Does Nuclear Deterrence Work?

The lesson of the Cold War is that against nuclear weapons, only nuclear weapons can hold the peace Chung Mong-joon

A world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous for all of us Margaret Thatcher

Nuclear weapons offer us nothing but a balance of terror, and a balance of terror is still terror George Wald

Abstract

Since the creation of the first nuclear weapon the little boy in 1945 nuclear weapons have mainly been used as a form of deterrence. Nuclear weapons have only ever been used twice both on Japan. Since then the main purpose of the weapon has been for deterrence and security. But does nuclear deterrence work? To answer this question, this essay first needs to look into the theory of nuclear deterrence. Section one looks briefly into the theory of nuclear deterrence and assesses whether the theory is workable in practice. To do this, this essay will look at the stability nuclear weapons created during the Cold War. Using Structural realist arguments, as well as the works of Kenneth Waltz, we will see that nuclear deterrence does indeed work because history shows us that whenever a state acquires nuclear weapons deterrence automatically takes affect and stability follows. We will also look into the most recent works of Scott Sagan and Mira Rapp-Hooper who argued that nuclear deterrence still works and could be the solution to the United States and North Korea situation. Nuclear deterrence does work because there has been an absence of nuclear war, absence of any major war between superpowers, and an absence of any other form of military engagement between the superpowers. However, history also shows us that nuclear deterrence can fail and not always work as it is supposed to. This is where section three will analyse and look into the Cuban missile crisis and rogue states to illustrate when nuclear deterrence has not and could not work. This essay looks into several historical events where nuclear deterrence has and has not worked, thus reaching the conclusion that nuclear deterrence is not guaranteed to work, nor guaranteed the fail, because it all depends on how the theory is applied, the actors, leaders, and time it takes place at.

Keywords: Nuclear deterrence nuclear peace nuclear order security mutually assured destruction secure second-strike capabilities.

Introduction

The debate on whether nuclear deterrence works or not has been a long-standing one. There is a division between those who believe nuclear weapons do deter, who then go onto argue in favour of proliferation, and those who argue that nuclear weapons does not deter, due to the infectiveness and dangers the weapon creates. The aim of this essay is to see if nuclear deterrence has created any peace by deterring, which historical events show us this, and does nuclear deterrence have any flaws and failures. In theory nuclear deterrence does work but in practice it varies time-to-time and place-to-place. We have never had an all-out war between nuclear states. Nuclear deterrence worked, even with, historical rivals like India and Pakistan. However, others argue that despite it working in some instances, nuclear deterrence is not a guaranteed source of security. There are examples in history where nuclear deterrence could have and even sometimes did go wrong. Within this essay we will see that nuclear deterrence in theory does work because the concept of mutually assured destruction does deter conflict. However, in practice the theory may not always work, the outcome of nuclear deterrence depends on the time it occurs, the leaders and actors involved, and the region it takes place in. For this reason, I argue that the theory of nuclear deterrence is a very influential one on government policy but the success of the theory in practice is not always guaranteed.

Section One: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence is an old practice in international politics. The Cold War provoked enormous interest in the need for deterrence because its role in international politics, particularly at the global level, promised to be critical (Morgan 2003). Deterrence is the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteractions (Department of Defence Dictionary 2010:67 Morgan 2003:8). Nuclear weapons were the ultimate weapon in threatening incomparable destruction, which was used to prevent conflict and create peace post-world war two. However, it was not just the destruction that made nuclear deterrence so effective it was the fact that this destruction seemed virtually unavoidable under any plausible strategy (Morgan 2003). This was the crux of the nuclear revolution (Morgan 2003:8).

Robert Jervis said nuclear deterrence consists of manipulating other actors assessment of their interest and seeks to prevent a specified action by convincing the actor that the costs exceed the rewards (Jervis 1976). Deterrence theory is based on the consensus that policy makers are rational beings that behave using a calculus that maximises payoffs and minimised costs (Morgan 2003). Nuclear adversaries are so horrified by the consequences of a nuclear war that they behave carefully towards one another (Morgan 2003). The key elements of nuclear deterrence theory is the assumption of a severe conflict, the assumption of rationality, the concept of a retaliatory threat, the concept of unacceptable damage, the notion of credibility and the notion of deterrence stability (Morgan 2003).

Nuclear weapons forced those who possessed them, mainly the superpowers, to turn deterrence into a new and comprehensive strategy, shaping and coordinating a lot of policies (Morgan 2003). Nuclear deterrence, by the superpowers and their blocs, gradually developed into cooperative security management, later on becoming a cornerstone in international politics, on which virtually everything else depended upon (Morgan 2003). Thus, deterrence came to operate on three levels: as a tactic, as a national security strategy, and as a critical component of security. Kaufmann (1954) says that in order to have an affective and credible deterrence policy you need to:

1. Persuade your opponent that you have an effective military capability

2. Persuade your opponent that you can impose unacceptable damage on him and

3. Persuade your opponent that you are willing to use all of your weapons if attacked.

This policy of nuclear deterrence was created to assist governments to survive in the nuclear age. It helped keep the cold war from turning into hot catastrophic conflict (Zinn 1980 Morgan 2003). Deterrence was in the interest of all states after world war two because a third world war would have been extremely destructive. Artillery became extremely accurate, even in long distances, rifles replaced muskets, and machine guns were invented. A third world war between the US and USSR would have been devastating (Morgan 1983). Superpowers became capable of huge wars in size of forces, number of kills, destruction, duration, and distance (Morgan 2003). In reality, no state actually won world war two, casualties were high and the damage was incomparable, even for the winners (Morgan 1983). As Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, and many other scholars noted, with nuclear weapons it is not about overkill but mutual kill because no country can avoid the devastation of a nuclear war (Jervis 1988:83). A thermonuclear war in the 21^st century would be total annihilation, a delicate balance of terror (Wohlstetter 1959). Hence why, Reagan and Gorbachev said in their joint statement after the November 1985 summit, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought (Jervis 1988:83). In addition to this, Charles De Gaulle similarly said, after a nuclear war the two sides would have neither powers, nor laws, nor cities, nor cultures, nor cradles, nor tombs and no other weapon could have this much destructive effects, making nuclear deterrence much more stronger than any other form of deterrence (Jervis 1988:84). Societies cannot reconstruct after a nuclear war, nor can it sustain life for a long time. It is this that makes nuclear deterrence so effective and it is exactly this that made it work during the Cold War. In fact, Harold Brown said, if the Soviets thought they may be able to recover in some period of time while the U.S. would take three or four times as long, or would never recover, then the Soviets might not be deterred (Jervis 1988:85). Nuclear deterrence works because nuclear weapons are the only weapon you cannot recover from. As said previously, the destruction is unavoidable and this is what made nuclear deterrence work and helped sustain peace post-world war two (Jervis 1976).

Therefore, in theory nuclear deterrence leads to nuclear peace and a nuclear order. Some scholars argue that the theory of nuclear deterrence evidently works in practice because we have had more peace since 1945 than we ever had in modern history (Sagan and Waltz 2003), whilst others argue that it merely creates minimum deterrence if anything. Most of the time nuclear deterrence does not deter anything besides the possibility of a nuclear war and even then the existence of nuclear deterrence itself actually creates more risk than it deters (Kugler 1984 Morgan 2003). We will now look into these in the following sections and assess whether nuclear deterrence does work or not in practice.

Section Two: Deterrence In Practice - has it ever worked and will it continue to work?

Without nuclear weapons the Cold War deterrence would have remained as an occasional stratagem (Freedman 2000:1). With nuclear weapons in play during the Cold War, the future of the world was at stake. All states looked at its neighbours, as an enemy, because they believed war was a constant possibility the enemy would not hesitate to attack if there was a clear chance (Morgan 2003 Burchill and Linklater 2013). If the opportunity to attack was there and attacking had no consequences, all states will attack (Burchill and Linklater 2013). Nuclear deterrence was the only way to keep peace because the consequences were never this high. Throughout the Cold War the attack-warning systems were operating continuously and the military was always on high alert. In fact, one Strategic Air Command (SAC) commander in 1960 said: we must get on with this airborne alert to carry us over this period. We must impress Mr Khrushchev that we have it and that he cannot strike this country with impunity. I think the minute he thinks he can strike this country with impunity, we will get it in the next 60 seconds (Sagan 1993:167). Thus supporting the view that there was a negative perception on other states, believing that they are just looking to attack, as opportunity driven , trying to maximise its relative gains (Morgan 2003 Powell 1991 Burchill and Linklater 2013). Due to nuclear weapons, the gains from war are relatively low and the losses are extremely high, thus producing, as Mueller refers to as, general stability (Jervis 1988).

Structural realists are one of the most supportive and strong believers on the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence. The realist school of thought emerged after world war two but has its roots traced back to Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes (Burchill and Linklater 2013). They argue that we live in an anarchic international system and the only way to create peace and survive in this system is my increasing our offensive capabilities, which acts as a defence (Burchill and Linklater 2013). Therefore, it is no surprise that structural realists truly believe nuclear deterrence works. They argue, Nuclear weapons produce strategy effects. There presence compels statesmen to behave cautiously in the face of grave danger. This cautiousness produced restraint, which shines up international stability. In short, nuclear weapons deter (Forsyth, Saltzman and Schaub, 2010:67). Some structural realists, Like Waltz, argue that nuclear weapons will never be used in reality because according to Waltz, one of the main engines of war is uncertainty regarding outcomes and because the immense destruction that can come as a result of nuclear exchange can be fully anticipated, it is never rational to engage in a war where nuclear exchange exists , and for his reason, Waltz argues the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero (Krieger and Roth, 2007:372). Hence why structural realists, like Waltz, are in favour of nuclear proliferation. For realists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrence any state can have from external threats. Nuclear deterrence is the reason why the Cold War never escalated into a heated battle between the two superpowers (Krieger and Roth, 2007). Structural realists believe in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence because they argue it creates maximum deterrence that leads to nuclear peace.

In addition, Kenneth Waltz wrote an article in 2012 arguing that Iran should acquire its own nuclear capabilities. He claims that nuclear deterrence does work because nuclear balancing creates stability. A nuclear-armed Iran, for Waltz, is the best possible outcome because it would most likely restore stability in the Middle East (Waltz 2012). This is also the most likely outcome because historical record indicates that a country that chooses to acquire nuclear weapons are rarely dissuaded from doing so and economic sanctions never effectively deter a state from its nuclear aims (Waltz 2012). Denuclearization is a western fantasy nuclear weapons will spread and nuclear deterrence will always work (Parker 2017). Nuclear deterrence works because reducing imbalances in military power produces more regional and international stability, not less (Waltz 2012). This is needed in the Middle East because Israel s regional nuclear monopoly for the past four decades have fuelled instability in no other region in the world does a lone nuclear state exist (Waltz 2012). Waltz says, Power, after all, begs to be balanced , the Middle East needs Iran to balance this power and restore stability (Waltz 2012:3). In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and will probably take a similar action against Iran. The only way to create peace and stability in the region, to prevent Israel from acting aggressively in the region again, is for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and restore a balance of military power in the Middle East (Waltz 2012). Nuclear deterrence works because history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability (Waltz 2012:4). Nuclear deterrence needs two nuclear actors deterring each other and Iran could be the second actor in the Middle East.

Furthermore, Waltz argues that nuclear deterrence does work because states desire nuclear weapons, not to improve its offensive capabilities, but to provide itself with security (Waltz 2012). According to the school of realism, self-preservation is the primary objective in the anarchic international system (Burchill and Linklater 2013). In fact, history shows us that whenever a country acquires nuclear weapons, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make then a potential target in the eyes of other nuclear states. This creates fear towards the other major powers nuclear arms and discourages any aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less aggressive after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964. Even historically embedded conflicts, between India and Pakistan, have gone more cautious since becoming nuclear (Waltz 2012). In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty not to target each other s nuclear facilities. Israel and Iran would most likely take a similar approach. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear states always have (Waltz 2012). There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear states so once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold nuclear deterrence will apply there is no reason why deterrence wont work, it always does (Waltz 2012). Thus, Waltz argues, the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown us that where nuclear weapons are built, stability follows (Waltz 2012). The international order can only be peaceful and stable with more nuclear weapons. These weapons deter conflict, hence why Waltz says, when it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better (Waltz 2012:5).

Some scholars have also argued that nuclear deterrence can work between the United States and North Korea. In 2017, a panel convened at Stanford, including political scientist Scott Sagan and Mira Rapp-Hooper, said that a similar deterrence strategy to the Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy could also work on North Korea (Parker 2017). Mutually assured destruction still works and will deter North Korea from any unwanted behaviour. Former US National Security Adviser, Susan Rice, said that the United States could tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea the same way it tolerated those in the Soviet un ion because nuclear deterrence works the same way in the 21^st century as it did during the Cold War (Parker 2017). CISAC assistant professor, Narang, once said deterrence is your friend in explaining why it can work with North Korea (Parker 2017 no page number). North Korea wants to preserve its regime, just like the former Soviet Union, and so deterrence works very much the same. Narang said, The good news is that deterrence can work, coupled with coercive diplomacy, because we know how to play this game (Parker 2017: no page number). In summery, nuclear deterrence has worked during the Cold War and many argue it will continue to work today. In 2017, Scott Sagan wrote an essay in the Foreign Affairs magazine on the North Korea nuclear crisis, saying deterrence still works and it is the best approach to the issue. For Sagan, nuclear proliferation is good because no military alternatives exist to solve the problems that nuclear deterrence solves (Sagan 2017). He argues nuclear deterrence worked against the Soviet un ion in the 1950s, then against China in the 1960s, and so it will still work against North Korea today. Sagan says that the risk of an accident, a false alarm, or a misperceived military exercise that could lead to a nuclear war is high, but nevertheless, he still argues that the same approach that prevented nuclear catastrophe during the Cold War can also deter Pyongyang (Sagan 2017).

Mutually assured destruction due to a secure second-strike capability, often in submarines, deters any nuclear state from doing a surprise nuclear attack. When two or more states have nuclear weapons they will be more reluctant to use them due to the consequences it will have on everyone (Waltz, 1990). Today the US has around 41 Polaris submarines carrying 656 missile launchers, all are hidden beneath seas safe and ready to be deployed as a secure second strike (Cantelon, Hewlett and Williams 1992). There is definitely compelling evidences that nuclear deterrence works because it helped keep the Cold War remain cold (Zinn 1980). This has worked so far and will continue to work. The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is evident by three reasons:

1. The absence of nuclear war

2. Absence of any major war between superpowers and

3. Absence of any other form of military engagement between the superpowers.

Section Three: Nuclear Deterrence Does Not Work - the flaws and problems in nuclear deterrence

It is true that we have had more peace since 1945 than all of modern history but this does not mean deterrence has worked, nor does it mean we have never had a period where no conflict occurred (Kugler 1984). The world has come very close to a nuclear Armageddon several times. For example, in 1962 the Soviet un ion placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, which lead to panic in the United States and sent warnings to Moscow. Although Soviet Ambassador, Dobrynin, gave every indication that the bombs were not placed in Cuba to create any trouble and instead the bombs where placed in a defensive nature that did not threaten the security of the United States, it still caused a lot of worry in the US that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Lebow 1983). On September 11 1962, President Khrushchev wrote a letter to President Kennedy saying, No missile capable of reaching the United States would be placed in Cuba , indicating that the Soviets recognised the nature and gravity of the American warnings (Lebow 1983:433). Nevertheless, Khrushchev still knew the missiles in Cuba would provoke a crisis with the United States but he accepted this risk due to the expected political and strategic gains it provided. Khrushchev had information that the United States was preparing for another assault on Cuba and shipped nuclear missiles to protect it. The Soviets also used the missiles to negotiate on the conditions of the German peace treaty, demanding a nuclear free zone in the Pacific and a pledge from China not to manufacture atomic weapons (Lebow 1983). There is no doubt that the Soviet missiles in Cuba definitely gave the USSR a lot of advantages, which is probably why they took such action, no other explanation accounts for the risks undertook by the Soviets at that precise moment (Lebow 1983:436). The Cuban missile crisis shows us that nuclear weapons itself can work, for political gains, but as a form of deterrence it can go wrong and may not be as effective. Nuclear weapons gives states a nuclear shield, allowing them to be aggressive and take actions they otherwise may not. The Russians also used nuclear stalemate as a shield for their military engagements in Africa too (Jervis 1988). Kennedy still attacked Cuba and most of the things the Soviets wanted never went through.

The most obvious and main reason for why the Soviets placed their nuclear missiles in Cuba was due to the 1958 US installation of missiles in Italy and Turkey. The US missiles in Turkey threatened the USSR s existence. The Cuban revolution in 1959 provided the Soviets with the opportunity for a similar missile site that can threaten the United States. The Soviet missiles in Cuba were capable of destroying the majority of the United States, including most of the capital cities (Lebow 1983). The missiles were median range R-12 (SS-4) and the intermediate range R-14 (SS-5) nuclear missiles. These missiles have a range of 1,770 km and a 4,500 km respectively (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2017). This meant that each missile was enough to level the entire city of Washington DC and produce enough fallout to irradiate the nearby city of Baltimore (Appendix One). In fact, the Soviet missiles in Cuba were capable of ending human life in the United States within 20 minutes. The US placed its PGM-19 Jupiter missiles in Turkey which was capable of destroying up to 1490 miles of the Warsaw pact including Moscow (Appendix Two). The Italian-Turkish missile crisis was the mirror image of the Cuban missile crisis. For both the United States and the Soviet Union, nuclear war was now a possible reality, not a myth (Lebow 1983). In 1956 John Foster Dulles created a policy called brinkmanship, arguing that US nuclear weapons should be used when judged appropriate. In October 1962, Kennedy was not even debating brinkmanship he was seriously considering the use of nuclear weapons. The end of civilisation was in the hands of Kennedy and Khrushchev and both these leaders by 1962 rationalised their use of nuclear weapons, even though both leaders understood the concept of mutually assured destruction. At the end, Armageddon was avoided and peace was sustained, nevertheless, the Cuban missile crises shows us how likely a nuclear war that can potentially end humanity could breakout with a world full of nuclear weapons trying to deter each other. Nuclear deterrence can easily go wrong if a similar crisis occurs in the future (Lebow 1983 Trachtenberg 1985 Morgan 2003).

However, Kennedy s worry during the Cuban missile crisis was based on fear, not just of Khrushchev s intention, but of human error, of something going terribly wrong down the line (Jervis 1988:88). Kennedy said, there is always some so-and-so who doesn t get the word (Jervis 1988:88). Nuclear deterrence fails when communication is not clear (Morgan 2003). This is because there was a real fear in the nuclear age that a nuclear war by accident, or even due to a loss of control, can happen. Nuclear weapon systems are complex and tightly coupled. Nuclear decision-making is in the hands of the leader alone and he alone can order the Strategic Air Command to launch nuclear weapons. This is problematic because if only this one individual loses control everything will be destroyed (Sagan 2017). Sagan says, We need more checks on how we decide to use nuclear weapons because this is one of the biggest problems in nuclear deterrence (Sagan 2017: no page number). Nuclear weapons take only a few moments to arrive so governments and officials have to be on high alert primed to act within moments (Morgan 2003). A malfunction within the warning systems or weapon system could lead to a launch when it was unauthorized. It all depends on who s on charge that day (Sagan 1993 Morgan 2003 Myre 2017). Waltz is wrong to argue that more nuclear weapons is better because the more nuclear weapons we have the greater the chance that one would be fired accidentally (Morgan 2003). Nuclear deterrence does not work because nuclear proliferation is inevitable which could disturb deterrence stability.

Moreover, Waltz argues that nuclear deterrence will work in all scenarios, even in Iran however, states like Iran are referred to as rogue states, which nuclear deterrence does work with. These states are often aggressive and have links with terrorist organizations. Nuclear deterrence only works between western superpowers because there is a general consensus that it would not be used due to these states being status quo states (Waltz 1990). There is no guarantee that nuclear deterrence will work in the Middle East, in fact, Israel has made it clear that it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity as an unacceptable threat (Waltz 2012). The US officials have also declared that a nuclear Iran is a terrifying prospect because rogue states are irrational and they challenge the status quo (Morgan 2003 Waltz 2012). There is a very serious belief that Iranian policy is made by mad mullahs who really are M.A.D in reality and so the theory of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic (Waltz 2012:4). Nuclear deterrence work when it deters conflict but if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even if doing so would invite retaliation and mutually assured destruction (Waltz 2012). These states have an incentive to change the status quo even if destruction is considerable (Jervis 1988). Even those who argue that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that nuclear weapons would embolden it giving Tehran a shield that would allow it to act aggressive, maybe even directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms (Waltz 2012). The Iranian leaders can also feel strong psychological pressures due to nuclear weapons, meaning nuclear weapons by themselves and even second strike capabilities is not sufficient to produce peace (Jervis 1988). Contrary to Waltz s argument, proliferation among dissatisfied countries like Iran would not replicate the Soviet-American pattern of stability (Jervis 1988). Moreover, key aspects of the Cold War are lacking and so nuclear deterrence no longer works the same today. The US will not accept a deterrence relationship with rogue states as it did with the former Soviet un ion because the United States believes nuclear deterrence would not work against these states. For example, Saddam Hussein was incapable of being deterred due to being too dangerous and mentally evil (Schwarz 2005). The theory of nuclear deterrence wants the actors to be rational for it to work and so if one actor is evil and irrational it does not work (Zagare and Kilgour 2000). Therefore, nuclear deterrence has worked and could potentially work but it depends on the actors involved, the location, the situation, and the time it takes place.

Conclusion

Nuclear deterrence does make mutual security more feasible and it does lead to the superpowers to adopt military doctrines and bargaining tactics, which is the first step to global peace, as Churchill once said Safety be the sturdy child of terror (Jervis 1988:90). However, does nuclear deterrence really work anymore? There is evidence that it did work during the Cold War between the former Soviet un ion and the United States but the current climate is much more dangerous. The Current Korean missile crisis is even more dangerous than the Cuban one (Sagan 2017). Nuclear weapons scholar Alex Wellerstein designed a model called NUKEMAP to estimate the damage a 100-kiliton nuclear weapon can do if detonated in Busan, South Korea. He said it would kill around 440,000 people in seconds. Over Seoul it will kill 362,000 over San Francisco it will kill around 323,000 (Sagan 2017). This does not even include the after effects. So even if nuclear deterrence does work, is it safe to have it when the likelihood of an accidental nuclear war is very high with so much at risk? Within this essay we saw that nuclear deterrence has worked but it has also failed in several insurances . It all depends on the actors involved within the nuclear deterrence game. Nuclear deterrence can work but the success is not guaranteed, nor is the failure. There are factors and dependents that play a role, for example, the location, the period, and the time. Nuclear deterrence may not work in the Middle East in the same way it worked between the Soviets and the United States. So does nuclear deterrence work? In theory, yes it does work. In the 21^st century? It may need revision for it to fit the new era. Is it safe? Nuclear deterrence is not a safe game to play.

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