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Edexcel GCSE History (Warfare and British society c1250-present) Smart practice A mixed round aimed at your weak spots
Unit 1
c1250-c1500: Medieval warfare and English society
Unit 2
c1500-c1700: Warfare and English society in the early modern period
Unit 3
c1700-c1900: Warfare and British society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
Unit 4
c1900-present: Warfare and British society in the modern era
Unit 5
Historic environment: London and the Second World War, 1939-45
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Case studies: the Somme and the Iraq War, 2003

Practise 20 exam-style questions on Case studies: the Somme and the Iraq War, 2003 for Edexcel GCSE History (Warfare and British society c1250-present). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 20 questions
  • 4–20 marks each
  • Instant marking
  • No sign-up needed
20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Explain one way in which the first use of tanks at the Battle of the Somme (1916) was similar to the first use of cannon by English armies in the years c1250-c1500.

Model answer

One similarity is that both were new weapons that were first used in small numbers, proved unreliable and had only a limited effect at first. When tanks were first used at Flers-Courcelette on 15 September 1916, only 32 of the 49 available even reached the starting line, and fewer went forward with the infantry. Many broke down or got stuck in shell holes, and the advance that day was only about 2,500 yards. In the same way, the first cannon used by English armies in the fourteenth century were small, slow to load and inaccurate, and they could burst. Edward III is said to have had a few guns at Crecy in 1346, but the battle was won by the longbow. In both cases the weapon became far more important later, once it had been improved and used in larger numbers, such as the tanks at Cambrai in 1917.

Explanation

Top answers state the similarity, such as unreliability and limited impact at first or the way both weapons became important later, and support it with specific detail from both periods, such as the breakdowns at Flers-Courcelette and the small, dangerous early guns of the fourteenth century. Do not claim that the tanks broke through in 1916 or that cannon won Crecy.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO2: 2 marks. AO1: 2 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): Features of the period are analysed to explain a similarity. [AO2] Specific information about the topic is added to support the comparison, showing good knowledge and understanding of the periods. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Simple or generalised comment is offered about a similarity. [AO2] Generalised information about the topic is included, showing limited knowledge and understanding of the periods. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Valid similarities, each needing specific information from both periods for Level 2: (1) Both were new technology, first used in small numbers, that proved unreliable and had only a limited effect at first. Somme: tanks were first used on 15 September 1916 at Flers-Courcelette; of 49 Mark I tanks available, only 32 reached the starting line, and fewer still went forward with the infantry (accounts vary, from about 15 to 25); many broke down or became stuck in shell holes and trenches; they moved at little more than walking pace, and their crews suffered from heat and fumes; they helped to capture Flers, but the advance that day was only about 2,500 yards (accept 2,500-3,500 yards). c1250-c1500: the first picture of a cannon in England appears in a manuscript by Walter de Milemete (1326); Edward III is said to have used a few small guns at Crecy (1346), although accounts disagree; early guns were small, slow to load, inaccurate and could burst (e.g. James II of Scotland was killed when a cannon exploded at the siege of Roxburgh, 1460); the battle was decided by the longbow. (2) Both had a strong effect on morale, through fear and surprise, as well as through the damage they did: tanks frightened some German defenders and excited the British public; the noise and smoke of early guns frightened men and horses. (3) In both cases the new weapon became far more important once it had been improved and was used in larger numbers: tanks at Cambrai (1917, over 400 tanks) and Amiens (1918); cannon in sieges (e.g. Henry V's guns at Harfleur, 1415) and in battle by the 1450s (French artillery used against the English at Formigny, 1450, and Castillon, 1453). Credit that both needed specialist crews (the tank crews of the Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps; gunners). Level 1: a generalised similarity (e.g. 'both were new inventions') or detail about only one period. Do not credit: differences (e.g. that tanks were armoured vehicles that moved across the battlefield, or that early cannon were used mainly in sieges); claims that tanks broke through the German lines in 1916 or that cannon won the Battle of Crecy.

Question 2

12 marks

Explain why the first day of the Battle of the Somme (1 July 1916) was so costly for the British army.

You may use the following in your answer:
- the week-long bombardment
- German dugouts

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The first day of the Somme cost the British army 57,470 casualties, including 19,240 killed, the heaviest losses it has ever suffered in a single day. The main reason was that the bombardment failed to destroy the German defences, so the infantry advanced into machine guns and wire that were still intact.

The week-long bombardment was supposed to make the attack easy. From 24 June British guns fired about 1.5 million shells at the German lines. However, the shells were spread over a long front and deep objectives, so there were too few heavy guns for each part of the line. Many were shrapnel shells, which burst in the air and could not destroy dugouts, and they often failed to cut the barbed wire. A large number of shells did not explode at all. Bad weather lengthened the bombardment from five days to seven and made it hard to see what damage had been done.

German dugouts explain why the bombardment did so little damage to the defenders. The Germans had dug deep shelters, about 20 to 30 feet down in the chalk, and most of the men inside survived. When the shelling lifted at 7.30am on 1 July, they climbed out and set up their machine guns before the British infantry had crossed no man's land. The mine under Hawthorn Ridge was exploded ten minutes early, warning the Germans that the attack was coming.

The tactics used by the British made the losses worse. Many of the attackers were New Army volunteers, such as the Pals battalions, who had never made a major attack. Many carried heavy loads and advanced in waves at a steady pace. In many places the wire was still uncut, so men bunched together at the gaps, where machine guns were waiting. Once the troops left their trenches, commanders lost contact with them, so further waves were sent forward into the same fire.

The strength of the German position also mattered. The Germans held higher ground with three lines of defence and fortified villages such as Thiepval and Beaumont-Hamel. Their artillery had already aimed at no man's land and the British front line, so it caught the attackers as they advanced.

Finally, Haig's plan was over-confident. He believed the bombardment would destroy the defences and set deep objectives, which spread the guns more thinly. In the south, near Montauban, where the German defences were weaker and French heavy guns helped, British troops did take their objectives, which shows how much the outcome depended on the bombardment.

The first day was so costly, then, because a bombardment that failed met defenders who survived in deep dugouts, and because inexperienced troops advanced across open ground into uncut wire and machine-gun fire.

Explanation

Level 4 answers explain why each factor increased the losses, linking the failure of the bombardment to the survival of the Germans in their dugouts and to the uncut wire. They add own knowledge such as shrapnel and dud shells, the Hawthorn Ridge mine, the tactics of the New Army or the contrast with success in the south. Avoid claiming that every part of the British attack failed.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers may explain: (1) The failure of the week-long bombardment: from 24 June 1916 British guns fired about 1.5 million shells (accept 1.5-1.7 million); bad weather extended a planned five-day bombardment to seven days and made observation difficult; the shells were spread over a long front and deep objectives, so there were too few heavy guns for each part of the line; a large share (often estimated at about two-thirds) were shrapnel shells, which could not destroy dugouts and often failed to cut the wire; many shells did not explode (estimates of the share of duds vary, some as high as about a third; accept 'many'). (2) German dugouts: the Germans had deepened their dugouts to about 20-30 feet (accept up to about 40 feet) in the chalk; most defenders survived the bombardment, and when it lifted they came up and set up their machine guns before the British infantry arrived. (3) The timing of the attack: the bombardment lifted to later targets on a fixed timetable, often too far ahead of the infantry; the mine under Hawthorn Ridge was exploded at 7.20am, ten minutes before zero hour (7.30am), warning the Germans. (4) Uncut wire: in many places the wire was still intact, so men bunched at the gaps, which machine guns covered. (5) Tactics and inexperience: many of the attackers were New Army volunteers (e.g. Pals battalions) with little experience; many carried heavy loads (accept about 30 kg or 66 lb) and advanced in waves at a steady pace; once they left their trenches commanders lost contact with them, so further waves were sent into the same fire. (6) The strength of the German position: three lines of defence on higher ground, with good observation; German artillery had already aimed at no man's land and the British front line; strongpoints such as fortified villages (e.g. Thiepval, Beaumont-Hamel, Serre). (7) The plan: Haig's confidence that the bombardment would destroy the defences, and his insistence on deep objectives, which Rawlinson had doubted. (8) Contrast (credit): in the south, near Montauban and Mametz, British troops took their objectives, helped by French heavy artillery, a creeping barrage in places and weaker German defences. Casualties: 57,470, including 19,240 killed (accept about 57,000-60,000 and about 19,000-20,000), the heaviest losses the British army has suffered in a single day. Do not credit: claims that the British were outnumbered or that the Germans used tanks; claims that the whole British attack failed; claims that most attackers were conscripts.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 3

12 marks

Explain why surveillance technology was important to British forces in the Iraq War in 2003.

You may use the following in your answer:
- Phoenix drones
- satellites

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

Surveillance technology was important to British forces in 2003 because it told commanders where the enemy was, allowed them to strike accurately from a distance and let them fight at night, which gave them a great advantage over the Iraqi army.

First, Phoenix drones gave British commanders a live view of the battlefield. These unmanned aircraft, flown by the Royal Artillery, flew over Iraqi positions and sent back pictures as they happened. They were used mainly to find targets for the British guns, so artillery could hit Iraqi tanks and positions that the gunners could not see for themselves. American drones such as the Predator also watched the battlefield.

Second, satellites were essential in several ways. The Global Positioning System let British units find their exact position in the desert, where there were few landmarks, so they could move quickly at night without getting lost. GPS also guided many of the precision weapons used in the war. Satellite images, mostly supplied by the United States, showed where Iraqi forces were, and satellite communications linked commanders in Iraq with headquarters in the region and in Britain.

Third, aircraft fitted with radar watched the whole battlefield. American radar aircraft tracked Iraqi aircraft and vehicles on the ground, and reconnaissance aircraft photographed enemy positions. All this information was passed to commanders by radio and computer networks, giving them a much clearer picture than commanders had ever had before.

Fourth, night-vision and thermal-imaging equipment allowed British forces to fight in the dark. Sights on Challenger 2 tanks and Warrior vehicles picked up the heat of enemy vehicles and soldiers at night and through dust and smoke, when Iraqi forces often could not see. This meant that British tanks could often hit Iraqi tanks before being seen themselves.

These technologies mattered because they helped British forces strike first, avoid ambushes and advance quickly with fewer troops. They also allowed weapons to be aimed at chosen targets, which helped to limit civilian casualties. However, surveillance had limits. Friendly-fire incidents still happened, as on 28 March 2003, when a US aircraft attacked British vehicles and killed a British soldier. After the invasion, insurgents who mixed with the civilian population were much harder to find from the air, so information from local people remained essential.

Surveillance technology was therefore important because it gave British forces better information than their enemy, which made their weapons more effective and their advance faster, even though it could not solve every problem.

Explanation

Top answers explain why each kind of surveillance mattered, linking drones, satellites and thermal imaging to advantages such as accurate artillery fire, fast movement and fighting at night. Recognising the limits of surveillance, such as friendly fire or the problem of finding insurgents, strengthens the analysis. Avoid simply listing equipment, and do not suggest that British forces used armed drones in 2003.

Mark scheme
  1. 12 marks

    Levels of response (12 marks). AO2: 6 marks. AO1: 6 marks.
    Level 4 (10-12 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (7-9 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1] Maximum 8 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (4-6 marks): An explanation is given, showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-3 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Answers may explain: (1) Phoenix drones: unmanned aircraft flown by the Royal Artillery sent back live pictures from over enemy positions, mainly to find targets for the guns; credit US drones such as the Predator. (2) Satellites: the Global Positioning System let units find their exact position in the desert, where there were few landmarks, and guided precision weapons; satellite images (mostly American) showed Iraqi positions; satellite communications linked commanders with forces in the field and with headquarters in Britain and the region. (3) Aircraft and radar: US airborne radar aircraft (e.g. AWACS, which tracked aircraft, and JSTARS, which tracked vehicles on the ground) and reconnaissance aircraft watched the battlefield; credit RAF reconnaissance aircraft. (4) Night-vision and thermal imaging: sights on Challenger 2 tanks and Warrior vehicles, and night-vision goggles, let British forces see and fight at night and through dust and smoke, when Iraqi forces often could not. (5) Why this mattered: knowing where the enemy was let commanders strike first at long range, avoid ambushes, move quickly and use fewer troops; it allowed precision weapons to be aimed at chosen targets, which helped to limit civilian casualties; information passed by radio and computer networks gave commanders a clearer picture than in earlier wars. (6) Limits: friendly-fire incidents still happened (e.g. a US aircraft attacked British vehicles on 28 March 2003, killing a British soldier); surveillance was less useful against insurgents who mixed with civilians after 2003, so information from local people (human intelligence) remained essential. Answers that describe the equipment without explaining why it was important should not go beyond Level 2. Do not credit: claims that British forces always knew where every enemy unit was; armed British drones presented as used in 2003 (the RAF's armed Reaper drones came later).

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in each level may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

20 marks

'High-tech weaponry was the main reason for the coalition's quick victory over the Iraqi army in 2003.'

How far do you agree? Explain your answer.

You may use the following in your answer:
- cruise missiles
- the weakness of the Iraqi army

You must also use information of your own.

Spelling, punctuation, grammar and use of specialist terminology will be assessed in this question.

Model answer

High-tech weaponry played a major part in the speed of the coalition's victory in 2003. However, I do not think it was the main reason on its own, because the Iraqi army was already very weak and the coalition had other great advantages, such as numbers, training and control of the air.

The case for high-tech weaponry is strong. From the first days of the invasion, which began on 20 March 2003, cruise missiles and precision-guided bombs destroyed Iraqi command centres, communications and air defences. Tomahawk missiles, some fired from Royal Navy submarines, and the RAF's Storm Shadow missiles hit targets far beyond the range of Iraqi weapons. About two-thirds of the bombs dropped by US and British aircraft were precision-guided, compared with less than a tenth in 1991. Air attacks destroyed much of the Republican Guard's armour before coalition ground forces reached it. Surveillance by drones, satellites and radar aircraft found targets, and GPS allowed units to move quickly across the desert. Tanks such as the British Challenger 2, with thermal-imaging sights, could destroy Iraqi tanks at long range and at night. Baghdad fell on 9 April, less than three weeks after the invasion began.

However, the weakness of the Iraqi army was just as important. It had been badly damaged in the Gulf War of 1991 and weakened by more than ten years of sanctions. Much of its equipment, such as its T-55 tanks, was old and Soviet-made. Many of its soldiers were conscripts with little loyalty to Saddam Hussein's government, and large numbers deserted or surrendered. Saddam distrusted his own generals, so Iraqi command was poor.

The coalition also had other advantages. The United States provided most of the invasion force and had vast resources, while Britain sent about 46,000 personnel. Coalition troops were professional and well trained, and they had complete control of the air. In the south, British success at Basra depended as much on patient encirclement, armoured raids and information from local people who opposed the regime as on technology. Some Iraqi forces, such as the Fedayeen Saddam, fought hard, which shows that technology did not make victory automatic.

Overall, I partly agree with the statement. If the criterion is speed, high-tech weaponry was the most important factor, because it paralysed Iraqi command and allowed the coalition to advance far faster than in earlier wars. But if the criterion is whether victory would have come without it, the answer is probably yes, more slowly, because a well-trained and much better supplied coalition was fighting a weak army with low morale. The quick victory came from technology working together with Iraqi weakness and the coalition's other strengths.

Explanation

Top answers weigh high-tech weaponry against the weakness of the Iraqi army and the coalition's other strengths, and use clear criteria such as speed or what the victory depended on. They use precise evidence such as the share of precision-guided bombs, Storm Shadow and Tomahawk missiles, Iraqi desertions and the fighting at Basra. Keep the focus on the defeat of the Iraqi army in March-April 2003, not on the insurgency that followed.

Mark scheme
  1. 16 marks

    Levels of response (16 marks).
    Level 4 (13-16 marks): An analytical explanation is given which is directed consistently at the conceptual focus of the question, showing a line of reasoning that is coherent, sustained and logically structured. Accurate and relevant information is precisely selected to address the question directly, showing wide-ranging knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. Criteria for the required judgement are justified and applied in the process of reaching the overall judgement. No access to Level 4 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 3 (9-12 marks): An explanation is given, showing some analysis, which is mainly directed at the conceptual focus of the question. It shows a line of reasoning that is generally sustained, although some passages may lack coherence and organisation. Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. The overall judgement is given with some justification, but some criteria selected for the required judgement are left implicit or not validly applied. Maximum 11 marks for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (5-8 marks): An explanation is given showing limited analysis and with implicit or unsustained links to the conceptual focus of the question. It shows some development and organisation of material, but a line of reasoning is not sustained. Accurate and relevant information is included, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. The overall judgement is given but its justification is asserted or insecure.
    Level 1 (1-4 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, lacking development and organisation. Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. The overall judgement is missing or asserted.
    0 marks: No rewardable material.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Points that support the statement: precision-guided bombs and cruise missiles (e.g. Tomahawk missiles, some fired from Royal Navy submarines, and the RAF's Storm Shadow) destroyed command centres, communications and air defences from the first days (from 20 March 2003); about two-thirds of the bombs dropped by US and British aircraft were precision-guided (under a tenth in 1991); air attacks destroyed much of the Republican Guard's armour before ground forces reached it; surveillance by drones (e.g. the Royal Artillery's Phoenix), satellites and radar aircraft found targets; GPS let forces navigate the desert; Challenger 2 and US Abrams tanks with thermal sights outranged Iraqi tanks, at night too; Baghdad fell on 9 April and British forces controlled Basra by 7 April. Points that counter the statement: the weakness of the Iraqi army: weakened by the Gulf War (1991) and years of sanctions, with mostly older Soviet-made equipment (e.g. T-55 tanks); many conscripts deserted or surrendered; low morale and loyalty to Saddam Hussein's government; poor command, as Saddam distrusted his generals; other coalition strengths: the size and resources of US forces (most of the invasion force; Britain sent about 45,000-46,000 personnel); professional, well-trained troops; speed of manoeuvre and logistics; control of the air; information from Iraqis who opposed the regime (e.g. in Basra); the fighting by Royal Marines at Al-Faw and the encirclement and raids at Basra; credit that some Iraqi forces (e.g. the Fedayeen Saddam) fought hard, which shows technology did not make victory automatic. A substantiated judgement could use criteria such as speed, which factor the others depended on, or whether victory would have come without the technology. Do not credit: the insurgency after 2003 as part of the quick victory, except to note that technology could not secure the peace; claims that the war was won by air power alone or that the Iraqi army did not fight at all.

    Pearson's marking instructions (part of the mark scheme): AO2: 10 marks. AO1: 6 marks. In each level the first bullet point (the explanation and line of reasoning) is [AO2], the second (the information, knowledge and understanding) is [AO1] and the third (the overall judgement) is [AO2]. Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding. The first two bullet points [AO1 and AO2] account for 3 of the 4 marks in the level and are equally weighted; the third bullet point [AO2] accounts for the remaining mark. Once the level has been found, there are two steps to follow to determine the mark within the level: Markers should consider bullet points 1 and 2 together. Strong performance (for the level) in both would be awarded all 3 marks, while 2 marks may be achieved by stronger performance in either bullet point; weak performance would be awarded 1 mark. The fourth mark in each level is allocated to the bullet point 3 and should be considered independently of the award of the other marks.

  2. 4 marks

    SPaG. Spelling, punctuation, grammar and the use of specialist terminology (4 marks).
    High performance (4 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with consistent accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with effective control of meaning overall. Learners use a wide range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Intermediate performance (2-3 marks): Learners spell and punctuate with considerable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with general control of meaning overall. Learners use a good range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    Threshold performance (1 mark): Learners spell and punctuate with reasonable accuracy. Learners use rules of grammar with some control of meaning and any errors do not significantly hinder meaning overall. Learners use a limited range of specialist terms as appropriate.
    0 marks: The learner writes nothing. The learner's response does not relate to the question. The learner's achievement in SPaG does not reach the threshold performance level, e.g. errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar severely hinder meaning.

    SPaG is marked separately from the 16 marks for the answer, on the whole response.

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