Critically Assess The Equal Weight View

Introduction

The field of epistemology that deals with the question of disagreement is populated by two families of contrasting views: conformism and nonconformism . In the former set, among the most popular scholars we find Adam Elga, proponent of the equal weight view . The focus of this paper is to explore the equal weight view and to assess its validity. The first section of this paper deals with the task of defining the equal weight view and a broad non-conformist position. We will not spend a considerable time looking at nonconformism. The second section presents readers with a criticism of the equal weight view and with an alternative approach to disagreement based on a blend of conformism and nonconformism. We will focus on disagreement in controversial issues (philosophy, politics and morality) rather than on disagreement on perception and arithmetic.

Section One

As per conformist views, disagreement has a vital epistemic significance. In a nutshell, according to the equal weight view in instances of disagreement, when you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you should give her conclusions the same weight as your own (Elga, 2007:487). With the term epistemic peer , Elga refers to a person who is our equal in terms of exposure to the evidence, intelligence, freedom from bias, etc (Christensen, 2009:756). In his paper Reflection and Disagreement, Elga argues that the rejection of the equal weight view leads to absurdity: the absurdity that you could reasonably come to believe yourself to be an epistemic superior to an advisor simply by noting cases of disagreement with her, and taking it that she made most of the mistakes (Elga, 2007:495). In virtue of (a) the epistemic importance of disagreement and (b) the fact that we should consider our epistemic peer just as likely as we are to be correct, the equal weight view often requires one to be moved a fair it by dissenting opinion (far more than most of us in fact tend to be moved) (Elga, 2007:495). In other words, we should defer to an advisor in proportion of your prior probability that the advisor would be correct in case of disagreement (Elga, 2007:495).

To illustrate how the equal weight view works in practice, Elga provides examples on how to deal with disagreement in different cases. This paper will present cases of dissent on perception,arithmetic problems and what Elga labels messy examples of real-world disagreement about hard issues (Elga: 2007,492). The case of perceptual disagreement involves two friends watching a horse race and you become confident that Horse A won, and your friend becomes equally confident that Horse B won (Elga, 2007:486) . In this instance, Elga believes it would be absurd to think that you are more likely to be correct than your friend, especially when you and your friend have watched a long series of races together. In this case, the fact that you have watched multiple races in the company of your friend, qualifies him as your epistemic peer and puts you in the position of according equal weight to her view. Similarly, in disagreement on an arithmetic problem, we count someone as an epistemic peer basing our evaluation on such factors as your friend s mathematical track record, what sort of training she has had, and so on. It need not be based on any particular view on the value of 5243324 x 922 (Elga, 2007: 492). Again, in this instance of disagreement, we must consider our friend as likely as we are to be correct, provided that she qualifies as an epistemic peer.

The examples we have looked at so far present disagreement about issues where it is possible to find a correct answer. For instance, in the case of perceptual disaccord the two friends could look at the official monitor and in the case of arithmetic disagreement they could check their results on a calculator and through these simple procedures of external checking the issue of disagreement would be settled. In addition, the outcome of a race or the result of an arithmetic problem are not questions on which we have a value-laden judgment. This cannot be said about disagreement on topics such as politics and philosophy, as these topics are all about value-laden judgments. Elga shows awareness of this issue which ultimately constitutes the existential difference between perceptual and mathematic disaccord and disagreement on areas that do not, and cannot, have an objective answer. Elga writes that in controversial issues, one s reasoning about the disputed issue is tangled up with one s reasoning about many other matters (Elga, 2007: 492). In virtue of this, the understanding of what constitutes an epistemic peer changes, because the condition of freedom from bias cannot be satisfied, as the very nature of thorny issues prevents us from doing so. Elga presents his readers with an example of two friends disagreeing on the issue of abortion, Ann and Beth. They have talked about similar topics, and they have always reached different conclusions and according to Ann, Beth is wrong. Due to their constant disagreement on related issues, does Ann think Beth would be just as likely as her to get things right? The answer is no (Elga, 2007: 493). Hence, Elga claims with respect to many controversial issues, the associates who one counts as peers tend to have views that are similar to one s own (Elga, 2007: 494). If this condition of basic agreement on certain issues is not satisfied, we should not count them as epistemic peers and if that is the case, we should not be swayed in their direction after becoming aware of their different position. More than that, Elga maintains that if you think that your friend has been consistently enough mistaken about allied issues, then the equal weight view requires you to become more confident in your initial conclusion once you find out that she disagrees (Elga, 2007: 493).

Having outlined a position belonging to the conformist tradition, we will now briefly consider nonconformism. According to the proponents of this view, disagreement itself can be wholly without epistemic significance thus, one can continue to rationally believe that p despite the fact that one s epistemic peer explicitly believes that not-p (Lackey, 2010: 299). At this point, it is easy to see why conformism and nonconformism are diametrically opposed. According to the former, disagreement possess a crucial epistemic value and following the latter, disagreement can possess no epistemic value. Conformism upholds the view that we should consider our epistemic peer as likely as we are to be correct, and in virtue of this we should sway in the direction of her position. On the other hand, a nonconformist position maintains that substantial doxastic revision in the face of peer disagreement is never justified merely by virtue of equal weight being given to my own beliefs and to those held by my epistemic peers (Lackey, 2010: 289). Therefore, while conformism encourages a chameleonic approach in the face of disagreement, nonconformism encourages steadfastness.

Section Two

The equal weight view seems to be effective in cases of perceptual and arithmetic disagreement. This is because in those cases disagreement is necessarily short lived. We will eventually find the evidence we need to settle the case by checking the arithmetic result on a calculator or by checking an official result of the horse race to know which horse won. In these instances, to accord equal weight to our point of view and that of our opponent, seems the most unproblematic course of action. Ascribing equal weight to our stances is a practice that takes place as we wait to seek the external view point needed to settle the issue. Clearly, this is possible in cases like perception and arithmetic because we can ultimately find out which horse won the race or the result of 25 x 3. Hence, our condition of disagreement is temporary, not existential. However, it is hard to say the same about debates on controversial issues. A debate between a communist and a fascist is existential and no external evidence could possibly settle their disagreement.

It is important to note that Elga slightly adjusts the requirements what constitutes an epistemic peer in exchanges that have controversial issues as a subject matter. The fact that we should only consider as epistemic peers those who have similar views to ours makes them more like epistemic clones. It then becomes perplexing how epistemic clones relative to a question can even be engaged in disagreement (Lackey, 2010: 311). Furthermore, it strips these issues of all the interesting features they posses. Imagine a debate about international politics. Elga would consider epistemic peers two proponents of liberalism, one on the side of neoliberalism and the other on classical liberalism. However, by Elga s scheme, a liberalist should not consider a realist as an epistemic peer. Therefore, by adopting this narrower view of what constitutes an epistemic peer, Elga is emasculating disagreement. Even though a proponent of neoliberalism and classical liberalism may disagree on some things they do share a meta-consensus. This is not the case with a liberalist and a realist. Hence, a debate between two proponents of more or less the same view, loses the meaning of what a real discussion should look like. It would be a mere parody of real debate, for the two parties lack essential antagonism. Prima facie, the equal weight view seems promising in virtue of the fact that it values disagreement highly and for this reason, we would expect it to encourage a certain diff rence of opinion given that we have seen in the examples of perceptual and arithmetic disagreement. However, as we have seen, it seems to exclude from thorny debates those who do not share the same assumptions, ultimately emasculating disagreement on controversial issues.

At this point we should ask whether it would have made a difference if Elga did not amend his definition of epistemic peers in regards to controversial issues. The answer to that question is no. Elga does not specify the point to which we should concede to our opponent. If the answer to that question is unclear in mathematical and perceptual cases, it is even less so in controversial issues. Where should we draw the doxastic revision line ? If two epistemic peers disagree, and the equal weight view required them to be moved one in the direction of the other, without specifying how much they should concede, what would their revised views look like? Should the change in position be temporary? Elga gives no answer to these questions. He claims that we should defer to an advisor in proportion of your prior probability that the advisor would be correct in case of disagreement (Elga, 2007:495). That answer is still too vague and does not present a viable solution.

To continue, we can argue that Elga s understanding of an epistemic peer in messy real world cases is too demanding. It is not clear how an epistemic peer in controversial discussions should be someone with whom we share a meta-consensus. It is sufficient to have as an epistemic peer someone who shares the same preparation that we do on the given topic, but whether she agrees with us on certain issues should have no bearing on her qualification as an epistemic peer. A proponent of the equal weight view could claim that the understanding of the epistemic peer does not shift in cases of controversial issues, as even in arithmetic and perception we count as an epistemic peer someone with whom we share a history of agreement. For that reason we should expect the same in cases of disagreement on controversial issues. In response to that, we could claim that although this is sensible in maths and perception, because we have the comforting thought that we will eventually find the true answer, the same cannot be said about controversial issues. In the latter cases, disagreement is vital to avoid not only the polarisation of the debate, but also to allow the disciplines to exist. Would nonconformism be more effective as a position on the epistemology of disagreement? Arguably, the first premise on which it is based is not encouraging, in the sense that is hard to see why disagreement possess no inherent epistemic value. However, in light of what we have seen about the equal weight view, it seems to put forward a more convincing strategy regarding the course of action to take once we become aware of disagreement.

This puts us on the right track to make a suggestion about a new approach to philosophical, ethical and political disagreement, that is a blend between conformism and nonconformism. According to this hybrid view, we should recognise the importance of disagreement, in virtue of its inherent value as a vital part of political, philosophical and ethical debate. It is not only difficult to imagine these disciplines without disagreement, but it is also highly undesirable. The hybrid view advocates consensus on the importance of disagreement itself, but ultimately it leaves the participants of the debate free to disagree and free to continue believing in what they did before engaging in discussion. Of course, dissent is of crucial importance, and participants to the debate should always listen to what the other has to say, but if they still think that their view is stronger (because of the arguments they advance and not because their view is their own view), they must be left free to retain that opinion. Hence, according to this approach, if Ann and Beth have a history of disagreement, but still enjoy debating because they find each other s argumentation style interesting and each other s points thought provoking, they should still engage in discussion, even if they do not agree. This does not mandate Beth to change her opinion moving in the direction of Ann s view, but it requires Beth to be reasonable and listen to what Ann has to say.

Conclusion

To conclude, this paper aimed at providing its readers with an overview of Adam Elga s equal weight view and assessing its validity. It reached the conclusion that the equal weight view is effective in instances where disagreement is temporary, but problematic in cases where disagreement is existential. Furthermore, it provided its readers with a different approach to the question of disagreement and what to do in such instances. The system it presented is a blend of conformism and nonconformism, that takes the basic premise of conformism viz. that disagreement possess a crucial epistemic value, and the rejection of doxastic belief revision presented by nonconformism.

Introduction

The field of epistemology that deals with the question of disagreement is populated by two families of contrasting views: conformism and nonconformism . In the former set, among the most popular scholars we find Adam Elga, proponent of the equal weight view . The focus of this paper is to explore the equal weight view and to assess its validity. The first section of this paper deals with the task of defining the equal weight view and a broad non-conformist position. We will not spend a considerable time looking at nonconformism. The second section presents readers with a criticism of the equal weight view and with an alternative approach to disagreement based on a blend of conformism and nonconformism. We will focus on disagreement in controversial issues (philosophy, politics and morality) rather than on disagreement on perception and arithmetic.

Section One

As per conformist views, disagreement has a vital epistemic significance. In a nutshell, according to the equal weight view in instances of disagreement, when you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you should give her conclusions the same weight as your own (Elga, 2007:487). With the term epistemic peer , Elga refers to a person who is our equal in terms of exposure to the evidence, intelligence, freedom from bias, etc (Christensen, 2009:756). In his paper Reflection and Disagreement, Elga argues that the rejection of the equal weight view leads to absurdity: the absurdity that you could reasonably come to believe yourself to be an epistemic superior to an advisor simply by noting cases of disagreement with her, and taking it that she made most of the mistakes (Elga, 2007:495). In virtue of (a) the epistemic importance of disagreement and (b) the fact that we should consider our epistemic peer just as likely as we are to be correct, the equal weight view often requires one to be moved a fair it by dissenting opinion (far more than most of us in fact tend to be moved) (Elga, 2007:495). In other words, we should defer to an advisor in proportion of your prior probability that the advisor would be correct in case of disagreement (Elga, 2007:495).

To illustrate how the equal weight view works in practice, Elga provides examples on how to deal with disagreement in different cases. This paper will present cases of dissent on perception,arithmetic problems and what Elga labels messy examples of real-world disagreement about hard issues (Elga: 2007,492). The case of perceptual disagreement involves two friends watching a horse race and you become confident that Horse A won, and your friend becomes equally confident that Horse B won (Elga, 2007:486) . In this instance, Elga believes it would be absurd to think that you are more likely to be correct than your friend, especially when you and your friend have watched a long series of races together. In this case, the fact that you have watched multiple races in the company of your friend, qualifies him as your epistemic peer and puts you in the position of according equal weight to her view. Similarly, in disagreement on an arithmetic problem, we count someone as an epistemic peer basing our evaluation on such factors as your friend s mathematical track record, what sort of training she has had, and so on. It need not be based on any particular view on the value of 5243324 x 922 (Elga, 2007: 492). Again, in this instance of disagreement, we must consider our friend as likely as we are to be correct, provided that she qualifies as an epistemic peer.

The examples we have looked at so far present disagreement about issues where it is possible to find a correct answer. For instance, in the case of perceptual disaccord the two friends could look at the official monitor and in the case of arithmetic disagreement they could check their results on a calculator and through these simple procedures of external checking the issue of disagreement would be settled. In addition, the outcome of a race or the result of an arithmetic problem are not questions on which we have a value-laden judgment. This cannot be said about disagreement on topics such as politics and philosophy, as these topics are all about value-laden judgments. Elga shows awareness of this issue which ultimately constitutes the existential difference between perceptual and mathematic disaccord and disagreement on areas that do not, and cannot, have an objective answer. Elga writes that in controversial issues, one s reasoning about the disputed issue is tangled up with one s reasoning about many other matters (Elga, 2007: 492). In virtue of this, the understanding of what constitutes an epistemic peer changes, because the condition of freedom from bias cannot be satisfied, as the very nature of thorny issues prevents us from doing so. Elga presents his readers with an example of two friends disagreeing on the issue of abortion, Ann and Beth. They have talked about similar topics, and they have always reached different conclusions and according to Ann, Beth is wrong. Due to their constant disagreement on related issues, does Ann think Beth would be just as likely as her to get things right? The answer is no (Elga, 2007: 493). Hence, Elga claims with respect to many controversial issues, the associates who one counts as peers tend to have views that are similar to one s own (Elga, 2007: 494). If this condition of basic agreement on certain issues is not satisfied, we should not count them as epistemic peers and if that is the case, we should not be swayed in their direction after becoming aware of their different position. More than that, Elga maintains that if you think that your friend has been consistently enough mistaken about allied issues, then the equal weight view requires you to become more confident in your initial conclusion once you find out that she disagrees (Elga, 2007: 493).

Having outlined a position belonging to the conformist tradition, we will now briefly consider nonconformism. According to the proponents of this view, disagreement itself can be wholly without epistemic significance thus, one can continue to rationally believe that p despite the fact that one s epistemic peer explicitly believes that not-p (Lackey, 2010: 299). At this point, it is easy to see why conformism and nonconformism are diametrically opposed. According to the former, disagreement possess a crucial epistemic value and following the latter, disagreement can possess no epistemic value. Conformism upholds the view that we should consider our epistemic peer as likely as we are to be correct, and in virtue of this we should sway in the direction of her position. On the other hand, a nonconformist position maintains that substantial doxastic revision in the face of peer disagreement is never justified merely by virtue of equal weight being given to my own beliefs and to those held by my epistemic peers (Lackey, 2010: 289). Therefore, while conformism encourages a chameleonic approach in the face of disagreement, nonconformism encourages steadfastness.

Section Two

The equal weight view seems to be effective in cases of perceptual and arithmetic disagreement. This is because in those cases disagreement is necessarily short lived. We will eventually find the evidence we need to settle the case by checking the arithmetic result on a calculator or by checking an official result of the horse race to know which horse won. In these instances, to accord equal weight to our point of view and that of our opponent, seems the most unproblematic course of action. Ascribing equal weight to our stances is a practice that takes place as we wait to seek the external view point needed to settle the issue. Clearly, this is possible in cases like perception and arithmetic because we can ultimately find out which horse won the race or the result of 25 x 3. Hence, our condition of disagreement is temporary, not existential. However, it is hard to say the same about debates on controversial issues. A debate between a communist and a fascist is existential and no external evidence could possibly settle their disagreement.

It is important to note that Elga slightly adjusts the requirements what constitutes an epistemic peer in exchanges that have controversial issues as a subject matter. The fact that we should only consider as epistemic peers those who have similar views to ours makes them more like epistemic clones. It then becomes perplexing how epistemic clones relative to a question can even be engaged in disagreement (Lackey, 2010: 311). Furthermore, it strips these issues of all the interesting features they posses. Imagine a debate about international politics. Elga would consider epistemic peers two proponents of liberalism, one on the side of neoliberalism and the other on classical liberalism. However, by Elga s scheme, a liberalist should not consider a realist as an epistemic peer. Therefore, by adopting this narrower view of what constitutes an epistemic peer, Elga is emasculating disagreement. Even though a proponent of neoliberalism and classical liberalism may disagree on some things they do share a meta-consensus. This is not the case with a liberalist and a realist. Hence, a debate between two proponents of more or less the same view, loses the meaning of what a real discussion should look like. It would be a mere parody of real debate, for the two parties lack essential antagonism. Prima facie, the equal weight view seems promising in virtue of the fact that it values disagreement highly and for this reason, we would expect it to encourage a certain diff rence of opinion given that we have seen in the examples of perceptual and arithmetic disagreement. However, as we have seen, it seems to exclude from thorny debates those who do not share the same assumptions, ultimately emasculating disagreement on controversial issues.

At this point we should ask whether it would have made a difference if Elga did not amend his definition of epistemic peers in regards to controversial issues. The answer to that question is no. Elga does not specify the point to which we should concede to our opponent. If the answer to that question is unclear in mathematical and perceptual cases, it is even less so in controversial issues. Where should we draw the doxastic revision line ? If two epistemic peers disagree, and the equal weight view required them to be moved one in the direction of the other, without specifying how much they should concede, what would their revised views look like? Should the change in position be temporary? Elga gives no answer to these questions. He claims that we should defer to an advisor in proportion of your prior probability that the advisor would be correct in case of disagreement (Elga, 2007:495). That answer is still too vague and does not present a viable solution.

To continue, we can argue that Elga s understanding of an epistemic peer in messy real world cases is too demanding. It is not clear how an epistemic peer in controversial discussions should be someone with whom we share a meta-consensus. It is sufficient to have as an epistemic peer someone who shares the same preparation that we do on the given topic, but whether she agrees with us on certain issues should have no bearing on her qualification as an epistemic peer. A proponent of the equal weight view could claim that the understanding of the epistemic peer does not shift in cases of controversial issues, as even in arithmetic and perception we count as an epistemic peer someone with whom we share a history of agreement. For that reason we should expect the same in cases of disagreement on controversial issues. In response to that, we could claim that although this is sensible in maths and perception, because we have the comforting thought that we will eventually find the true answer, the same cannot be said about controversial issues. In the latter cases, disagreement is vital to avoid not only the polarisation of the debate, but also to allow the disciplines to exist. Would nonconformism be more effective as a position on the epistemology of disagreement? Arguably, the first premise on which it is based is not encouraging, in the sense that is hard to see why disagreement possess no inherent epistemic value. However, in light of what we have seen about the equal weight view, it seems to put forward a more convincing strategy regarding the course of action to take once we become aware of disagreement.

This puts us on the right track to make a suggestion about a new approach to philosophical, ethical and political disagreement, that is a blend between conformism and nonconformism. According to this hybrid view, we should recognise the importance of disagreement, in virtue of its inherent value as a vital part of political, philosophical and ethical debate. It is not only difficult to imagine these disciplines without disagreement, but it is also highly undesirable. The hybrid view advocates consensus on the importance of disagreement itself, but ultimately it leaves the participants of the debate free to disagree and free to continue believing in what they did before engaging in discussion. Of course, dissent is of crucial importance, and participants to the debate should always listen to what the other has to say, but if they still think that their view is stronger (because of the arguments they advance and not because their view is their own view), they must be left free to retain that opinion. Hence, according to this approach, if Ann and Beth have a history of disagreement, but still enjoy debating because they find each other s argumentation style interesting and each other s points thought provoking, they should still engage in discussion, even if they do not agree. This does not mandate Beth to change her opinion moving in the direction of Ann s view, but it requires Beth to be reasonable and listen to what Ann has to say.

Conclusion

To conclude, this paper aimed at providing its readers with an overview of Adam Elga s equal weight view and assessing its validity. It reached the conclusion that the equal weight view is effective in instances where disagreement is temporary, but problematic in cases where disagreement is existential. Furthermore, it provided its readers with a different approach to the question of disagreement and what to do in such instances. The system it presented is a blend of conformism and nonconformism, that takes the basic premise of conformism viz. that disagreement possess a crucial epistemic value, and the rejection of doxastic belief revision presented by nonconformism.