Contradictions In Aristotle`s Account For Eudaimonia?

"Does Aristotle show in Book X that contemplative activity meets the conditions of eudaimonia set out in Book I better than ethically virtuous activity? Does Aristotle's appeal to divine happiness support his account of human happiness, or undermine it?"

According to some commentators of the Nicomachean Ethics, there remains an integral tension between two (arguably) different theories, both embraced by Aristotle. This tension refers to the apparently contradictive held views taken by Aristotle: where, on one hand, he claims that it is the solely the contemplative life which enables one to live an eudaimon life, and on the other hand he appears to be arguing the eudaimonia is fulfilled when one exhibits a range of different virtues in addition to that of the contemplative life. Essentially, Aristotle, at times, espouses an exclusive picture of how to reach eudaimonia, which is solely dependent on contemplative activities - whereas, occasionally he appears to be arguing that whilst the contemplative (intellectual) virtue is important, eudaimonia is contingent on this intellectual virtue overlapping with a variety of other virtues. This is the main source of tension to be found in this account. There are, however, less fundamental objections which could be raised by opponents of Aristotle's view. As, we shall later see, these objections can be overcome once one truly grasps the necessary relationship between intellectual virtue with the other virtues - to the extent that one understands how both sets of virtues need not contradict, but instead rely upon each other.

An understanding of the supreme good, or 'happiness' as Aristotle names it, is necessary before any enquiry. 'Happiness' has often been translated in to Eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is essentially the supreme good. Often this is typically translated to mean happiness but there are certainly differences between the two. Firstly, we often think of happiness as a psychological state, similar to having a positive state of mind or feeling positively about some object in the world; so for example you could be happy you won a car. According to Aristotle, though, eudaimonia is not a state, but instead an activity, something we do (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, pg 6). Moreover, we tend to feel that individuals cannot be mistaken regarding their own personal sense of happiness; Aristotle however argues that individuals can be mistaken as to whether they exhibit eudaimonia. Lastly, happiness is considered as transitory; one could feel happy that they were on holiday last night but miserable that they return the following day. Eudaimonia, on the other hand, isn`t. It applies to an individual's whole life. This supreme good, according to Aristotle, 'is good in itself and causes the goodness of all these [other 'goods'] as well (pg 6).`

According to Aristotle, there are three types of discourses people tend to take: 'three prominent types of life - that just mentioned (good is pleasure and honour and wealth driven lives), the political and thirdly the contemplative (pg 7).` Both, `the life`s of pleasure` directed towards hedonistic pleasures and those directed towards honour are rejected. According to Aristotle, the good life is one where the `good we divine to be something of one's own and not easily taken from one.` Unlike other ends perceived by humans to be good, eudaimonia is `that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else (pg 11)'. Secondly, Aristotle considers eudaimonia to be `self-sufficient.` By this he means an end which is `choice-worthy` and `lacking in nothing.` By 'lacking in nothing' Aristotle means things 'we think it most desirable of all things, not a thing counted as one good thing among others - if it were counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods.'

Aristotle expands his discussion of eudaimonia in the final and tenth book of his text. Here, he claims that complete eudaimonia 'will be (an) activity in accord with its proper virtue; and we have said that this activity is the activity of contemplation`: this should be understood as the activity of possessing and reflecting on knowledge - the reflection of necessary truths in the world. The conflict, or inconsistency, appears at the start of chapter 7 where Aristotle appears to claim that a eudaimon life is one `of contemplation` where such a life is lived in accordance to other `secondary` virtues. Aristotle importantly claims that 'complete eudaimonia will be (an) activity in accord with its proper virtue; and we have said that this activity is the activity of contemplation (pg 255).'

Aristotle offers a variety of reasons to suggest why the contemplative life is the supreme activity for fully operational human brings: This is essentially done by referring to other attributes that eudaimonia has, attributes which he has already stated earlier in the text, and showing how they are almost identical to the qualities contemplation exhibit: so firstly Aristotle claims that 'this activity is the best (since not only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best of knowable objects). Secondly, a contemplative life is 'most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything... And philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities.' Moreover, if we envisage gods, we would know they exclusively contemplate such matters: 'the activity of god, which surpassed all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness (pg 268).'

So having dissected the various postulates which seemingly constitute eudaimonia, and the contemplative life, it becomes clearer as to where the tension - in Aristotle's account - arises. The main issue is Aristotle at times appears to be arguing that eudaimonia consists in a complex combination of goods, but at other times seems to be claiming that eudaimonia can be fulfilled solely with contemplative virtues. Secondly, Aristotle doesn't appear to consider if that which aids a contemplative life conflicts with practically desirable things such as having loads of friends: does having a load of friends stifle future contemplative activities? As Rorty notes, Aristotle may not have been 'aware of the strains in his account (pg 378).' But despite this observation, one could use an 'Aristotelian solution to the problems of reconciling the respective claims of the practical and the contemplative lives.'

Thus, occasionally, Aristotle appears to be arguing that eudaimonia can be directly located in those living a solely contemplative life - a view which is reinforced when Aristotle repeatedly emphasises how virtue alone cannot constitute eudaimonia. So if, indeed, this was the case, we could envisage Machiavellian individuals who fully rely on the rational aspect of the soul - where contemplation is in use - whilst also lacking the basic virtues expounded by Aristotle, such as bravery or generosity. Surely, such a world, full of contemplative Machiavellian individuals would not exhibit a virtuous picture? Something which Aristotle would certainly agree with - considering, he doesn't illustrate such a case. Thus, this should suggest how Aristotle is certainly not espousing a view whereby contemplative activities are the sole constituent of a eudaimon life.

As Rorty notes, Aristotle was likely to conclude with a discussion of politics since he felt that analysis of polities are largely associated to contemplative activities - whereby those who tend to contemplate, are in the best positions to establish a society on the basis of contemplative truths regarding morality, amongst other abstract notions. According to Rorty, this is to show how 'one of the aims of a statesman is the reconciliation of the contemplative and the practical lives.' Thus, if this was indeed the case, Aristotle would be arguing that eudaimonia, and indeed a society which exhibits relatively high levels of eudaimon amongst citizens, is something dependent on contemplative as well as practical wisdom. This is not difficult to envisage. If there is a person X who appears practically wise - for his brave, generous and so on - would we consider him 'happy' or 'praiseworthy' if he was indoctrinated to behave virtuously? Essentially, X is a robot, who has no prior contemplation - and rational - basis which underpins his subsequent actions. Likewise, as we have already discussed, imagine the Machiavellian person Y. He doesn't have practical wisdom - with no sense of how one should act virtuously - yet he incessantly contemplates about intellectual abstractions. Again, whilst it is good that he follows a contemplative life, what if he does so to justify oppression? Now, with both examples, would we expect Aristotle to consider such individuals as good statesman - those best equipped to theorise and establish the good polity? Certainly not! It is likely, instead, that Aristotle is arguing that 'contemplation is wider and its effects more far-reaching than has generally been allowed.'

The contemplative life is very important in Aristotle's account, since to me, it shows how one initially becomes acquainted with virtue, through practical wisdom. It appears that intellectual virtue is, in many ways, a prerequisite to acquiring practical wisdom, and hence possessing a virtuous disposition. It is the contemplative individual who is able to discern the 'good' and how to live a virtuous life - and hence Aristotle argues that one cannot live a life of eudaimon, without such a crucial virtue. This need not mean that contemplative activities solely prompt eudaimonia - but instead interpreted as one cannot exhibit eudaimonia without having the necessary contemplative tendencies which initiate course towards virtue. Practical wisdom is very important - but one cannot be fully happy without also relying on intellectual wisdom.