An Essay On Plato`s Protagoras

`I maintain that, if that is your position, it is absurd for you to say that a man often does bad things though he knows they are bad and could refrain from doing them, because he is driven and overwhelmed by pleasures.` (Plato, Protagoras, 355a5-9b). Discuss.

The quote above is spoken by Socrates in Plato`s Protagoras, in which he and Protagoras discuss the nature of virtue. Socrates wishes to assert that virtue cannot be taught, and that it is a unique idea with many names (e.g. justice, holiness, wisdom etc.), while Protagoras claims that virtue is teachable, and that the different facets of virtue are not identical. What I wish to discuss in this essay is whether Socrates` argument from 351b - 355e2 must logically entail the proposition given in the question. I will show that one flaw in Socrates` argument is that his reasons for proposing an ethical hedonism are more ad hoc than purely logical, and that another is the assumption that `pleasure` and `good` are synonymous (i.e. his hedonism fails as an ethical one). In doing this I will also find fault in Plato`s ideas about emotion and desire, or at least one way they are interpreted - that the way he has set up his arguments to try to prove knowledge takes precedence over emotion are not convincing.

To begin with, Socrates introduces the idea of living well, in order to set up a new criterion with which to show his main point that bravery can be "reduced to knowledge" (Sullivan, 1961). To do this he must show that knowledge is the means to moral choices, in order that he might suggest the coward is guilty of ignorance (in addition to fear). In doing so, the question of the virtue of pleasure is raised seemingly to clarify Socrates` and Protagoras` views on knowledge. Now Socrates suggests that living "pleasurably is good . painfully bad" (Plato 1956, 351c) to which Protagoras assents with the condition that the pleasure is morally sound. In Socrates` response to this he begins his teasing of language to suit his needs, saying "in so far as [some pleasures] are pleasant, are they not also good?" (Plato 1956, 351c5). This sentence is a tautology, since Socrates is asking if the pleasantness does not make a pleasure pleasant. While he says this, he means for Protagoras to hear `good` as `morally good`, in order to set up the hedonist assumption that enjoyment is always honourable. I believe this is where Socrates begins to commit the fallacy of equivocation, as hinted at by Evans (et al, 1996). Indeed Moore`s idea that `good` is undefinable in natural terms (i.e. any concept or word we can articulate) (Tanner, 2006) might be sufficient basis for this counter-argument, though I feel the assumption is rather more far-reaching than is needed here.

There is however an opposing interpretation of this question, namely that in fact Socrates is really asking whether pleasantness is not always moral. This lends two consequences to the discussion: that Plato means for Socrates to be a hedonist and truly believe pleasure is always moral, or that he is written to be proposing this despite his beliefs in order to prove his point. If the latter is true then he must believe the logic of the argument holds fast (which I do not believe to be the case), and moreover we can see that Socrates aims to win this argument irrespective of his beliefs, which destabilises the basis of his argument. The former is clearly not true, as can be seen from a brief look at Plato`s Gorgias. In this, the hedonism of Callicles is refuted by Socrates` enlenchus method (asking leading questions to produce a contradiction to the initial proposition), showing that Socrates does not generally agree with hedonism (Boyd-White, 1983). For the moment, let us consider the assumption that pleasure is always moral.

Prompted by Protagoras, Socrates begins to investigate the goodness of pleasure (leaving the definition of good open to being both moral and pleasant). He and Protagoras agree that knowledge rules the person`s choices absolutely, though they also believe that many people would say knowledge can be subverted by strong passions (as in the quote of the question) (Plato 1956, 352d). I will now look at Plato`s Theory of Forms (hereafter ToF) in order to explore the view of knowledge being proposed. In the ToF, the soul is said to be in three parts: knowledge, emotion and desire (Annas, 2001). Reason and desire are polar opposites, while emotion is a compromise of feeling informed by reason. For example, a feeling of guilt is produced by the knowledge of having done something against one`s morals (Annas, 2001). However there is a contradiction here: how can a misdeed happen if the decision had been made purely rationally, in partnership with one`s morals? The loophole would have to be the idea of a misinterpretation of knowledge, and certainly this seems possible. Looking to a separate portion of the text, Socrates puts it to Protagoras that acting on pure desire is acting in ignorance (Plato 1956, 357e2), and indeed this is the only logical conclusion to draw from the assumption of the tripartite soul. As Allen (in van Ophuijsen, 1999) says, Socrates (earlier) argues that evil is never done willingly. If there are cases then in which moral knowledge does not occur to the person, they will then be left to act with only uninformed desire. This does not quite satisfy the meaning of "overcome by pleasures" however, as there is an implicit sense of some morality or rationality being conquered by the pleasure, which has not yet been accounted for. When this is proposed by the opposition, it is likely with the idea in mind of giving into a temptation. I believe there can be many examples which would show guilt arising from an immoral action taken in full knowledge of the consequences. An example might be as simple as a modern-day dieter buying a portion of chips, though they know they will feel guilty later and subsequently need to work harder at their diet. Moreover I believe this experience of immorally acting in full knowledge of the consequences is one which every person feels. This point can be backed up by the reader`s own experience as well as other examples in the world - perhaps a convincing one is the building of religions around the rules that temptation must be avoided, thus assuming that people can recognise temptation and choose whether or not to follow through with it. Following on from this, it is hard to see why Plato`s theory would imply that pleasure is morally good since he postulates the base desire which is acted on in ignorance, and this idea implies that pleasure is a motive in following desire. So pleasure can then be felt through both moral and immoral actions, through pure desire, or emotion which is reactionary to knowledge. As such, the ToF fails to account for a common human experience, meaning most people would disagree with this definition of moral value, not to mention that it is incompatible with Socrates` proposed prerequisites for a virtuous life.

From the arguments to hedonism, the investigation turns to being a refutation of the phrase in the quote, the belief that passion may win over knowledge. The quote in question is referring to the position detailed by Protagoras in which moral virtue, or "good" (Plato, 1956), is defined as what is pleasurable (including any small amount of pain that is outweighed by consequent pleasure), and moral wrong, or "bad/evil" (Plato, 1956), is defined as what is painful (including any small pleasure that is outweighed by consequent pain). Though Protagoras begins by saying that some pleasures are bad and some pains good, as I have shown Socrates persuades him to change his terminology so that the moral worth of an act is defined by the net effect on the person, i.e. the overall amount of pleasure or pain. Thus Socrates concludes that one holding such a position cannot also say that one can do evil through being "driven and overcome by pleasures". He rightly sees that they have supposed these "pleasures" are interchangeable with goodness, which means a man cannot call his apparently uncontrollable passion in doing evil "pleasure". The content of the quote then, draws a valid conclusion only under the following assumptions: pleasure is morally good (or the two are synonymous); knowledge is the greatest human faculty which nothing can overthrow; Plato`s theory of the soul is valid. As I have shown, these propositions depend on each other for their collective truth, and what`s more, they can be held up against one common human experience (giving in to temptation) and shown to be collectively false, forcing Socrates` conclusion of equating bravery with knowledge to be false under the argument for ethical hedonism. Hence, I believe that Socrates uses the definition of pleasure as moral in an ad hoc attempt to show that all humans will choose the lesser evil. (This means cowards make choices in ignorance, making fear the opposite of knowledge, and thus bravery the same as knowledge, since he has previously assumed the uniqueness of opposites).