Bloody Sunday`s And Good Friday`s.

The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act was implemented by the British government in 1974, mainly in response to increasing tensions in Northern Ireland and the rise of PIRA terrorism; however, it is commonly recognised to be one of the key policies which escalated violence, not only within Northern Ireland, but also in England. It granted the police and security services a range of 'emergency powers', which included: arrest without charge, detention without trial, trial without jury, as well as: the searching of properties without a warrant, the banning of organisations, exclusion and deportation orders, the increase of stop-and-search procedures, and perhaps most importantly, the relaxation of laws concerning interrogation. Ministers at the time admitted that the powers were "draconian" and "unprecedented in peace-time" (Jenkins, 1974), yet the Act was renewed every year up until 2000, when it became common law. To be precise, the 'temporary provisions' banned the IRA in Britain with a minimum sentence of five years for those found to be a member, allowed police forces to arrest suspected members without evidence, permitted detention and questioning for up to 48 hours and authorised security services to utilise reasonable force when interrogating suspected terrorists - furthermore, it gave the Home Secretary considerable powers to deport individuals considered to be involved in terrorism. Of course, these policies were all designed to alleviate the prospect of increasing violence; however, they very much did the opposite. During the first four months of the act's implementation, 45 people were deported from the country and 489 people were detained for more than 48 hours, which sparked a series of heated protests in Northern Ireland (Bunyan, 1977: 52). Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the powers resulted in random and arbitrary detentions, the misuse and overuse of stop-and-search, the mistreatment, beating and torture of prisoners and grave miscarriages of justice within the Diplock courts (Holt, 2010).

The literature concerning the implementation of these 'emergency powers' has generally been critical, and very few achievements can be drawn, if any, from their impact on PIRA terrorist activity - this can be put down to three main factors. Firstly, the counterterrorist methods associated with these powers were, in essence, counterproductive, secondly, the "draconian nature" of such strategies was deemed acceptable due to them being 'temporary', however in reality, they tended to become the norm, and thirdly: such measures had a tendency to demoralise public confidence in the law itself, through the suspicion that civil liberties were being increasingly eroded (McGovern et. Al, 2010: 16). There is little doubt that the majority of policies associated with the Prevention of Terrorism Act were, indeed, counterproductive, especially in light of evidence that such measures simply served to increase levels of violence and alienation, whilst prolonging the conflict before a political settlement rather than a military defeat could be obtained (Hillyard, 2005: 1). Likewise, not only did such measures fail to prevent conflict, it was also suggested that they directly led to 'radicalisation'. For example, procedures such as deportation, harsh interrogation, and stop-and-search were counterproductive in combating violence, as they generally hardened attitudes among sections of both communities and increased support for the PIRA and other paramilitary organisations (Warbrick, 1983: 764; Scorer, 1980: 107). As detailed in a report by the Committee on the Administration of Justice, the regular persecution and intimidation by the security forces in Northern Ireland often radicalised sections of the community and "encouraged people to get involved who might not have done so before" (CAJ, 2008: 34) - this can be seen in the case of Bloody Sunday. By 1989, over 7,000 people had been arrested and detained under the act, predominantly nationalists, yet 86% of these were subsequently released without any further action being taken (Finnie, 1989: 705). This mainly illustrates that powers were abused to probe for low-level intelligence and assert authority over the alienated republican/Catholic community, rather than to prosecute. Finally, aside from Northern Ireland, one of the most important problems with this emergency legislation, as explained by Paul Hilliyard in 'Suspect Communities', is that it eventually became 'normalised' and accepted as customary (Hilliard, 1993: 33), therefore permanently eroding British civil liberties - hence why we have seen its clauses being constantly renewed in recent swathes of anti-terrorist laws (2000/01/05/06/8).