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Attempts to reduce superpower tensions in the 1970s

Practise 30 exam-style questions on Attempts to reduce superpower tensions in the 1970s for Edexcel GCSE History (Superpower relations and the Cold War 1941-91). Write your answer as you would in the exam and get it marked in seconds against the mark scheme, point by point, with the Study Helper on hand if you get stuck.

  • 30 questions
  • 4–8 marks each
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20 questions, marked as you go

Sample questions with model answers

Here are 4 of the questions in this topic, each with a model answer, an explanation of why it earns the marks and the mark scheme an examiner would use.

Question 1

4 marks

Explain one consequence of the US-Soviet grain deal (July 1972).

Model answer

One consequence of the grain deal was that it turned many Americans against détente. In July 1972 the US government offered the Soviet Union 750 million dollars of credit to buy American grain over three years. The Soviets, who had suffered a disastrous harvest, quickly bought huge amounts from private US companies, about 440 million bushels of wheat in a few weeks, and the government subsidised the exports. As a result, American grain and food prices rose sharply in 1972-73. Critics called the deal the 'Great Grain Robbery', a phrase usually credited to Senator Henry Jackson, and argued that détente was helping Moscow at the expense of American consumers. This strengthened opponents of détente in Congress, who went on to back the Jackson-Vanik amendment linking trade with the Soviet Union to its treatment of Jewish emigrants.

Explanation

This reaches Level 2 because it explains a clear consequence and supports it with specific detail: the 750 million dollar credit, the scale of the purchases, rising prices and the 'Great Grain Robbery'. Another valid answer is that the deal helped the Soviets through their 1972 harvest failure and showed them the benefits of détente. Do not confuse this deal with Carter's grain embargo of 1980.

Mark scheme
  1. 4 marks

    Levels of response (4 marks). AO2: 2 marks. AO1: 2 marks.
    Level 2 (3-4 marks): Features of the period are analysed to explain a consequence. [AO2] Specific information about the topic is added to support the explanation, showing good knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): Simple or generalised comment is offered about a consequence. [AO2] Generalised information about the topic is included, showing limited knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): In July 1972 the US government made credit of 750 million dollars available over three years for Soviet purchases of American grain; in July and August 1972 Soviet buyers contracted with private US exporters for about 440 million bushels of wheat and other grain, and in 1972-73 the USSR bought about 18 million tonnes of grain from the USA (about 28 million tonnes abroad in all) after its poor 1972 harvest. Valid consequences include: (1) It helped the Soviet Union cope with the 1972 harvest failure, showing Soviet leaders the practical benefits of détente and encouraging further economic co-operation (a trade agreement later in 1972; a ten-year economic agreement in 1974). (2) It caused anger in the USA: the purchases, made with US credit and export subsidies, helped push up grain and food prices in 1972-73; critics called it the 'Great Grain Robbery' (a phrase linked to Senator Henry Jackson) and argued that détente benefited Moscow more than Washington, strengthening opposition such as support for the Jackson-Vanik amendment. (3) The US government responded by requiring exporters to report large export sales (1973) to avoid being caught out again. (4) World grain stocks fell and world food prices rose sharply in 1973. (5) Grain became a lever in US-Soviet relations (e.g. Carter's grain embargo of January 1980; credit only as a later, longer-term point). Level 2 needs a consequence explained with specific supporting information (e.g. the 750 million dollar credit, the quantities, rising prices, the 'Great Grain Robbery'). A comment such as 'the Soviets got food' with no development is Level 1. Do not credit: confusing this deal with the 1980 grain embargo; claims that the USA gave the grain free; the Marshall Plan or Lend-Lease.

Question 2

8 marks

Explain the importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972) for nuclear deterrence between the superpowers.

Model answer

The ABM Treaty, signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on 26 May 1972, was important for nuclear deterrence because it kept both superpowers deliberately vulnerable. Each side was allowed only two ABM sites, one round its capital and one round a field of ICBMs, with no more than 100 interceptor missiles at each, and neither could build a defence covering the whole country. This meant that whichever side struck first would still face devastating retaliation. By building mutually assured destruction into a treaty, it made a nuclear first strike pointless and therefore made deterrence more stable.

The treaty was also important because it removed a powerful reason to build more attacking weapons. If one side had built strong missile defences, the other would have added more warheads to overwhelm them, so an ABM race would have fuelled the offensive arms race. The treaty also banned ABM systems based at sea, in the air or in space, preventing a new technological race in which one side might gain a defensive breakthrough. Verification by satellites and a Standing Consultative Commission set up in December 1972 meant each side could check the other, which built confidence. Its importance was confirmed in 1974, when a protocol cut each side to a single ABM site.

However, the treaty's importance had limits. It said nothing about multiple warheads (MIRVs), and during the 1970s both sides fitted more warheads to their missiles, so deterrence rested on ever larger arsenals. Even so, the treaty set the rules of nuclear deterrence for the rest of the Cold War: as long as neither side could defend itself, both had a strong reason never to start a nuclear war.

Explanation

This reaches Level 3 because it explains how the treaty's precise terms (two sites, 100 interceptors, no nationwide or space-based defence) kept both sides vulnerable and so made deterrence stable, and it recognises the limits of its importance. The key is to link the terms to the 'for' in the question, deterrence. Common mistakes are to confuse ABMs with attacking missiles or to claim that the treaty cut the number of nuclear weapons.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): The ABM Treaty was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on 26 May 1972 as part of SALT 1; the US Senate approved it on 3 August 1972 and it came into force on 3 October 1972. (1) It preserved mutual vulnerability (mutually assured destruction): each side could have only two ABM deployment areas, one round its capital and one round an ICBM field, each with no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers, and could not build a nationwide defence; so neither could hope to survive a retaliatory strike, which made a first strike pointless and deterrence more stable. (2) It removed a reason to build ever more offensive missiles: an ABM race would have pushed each side to add warheads to overwhelm the other's defences; the treaty's preamble linked limiting ABMs to 'curbing the race in strategic offensive arms'. (3) It blocked a new technological race: sea-, air-, space-based and mobile land-based ABM systems were banned, as were launchers firing more than one interceptor, so neither side could gain a defensive breakthrough. (4) It made deterrence more predictable and verifiable: each side used national technical means (satellites) and agreed not to interfere with them, and a Standing Consultative Commission (set up in December 1972) handled questions of compliance. (5) It saved money and was tightened in 1974, when a protocol cut each side to one site (Moscow; the US ICBM field in North Dakota). (6) Limits: it did nothing to stop the offensive race; MIRVs multiplied warheads in the 1970s, so deterrence still rested on huge arsenals; later, Reagan's SDI (1983) challenged the treaty's logic (credit as a later point only). Accept 'two sites with 100 interceptors each' or '200 interceptors in all' for 1972, and 'one site with 100' after the 1974 protocol. Do not credit: claims that it limited ICBMs or reduced the number of nuclear missiles (that was the Interim Agreement, and it froze rather than reduced them); confusing ABMs (defensive interceptors) with attacking missiles; general comments that it 'reduced tension' with no explanation of deterrence.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 3

8 marks

Explain the importance of Nixon's visit to China (February 1972) for US-Soviet relations.

Model answer

Nixon's visit to China from 21 to 28 February 1972 was important for US-Soviet relations because it frightened the Soviet leaders into closer co-operation with Washington. Since the border clashes of 1969, Moscow had regarded China as a serious threat. When Nixon met Mao and Zhou Enlai and the two governments issued the Shanghai Communiqué, promising to work towards normal relations, the Soviets feared that the USA and China might combine against them.

This made the Soviets much keener to improve their own relations with the USA. The Moscow summit took place only three months later, in May 1972, and there Nixon and Brezhnev signed SALT 1 and the Basic Principles. The Soviet leaders even went ahead with the summit after Nixon ordered the mining of North Vietnam's harbours that month. This suggests that they were determined not to let the USA draw closer to Beijing than to Moscow.

The visit also gave the USA leverage. Through 'triangular diplomacy', Nixon and Kissinger could deal with each communist power separately and use the prospect of better relations with one to put pressure on the other. Nixon also hoped that both would reduce their support for North Vietnam in order to protect their new relationship with Washington, although in practice both kept supplying Hanoi.

Overall, the visit changed the shape of the Cold War from a two-sided to a three-sided contest. This strengthened the USA's hand and helped to push the Soviet Union into the détente of the 1970s, although it also left Moscow suspicious of American motives.

Explanation

This reaches Level 3 because it explains how the visit changed Soviet behaviour, with specific evidence (the Shanghai Communiqué, the timing of the Moscow summit, the Haiphong episode), and it shows the limits of its importance. The focus must be on US-Soviet relations, not on Sino-American relations alone. Avoid simply describing what happened on the visit.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): An explanation is given, showing analysis of importance. It shows a line of reasoning that is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the required features or characteristics of the period studied. [AO1]
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): An explanation is given, showing an attempt to analyse importance. It shows some reasoning, but some passages may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the period. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised answer is given, showing limited development and organisation of material. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the topic is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): Nixon visited China from 21 to 28 February 1972, met Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and the two governments issued the Shanghai Communiqué (27 February), agreeing to work towards normal relations. (1) Pressure on Moscow: after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 the Soviet leaders feared a US-Chinese combination against them, so the visit made them keener to reach agreements with the USA; the Moscow summit followed three months later (22 May 1972) and SALT 1 and the Basic Principles were signed there. (2) The Soviets went ahead with the Moscow summit even after the USA mined North Vietnam's harbours in May 1972, which suggests how much they now wanted good relations with Washington. (3) Leverage: 'triangular diplomacy' allowed the USA to deal with each communist power separately and to use the threat of closer ties with one to win concessions from the other; increasing US leverage against the Soviet Union was one of Nixon's aims. (4) Vietnam: the USA hoped that both Moscow and Beijing would reduce support for North Vietnam to protect their new relationship with Washington; both continued to supply Hanoi, so this succeeded only partly. (5) The Cold War became three-sided rather than simply bipolar, which encouraged the wider move towards détente between the USA and the USSR. (6) Limits: the visit also deepened Soviet suspicion of US motives; later US-Chinese steps, such as full diplomatic relations in January 1979, worried Moscow (credit briefly as later significance). Level 3 needs the visit's effects on US-Soviet relations explained, not just a description of the visit. Do not credit: describing the visit (banquets, the Great Wall) with no link to the Soviet Union; claims that the USA and China signed a military alliance; confusing the 1972 visit with Kissinger's secret trip of July 1971.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

Question 4

8 marks

Write a narrative account analysing the key developments in the superpowers' dispute over human rights, 1977-78.

You may use the following in your answer:
- Carter's letter to Andrei Sakharov (February 1977)
- the Belgrade review conference (1977-78)

You must also use information of your own.

Model answer

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 had committed the Soviet Union to respect human rights, and by 1977 groups such as the Moscow Helsinki Group were recording its failures. The dispute became a superpower issue when Jimmy Carter became president in January 1977, promising to put human rights at the heart of American foreign policy. In the first weeks of his presidency, US officials publicly criticised the harassment of dissidents in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

This led to a direct clash. The dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov had written to Carter, and Carter replied with a letter dated 5 February 1977, which was handed to Sakharov on 17 February and made public. The Soviet leaders saw this as open interference in their internal affairs. At the same time the KGB arrested leading members of the Helsinki monitoring groups, including Yuri Orlov, Alexander Ginzburg and Anatoly Shcharansky. The bad atmosphere spread to other issues, and in March 1977 the Soviets rejected the new arms proposals that Secretary of State Vance brought to Moscow.

The quarrel then moved to the first Helsinki review conference, which opened in Belgrade in October 1977. The American delegation criticised Soviet and East European abuses, while the Soviet side rejected this as interference. Consequently, when the conference ended in March 1978, its short concluding document did not even mention human rights.

The dispute came to a head in 1978. In May Orlov was sentenced to seven years in a labour camp and five years' exile, and in July Shcharansky received 13 years and Ginzburg eight. The US government condemned the trials, cancelled some lower-level official visits and blocked the sale of an American computer to the Soviet news agency, TASS. As a result, by the end of 1978 human rights had become one of the main sources of distrust between the superpowers, even though talks on SALT 2 continued.

Explanation

This reaches Level 3 because it presents the developments in sequence, from Carter's new policy to the 1978 trials, and analyses how each step deepened the dispute, ending with a clear outcome. It goes beyond the stimulus with the arrests, the effect on the arms talks and the trials. Avoid drifting into 1979-80 events such as Sakharov's exile or Afghanistan, which are outside the dates.

Mark scheme
  1. 8 marks

    Levels of response (8 marks). AO2: 4 marks. AO1: 4 marks.
    Level 3 (6-8 marks): A narrative is given which organises material into a clear sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events analyses the linkage between them and is coherent and logically structured. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is included, showing good knowledge and understanding of the key features or characteristics of the events. [AO1] No access to Level 3 for answers that do not address three or more aspects of content.
    Level 2 (3-5 marks): A narrative is given, showing some organisation of material into a sequence of events leading to an outcome. The account of events shows some analysis of the linkage between them, but some passages of the narrative may lack coherence and organisation. [AO2] Accurate and relevant information is added, showing some knowledge and understanding of the events. [AO1]
    Level 1 (1-2 marks): A simple or generalised narrative is provided; the account shows limited analysis and organisation of the events included. [AO2] Limited knowledge and understanding of the events is shown. [AO1]
    0 marks: No rewardable material.
    Performance in AO1 and AO2 is interdependent. An answer displaying no qualities of AO2 cannot be awarded more than the top of Level 1, no matter how strong performance is in AO1; markers should note that the expectation for AO1 is that candidates demonstrate both knowledge and understanding.

    Indicative content (not a checklist; credit other valid points): (1) Starting point: the Helsinki Final Act (1975) committed the Soviet Union to respect human rights, and groups such as the Moscow Helsinki Group (1976) and Charter 77 (January 1977) were monitoring breaches; Jimmy Carter, inaugurated on 20 January 1977, promised to make human rights central to US foreign policy and rejected Kissinger's 'linkage'. (2) In the early weeks of 1977 US officials publicly criticised the harassment of dissidents in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. (3) Carter replied (letter of 5 February 1977, handed over on 17 February) to a letter from the dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov, winner of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize; Sakharov made it public, and the Soviet leaders treated it as interference in their internal affairs. (4) In early 1977 the KGB arrested leading Helsinki monitors, including Alexander Ginzburg, Yuri Orlov and Anatoly Shcharansky. (5) The quarrel soured other business: in March 1977 the Soviets rejected Vance's new arms proposals in Moscow (credit the link to the worsening atmosphere). (6) Belgrade review conference (October 1977-March 1978): the US delegation criticised Soviet and East European abuses; the Soviets rejected this as interference, and when the meeting ended on 9 March 1978 its brief concluding document did not mention human rights and recorded that consensus had not been reached on a number of proposals, though the participants agreed to meet again in Madrid (1980). (7) Trials: Orlov was sentenced in May 1978 (seven years' camp plus five years' exile); in July 1978 Shcharansky (13 years, on charges including treason) and Ginzburg (eight years) were sentenced; the US government condemned the trials, Carter sent Brezhnev a message warning that they were damaging relations, two lower-level official visits to the Soviet Union were cancelled, and Carter blocked the sale of an American computer to the Soviet news agency TASS. (8) Outcome: by the end of 1978 human rights had become a major source of distrust between the superpowers, although SALT 2 negotiations continued. Level 3 needs at least three aspects of content linked in sequence to an outcome. Do not credit: Sakharov's exile to Gorky (January 1980) or the Afghanistan invasion as part of the sequence; confusing Sakharov with Solzhenitsyn; claims that Carter broke off relations with the Soviet Union.

    Pearson's marking instructions: The middle mark in Levels 2 and 3 may be achieved by stronger performance in either AO1 or AO2.

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