Is There Any Convincing Argument For An Environmental Ethic That Justifies Extending Moral Consideration To Non-humans?

Abstract

The question this essay will answer is mainly a normative one. This essay will have some empirical analysis but it will be driven by mainly normative literature, therefore forming a normative argument. The essay will answer whether any of the arguments for an environmental ethic that extends moral consideration to non-humans are convincing, not whether it is needed or not. The essay will begin with the assumption that an environmental ethic for extending moral consideration to non-humans as already established and agreed upon, but we will see which arguments best give moral consideration and which one is convincing.

The two main approaches are ecocentrism and anthropocentrism. The first section of the essay will look into the anthropocentric-ecocentric divide, where we will see that the two approaches differ in terms of the values they use when arguing for moral consideration towards non-human. The first assigns instrumental value to non-humans when arguing for its moral consideration, whilst the latter bases its argument on nature having intrinsic value. Once we looked at the different arguments given from the two different approaches we will start looking into other arguments from moral extensionism and holism.

In the second section, section on moral extensionism, will focus on the works of influential animal liberationists Peter Singer and Tom Regan. They seek to extend moral consideration to animals and not all non-humans. The arguments in this section has elements of both anthropocentrism and some ecocentrism but the fact that it is limited to some non-humans instead of the whole non-human world makes it very practical and convincing.

The third section will look into holism. This section provides much more radical arguments. We will look into many different literatures but one of the most influential works that we will analyse in this section comes from Naess and his 8-point platform. This section adopts a more ecocentric approach as it argues that all non-humans have intrinsic value. They also want to extend moral consideration to all non-humans, which makes it much less practical than the arguments we will look at in section two.

The final section is the most important. In this section I will critique the arguments from holism and conclude that the anthropocentric and moral extensionist arguments for an environmental ethic that justifies extending moral consideration to non-humans are more convincing because they are practical, whilst holism is only convincing in theory. This essay uses a rich list of literature but the essay will mainly use Neil Carter s work. I was very privileged to have professor Neil Carter as my lecturer, which gave me even more insight into his views that is beyond his book. I agreed with a lot of the arguments made by professor Carter and I really enjoyed reading his entire work. Thus, I think its important for me to say that a lot of the views I put forward in this essay, especially in section four, was developed whilst I was reading his book.

Keywords: Anthropocentrism Ecocentrism Environmental Ethics Holism Humans Intrinsic Value Instrumental Value Non-Humans Moral Extensionism Value.

Introduction

One of the most problematic tasks for environmental ethics is the problem of constructing an adequate theory of intrinsic value for non-humans (Callicott 1985, cited in Carter 2007). There are many arguments for extending moral considerations to non-humans but are any of them convincing? It is difficult to find a convincing argument because environmental politics is fused with many ethical dilemmas. For example, is it ethical to reduce employment of the working class in order to save nature and endangered species? Is dictatorship and coercion ethically justified if it is aimed to protect the environment? These questions have divided many environmental scholars because they are all summarised in one single question does nature have value separate from meeting human needs? And is an anthropocentric approach more convincing than an ecocentric one? (Carter 2007).

There are many arguments for an environmental ethic that justifies extending moral consideration to non-humans. One of the radical ecocentric arguments comes from deep ecology, which argues for preserving nature from human interferences. Deep ecology is willing to exclude humans from the top of the ethical hierarchy because they believe nature alone has value and moral significance. This essay will look into and assess whether this argument is convincing or not. The essay will also look into other arguments from moral extensionism and environmental theories of value under holism. However, this essay will show that a radical ecocentric argument that is non-anthropocentric is not convincing at all because they are impractical in implementation (Carter 2007). All of the arguments in this essay are convincing in a way, but the ecocentric and holistic ones are convincing in theory only, whilst the anthropocentric and moral extensionist arguments are more convincing because they can be implemented in our current society.

Section One: The Anthropocentric-Ecocentric Divide

There are different arguments for extending moral consideration to non-humans based on different approaches. The two main approaches are ecocentrism and anthropocentrism, which has caused a massive divide between green politics known as the anthropocentric-ecocentric divide (Carter 2007). Anthropocentrism is a way of thinking that views humans as the source of all value. They are mainly concerned with human interests. For anthropocentricism, nature has value because it fulfils these human interests. Ecocentrism is a mode of thought that regards humans as only a part of the ecosystem. They view all parts of the ecosystem as holding intrinsic value and moral consideration. According to anthropocentrism, non-humans should have moral consideration because they have instrumental value, or even because they can have inherent value to some people. However, for ecocentrism, non-humans require moral consideration because they have intrinsic value (Carter 2007).

If exploiting nature and non-humans satisfy human interests, then it is legitimatized according to anthropocentrism. So not all anthropocentrics argue for extending moral consideration to non-humans, they only argue this is it satisfies human interests (Carter 2007). Humans are the only ones with intrinsic value. Animals are simply only a storehouse of resources for the use of humans (Eckersley 1992:26). Non-humans should have moral consideration because the consequences of food scarcity and overpopulation could have negative effects on human interests. So anthropocentrism seeks to extend moral consideration to non-humans, not because non-humans have intrinsic value, but instead because it could have negative effects on humans and their interests (Carter 2007). The anthropocentric arguments can be traced all the way back to religion, for example, Christianity when it talks about stewardship and conserving nature to serve mankind. Therefore, the anthropocentric argument for extending the moral community to non-humans and creating an environmental ethic comes from the bases of nature holding instrumental value. Non-humans should have moral consideration because they hold instrumental value to human needs and their survival (Carter 2007).

However, this is not the only argument and approach. Environmentalists have tried to develop a non-anthropocentric ethics too (Eckersley 1992). This is the ecocentric approach that rejects human chauvinism and argues that non-humans also have intrinsic value like humans (Carter 2007:16). They argue that moral consideration should be given to all non-humans, including animals, trees, plants, and so on. This is where ecocentrism and anthropocentrism differ they assign different types of value to non-humans. Ecocentrism says non-humans have intrinsic whilst the other says instrumental. This creates the anthropocentric-ecocentric divide to why non-humans should have moral consideration. One bases its argument for extending the moral community due to resource conservatism and human benefits, whilst the other sees intrinsic value in non-humans instead of instrumental (Carter 2007). Examples of ecocentric arguments include deep ecology (Naess 1973) and transpersonal ecology (Fox 1990). There is also a third argument for why some non-humans should have moral consideration. This third perspective is a middle ground for the two approaches we discussed above and most of the environmental philosophy falls within this category, notably moral extensionism such as Singer (1976) and ethical holists such as Callicott (1985). They agree with anthropocentrism that humans have the highest degree of value but they argue that some other non-humans also deserve moral consideration because they too have intrinsic value. In the next section we will look at this third perspective.

Section Two: Moral Extentionism

One of the arguments for extending the moral community to non-humans comes from moral extentionism. Moral extensionism broadens the moral community to include some non-human entities, mostly animals, because of their possession of sentience and the capacity to reason (Carter 2007). According to moral extensionism, any non-human entity that has sentience, consciousness, or rationality, has moral value and consideration. The key word here is some , thus why underlined. Moral extensionism does not extend moral consideration to all non-humans they only extend it to some.

Animal liberationism is one type of moral extensionism that argues for an environmental ethics for extending moral consideration to non-humans. The arguments here are traced back to the early animal rights movements rather than environmentalist movements (Carter 2007). The first wave of environmental pressure groups came out from conservationism and preservationism. Resource conservationism refers to land management popularised by Gifford Pinchot and preservationism refers to the idea of preserving nature, including non-humans, from development, popularised by Muir (Carter 2007). You can clearly see that conservatism is anthropocentric whilst preservationism is ecocentric Pinchot was concerned with conserving nature for development, whilst Muir s concern was to preserve nature from development (Eckersley 1992, cited from Carter 2007).

The animal liberationist argument is a limited argument because it only seeks to protect some non-humans, not the whole nature. The two main arguments are from Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Singer gives us a utilitarian argument for extending moral consideration to non-humans. He uses Jeremy Bentham s observation, which says that to determine if a non-human deserves moral consideration we need to ask ourselves can they suffer? (Singer 1979:50). Singer agrees with Bentham s approach and says that if a non-human has the capacity to suffer, then they deserve moral consideration. A stone has no feelings and cannot suffer, so humans do not need to give moral consideration to a stone. However, anything that has sentience deserves moral consideration because sentience is the only defensive boundary of concern for the interests of others (Singer 1979:50). For Singer, the non-humans that deserve moral consideration include birds, reptiles, fish, and some crustaceans (Carter 2007). I personally find this argument very convincing, definitely more than the holistic arguments in the next section.

Regan (1983) developed a rights-based argument for extending moral consideration to non-humans. He argues that all subjects-of-a-life individuals who have beliefs, desires, perceptions, memory, and a sense possess intrinsic value. Most animals fit this category according to Regan so most animals deserve moral consideration. All animals have a right to live without harm. Again, Regan and Singer differ from holist arguments because they don t argue for extending moral consideration to all non-humans they only extend it to some animals. However, this is much more practical than to argue for extending moral consideration to all non-humans, which is why I find it much more convincing.

Based on a book by Cavalieri and Singer, the rights of all sentient creatures in a moral society are:

1. The right to life

2. Protection of individual liberty and

3. Prohibition of torture.

(Carter 2007)

Dworkin (1993) is one of the many who produced a moral extensionist theory. He argues that nature should be respected due to its sacredness . Extending moral consideration to animals is good but nature too has intrinsic and inherent value. Based on an Aristotelian view, the flourishing of human life depends on a good relationship with nature (Carter 2007). Raz (1986) adopts this Aristotelian idea and says that a close relationship between a man and dog makes the life of that man better. Animals and nature also give us humans value. This Aristotelian view is also very anthropocentric as human flourishing is the main aim and objective within it, making non-humans an instrument for this flourishing instrumental value. Nevertheless, there is definitely a connection between the two (humans and non-humans), which is why non-humans deserve moral consideration too (Carter 2007). There are many more arguments for an environmental ethic that justifies extending moral consideration to non-humans and the next section will look into the ecocentric holistic arguments, which take a more ecocentric approach.

Section Three: Holistic Arguments

Environmentalists have always tried to create a green theory of value based on the concern of the whole environment, not just some of it as moral extensionism does. Goodin (1992) says a theory of value is a theory of the good that tells us what has value and why. This theory would act as a blueprint for us on how to act morally towards all non-humans because everything has moral consideration. Everything in nature, all ecosystems, has intrinsic value. By accepting that everything has intrinsic value we will all act morally towards it.

Many argue that if non-humans have intrinsic or inherent value, then they also have interests. The possession of interests and rights mean that we have a duty to act morally good and ethical towards it (Carter 2007). Greens, especially holistic greens, believe all of nature has intrinsic and inherent value. All plants, sentient beings, all categories, including the ecosphere, should have moral consideration because all have intrinsic value (Appendix One Carter 2007). Moral extensionism agrees with this to an extent but it is not as radical as the holistic perspectives. Moral extensionism also uses a value based theory to argue for moral consideration in non-humans but the most radical arguments adopt a holistic analysis, which includes ecocentrism, deep ecology, and ethical holism (Carter 2007).

Holism argues for moral consideration to non-humans because they believe everything is connected to each other. The whole is better than the sum of the parts and we need unity between humans and non-humans for a better world. Hence why, holism strongly argues for extending moral consideration to animals, plants, and even rocks. According to Dobson (2000), the way holists try to do this is by creating an ethical code of conduct and the development of an ethics based on a changed ecological consciousness or state of being (Carter 2007). Both of these approaches can be found in the work of Arne Naess, one of the founders of deep ecology, whose ideas have influenced ecocentrism.

Naess created an 8-point platform for deep ecology. The first point is the flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has value in them. These values are independent of their usefulness for human purposes (Naess 1989:29). So the first point argues for moral consideration because non-humans also have intrinsic value. The third point says that humans have no right to deny this moral consideration except to satisfy vital needs. The fifth point says that the present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation if rapidly worsening. So things must change soon (Naess 1989). The entire 8-point platform can be found in the appendix below (Appendix Two). Naess argues that every entity on earth needs another this is the idea of symbiosis. Nothing is entirely independent so everything has value to another (Naess 1989 Carter 2007). Naess also talks about bio-centric egalitarianism the notion and argument that all life forms have an equal right to live and blossom. So another argument for why non-humans deserve moral consideration comes fro Naess who believes everything has value and everything is equal (Carter 2007), which links back to the Aristotelian view in the previous section.

The second argument in Naess s work that underpins the claim for non-humans having intrinsic value is a metaphysical argument that says a closer human relationship with nature would create a higher ecological consciousness (Naess 1989 Carter 2007). This view is very similar to the ancient Greek view of nature (Nussbaum 1986). The more we see ourselves as a part of nature the more we become a part of it and look after it. This creates ecological consciousness and develops obligations towards nature and the non-human world. Callicott (1986) gives a bio-empathetic theory based on the claim that all moral sentiments are a product of the evolutionary process. There is no difference between humans and non-humans, the sooner we realise this the quicker we can give moral consideration to non-humans (Carter 2007). So if humans have intrinsic value, so do non-humans. If humans have moral consideration, non-humans should also have it.

The whole is better than the sum of parts. Naess and Callicott draw on Aldo Leopold s (1949) land ethic thesis that argues a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community (Leopold 1949:225, cited from Carter 2007). Non-humans deserve moral consideration because it is the large wholes in life that have value (Taylor 1992). Everything in nature has intrinsic value and everything deserves moral consideration, this will make the whole society have value. Brennan (1986) critiques this point by arguing that whole categories do not have interests and so cannot have intrinsic value but greens dismiss this argument because babies also have no interest, yet they have intrinsic value. So this critique is not strong enough to argue against the moral consideration for non-humans.

Overall, holism is arguing for giving moral consideration to non-humans because

1. Non-humans possess intrinsic value and

2. The whole is better than the sum of the parts.

Section Four: How Convincing Are They?

The holistic arguments are not too convincing for several reasons. Firstly, they argue that just because something has interest humans have a duty to give moral consideration to it. However, a monkey (non-human) has interests too, such as to live a full life, but this does not mean humans have a duty to let it flourish (Carter 2007). A monkey can have a right to life but this does not necessarily mean humans have to give it moral consideration. Believing that by giving every non-human with interests intrinsic value will make humans act morally ethical towards it, as holists do, is very ambitious and deterministic in my opinion. Humans can still deny moral consideration, which they currently actually do. Therefore, I don t find this argument too convincing.

Some political philosophers argue that only animals that have the ability to make political contracts can be moral agents with moral consideration. Since animals cannot carry out responsibilities or duties, nor can they make political contracts, they cannot have moral consideration (Rawls 1973). Holism does counter this argument because they say that babies also cannot make contracts, carry out responsibilities or duties, yet they still have moral consideration because they are human Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (Carter 1948). However, I still agree with the argument made by Rawls because babies grow and gain the ability to make contracts, whilst non-humans do not develop his ability. Therefore, I personally still find the argument very weak and I agree with Rawls. The accuracy and appropriateness of applying this kind of human moral discourse to the non-human world lie at the heart of environmental ethics (Carter 2007).

Regan (1983) argues against the holistic environmental ethics because he argues that the focus on the whole or biosphere is environmental fascism as it ignores the rights of individuals. Forcing humans to give moral consideration to non-humans can infringe on an individuals humans rights, which can be unethical. Some argue that this problem can be overcome through the concept of autopoiesis , which is when individual species strive for their own and this will add value to the whole (Carter 2007). The problem however with this is that, let s say it was agreed that the good of the biotic community required the drastic reduction in the human population to lessen the pressure on scarce resources, would then infanticide be justified? Or would be moral rights of babies be upheld? Everyone striving for his or her own does not necessarily mean it will add value to the whole (Carter 2007).

Furthermore, holists argue for moral consideration based on the belief that non-humans have intrinsic value, but do they have equal amounts of intrinsic value as humans to actually have moral consideration? Humans don t have moral consideration because they have intrinsic value they have moral consideration because they have more intrinsic value than any other species (Rodman 1980). Naess rejects this idea and argues that humans and non-humans have the same degree of intrinsic value but I personally disagree with Naess (Carter 2007). I agree with Rodman that humans have more intrinsic value than koalas, rats or mosquitos, so the violation or denial of moral consideration to some non-humans can be justified in my opinion. Even Naess himself accepts this because he replied back to his criticism by saying that, he is misunderstood as meaning that human needs should never have propriety over non-human needs. But this is never intended. In practice, we have for instance greater obligation to that which is nearer to us. This implies duties which sometimes involve killing or injuring non-humans (Naess 1989:170).

So according to Naess s response to the critique, humans can harm non-humans if it is necessary, but what is necessary? Naess is not clear and does not give us an answer to this question (Fox 1990). Naess is making a non-anthropocentric argument and the problem with non-anthropocentric arguments for extending the moral community to the non-human world is that they are often much less impractical than the more anthropocentric ones, such as moral extensionism.

Further criticisms are aimed at the holistic arguments for an environmental ethic. One of these are that holism argues humans have an obligation to the non-human world because we are connected with it. However, this obligation cannot be proven in any way, and even if it can, we don t have an obligation to it just because we are connected with it. In fact, we have more obligations to things we are disconnected with. For example, we are obliged to help the poor in India even though we have no dependence with it (Carter 2007). So the argument for extending moral consideration to the non-human world just because we are connected with it is a very weak one.

Another reason why I find the holistic arguments for an environmental ethic that extends moral consideration to non-humans less convincing is because there is definitely a hierarchy of value-holders in society where non-humans are not at the apex. There are also value divisions within non-humans too, such as between mammals, plants, and so on, which creates further problems which non-human deserves moral consideration? Not all non-humans are equal in value either. Warwick Fox (1990) rejects this intrinsic value theory put forward by holism. We actually don t even need to give moral consideration to non-humans because if we embrace other beings there is no need for moral exhortation (Eckersley 1992). Fox argues we don t even need an ethical code of conduct all we need is to leave our atomistic nature (Carter 2007). Although an ethical code of conduct can be useful in extending moral consideration, it is not necessary as holism argues it is.

Attributing value to non-human entities and creating an ecological consciousness is also extremely impractical. This requires a radical transformation and a push back in the current conventional political philosophy by replacing an anthropocentric moral reasoning with an ecocentric morality (Carter 2007). Therefore, the holistic argument for an environmental ethic that argues for moral consideration to non-humans is, good in theory, but difficult in practice and implementation. Moral extensionism takes a different approach, which is why I find it much more convincing. Extending moral consideration to only some non-humans, the ones those have the capacity to suffer (animals), is much more practical in my opinion, which makes the arguments from moral extensionism more convincing.

Some of the critiques above that are aimed at holistic arguments do also apply to moral extensionism too. For example, animals lack the ability to reason or enter contracts too so giving them rights can be difficult. However, Singer and Regan acknowledges this but argues that babies, the disabled, or those with learning difficulties also do not have the capacity to enter agreements but still have moral consideration (Carter 2007). Therefore, I agree with Singer that the capacity to suffer is what gives you moral consideration, thus I find his arguments very convincing. I do agree that their may be a hierarchy of value holders and the suffering of humans are worst than the suffering of animals, which Singer himself would actually disagree with me, but I don t think animals should be denied moral consideration due to being lower in the value hierarchy. I personally believe that just because human suffering is worst doesn t mean anything less should be denied moral consideration.

I don t agree with everything moral extensionism argues for and I do agree with some of the critiques towards it. For example, I do not believe it is acceptable to help a cat that is drowning whilst a human is drowning at the same time. Humans do have more intrinsic value in my opinion so humans should receive much greater weight in the utilitarian calculus than animals a human life deserves more moral consideration than an animal life. However, I find moral extensionism much more convincing because extending moral consideration to animals instead of all non-humans is much more practical. Nash (1989) has argued that history has progressively extended rights and moral consideration to others. For example, rights where given to black people, slaves, women, etc. Therefore, animals might be the next group that received moral consideration and moral rights (Nash 1989). Taylor (1992) critiques Nash by arguing than comparing humans relationship with other humans would not replicate in a human-animal relationship. He argues that animal rights should not be compared with women s emancipation, civil rights, and anti slavery movements (Carter 2007).

Overall, Moral extensionism does not go far enough for holists and might not be an adequate argument for extending moral consideration to non-humans because it excludes a large part of the non-human category. Attfield critiques moral extensionism for not extending moral consideration to plants and for confusing moral consideration with moral significance because an entity might have intrinsic value (moral consideration) but low significance (Carter 2007). However, this is mainly because moral extensionism takes an anthropocentric approach. Also the fact that their argument is limited to animals only and not all non-humans is what makes it convincing it my opinion. Their argument is much more feasible and practical. Moral extensionism, particularly animal liberationists, is a strong approach to extend moral consideration to non-humans and the works of Singer and Regan has been very influential. Maybe once humans give moral consideration to animals, then we can start extending it to the whole nature (Carter 2007). This gradual step-by-step approach is much more convincing than the radical holistic ecocentric approach.

Conclusion

We have looked at many arguments within this essay. We looked at anthropocentric arguments and ecocentric arguments. They both broadly agree with the solutions on how to extend moral consideration but they only differ in the whys and the extents (Norton 1991). We then looked at arguments from moral extensionism and Holism. I found the moral extensionist arguments more convincing because they are more practical, which is probably because they have anthropocentric elements within them. Humans must always place themselves above other specials to simply live (Luke 1988). Therefore, weak anthropocentrism , which argues that non-humans have some non-instrumental value, therefore they deserve moral consideration, is more convincing (Barry 1999).

Holism goes too radical because they adopt an ecocentric approach, which means that their arguments are almost impossible to implement in practice. For holism, there is no point in taking a shallow view like moral extensionism does, when a deeper view is available (Goodin 1992, cited in Carter 2007). However, the more you go radical, the more you go impractical (Taylor 1991 Barry 1999 Dobson 2000). Deep ecologist do not try to change society they try to change the individual by creating ecological consciousness , which is very difficult to do if you cannot change the world, change yourself (Barry 1994:390). In conclusion, anthropocentric and moral extensionist arguments for an environmental ethic that justifies extending moral consideration to non-humans are convincing because they are practical, whilst holism is only convincing in theory.

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