Since its inception during the post-colonial period of the mid to late 20th century, the Global South has, over time, become more distinct in its methods of ensuring state stability than the Global North. This essay aims to explore strategies used with a view to understanding why the adoption of democratic practices is considered less important than strong governance in the Global South. This argument can be framed through political, economic and/or social understanding, as well as the relationship each framework has with one another. This can help identify the layers to which effective governance can ensure survival of systems with regard to how distinctive states are run in both global regions.
Kaufmann (2010) has described governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (2010, pp. 4). This includes the process by which governments are managed, the efficiency of policy implementation and the respect by which citizens and the state have towards institutions which “govern economic and social interactions among them” (2010, pp. 4). Due to the South’s history of underdevelopment being entwined with intervention and exploitation by the Global North through colonial and imperial practices, the means to which states within this side of the globe were governed successfully should be maintained within the context of this history.
However due to external pressures set by Western superpowers such as the United States this has resulted in effective governance within states being diminished. As discussed by Krasner (2013), a focus on American security would help better provide “a better guide for U.S policy” (2013, pp. 4) rather than trying to put countries on a non-existent path of “consolidated democracy” (2013, pp. 4). This essay will illustrate that the most effective way to ensure freedom and success in the long run is by prioritising the improvement of security and economic growth rather than being pressured for “direct democratic reforms“ through careful government management in the short run” (2013, pp. 1).
It is widely accepted that the priority of effective political governance is key in helping shape the existence of states within the Global South. This can be considered as more important than prioritising democratic values and guidelines within these processes because this has proven to result in a weakened state apparatus and potentially even result in the collapse of government. Bardhan (2020) analyses and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese governance system from a comparative development perspective. The author uses neighbouring Asian superpower India to better understand the “essential” distinctiveness of “China’s development model” (2020, pp. 1).
The writer organises his findings into three sections to help broaden the understanding of China’s governing methods. The first is the ‘Internal Organization of Government’ by which China’s success in “catching up” with technological innovation by “the large size of the population and of the domestic market” (2020, pp. 3) as well as maintaining Upward Accountability making it easier for leaders to take “long-run decisions under the Chinese governance system” (2020, pp. 4). Bardhan argues China has been somewhat ineffective with maintaining systematic stability, with it going “off-equilibrium” when faced with crisis (2020, pp. 3). He argues it also falls behind in its political meritocracy compared to democratic India in its “top administrative system” (2020, pp. 2).
In the second section, entitled ‘Abuse of governance and corruption’, Bardhan compares both India and China’s use of similar methods and believes there to be striking links between businesses and the state while having completely different political systems. In the third and the final section, entitled ‘Decentralised structures and practices’, the writer mentions how the mixed effectiveness of China’s centralisation tactics combine “political centralization with economic and administrative decentralisation” (2020, pp. 5). However, the writer also points out that China has not been able to avoid “the problem of serious local elite capture” (2020, pp. 6) by which Chinese local businesses often have clashes with local officials.
What can be deciphered from Bardhan’s observations is that while China’s style of political governance is indeed effective in areas including technology, accountability and centralisation, compared to styles of democracy practised in neighbouring India, it shares many of the same issues. Whilst India maintains systematic stability as well as a successful relationship between local businesses and officials it retains both authoritarian and democratic regimes. Both have positives and negatives when it comes to political governance. Also, compared with India, China’s Communist Party’s grip on power (created through security, censorship and stamping opposition to resistance, with an example being the 1989 standoff in Tiananmen Square) and governmental manoeuvring (within the Communist party) has made opposition of any sorts ineffective. It can be argued this perpetuates China’s stability both internally and externally.
Furthermore, it can be stated that the rise of Modi’s vision of a nationalist India has based some of its governing methods on China, from the persecution of religious minorities to the censorship of Press Freedom. A report by the World Bank stated that India fell in its ranking from 54.67 in 2020 to 41 in 2022 (2023, n.p) is proof of this. It can meanwhile be argued that while China’s method of political governance has weaknesses, its growth as a economic powerhouse has become the blueprint for effective authoritarian governance which in turn has been copied and adopted by states, including India and other Asian countries.
Similarly, Sawani (2020) discusses the effectiveness of authoritarian political governance as conducted by former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and how this contrasts to the failed state status of Post-Arab Spring Libya. This in turn failed to adopt an effective democratic system. The writer states how in the post-Gaddafi era, the weakness of civic and democratic culture as well as the influence of the peripheries, helped produce a crisis and as a result, contributed to the end of the “actual, sometimes symbolic, existence of the state and its institutions” (2020, pp. 2). This contrasts to the culture of “institutionalism, rule of law, and the sense of community” (2020, p.6) which was present under Gaddafi’s leadership which saw political and civil organisations crushed. Gadaffi also helped promote a culture of “dependency” (2020, pp. 6) on the state through a rentier economic system.
Using Libya as a case study, the forced incorporation of democracy in an environment where strong authoritarian political governance strived, could be said to have ultimately led to its collapse. This further exacerbates the importance of maintaining governance especially in states within the Global South, rather than adhering to democracy. Through the success of Gaddafi’s Libya and China in maintaining their grip on power through the dissociation of democratic implementation and reform, it can be argued that this style of effective governance has become a blueprint for authoritarian states across the Global South. Political governance becomes the most important factor in proving why the adoption of democracy is unfit to Global South states.
Moreover, it can be stated that the way in which effective economic governance is managed plays into the overall underlying structure of political governance as the economy can help better understand about the success of the state apparatus at a wider level. Erol and Şahin (2022) use the two case studies of Turkey and Egypt, since the 1970’s, to demonstrate why the adoption of a neoliberal authoritarian style of economic governance is preferred by most state managers (2022, pp. 134). This is done to “resolve the crisis of ISI (Import substitution industrialization)/state-led political economy” as well as overcoming politicised social relations and collective demands (2022, pp. 134).
However, the contradictory nature of neoliberalism (enforced by the 1989 Washington Consensus on Global South) states that class struggle has often lead to incoherency of implemented orientation manifested in these cases (2022, pp. 134). To counter this, the state managers of Egypt and Turkey according to Erol and Sahin, use “different strategies” such as co-optation to repression and authoritarian populism in “different periods of neoliberalism” to help control and contain the labour movement for the effective implementation of “neoliberalism as a development strategy”.
The implications of both of these case studies demonstrates the way in which Global South states have method’s of economic management somewhat modelled after each other’s authoritarian neoliberalism system in rejection to westernised forms of market liberalism through democratic means. Especially with the binding conditions set by the Global North biassed Washington Consensus, it could be argued that in this aspect the means in which states were to achieve economic prosperity is through rebellion rather than prioritising democratic reform. This can also be seen through Africa’s growing allegiance to the Chinese economic system. As Lagerkvist (2009) notes, the involvement of Chinese assets within certain African states has resulted in them achieving unprecedented poverty reduction (2009, pp. 130). This is a sign that effective economic governance can not just occur internally but also externally by which other states are impacted positively and adopt in this case ‘a market economy with Chinese characteristics’.
However, the Covid-19 pandemic especially has halted the efforts of effective economic governance in the way this has been historically achieved and was limited in its capability of development. Although, it can be argued this actually further strengthens the importance of political governance in maintaining the status quo as seen through the strict lockdown measures implemented by China during the early stages of the pandemic. In turn, while effective economic governance is indeed important more so than adopting the models of Western democracies in helping to bring about legitimacy and prosperity within Global South state’s, the success of it is widely dependent on internal and external variables coming into play. Moreover, the way in which economic governance feeds itself into the varying effectiveness of political governance is a somewhat similar measure of how social governance does the same.
Finally, alongside the economy, society has also been key in forming effective political governance whilst helping to maintain a stable social order which can be more important than adhering to democratic norms. A stable society can be considered as the backbone to a state and if this is not managed properly, a domino effect may occur which has happened in places such as in Nigeria. As Orgundiya (2010) points out, the inherent corruption within Nigeria (which is a key indicator of bad governance) has “generated unimaginable level of poverty” (2010, pp. 208) by which it makes the poor unaware of the problems they face making them “easy to manipulate” (2010, pp. 208) and to be used by the political elite “for further manipulation and exploitation” (2010, pp. 208).
As can be seen in Nigeria’s case, as similar to Libya, democracy and democratic institutions were ‘imposed’ upon them in 1999. What the writer argues is that the “problem here is that liberal democracy does not evolve, as it was in the west, with African societies” (2010, pp. 205). In this aspect, the imposition of a democratic system ultimately prospered corruption and an unstable class system as a result. Weak democratic systems are a breeding ground for corruption and this further prioritises why it’s so important to focus on good governance rather than the adherence to democracy. Democracy in Africa and more widely in the Global South is a strictly alien concept and could only particularly lead to social unity in respect in the region it prospered in, the Global North. This poses the question “democracy for who and democracy for what?” (Orgundiya, 2010, pp. 205).
The Global South’s attempts at adopting democratic systems and institutions has ultimately led to failure. Orgundiya identifies the case of Nigeria (from a social context) and Sawani (in the case of post-Arab Spring Libya) stating how instability has resulted from Western external pressure. Democracy thrived in the global north because it was born out of the context of the West but the Global South adopted the system but it is not successful because democracy is a western concept. Effective layered governance is more a priority to the Global South than an adherence to democracy.
Reference List-Bardhan, P. (2020). The Chinese governance system: Its strengths and weaknesses in a comparative development perspective. China Economic Review, 61, p.101430.
-Erol, M.E. and Şahin, Ç.E. (2022). Labour unions under neoliberal authoritarianism in the Global South: the cases of Turkey and Egypt. Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d’études du développement, pp.1–20.
-GovData360. (n.d.). GovData360: Press Freedom Index. [online] Available at: https://govdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/h3f86901f?country=INDindicator=32416viz=line_chartyears=2002 [Accessed 24 Apr. 2023].
-Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues, pp. 1-29
-Krasner, S. (2013) “Seeking `Good-Enough-Governance` — Not Democracy.” Reuters, pp. 1-5
-Lagerkvist, J. (2009). Chinese eyes on Africa: Authoritarian flexibility versus democratic governance. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27(2), pp.119–134.
-Ogundiya, I.S. (2010). Democracy and good governance: Nigeria`s dilemma. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 4(6), pp. 201-208
-Sawani, Y.M. (2020). Gaddafi’s Legacy, Institutional Development, and National Reconciliation in Libya. Contemporary Arab Affairs, 13(1), pp.46–68.
