How Does Thought Resist Its Own Tendency Towards Dogmatism, And Why Should It Do So?

How does thought resist its own tendency towards dogmatism, and why should it do so?

What are you doing when you re thinking? The concept of thought is incredibly complex. To write about it requires thought about thought. But what are we doing when we re thinking about thinking? I will be specifically looking at the chapter on The Image of Thought within Difference and Repetition by Gilles Deleuze as a challenge to the perceived dogmatic nature within traditional philosophical thought. Initially I will look at the ideas within Martin Heidegger s book What Is Called Thinking as a precursor to those put forward in the piece by Deleuze. The influence of Heidegger on Deleuze is extremely prevalent with regards to this topic, and his conception of thought will provide a useful basis for understanding the idea of thought resisting the propensity towards dogmatism put forward within The Image of Thought.

Heidegger however, is looking at thought from the basis of an assumed rational capacity within the mind. This will be explored further when looking at the difference between Heidegger s and Deleuze s conception and thought. This is in order to pursue the idea of thought manifesting without recognition or ownership. This notion of thought independent of any basis such as rationality, points towards the seemingly mystical tendencies in Deleuze s work which will be examined later in this piece of work. However, both Heidegger and Deleuze s conception of thought are not too dissimilar, and both provide useful ideas regarding the nature of thought itself. However, Deleuze s framework will be used to analyse the nature of resistance within thought, whilst examining the reasons as to why this resistance should happen. I will also look at the extent to which, if any, the Deleuzian conception of thought is nothing more than just an image itself which merely leads us further into a new form of dogmatism. However, the main focus will examine the processes by which Deleuze views thought to occur, and why these must be engaged with in order to resist the problematic and restrictive imposed directives of traditional philosophical thought.

What is thought? Heidegger and What Is Called Thinking?

In Martin Heidegger s book What Is Called Thinking? he outlines an understanding of thought, and how it manifests. In order to comprehend the idea of what it means to think we must attempt to think ourselves, and learn thinking . To begin the process of learning to think we have already accepted the fact that we are not yet able to think. However, he puts forward the notion that within us there is an innate possibility for thinking to happen which is intimately linked to our rationality. As rational beings we have a capacity for thinking, which in turn provides a space for our rationality to evolve within. However, just this possibility by itself is not sufficient enough to ensure that we have the capability for thought. For Heidegger, this is because we are only capable of doing what we are predisposed to do, and therefore there is no guarantee that this capacity exists. He stresses that we truly incline only toward something that in turn inclines towards us, toward our essential being, by appealing to our essential being as the keeper who holds us in our essential being.

This is the notion that thinking does not just occur as an innate facet, but rather it is our being that causes us to think. If the conception of thinking as a response to being is not grasped then this capacity for thought becomes lost, as one becomes caught within a repressive belief that the world is not external to the mind. Heidegger asserts the idea of the cabinet maker learning their craft through an interaction, response, and connection with different kinds of wood. Crucially there must be recognition of thought as that which happens to us and must therefore be seen as something which is essentially an adaptation and response to the external. The composites of being are seen only in relation to other aspects, with different facets of an object s being revealing themselves in different conditions. This understanding does away with the notion of a core inner essence which needs to be uncovered. For Heidegger, the purpose of thought is not to bring things into our own path in order to take ownership over them, but rather it is intended as a means through which the external can be revealed.

However, our being only grips us and compels us to think to the extent that we hold onto it. We continue to hold onto it by keeping it in our memory. Memory is seen to be that which gathers thought of what seizes us, in that we think about it because it persists to be that which must be given thought. We are only capable of thinking once we are predisposed toward that which is to be thought about. Heidegger stresses however that initially one must learn what thinking is in order to have the capacity for it. Learning happens when one s own actions are inclined towards answering whatever fundamentals are given to them at any point in time. Through imparting our mind upon what there is to think about we learn to think. Our mind is drawn towards that which is the most thought-provoking. For Heidegger, what is most thought-provoking is what is not being thought about, as we are still not thinking. However, the increasingly thought-provoking nature of the world implies response and action, rather than merely positing ideas regarding the way in which the world should be man should act, without delay, instead of making speeches at conferences and international conventions and never getting beyond proposing ideas on what ought to be, and how it ought to be done.

Heidegger s conception of a thought-provoking world which requires action and response as a means to learning provides a substantial explanation of thought itself. There is a somewhat obvious resistance against thought as that which seeks to control and impose, rather than that which allows for learning to happen through a revealing of the external and an interaction with it. The notion of interaction as a means to learning is something which will be heavily focused upon as a method of resistance to the tendency of thought s own dogmatism. This will be used as basis from which to extend this idea, whilst identifying the differences between Heidegger s conception of thought and that of Deleuze. The ideas within Deleuze s Image of Thought, specifically with regards to his understanding of learning, will provide the main basis for the argument within this piece of work.

Deleuze and the Image of Thought

The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze attempts to challenge preconceptions regarding thought, our experiences, and reality. This challenge manifests as resistance which occurs in the mind, through a revolution in the way in which we think. This resistance occurs in response to what Deleuze perceives to be a reduction of thought itself to externally imposed orders within traditional philosophical thought. This implies the creation of dominant narratives which create presuppositions resulting in a limitation to the commencement of thought. For Deleuze, these presuppositions must be dispelled in order for thinking to actually happen, as the problematic nature of these presuppositions is that they are subjective and exist for so long without serious evaluation. Deleuze s conscious creation of The Image of Thought as a concept provides an extensive and concise evaluation of what is seen to be dogmatic nature of traditional philosophical thought which must be resisted. He challenges the presupposition that traditional philosophical thought contains no presuppositions. The example of Descartes Cogito is initially used to clarify this point further: There is an attempt made by Descartes to escape the definition of the rational nature of humans, in order to evade all the objective presuppositions which restrict those processes which function by means of classification. According to Deleuze however, the presuppositions which are imbedded or subjective cannot be avoided, as they exist not within concepts but rather in opinion. Ultimately there is the belief that everybody knows what is meant when we discuss the self , thinking , or being , irrespective of any concepts regarding these notions. The idea of I think as foundation of the fundamental self only appears in such a way because the presuppositions have been referred back to the experiential self. To uncover what is meant by the imbedded or subjective presuppositions, Deleuze focuses on this idea of everybody knows outside of a conceptual or philosophical context. When Descartes says I think therefore I am , there is the assumption that everybody will understand what thinking and being means which no-one can deny.

This presupposition ultimately allows for a dogmatic, rather than inclusive, process of philosophical thought which claims however to commence without any presuppositions whatsoever. Deleuze s problem with this notion is an extreme moment of resistance, seemingly shaking one out of this comfort. Arguably it is resistance to what has been laid out as a comfortable and secure precedent over a proceeding statement, allowing the thought to be cemented and the forcing the individual to become represented in the wider scope of everybody .

To be an individual without presuppositions requires an active attempt to avoid representing anything, or being represented. In possessing the humility of not be able to know what everybody knows , along with the denial of what everybody is supposed to identify, one is able to enact a fervent form of resistance against a dogmatic presupposition. Philosophical thought puts forward what is meant by thinking, being, and self to be given universal recognition. The focus is therefore on the shape of representation or recognition in general. For Deleuze, this form of representation or recognition contains the presupposition that we are naturally capable of thought, with an innate capacity always inclining towards truth or the true, as the philosopher themselves are endowed with good will and utilise the supposed upright nature of thought. However, this point is hidden because the proposition is that within conceptual philosophical thought there is a presupposition of a pre-philosophical Image of thought, taken from constituent of pure common sense. Rather than putting forward various images which correspond to the philosophy in question, it is a single Image in general which Deleuze sees as that which composes the subjective presupposition of philosophy as a whole. What he is suggesting is that for philosophy to escape the presupposition of being supported by an Image which inclines towards the truth, it must uphold an essential critique of this Image as its foundation. In resistance to this Image, philosophical thought must continue within thought outside of it, abandoning the form of representation and the notion that everybody knows , whilst accepting the paradoxical nature of things. This liberation from the Image allows for the commencement of thought to be thought, with a constant repetition of this commencement when freed from the imposed directives of traditional philosophical thought.

The end of this paragraph is particularly interesting when looking at what one could view as the mystical quality to Deleuze s conception of the Image, and how philosophical thought can be liberated from it. It is not so much that he provides a substantial remedy to the problem which he has set out. Rather, there is an identification of this Image-less thought against an understanding of what it is not. One may be able here to draw comparisons between this descri ption and ideas within Zen Buddhist thought, particularly when looking at the concept of the Koan and the idea of resistance to recognition.

The Zen Koan is a riddle which seeks to shake one s mind out of their ordinary thought patterns, creating non-rational connections between the descri ptive aspects of the riddle and that to which the linguistic expression refers to. It is an attempt to produce a different state of mind and baffle the intellect , rather than to propose a logical problem which must be solved through an employment of one s own understanding or intelligence. There is the story of a Zen master addressing a monk on the topic of a bamboo stick: The Zen master asks, If you call this a stick, you affirm if you call it not a stick, you negate. Beyond affirmation and negation what would you call it? Much like Deleuze s notion of a thought without Image, the Zen koan can be viewed as that which causes one to become comfortable with and internalise paradoxes, whilst dispelling the presupposition that there is something to be figured out or truth to be found in what has been proposed. However, there must be further exploration into the imposed directives which construct the Image, and the way in which Deleuze sees resistance to this Image through his understanding of thought.

As mentioned before, there is an attempt to dismiss the notion of thought as an innate capacity, with thinking being done in an upright and good-natured fashion which inclines towards the uncovering of truth. Rather this thinking happens, for the most part, as a result of an impulsive response to something. This notion of thought being involuntary is crucial to understanding how the Image can, and should be resisted. This involuntary thought is a production of what Deleuze views as the encounter. This encounter is seen to be that which can only be sensed, and is placed in opposition to the notion of thought as recognition. The notion of recognition utilises the faculties of experience as a means to continue the construction of the common sense.

Resistance to the Image of Thought

In his critical guide and introduction to Difference and Repetition, James Williams looks at Deleuze s concept of the Idea as a result of the encounter. The Idea is different from the notion of ideas, meaning any identifiable thought about something. The Idea is what must be connected to through the encounter, as it provides the Image-less condition for thought which animates concrete lives through intensity and difference. What is encountered may be sensed in various ways, but it can only be encountered by sensing. This concept of the Idea is a way to explain the relationship between things external to the mind, which provides the space for our ideas to evolve and change. This relationship is in constant flux, with no fixed character, and can only be sensed and known to a degree through the encounter. What is being resisted is the need to preserve identification. The Idea is comprised of difference and intensities which can only be inferred from the notion of sensation as a basis.

This notion of the Idea as a relationship which is constantly changing, without any permanent identity, seems to suggest an almost meditative method of uninhibited interaction which allows for the encounter to happen. One must become open to the rejection of thought manifesting as recognition or identification in order for the Image to be resisted. The indication of an uninhibited method of interaction however, seems to require an openness as a prerequisite to having this encounter. Ultimately we are faced here with a paradoxical conception of learning which must be grappled with. How can one simultaneously be open to an encounter whilst requiring the encounter to produce the openness? Is Deleuze assuming that we are already open to such an encounter? The extent to which we can make ourselves open to this encounter becomes very complicated. If we are indeed to make ourselves open to this, then we are closing down the possibility of the uninhibited interaction by willing it. There is the possibility however, that by chance we are open to this interaction.

We may be able to understand this process further through using the example of the Deleuzian conception of learning to swim. Particularly this focus is on the interaction that takes place between the body of the individual and the body of the water. For both bodies they are made up of a universal facet which is based on relations which have a degree of difference, such as height and depth for example. For Deleuze, this system of relations composes the objective Idea of the body . However, there are differences within the objective Idea of the body. For example, when one is swimming the shallow end may end for one person but not for another. This learning process takes place when the particularities of both bodies are brought together. Essentially we are learning to swim through the engagement. However, this learning process does not just stop at the interaction itself. For once we interact we understand how to swim, but this does not mean that we stop learning. In contrast, the conception of learning within modern societies is that knowledge is gained through following the appropriate methods put in place by an instructor, and that learning stops once the correct knowledge is gained. For Deleuze, this has made the process secondary to the desired result, creating a tradition of learning which is secondary to the procedure through which knowledge is gained. Learning must be thought about in a way that escapes this problem of it being made secondary to knowledge.

This Deleuzian conception of learning as resistance to the Image ultimately requires a combination of passivity and activity. It is the notion of attempting to makes one s self as open as possible. But already we have raised the problem regarding an attempt to make one s self as open as possible, as it could contradict the very concept of openness through constructing the means by which to be open. So rather than an opening, it is a construction which closes down or distils the very nature of what it means to be open . However, this critique can merely be viewed as that which falls into the presupposition of what it means to think. By raising a problem with the paradoxical nature of this conception we are allowing our thought to become dogmatised by an Image which seeks to find concrete logical answers and truth. For thought to escape dogmatism it must occur, more often than not, when there is no active attempt to think within a passive construction of the self through learning. Both Heidegger and Deleuze promote this notion of passivity, in the belief that for the majority of the time we are not thinking.

However, Heidegger attaches a somewhat elitist character to his conception of thought, through the proposition of the innate rational faculty of humans as a prerequisite for the capacity for thinking. This notion of rationality is held up in rather an aristocratic fashion, which doesn t necessarily promote openness to others. This premise of our innate rationality providing the capacity for thought does not allow for a complete escape from the Image. However, whilst Deleuze s Image-less conception of thought recognises the rarity of thought similarly to Heidegger there is also the acknowledgment of the potential democratisation of thought to happen. This is arguably a true critique of philosophy which allows for openness to different disciplines and domains which are capable of thinking. It is the prioritisation of learning over knowing.

Conclusion

How we come to understand what it means to think requires a transformation of ordinary thought patterns. In order to even begin to think about what it means to think, we must acknowledge that what is perceived to be as common sense must be challenged.

It is as if we must utilise the moments where we are passive as tools which enable this openness to the encounter. Be it within different aspects of our lives which may seem abstract or arbitrary to our perception of thought. However, there is a quality to these aspects which we are not aware of until we step back and attempt to understand the nature of thought. We may view thought itself as an art form, not needing to control or impose, but simply as a means to engage with the world. It is a means for the world to reveal itself. We may lose ourselves in various things such as music, art, martial arts, meditation, literature, romance, psychoactive substances, and we could go on finding so many different aspects of human experience which cause something to happen, creating a thought which has the potential to lie outside the realm of our normal thought patterns what is immediately tangible. We may see different and abstract patterns in art, hear new sounds within a piece of music, discover new feelings in a relationship, or have our visual and sensory perception changed under the influence of certain substances. Or it may be as simple as the time we spend in the shower every morning. When we stop trying so hard to think, almost naturally, we may find that is when our mind is calm enough and uninhibited to the point where an Image-less moment of thought through interaction may occur. Some may constantly desire to explain to inexplicable, they may be too attached to categorisation and ownership over understanding. One may constantly question what the point of all this is, and claim that Deleuze has merely led us down a strange metaphysical path only to create his own Image. This rigidly is ultimately undesirable, and should be resisted at all costs! It fails to grasp or acknowledge the potential of thought to be thought about in a different way.

The interaction does something to our mind which causes us to think differently. We should actively seek to engage with that which allows for the passivity, creating the openness required. This is a paradox which has been grappled with the simultaneous existence of passivity and activity, with one essentially feeding into the other. We utilise the activity to allow for the passivity, but the passivity opens us up for the activity. Arguably the acceptance of this paradox is a moment of thought resisting its own tendency towards dogmatism. We must relinquish our perceived notion that we understand everything in a straightforward manner. The problem of the Image proposing concepts regarding the way in which the world ought to be becomes problematic if the world takes us by surprise. The Image places humans above everything else separate from nature, as if we are almost guardians of the divine knowledge of the universe. In resisting this Image however, we allow ourselves to be in the world, interacting as part of this changing flow of encounters.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cutler, A., and MacKenzie, I. (2010) Bodies of Learning, editors - Guillaime, L., Hughes, J., Deleuze and the Body Edinburgh University Press

Deleuze, G., Patton, P. (2005) Difference and Repetition Continuum International Publishing Group

Froese, K. (2007) Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Daoist Thought: Crossing Paths In-Between SUNY Press

Heidegger, M. (1968) What Is Called Thinking? Harper and Row

Williams, J. (2003) Gilles Deleuze s Difference and Repetition : A Critical Introduction and Guide Edinburgh University Press

Zug III, C.G. (1967) The Nonrational Riddle: The Zen Koan The Journal of American Folklore, Vol.80, No.315 American Folklore Society