'nobody There?': An Evaluation Of Gareth Moore's Philosophical Account Of Believing In God.

In this essay I propose to do three things: 1. Describe and summarise Gareth Moore's arguments, the germ of which are tendered in the introduction of his book Believing in God: A Philosophical Essay; 2. Analyse the author's view of language in relationship to God and his application of insights drawn from Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy; and finally, to consider and respond to the label 'non-realist' in regards to Moore's position on the question, 'does our language about God have any objective referent outside our use of language?' I will propose that Moore can be read in a way that is compatible with realism. Summary of Moore Philosophical Approach

Gareth Moore's stated aim is to provide 'a sketch toward a philosophical understanding of Christianity'. (Moore: ix) The methodology employed is to examine the ways Christian believers talk about God. The range of contexts for such 'God talk' spans a variety of 'forms of life', to use that term in the more narrow sense that Wittgenstein seems to do, i.e. a kind of activity that includes some form of speaking. (Kerr: 29ff): speech about trusting, loving and fearing God, rewards and punishment, serving God, miracles, prayer and a host of situations in which believers attribute some kind of action to God. In all this a significant influence on this thinking is acknowledged: 'It will be obvious, if only from the fact that I quote him so much, that I have been much impressed and influenced by Wittgenstein'. (x) Indeed, Moore had done his B.Litt at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, examining the later writings of Wittgenstein, which would come to influence the direction of his thinking.

There is in the style that Moore adopts something that evokes Wittgenstein's use of practical, even banal, examples to help clarify the point he is making or even to subvert the reader's own inveterate metaphysical prejudices. So in the introductory chapter, Moore approaches the question, 'what is it to believe in God?' by way of hypothetical situation in which one had to explain their belief to a young man named Otto who had been brought up in an isolated community of logical positivists, with no experience or understanding whatsoever of Christianity or any other religious conception. All his days, until his venturing forth into the wider world to satisfy his curiosity, have been spent studying mathematics and reading (or being read) the propositions of natural science.

By way of explaining belief to Otto he is, of course, encouraged to read the Bible and other religious literature but also to visit churches to learn about what people do there and to observe how they go about their daily lives.

Through this device Moore introduces the kind of perplexities that Otto will face with regards to the way Christians speak of God as a person and how they behave toward God as a person 'when there is nobody there called God'. This is not how he has learned what it means to speak to another person. In the positivist community where he grew up, speaking to somebody, unless you were using a phone or some other device, entailed their actually being present in a tangible way. 'It is a fact about the way the words "speak to" are used that, barring the use of special apparatus, talking is only called "speaking to" somebody if there is somebody there. When he was brought up he was taught to be respectful to others and sometimes to bow before them; but then the others had to be there before him for him to bow to. So an important part of learning to speak to people and to bow to them was for him (as it is also for us) learning what counts as there being somebody there, when it can properly be said that there is somebody there.' (5)

It is this experience of 'nobody there' in its various permutations across diverse aspects of the Christian forms of life that furnishes the 'leitmotif' in Moore's analysis of how Christians speak to, worship, obey, receive things from, and understand the activity of God.

The fictional Otto learns that the words and actions of Christians do not follow the same kinds of rules as those obtaining in his community. Although Christians talk to God in the same way he might talk to a friend or someone else, it is clear, by the canons he has learnt, there is nobody there for them to be talking to. Where otherwise this might be attributed to insanity, Otto recognises that the practice is too widespread and institutionalised for that to be the case. The apparent competency of the practitioners also undermines the 'madness' explanation. The alternative answer that presents itself to Otto is this: language is being used by these Christians in ways he has not yet learned but which might become apparent given time and further opportunity to live among them and observe their practice.

Moore's book is in fact an analysis of belief in God rooted in grammar, the network of rules governing the use of language in religious discourse. Otto's perplexity is resolved in Moore's distinction between 'evidence' and 'grounds' for belief. Where the former primarily counted as a basis for accepting beliefs about things in Otto's positivist community, it is the latter that counts in the sphere of religious belief. (In fact, in science 'evidence' and 'grounds' may be more closely associated. In matters of religious faith there is a wider gap between the two spheres.) Truth about God is rooted in what is authoritatively taught. It is not believed because some evidence has pointed to it. Says Moore: '..in religion there is an important distinction between grounds and evidence. That the Bible says the earth was created in six days is certainly not evidence that that is what happened; evidence might come from something like radio waves or very old rocks. But for the religious believer the words of the Bible are certainly grounds for believing that is how it happened. (Different believers have different ideas on whether they are strong or convincing grounds.) That the pope says contraception is wrong is, again, not evidence that it is wrong; but for a Catholic or mainstream Christian it is certainly grounds for believing it is wrong. In a scientific, empirical outlook, on the other hand, there is a much closer identification between grounds and evidence. So a Catholic woman may at the same time hang on the words of the pope and yet be ready to challenge the foremost authorities in her own scientific field.' (27)

Abetted by his reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Moore proceeds to articulate a philosophy of belief that on the surface certainly invites the question: 'Does Moore believe that, outside the framework of language and the multiple forms of life that comprise the community of faith, there is any referent for the work "God"?'

Developing the theme of the difference between 'grounds' and 'evidence', Moore tenders the difference between a hypothesis, which can be tested on the basis of evidence and religious belief. 'There is here no equivalent to, "There is a smell of burning, and smoke - and see, here is the fire!" We cannot say, "Here are things in motion, here are things that exhibit design - and see, here is God!" There is in this sense no discovery of God as there might be of fire.' (16) Even if we speak of 'discovering God' we are using language differently from that in the example of fire. For indeed, says Moore, there is nothing to discover that we might construe as a fact called God. The Christian must reject any alleged instance of a 'discovered God' as idolatrous. Nor must God be thought of as an invisible, intangible object or person who is simply inaccessible to any of our technologies for detection. In fact, these traditional attributes of God are used as a way of saying 'There is no such thing as discovering God. God is not this, not that. God is "totally other" (than what you might find), "transcendent" (outside the realm of the discoverable).' (18)

For Moore, following Wittgenstein, it is the use that words are put to that is significant. For example, the word 'God' is not to be explained as a 'referring expression', like the work 'chair' or even 'Gareth Moore'. It is a word that could not be explained by pointing at something, even figuratively, saying 'that is God', as one might do to a chair or Gareth Moore. This is simply not the way the word is used in the discourse of faith.

Citing Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Moore likens the way the word 'spirit' enters language to that of the word 'God'. Wittgenstein is talking about the use of the phrase, 'point to the shape of a thing'. Because it is impossible to identify a single bodily action called 'pointing to the shape' it is said that a 'spiritual activity' corresponds to these words. Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should say, is a spirit.' (18) Similarly, when speaking of God as spirit we are making a logical point regarding the use of the word 'God'. God is not 'something' to which we can append a label.

So Moore builds on this theme of God being 'nothing' from the standpoint of the logic of grammar. With generous quotations from Wittgenstein to buttress his philosophical approach, Moore develops his argument through out the variously themed chapters which focus on mainstream discourse about 'God' and the character, structure and ethos of human relationships with the term, to his concluding - or shall we say with Moore himself, 'unconcluding' - remark: 'People do not discover religious truths, they make them.' (287)

What does Moore mean by this last remark and, indeed, the repeated references to God being 'nothing' and 'nobody', whether as an agent and subject of action or as an object of devotion, prayer and trust? Are Peter Vardy and Felicity McCutcheon justified in locating Moore in the same camp as other alleged non-realists? (McCutcheon: 135; Vardy, 1999: 59ff; Vardy, 2001: 40, 42) What precisely is Moore drawing from Wittgenstein to support his 'philosophical understanding' Christianity?

Moore's Use of Wittgenstein

Perhaps by addressing the latter question we will have a firmer basis for clarity in regards to others. Reflecting back on Believing in God ten years after he had written it, in an article jointly written with Brian Davies, Moore recounts: 'Moore attempts to follow Wittgenstein's general philosophical approach, as expressed in the Philosophical Investigations, by trying to understand some of the things Christians say by setting them in their context in the lives of believers. His central concern is to show that 'God' is not the name of a thing. That is to say, the way in which the word is used shows that the relationship between 'God' and God is not to be conceived on the model of a name and object to which it corresponds. ..In particular.. Christian use of 'God' is not to be conceived as a personal individual, rather like a human being, ..God is not a "bodiless person"'. (Moore and Davies: 33,34) It is also noted in the same article that Moore's book is a reaction to the kind of approach used by Richard Swinburne which seeks to infer the existence of a personal God 'by reasons on a level with those employed by scientists'.

So Moore draws on the first section of the Philosophical Investigations and other writings to elucidate our understanding of how language about God is being used. He does this, on one hand, by quoting from Wittgenstein at appropriate junctures. Take for instance, the citation in reference to the use of the phrase 'point to the shape of a thing' as referred to above. Or when he quotes from Zettel to illustrate the idea of extending the use of language, as when the extraordinary claim is made that Jesus is God or for other uses than to convey information. (21, 69ff) But he also does this by following the counsel of Wittgenstein himself: 'One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that.' (Wittgenstein, 1953: I 340) So also Moore: 'We actually have to look at how language about God works, how it is used, if we are to get any real understanding of what it is for God to be a person, an agent.' (102) Also, in Culture and Value Wittgenstein asks, 'How are we taught the word "God" (in its use, that is)? I cannot give an exhaustive systematic descri ption. But I can as it were make contributions towards the descri ption; I can say something about it & perhaps in time assemble a sort of collection of examples.' (Wittgenstein, 1998: 82)

This is precisely the methodology followed by Moore. He examines closely the use that words and language are put to in a variety of religious contexts - a 'collection of examples', as it were. Wittgenstein had written 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.' (1953: I 124) So Moore attempts through his descri ption of the use to which language is put to uncover the deepest grammar governing the believer's talk about God. This, I think, he does well. By closely examining not only the language of believers but also of the sacred texts themselves Moore brings a degree of 'perspicuity' to the phenomenon of 'God talk'.

For example, take his discussion on the theme of what it means to love, fear and trust God. (103-134) The meaning of these words in relation to God is contrasted with how they are used in relation to a Charlie, Bill or Carol. One can work for Charlie and Carol at the same time. One can hope for a reward from Bill and Harry. One can trust or be active in regards to more than one person simultaneously. But, says Moore, for many activities, it only makes sense to refer to God if there is nobody to refer to. After citing several passages from the New Testament, which Moore says reflect the logical discontinuity between God and the world, he proceeds to describe and analyse particular instances of trusting, fearing and loving God.

Through the device of the fictional 'Otto' we observe and learn how the above words are used by people said to be trusting God. He sees that when Alvin trusts Mary he actually sees somebody (Alvin) trusting and somebody (Mary) being trusted. This trust is expressed in various ways. For example Alvin may share confidential information about himself with Mary who, in turns, does not violate this trust by gossiping with Bill about it. Alvin may also say things when he is in difficulty like, 'It's all right. I know Mary will help me out.' But this is not what 'Otto' sees if Alvin is trusting God. He does not 'see Alvin and see God and see Alvin putting his trust in God. What he sees is Alvin not putting his trust in anybody, refusing to put his trust in men.'

The evidence that Alvin puts his trust in Mary is of a different order from that which would confirm trust in God. The absence of any thing, object or person called 'God' is crucial to this difference but not the sole criterion. This trust is also accompanied by a certain set of behaviours which would tell 'Otto' that Alvin is trusting God. (For example, he may himself behave in a trusting way with other people; he may be quiet and confident under duress; or he may be seen not to fall apart as someone lacking a sense of security with no one to trust. He will speak as one who trusts God saying things like, 'I know it will be OK in the end. God will see me through all this.' 'Circumstances such as these will make his trusting behaviour and words intelligible, and make us want to say of him that he trusts in God. This is how the concept of trusting in God works, this is the kind of thing Otto must see if he is to understand that concept.' (109)

The 'negative universal proposition' (109) that there is nobody there when we speak of trusting, fearing, or loving God is important to Moore's approach. (Indeed, it is also true of speech about God as the object of prayer and devotion or the agency of action such as miracles or creation. See Chapters 6-8) Some times this 'nobody' is spoken of in terms of God being invisible. But invisibility here is not to be construed in the sense of someone 'just like Charlie' only he can't be seen. Moore bolsters this negative universal proposition by a reference to Philosophical Investigations 293, - the passage containing Wittgenstein's celebrated beetle in a box. 'What is invisible is not like what is visible, with the slight difference that it cannot be seen or otherwise detected. To call God invisible is to give him an altogether different logical status from what is visible. "God is invisible" is like "Sensations are private", a grammatical remark; it is a guide to how we use the word "God".' (111)

So it would seem that talk about God and expressions of religious truth are not primarily in the category of 'referring expressions' but rather constructions out of the connexions that are made at the deeper level of grammar. Hence the concluding remark: 'People do not discover religious truths, they make them.' (287)

Moore: Realist or Non-realist?

Where does this leave us? Moore has offered a clear account of the way language about God differs from other kinds of discourse. Theologically and philosophically it is sound to regard God as 'other' than an invisible person. M. Jamie Ferreira has commented that an adequate philosophy of religion must retain its integrity as philosophy and do justice to religious tradition. (Ferreira: 443) Moore, I think, has met the first criterion with aplomb through his consistent application of his reading of Wittgenstein to the Christian tradition. One might say that through making visible 'connexions' in the grammar of our use of language about God he has brought about a degree of 'perspicuity' and clarity. Of course, if this in itself has challenged certain perceptions of Christian practitioners, it need not imply that Moore has failed as regards the second of Ferreira's criteria, viz. to do justice to the religious tradition.

It is, however, on this second criterion that Moore may be most vulnerable. On the face of it, notwithstanding Moore's self-conscious claims to orthodoxy (283), and the strong suit he plays by rooting much of his material in an abundance of biblical texts, I suspect that the average person attending church on a given Sunday might be discomfited by the statement, 'God is nobody'. To proclaim that we pray to 'nothing' and that in serving God we are serving 'no one', on the face of it, suggests a rather different account of the Christian tradition. Peter Vardy is especially inclined to view Moore as an 'anti-realist' in the light of his line of argument and of the final sentence in his book regarding the making rather than discovery of religious truths. (Vardy, 2001: 146, 198)

A casual and selective reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein might even deepen these suspicions of non-realism in Moore's approach. Of course it should be noted here that many authors hold that to read Wittg