Us-soviet `thaw` - How Important Was Khrushchev`s `peaceful Coexistence` Policy?

Between 1953 and 1962, a change in superpower relations between the USA and the USSR is largely evident. Both blocs reduced their levels of animosity towards each other, worked (broadly speaking) towards a more neutral and less militarized world and attempted to coexist, achieving some measure of peace for the price of mutual tolerance. One factor cited as the driving force behind this shift is the Soviet policy of Peaceful Coexistence, shaped by Khrushchev in the mid 1950s. Although this was important, it is crucial to note that had the Americans not answered in kind, and had there not already existed a global political climate that made striving towards normalized relations jointly beneficial, the Thaw would not have occurred. Thus Peaceful Coexistence must be identified as a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of the Thaw.

Peaceful Coexistence was first proposed in August 1953 by Malenkov, recommending a 'New Course' in terms of relations with the West. In 1956, Khrushchev openly denounced Stalin at a Party Conference with a speech entitled 'On the Personality Cult and its Consequences', and began the implementation of destalinization and normalizing relations with the West. Peaceful coexistence was meant to assuage Western, capitalist concerns that the socialist Soviet Union was driven by the concept of world revolution advocated by its founders, Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks. To demonstrate his commitment to opening up to the West and setting the USSR on a more conciliatory path, Khrushchev made a number of foreign policy concessions, including joint US-USSR withdrawal from Austria in 1955 to create a neutral Austrian state, and unilateral withdrawal from Finland in 1956. By doing so, the Soviets managed to physically express a previously only verbal desire for a reduced state of tensions in Europe. In line with the new doctrine, Khrushchev and Bulganin also visited Yugoslavia, endorsing Tito's 'anti' Russian regime and proposed the Geneva Summit of 1955, in which cultural and social exchange between the two blocs was agreed upon. Although these results did not massively change the underlying power structure, it allowed for greater co-operation and the promise of future change.

Although Peaceful Coexistence demonstrably improved relations, the extent to which it can be called 'Khrushchev's Policy' must be evaluated. As previously mentioned, the concept of initiating a period of mutual tolerance was first raised in 1953 by the Prime Minister of the time, Malenkov. Although he did not shape and form the finalized policy, his efforts must be acknowledged as foundational to the policy. However, Khrushchev was the individual who shaped the policy, gave it a practically applicable form and began the process of destalinization and reaching out to the West. As such, it is broadly justifiable to term the policy of Peaceful Coexistence as Khrushchev's.

The USA as whole, and through the actions and policies of Eisenhower and Kennedy, were also instrumental in the Thaw through their reciprocation of Soviet reconciliation attempts. Although Eisenhower publicly presented an image of hard-line anti-Communist rhetoric through his 'New Look' policy, he was far more pragmatic and willing to compromise when actual diplomatic or political crises arose; two key examples being the 1953 Berlin Crisis and the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956. The crushing of the anti-Sovietisation riots in East Berlin was overlooked by the USA, who failed to involve themselves in proceedings, despite Dulles' advocation of the 'rollback' of Communism wherever possible. This was a perfect opportunity, with Berlin reeling in the throes of possible revolution and the hand of the USSR unsteady. Eisenhower chose not to act, demonstrating that each country's sphere of influence was now tacitly accepted and would not be interfered in. The aggressive policy of rollback was demonstrated to be political rhetoric, highlighting the efforts of the USA to maintain and improve relations with the USSR. The Suez Canal Crisis further illustrates the desire for peaceful relations between the USA and USSR through the maintenance of the current political balance. Egypt was essentially a Soviet-leaning country at the time of the Crisis; the joint Anglo-Franco-Israeli invasion of the canal was in effect a massive undermining of Soviet power in the Middle East region, tantamount to rollback. The USA stepped in and through economic pressure forced the invading forces to withdraw, returning influence to the Soviets. This was not, as in the previous case of the Berlin Crisis, merely a declination of a possibility of rollback, but an active counter-action to prevent rollback that was already underway.

It is critical to note, however, that no amount of 'reaching out' from one bloc to the other would have resulted in the temporary improvement in relations if there were not mutual benefits to be gained by striving towards normalized diplomacy. Such reasons encompassed military, economic and political concerns, all interlinked with considerable complexity. Both the USA and the USSR were in possession of fusion bombs by the end of 1953, and of ICBM delivery systems by the end of 1959. The implication of these developments was a shift from the previous ability to launch a 'pre-emptive first strike' to the state of 'Mutually Assured Destruction'. Because of the ease with which nuclear weaponry could now be deployed from a friendly base via a missile, and because of the sheer destructiveness of the new H-Bomb, any attempt to launch a nuclear war would be met with instant retaliation by the attacked country and the assured annihilation of both countries. For obvious reasons, neither the West nor the USSR wished this. Furthermore, this meant that it was no longer expedient to continue building up A-Bomb and H-Bomb stocks; both sides knew that threatening their use was essentially an empty bluff, because of the newly calculated situation of MAD. The Thaw may have partially arisen from a desire to reduce tensions, reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and therefore reduce wasteful and uneconomic spending. The role of the military-industrial complex must also be considered when evaluating the reasons for the occurrence of the Thaw. The MI Complex theory states that the heavy industries necessary for war become crucial in the continued wellbeing of the economy of a country; and that due to this importance, both the military and said corporations have undue influence in policy decisions, specifically those concerning warfare abroad. It has been argued by some historians that the Thaw was a deliberate attempt by both blocs to shatter the power of the MI Complex; specifically the authority of the corporations in the West and the military in the USSR. By reducing hostilities and thus gradually phasing out and undermining importance of 'war industries' to the economy, the politicians could regain greater control of their respective countries.

A further important underlying factor to be considered is the gradual change in the 'climate' of the Cold War. Following the tumultuous and aggressive years after the irrevocable breakdown of diplomacy in 1947, the two rival blocs had settled into their own spheres of influence. Some historians have judged that the Thaw was merely the result of a period of calm following the turmoil when both the Soviets and Americans were racing to assert their dominance over 'unclaimed' areas of territory in strategically important areas; once these had been 'assigned' to either power, they were no longer contested, and accepted for pragmatic reasons by the bloc who did not control them. If there were still sizeable tracts of important land to be challenged for, then it is feasible that the Thaw would not have occurred. In this view, it was only after the spheres of influence had been definitively consolidated that any attempt at detente could have taken place.

Therefore, although Peaceful Coexistence was an important factor in the post-Stalin thaw in superpower relations, reciprocation on the part of the USA, and an underlying climate which dissuaded both blocs from further militarization and aggression were also requisite. However, if the Russians had not 'reached out', then there would have been nothing for the USA to respond to; thus Peaceful Coexistence can be judged as a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in the 1953-1962 Thaw.