“if We Take The Universe To Be A Creation, What Are The Principle Marks Of A Creature?”

This question asks what the doctrine of creation implies about the character of the universe. For the purposes of this essay I will consider the principle marks of creaturehood generally, in terms that apply to creaturehood on a universal level as & a created universe, rather than attempting to address the sheer range of features and characteristics of differentiated creatures within that universe rather than addressing what marks distinguish the status of an octopus from an oak tree, as different beings within creation, I will attempt to describe what features they share as created beings. The implication of the doctrine of creation can appear initially to present a negative assessment of the value of created beings and their ontic dignity and freedom, but I will attempt to address these anxieties and describe how a comprehensive understanding of the doctrine of creation allows for a positive assessment especially considered against the consequences of alternative theses derived from classical philosophy. The doctrine hinges on a relationship between creatures and a loving creator and a bestowal of an inviolable dignity of being on creation that secures its status rather than eclipses it.

Any consideration of the doctrine of creation must begin with a recognition of its centrality in any theological system of thought. Creation as a concept speaks primarily of the characteristics of God as creator and the nature of his being and activities, and as such has implications throughout theological discourse in all areas of thought. All other theory about divine action or relationship through salvation, providence, grace or history presupposes the existence of beings other than God, and an assumed order of those beings through and with which God interacts& creation opens the logical and theological space or other Christian beliefs and mysteries, CITATION Sok90 l 2057 &(Sokolowski 1990). Precisely because of its wide ranging implications and radical importance the doctrine of creation is also a distributed doctrine CITATION Web13 l 2057 (Webster 2013) which finds varying degrees of expression in all areas of theological exploration of the world. In the notions of incarnation, salvific economy, grace, providence and natural law the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is fundamental.

Creatio ex nihilo is the fundamental and defining feature of the doctrine of creation understood in Christian terms, and is the most important feature of the idea of creation with respect to its implications for creaturely life. It is also what centrally distinguishes it from prior philosophical theories like that presented in Plato s Timaeus or Aristotle s metaphysics. Where Plato s dialogue considers the existence of a demiurge that shapes a pre-existent matter and in that way creates the universe in a manner comparable to that of a human craftsman the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo insists that no pre-existent matter is possible, and that all being, indeed all faculties of time/space/existence that are not-God, were made by God. Aristotle s conception of a disinterested deity precludes any kind of divine creative activity and allows movement only by way of induction, and furthermore posits the co-eternality of the unmoved mover with the substance that it moves. Compared to these theories it is evident that creatio ex nihilo is an intrinsically Christian or religious impulse and cannot be traced to prior philosophy or Hellenic influence, which further demonstrates its radical importance in Christian theology.

As previously mentioned the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo primarily concerns the nature and activity of the divine being, speaking more to the characteristics of God than it does directly to the characteristics of creatures. Creation from nothing can take place only if we hold certain beliefs about God to be true. The most fundamental of these beliefs is in the omnipotence and supereminence of God in general and in the creative act specifically& that God s act of creation is sufficient alone to create everything unaided and unhindered and with no pre-existent matter. This sharply distinguishes creation from notions of making and shaping like that of a demiurge, and in its supereminence all acts of creativity demonstrated by themselves created beings. With no prior matter or necessary process to inhibit God s creative act, creatio ex nihilo also necessitates a degree of atemporality to the terminus ad quo CITATION Web13 l 2057 (Webster 2013) of the universe. This beginning is not only the point at which all matter is created but also the inauguration of time itself and therefore any activity that we conceive of as prior to that inauguration would in fact be considered atemporal. In light of this gulf of atemporality to temporal existence, and non-existence to existence, the act of creation is also necessarily ineffable we have no suitable frame of reference, no conceivable experience or analogy through which to properly comprehend and speak of God s creative act. This fundamental ineffability is nevertheless ameliorated through the use of myth, in scri pture, and divine illumination by gift of grace.

The most striking element of the doctrine of creation at least from the perspective of our consideration of creaturehood is the lack of necessity. God, being totally free and pure actuality, sufficient and dynamic within himself in the Trinitarian relationship, did not need to create for any reason. To create is seen as in accordance with God s goodness and love but was not the necessary consequence of that love, nor can it be seen as a fulfilment of that love given that a lack of fulfilment within God would imply a lack that a perfect deity cannot have, and therefore the act of creation must be seen as purely voluntary. Creation could not have been, and need not have been, and only is by the will of God. This intrinsic voluntarism in creatio ex nihilo is what has the most influence on the principle marks of creaturehood.

Perhaps because in the modern era people appear less likely to see the totality of creation as a good, to understand it as an act of love, the initial implication of unnecessary creation is characterised negatively. If our existence is unwarranted, unearned, and only at the behest of the all-powerful creator we tend to see that existence as lacking in intrinsic value. Creaturely being without any ontological standing of its own appears to lack worth, and it is true to say that according to the doctrine of creation our being is totally contingent on the act not just in the initial creation but also in perpetual sustaining of God. We are therefore totally dependent on the will of God, limited by our (arbitrarily?) assigned position within God s creation, and dependent on God s grace. This engenders a kind of total subservience that can be quiet odious when viewed in the wrong light. To summarise, one of the principle marks of a creature is total contingency on the will of God, a conditioned and limited conceptual life, and an ontological distinction between creaturely being and the being of God as two separate others: one perfect, creative, and the other created.

The implications of such an ontological distinction and the manner in which creatio ex nihilo takes place brings forth a variety of anxieties about what the marks of creaturehood are. Ultimate subservience to an all-powerful creator is as mentioned a difficult thing for us to conceptualise in a positive way while holding on to the idea that contingent being has less or no intrinsic value compared to independent being. The fact that creation takes place outside of time and in a manner with no analogy in created life highlights how conditioned our conceptual understanding is and the limits of human reason. Furthermore, it calls in to question the ability of creatures to have a meaningful relationship with their creator the link between us has to bridge a gap as monumental as the chasm between being and non-being, a feat impossible for human reason acting alone. The perceived lack of dignity in created life is compounded by the experiential dimensions of creaturehood that are based on contingency and need. Unlike the perfect creator, creatures have needs, are susceptible to change, and have only finite capacities for activity imperfection is another mark of being a creature. The existence of this imperfection and the suffering it engenders in a universe created ex nihilo is a question of such wide scope and importance that it cannot be discussed satisfyingly here.

It can however be argued that this assessment of the characteristics of creaturehood is unnecessarily pessimistic. The gulf that exists between God as creator and creatures is wide, but a mistake is made if we neglect the fact that God s creative activity takes place in accordance with perfect love. In creating, God confers a good, and is the sole power that can bring about being the alternative is non-being, and it would be fatuous to argue that never having existed was a greater good than having existed dependently. Because the creative act of God is made in accordance with perfect love, instantly and without hindrance, and because God is internally sufficient and lacks nothing, the same sense of flippant voluntarism that appears to devalue creation is in fact what grants creation its worth. Creation exists out of the generosity of Godly love bringing things in to being for no other reason than love& not out of necessity, or mistake, or duty. Creatures exist because they are loved. Furthermore, the ex nihilo nature of creation and the total presence of God s intention in all aspects of the created universe is intrinsic to the economy of salvation and reconciliation that exists to bring created beings in to greater commun ion with the divine. Far from being intrinsically worthless and subservient to the whims of God it is possible to consider the status of creatures as a privileged one of being loved and cared-for, benevolently and without desert, by the almighty.

As mentioned earlier the vast diversity of the created universe brings about a variety of conditions that are not shared by all of creation. To speak of the status of intelligent beings in the divine order as identical to that of inanimate objects would to be ignore some of the pressing existential questions that arise from the activity of the mind. Having established that the existence of all creation is positively secured in the benevolent action of the creator without necessity, as an unwarranted gift, and that the omnipotence of God and the ex nihilo nature of creation means the entirety of the universe is embraced in this way, one important question pertinent to intelligent beings alone remains. The conflict between creatio ex nihilo and freedom, even if conceived of as an act of love, is a problem. The capacity for beings to be truly free to make decisions and act in accordance with their own will in a totally created universe is limited in light of their own created nature and the orderedness of the universe around them, and furthermore in the sustaining activity of God throughout. If God s creation is a sustained activity and we are to understand that only that which God wills exists then it stands to reason that God s will eclipses all other wills and therefore nothing that runs counter to the will of God is allowed to exist, which causes problems for the freedom of agents to act in a way that might run counter to the will of God. Either we never practicably could, or the potential would never exist in our wills to begin with.

For some theologies the idea of a lack of personal freedom is not a problem, and even outside the realms of theology the idea of radical personal freedom of choice is beginning to wane. However, in order to justify the claim that created beings have an honour of their own more akin to the honour of a loved child than the honour of a particularly treasured knick-knack I find it necessary to hold on to some notion of individual agency. Resolving this difficulty is a matter of closer attention paid to the character and effect of divine creativity. It is the perfection of the divine wisdom and the assumption that God has no need to create extraneous or useless things that sures-up the experience of human decision making. Divine wisdom produces nothing that has no value, and just as divine love confers legitimacy and honour to being, so to must it confer legitimacy to action as well. Our actions have value because they take place in the light of God. God s sustaining love is not so much a hindrance to our freedom as it is a facilitator, which preserves the sense of individual and meaningful freedom without marginalising the influence of the divine.

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