Theoretical Accounts Of Great Power Politics/world Politics.

Neo-Gramscian hegemony, in stark contrast to HST yet with some remarkable similarities, asserts that a hegemon assembles a hegemonic world order to maximise its own interests and the interests of the economic bourgeoisie, mainly by giving concessions to other countries so that it does not appear to be doing so. From this account of world politics, hegemony is merely a deceitful means of increasing power by smoke-screening the true intentions of exploitation with allowances and compromises to subordinate states. For example, the hegemon's promise of loans, free-trade and tariff reductions are simply an "ideological cloak that hides the exploitative power of capitalism" (Hobson, 2000: 130). The universal norms and values of the dominant hegemon are diffused and expressed to other countries through its ideological state apparatus, that is, international institutions; for example, the Gold Standard, IMF, World Bank and WTO. These organisations embody the hegemon's culture through rules and norms and facilitate economic expansion in the interests of the hegemon, but at the expense of subordinate states (Cox, 1987: 215). As previously mentioned, all theoretical accounts of world politics are flawed in one way or another, however, neo-Gramscian hegemony offers a solid explanation of how hegemony becomes entrenched within civil society and how it is exploitative and coercive rather than altruistic, this can be put down the virtues of 'critical theory' by which it pursues. Unlike HST, which approaches the task of science in a positivist 'problem-solving' manner, neo-Gramscian theories of hegemony are based on historicism and 'critical-developing'. Thus, they do not envisage universal laws which dictate human behaviour and human behaviour itself needs to be observed within particular historical blocs as it has the capacity to change (Cox, 1996: 52-56). It is this ability to account for structural transformation, which Realist theorists such as Gilpin and Waltz fail to do, that puts neo-Gramscian hegemony ahead in the race towards explaining world politics - for as long as HST holds onto its archaic values, neo-Gramscianism has the faculty to change and adapt with the modern IPS.

It is now appropriate to explain why this adaptive capacity is useful, mainly in the light of criticism that neo-Gramscian hegemony is clouded by unforgivable Eurocentricism, by maintaining an ancient conception of the West as the only self-generating, proactive leader in world politics. Some non-Eurocentric scholars go as far as saying that neo-Gramscian hegemony theories and HST are "but mere variants on a common Eurocentric theme" merely separated by a paternalist/anti paternalist divide (Hobson, 2007: 95). For instance, Robert Cox asserts that hegemonic world orders are founded by powerful states which have gone through socio-economic revolutions and have subsequently created an internal national hegemony (Italy, Britain, America); the technology and culture associated with this national hegemony becomes a blueprint for imitation abroad, intruding on 'third-world peripheral countries' as a passive revolution (Cox, 1996: 137). Considering no Western countries can be labelled as third-world peripheries, Cox's notion of hegemony is essentially Westernism writ large whereby the West remakes the East in its own image. Moreover, Cox's assumption that some countries in the south adopt Western practices but pervert them to morally regressive ends may be 'positive' counter-hegemonic action, but he only arrives at his conclusion through his subconscious supposition that the periphery (East) is barbaric, despotic and growth-repressive. Overall, like most materialist theories, neo-Gramscianism rests upon the Eurocentric assumption of a Western 'logic of immanence' in that it denies the possibility of progress in the East independent of the West; great Eastern powers between 850 and 1850 in Afro-Asia are ignored as their inclusion would break the wholly-Western hegemonic timeline (Hobson, 2012: 12).

On the other hand, a strong counterargument can be made against these critiques, for there is a high propensity for neo-Gramscianism to easily 'absorb' much of the non-Eurocentric rhetoric and include the East in its notion of hegemony. It should also be taken into account that materialist theories in general are inclined to downplay the agency of all actors - both Western and Eastern. Firstly, neo-Gramscianism approaches have made considerable progress in attempting to produce non-Eurocentric theories of world politics, more so than scholars who have merely criticised international relations for being 'Eurocentric', regurgitated a historical narrative and offered no solutions. Take for example, the in?uence of Gramsci on Edward Said, one of the fathers of postcolonial/non-Eurocentric theory. Thus, although Gramscianism has a long way to go in establishing a coherent theory which includes Eastern agency, the recent Gramscian shift towards 'civilisational analysis' demonstrates a promising future. Cox himself for example, recognises that the present challenge for IR scholars, neo-Gramscians in particular, is to incorporate the experience and histories of different cultures and civilisations within their conceptual understandings of the modern world (Cox, 200: 232-33). The work of Mustapha Pasha also highlights the flexible malleability of the neo-Gramscian doctrine in the way he asserts that recent counter-hegemonic movements beginning in peripheral LEDCs are the biggest challenge to U.S. hegemony since the Cold War (Pasha, 2006: 554), thus, Eastern agency is on the rise and neo-Gramscians can explain it. Finally, it is worth noting that neo-Gramscian theories of hegemony incorporating: racism, colonialism and culture were being produced as early as 1960 - long before 'Eurocentricism' was even conceptualised. Neo-Gramscian Randolph Persaud, who was heavily instrumental in redirecting the work of the 'Birmingham School on Cultural Studies', utilised and advanced the Gramscian analytical framework to examine the formation of hegemonic culture in the East, post-colonial hegemonic formations within China, and counter-hegemony. (Ramesh, 2013: 17).