting on the untestable claim that their exists this misidentification of the self.

There exists a wealth of problems with the Sankhyan doctrine which I have not addressed. For example the problem of the plurality of selves in which it is argued how can one self be different from another if there exists no attributes with which each particular self can be distinctively defined. What makes one self different from another if everything we once used to differentiate ourselves from others supposedly belongs to nature. Although this is beyond the scope of my essay it has still, nonetheless, been demonstrated that system cannot be defended even granting the fundamental presumption that there exists a misidentification of the self instantiated, maintained and dissolved by nature. The concerns that the effect being inherent in the cause would render the individual s will to the mercy of the initial conditions of the universe were brushed aside by the introduction of an undifferentiated self distinct from that of nature. But that move in itself posed the problem how could an unproductive self instantiate practises geared towards liberation? Practises preached by verse 64 just appear to be modifications of nature and yet these modifications are wholly independent, or distinct, from the self that comes to know them. With no serious explanation to how such a relationship could possibly be conducive to forming the path of liberation, an inquiry supposed to be bountiful by the initial verse, one is forced to turn to the analogies for clarification. Although helpful, the analogies, as explained are so metaphorical that they simply add poetic vivacity to how the conception of a relation between that of prakrti and purusa may be construed. They certainly do not clarify, metaphysically speaking, how it is possible to establish a path of liberation willed by the individual. This inability to formulate concrete points concerning these matters is due to what they consider to be epistemically fruitful means of argumentation. The degree to which analogies are used are debilitating to their cause such to form a doctrine that may be complex and arguably coherent within their own epistemic scheme, but certainly arbitrary and methodologically deficient. It can thus be concluded that the Sankhyan doctrine of the teleological evolution of an insensate universe, without God, for the liberation of the self is incoherent.

Bibliography

Chalmers, David J. 2002. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OUP USA.

Moore, SarvePalli Radhakrishhan and Charles A. Moore. 1967. A sourcbook in Indian Philosophy. Princeton