A Case For Human Rights Education In An African Context: The Concept And The Practice

rights is. There has, however, been considerable consensus on the articulation of various human rights articles. I emphasise the articulation because beyond that, a number of problems arise. The problems are by way of example, historical, semantic, economic and contextual. These problems arise because there is no agreement on which rights to grant, who has the obligation to realise these rights and what the source of these rights is (Gwisai, 1999). In the Western world, human rights have been discussed from early times. Their origin has been variously described – for example, in feudal times, rights had to do with what people owed their landlords, kings of God. With the collapse of feudalism, people started challenging such narrow conceptions of human rights. Questions started being raised as to how individuals should treat each other, what institutions (such as the state or religion) can do and cannot do, and how individuals and groups should relate to each other. Rights, it has also been argued, are derived from the nature of human beings as such. With the outbreak of the two world wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945), a plethora of human rights issues came on board. Thus, both the League of Nations and the United Nations formulated procedures and guidelines that prescribed what human rights would entail. It is important to note that such a project would be set up using particular languages. Those languages arose from specific cultural experiences. This in itself presents unique challenges, and these challenges will be explored later. With the formation of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), however, the African continent formulated its charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Despite the widespread assumption that human rights are universal (Dower, 1983), the attempt in the current decade to introduce human rights education within an African/multicultural context, raises pertinent issues of concern with respect to both the concept and the practice. 2. TENSIONS BETWEEN WESTERN AND AFRICAN CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS Multiculturalism has therefore been broadly understood to refer to an individual’s having his/her own world view, engaging in practices that are different from other peoples’, having the ability to interpret other people’s signs, lan97 A Case for Human Rights Education in an African Context: The Concept and the Practice Tarcisio Nyatsanza 98 Nyatsanza guage, gestures, cues, as well as developing anti-racist, anti-gender biases based on both historical and contemporary experiences (Bennet, 1999:30). This then brings us to a point where educational practitioners need to translate the concept of human rights into a meaningful practice within the school curriculum. Before the concept human rights itself is addressed, one needs to clarify the issue of multicultural education, of which the African context is a typical example. I need not spend much time explaining how the African context is multicultural, but suffice it to say that there is a debate on whether or not the term African refers to something simple or complex. In fact, many strands of meaning may be identified. One is that multiculturalism within an African context refers to historical genres: Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial and how the three sometimes coexist. The other level of meaning refers to African multiculturalism insofar as Africa consists of various cultural groups. This way of characterising African multiculturalism avoids the reductionist tendency of assuming African particularity rather than multiplicity (Makang, 1997:330). What this therefore means is that multiculturalism in Africa does not necessarily entail uniqueness but the ability of the complexity of African culture to interface with Western experiences. Mudimbe reiterates the same point when he argues that such thinking is a result of the notorious mystification of African tradition ((Mudimbe, 1988:153). The rest of the paper will try to explore the various tensions that emerge from the African context within itself, as well as the interface between the African and the Western conceptions and practice of human rights. The author would like to argue that it is the discussions about these tensions that will inform us whether or not the human rights education is implementable or not. Notwithstanding the above, Zimbabwe has launched a pilot scheme through the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) in partnership with some neighbouring countries, but the results will depend on the appropriateness of the theoretical framework. Since the 18th and 19th centuries, European political thinkers have been concerned with how authoritarianism could be kept in check. One of the ways in which this would be realised was to emphasise the concepts of consent, accountability, democracy and participation. To that end, it was argued that the individual should be given the highest regard vis-à-vis the community (Komba, 1998:197). John Stuart Mill also argued that the independence of the individual was absolute and that the rest of the community was dependent on such axioms (ibid). It was on the basis of the same logic that Benjamin Constant stressed the fact that in order to free oneself, one should be free to determine one’s life and ends without interference. Modern liberty was to anchor on a constitution that defended the rights of individuals (Constant, 1988). The preceding points present a backdrop against which the West conceive and exercise their rights. Thus, in Western terms, rights are understood more in terms of the singular pronoun rather than the plural. In practical terms it therefore makes perfect sense to talk of an individual demanding social space, claiming a realm of privacy and arguing for a child’s right to choose “a”, “b”, “c”, etc. Within such a framework, human rights education would be based on values that are in tandem with individualism and Western ideology. The above scenario stands in stark contrast to the African conception(s) of human rights. In fact, the idea of singling out human rights as an identifiable aspect of human enterprise is itself an issue. From the traditional (pre-colonial) through to the contemporary African point of view, life is not necessarily segmented. It is conceived in holistic terms, that is, regarding one’s cosmic experiences as a totality. Values (and therefore rights) are construed in collective terms (Komba, 1998:197). Edison Zvobgo (1979:93), a renowned Zimbabwean legal expert, has similarly argued that: “Rights ... do not exist as an integral part of human nature. They arise from a person’s destiny of living in relationship with family, friends, the ethno-linguistic group and nation ... No rights can be exercised apart from one’s relationship with another.” In fact, Ramose argues that what Zvobgo propounds is true insofar as the African political culture emphasises reciprocity in the realm of human relations. Reciprocity, according to Ramose (1999:139), crystallises into the principle of solidarity. Human rights then operate

greement on which rights to grant, who has the obligation to realise these rights and what the source of these rights is (Gwisai, 1999). In the Western world, human rights have been discussed from early times. Their origin has been variously described – for example, in feudal times, rights had to do with what people owed their landlords, kings of God. With the collapse of feudalism, people started challenging such narrow conceptions of human rights. Questions started being raised as to how individuals should treat each other, what institutions (such as the state or religion) can do and cannot do, and how individuals and groups should relate to each other. Rights, it has also been argued, are derived from the nature of human beings as such. With the outbreak of the two world wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945), a plethora of human rights issues came on board. Thus, both the League of Nations and the United Nations formulated procedures and guidelines that prescribed what human rights would entail. It is important to note that such a project would be set up using particular languages. Those languages arose from specific cultural experiences. This in itself presents unique challenges, and these challenges will be explored later. With the formation of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), however, the African continent formulated its charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Despite the widespread assumption that human rights are universal (Dower, 1983), the attempt in the current decade to introduce human rights education within an African/multicultural context, raises pertinent issues of concern with respect to both the concept and the practice. 2. TENSIONS BETWEEN WESTERN AND AFRICAN CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS Multiculturalism has therefore been broadly understood to refer to an individual’s having his/her own world view, engaging in practices that are different from other peoples’, having the ability to interpret other people’s signs, lan97 A Case for Human Rights Education in an African Context: The Concept and the Practice Tarcisio Nyatsanza 98 Nyatsanza guage, gestures, cues, as well as developing anti-racist, anti-gender biases based on both historical and contemporary experiences (Bennet, 1999:30). This then brings us to a point where educational practitioners need to translate the concept of human rights into a meaningful practice within the school curriculum. Before the concept human rights itself is addressed, one needs to clarify the issue of multicultural education, of which the African context is a typical example. I need not spend much time explaining how the African context is multicultural, but suffice it to say that there is a debate on whether or not the term African refers to something simple or complex. In fact, many strands of meaning may be identified. One is that multiculturalism within an African context refers to historical genres: Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial and how the three sometimes coexist. The other level of meaning refers to African multiculturalism insofar as Africa consists of various cultural groups. This way of characterising African multiculturalism avoids the reductionist tendency of assuming African particularity rather than multiplicity (Makang, 1997:330). What this therefore means is that multiculturalism in Africa does not necessarily entail uniqueness but the ability of the complexity of African culture to interface with Western experiences. Mudimbe reiterates the same point when he argues that such thinking is a result of the notorious mystification of African tradition ((Mudimbe, 1988:153). The rest of the paper will try to explore the various tensions that emerge from the African context within itself, as well as the interface between the African and the Western conceptions and practice of human rights. The author would like to argue that it is the discussions about these tensions that will inform us whether or not the human rights education is implementable or not. Notwithstanding the above, Zimbabwe has launched a pilot scheme through the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) in partnership with some neighbouring countries, but the results will depend on the appropriateness of the theoretical framework. Since the 18th and 19th centuries, European political thinkers have been concerned with how authoritarianism could be kept in check. One of the ways in which this would be realised was to emphasise the concepts of consent, accountability, democracy and participation. To that end, it was argued that the individual should be given the highest regard vis-à-vis the community (Komba, 1998:197). John Stuart Mill also argued that the independence of the individual was absolute and that the rest of the community was dependent on such axioms (ibid). It was on the basis of the same logic that Benjamin Constant stressed the fact that in order to free oneself, one should be free to determine one’s life and ends without interference. Modern liberty was to anchor on a constitution that defended the rights of individuals (Constant, 1988). The preceding points present a backdrop against which the West conceive and exercise their rights. Thus, in Western terms, rights are understood more in terms of the singular pronoun rather than the plural. In practical terms it therefore makes perfect sense to talk of an individual demanding social space, claiming a realm of privacy and arguing for a child’s right to choose “a”, “b”, “c”, etc. Within such a framework, human rights education would be based on values that are in tandem with individualism and Western ideology. The above scenario stands in stark contrast to the African conception(s) of human rights. In fact, the idea of singling out human rights as an identifiable aspect of human enterprise is itself an issue. From the traditional (pre-colonial) through to the contemporary African point of view, life is not necessarily segmented. It is conceived in holistic terms, that is, regarding one’s cosmic experiences as a totality. Values (and therefore rights) are construed in collective terms (Komba, 1998:197). Edison Zvobgo (1979:93), a renowned Zimbabwean legal expert, has similarly argued that: “Rights ... do not exist as an integral part of human nature. They arise from a person’s destiny of living in relationship with family, friends, the ethno-linguistic group and nation ... No rights can be exercised apart from one’s relationship with another.” In fact, Ramose argues that what Zvobgo propounds is true insofar as the African political culture emphasises reciprocity in the realm of human relations. Reciprocity, according to Ramose (1999:139), crystallises into the principle of solidarity. Human rights then operate 99 Nyatsanza within a context where the group is mutually agreed to respect and recognise (collectively) each other’s life experiences. Gyekye (1987:8) reiterates the same point when he argued that: “The communal ethos of African culture necessarily placed a great value on solidarity, which in turn necessitated the pursuit of unanimity or consensus not only in such important decisions as those taken by the highest political authority, town or state, but also in decisions taken by lower assemblies such as those presided over by heads of clans, that is the councillors.” It has therefore been demonstrated that the African perspective is collective and this in turn informs their conceptualisation and exercise of human rights. But of critical importance is the fact that the collectivity did not entail unanimity. The collective position was arrived at through a process of reconciling many and often divergent views. The above argument proceeded on some assumed premise that rights do exist in one form or another. However, Karl Marx’s critique of society offers some useful insights into the discussion of human rights. According to his logic, human rights are based on economic power relations. It is the propertied class, which has rights and entitlements. This imbalance (of only the dominant class having rights) undermines the concept of rights being universal. According to the Marxist trajectory, the final stage of societal development is when there will be a classless society. In this society, it is presumed, rights will not make sense. In Marxist terms, any talk of rights is meaningless. 3. PROBLEMS OF THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS The preceding discussion has already characterised the broad differences between Western and non-Western conceptions of human rights. This section will cite some specific examples of the African context. One area in which the term human rights is problematic is language. An exploration of a few African languages demonstrates that the term is relatively new, and has been coined in the recent “era of development”. In fact, what has happened is that the two words human and rights have been separately translated in order to come up with the African (indigenous) language phrase. When I called one of my colleagues from Kenya to find out what the KiSawahili phrase for “human rights” is, he paused for a couple of minutes before answering. In fact, he told me that he was trying to translate because the expression is not part of the ordinary language use. I am informed that the equivalent phrase is haki za watu wote. In SiNdebele, the expression is amalungelo abantu, in Setswana, it is ditshwanelo tsa batho and in ChiShona they say kodzero dzevanhu. Because language is conceptual and is intended to convey meaning, it becomes problematic if words are used but their meaning is unclear. The practice of human rights essentially becomes problematic. In fact, part of what emerges from this discussion is that within the African context, human rights are not singly considered. They are conceptualised within the broad framework of a cosmic view of life. The issue of the relatedness of beings already discussed aptly, applies here. Humans are related to other human beings, to animals, the environment and the spirit world. Whatever conception of rights one would have, within this context, they are defined in a relational manner. Another example of how rights become problematic in the African context is the impact of the role of patriarchy in defining those rights. Questions are asked, for example, whether or not women’s rights are in fact human rights. Pat McFadden (1988) has explored how male dominated epistemology has been constructed in order to define and exercise “human rights” from a biased and monolithic point of view (Gwisai, 1999:5). A similar paradigm also applies when children’s rights are considered. It has been argued that there should be a distinction between the rights enjoyed by adults and those enjoyed by children. In a famous case in Zimbabwe, Justice McNally ruled that it was not inhuman to whip a juvenile, but that it was inhuman to whip an adult (Unesco:127-134). I shall briefly focus on Zimbabwe in terms of the Unesco project on human rights education. While it should be applauded that such a venture has been embarked upon, critical issues need to be considered if it is to succeed. Workshops have been held with the view to exploring how to incorporate human rights issues in various subjects within the curriculum. While such an inclusivist approach has 100 Nyatsanza some merits, there is need to clarify the conceptual issues that have been highlighted above. It is the author’s view that current conceptions (including the manual Human Rights and Democracy for Southern Africa:1999) present a rather simplistic and uncontroversial view of human rights. The text does not reflect a homegrown product in terms of sensitivities, peculiarities and dialectics of the African experiences. Take for example the right to health or the need to protect the environment (Unesco: 127-134). Within the African context, to be healthy means, among other things, being at peace with the spirit world, being physically fit, being productive and being prosperous. On the other hand, the environment does not just refer to geophysical space, but it is a whole world of existence with beings of different levels. These beings have a history, politics and ideologies, and relate in very complex ways. It should also be borne in mind that education on the African continent is diverse and complex, reflecting the educational traditions, strategies, aspirations and policies of various communities as well as those of the whole of contemporary Africa. CONCLUSION Turning to our own region, I would like to argue that it is imperative to continue to search for a just and equitable society. In order to do this, there is need for an appropriate education system with both the educators and those being educated being critical as well as resourceful. Because the education system is the seedbed of future society, human rights education must be the basis upon which it should develop. Although some work on human rights has been done, very little work has been done to explore the problems surrounding the concept and practice of human rights in the African context. More importantly, if human rights education is to be introduced in the school curriculum, it will require that a well-articulated and defensible theoretical framework first be put in place. The African context urgently needs specific attention in order to provide a meaningful response to continued violations in many parts of Africa. It is hoped that this paper has raised some pertinent issues on human rights education and that out of this will come some suggestions towards broader and African-oriented conceptions of human rights.