Is Russell's Argument That Matter Exists Independently Of Us Effective?

In response to Berkley's idealist conviction that matter does not exist independently from mind, Russell counters with a series of arguments which aim to show that there is indeed a world of actual, "real" matter behind the layers of perceived sense data which he holds this matter to emit. To elucidate the key terms employed; "Sense data" is here used to signify the signals (visual, auditory. etc.) through which we are given the impression of our surroundings, or, of "matter". Matter differs from mind in that matter is the theoretical substance, the essential core "truth", or unreachable noumena which bears the properties- or phenomena- that mind is able to distinguish. While Berkley holds that only the sense-data representing the table exists- the colour, shape, texture- and remains a constant in the universe just because it is constantly being perceived (in the mind of God), Russell wishes to prove that "there really are objects other than ourselves and our sense-data which have an existence not depending upon our perceiving them" The premises of Russell's argument are that, indeed, as Berkeley says, sense-data itself does depend upon the perceiver for its existence. If there is such a thing as noumena, it is most probably unknowable; for it seems inconceivable that anyone might prevail to transcend the intermediate of sense-data to reach the "essence" underneath. However, as opposed to Berkeley and Descartes, Russell holds that despite the impossibility of being acquainted with matter, it is reasonable to assume that matter exists independently from perception. In order to uphold this claim, Russell half-heartedly argues that- - People have similar perceptions of the world and therefore there must be some underlying reality- "The fact that different people have similar sense-data [.] makes us suppose that over and above the sense-data there is a permanent public object which underlies or causes the sense-data." Having said this, Russell backtracks; admitting to the embedded logical inconsistency which comes of using a phenomena (the existence of other people) to prove more phenomena (the existence of matter). "in so far as the above considerations depend upon supposing that there are other people besides ourselves, they beg the very question at issue" The degree of non-coherence within this style of reasoning is like if I were to say- "cats really exist because there seem to be dogs. And dogs chase cats." - It is simpler to believe in a "real" world than to believe that it resides only in our heads. The world is too complex and seemingly independent to be a mere illusion. The thoughts of others, for example, or the hunger of cats, are evidence which would seem to show that beings have inner lives of their own and therefore exist independently of our perception. "when human beings speak [.] it is very difficult to suppose that what we hear is not the expression of thought, as we know it would be if we emitted the same sounds" Here, having allowed that "we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences" Russell doesn't use the world's seeming independence from us as proof of reality. Rather, he holds that according to the method of inference to the best explanation, it is more rational to believe in a complex external world than a complex internal world. This is a matter of opinion. Why, might one ask, is it harder to imagine that life is a dream, as opposed to an incomprehensibly vast and unlimited and chaotic and yet logical universe sprung from nothing? If these arguments aren't inconclusive enough on their own, he adds another layer of doubt by admitting that life does indeed share all the aforementioned "truth-affirming" characteristics with dreams. "Of course similar things happen in dreams, where we are mistaken as to the existence of other people." However, he unduly dismisses this counter-argument on the grounds that dreams and hallucinations draw their fuel from life- "but dreams are more or less suggested by what we call waking life, and are capable of being more or less accounted for on scientific principles if we assume that there really is a physical world" - which, as Broad astutely points out, is an empty argument- the mere fact that to have had normal waking sense perceptions is a necessary causal precondition for having dreams and waking hallucinations does not entail or even make probable that the former differ fundamentally in their epistemological character from the latter. So this alleged fact is irrelevant to the validity of the argument and to the truth of its conclusion. Aware of the fragility of this entire train of reasoning, Russell moves unceremoniously on to the separate and somewhat superior argument that there are grounds for accepting instinctive beliefs, for- "if these are rejected, nothing is left". Despite having debuted his Problems of Philosophy saying that philosophy is praiseworthy precisely because it doesn't take anything for granted "philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically", he ends his second chapter in deflated compromise, asking the reader to please play along, trust that instinctive beliefs are true, and matter really exists. The statement that "we cannot have reason to reject a belief except on the grounds of some other belief" seems a world away from the critical tone on which he set off- "any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong". Inconsistencies aside, Russell concludes "without being able to find demonstrative reasons, that it is rational to believe that our sense-data [.] are really signs of the existence of something independent of us and our perceptions" This does not go without saying. To be sure, such a belief isn't irrational, but to the same extent, despite everything Russell has tried to argue, neither is Idealism. Is it ever rational to believe in anything without any evidence whatever? Indeed, one might be tempted to ask whether it wouldn't be more judicious to subscribe to the scepticism that Hylas derides in Berkeley's Three Dialogues and accept our unknowing, limbo state of matter-related ignorance, admit that there might well be nothing independent of perception, and continue to live in accordance to the coordinates that logic and physical laws - real or virtual as the case might be- necessitate. Although the world may well be as lacking in real substance as Russell's arguments about matter, however, "you do not get rid of anything by labelling it "appearance". Appearances are as real in their own way as anything else. [.] words like real and reality are ambiguous." As he later states when contemplating the nature of matter, what we can know is structure and interrelation. "we cannot know about physical space. We can know the properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence with sense-data, but we cannot know the nature of the terms which the relations hold" This principle can be applied not only to the particularities of matter such as things having different colours and moving through time in a certain order, but also, in a more macrocosmic sense- we cannot know what matter is or whether it exists, but within its theoretical parameters, the structure according to which we live constrains us - "we can know nothing of what it is like in itself, but we can know the sort of arrangement of physical objects which results from their special relations"- and is therefore for all intents and purposes "real" In conclusion, to prove the existence of matter, Russell apologetically suggests a number of unstable arguments, then decides that matter is deducible from inference to the best explanation. As Turbayne says in his review, "The solution Russell finds to the problem of our knowledge of the external world is found to be wanting, on the grounds that Russell's procedure is essentially circular. Russell's constructions fail to perform the task that Russell sets for them".

Bibliography: Berkeley, George- Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous In Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists Broad C.D. - Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing: A Book of Readings from Twentieth-century Sources in the Philosophy of Perception- University of California Press, (1965) Broad, C.D. Philosophy "some elementary reflexions on sense-perception", Volume 27. Anchor Books (New York: 1952 ) Russell, Bertrand- Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University press, (New York, 1912) Turbayne, Colin M. The Philosophical Review- Vol. 62, No. 3- Duke University Press (Jul., 1953)