“the Mind Is A Physical Substance With Non-physical Properties” Discuss. [25 Marks]

“The mind is a physical substance with non-physical properties” Discuss. [25 MARKS]

Chalmers argues through his Philosophical Zombies argument that the mind must be a physical substance with non-physical properties. Philosophical zombies can be identified as a person who is identical physically to a human but experience no qualia (they have no mental activity). Whilst a zombie may say ‘ouch’ after touching hot metal it still does not experience any of that pain that a regular human would feel. It feels right to suggest that there is a possible world upon which these zombies exist, to say this is to say that zombies are metaphysically possible and so conceivable. We could imagine a physically identical world but with the exception that the inhabiting people experience no qualia. In this metaphysically possible world humans would act and behave as one would expect them to except there would be no qualia. It follows using Leibniz’s law of indiscernibility that if A is the same as B in all qualities, they are identical, if not then the two are not identical and are distinct. So, in this circumstance, if we can imagine two people one with consciousness and qualia the other only physically the same, the two are different and consciousness is not a physical property as the difference cannot be told by physical analysis. This philosophical theory of mind as a non-physical property is known as property dualism, it maintains that whilst there is only one substance (the physical) that this substance can take on non-physical problems e.g. the property of qualia/consciousness. Qualia for a property dualist are subjective qualities of experience that differ from person to person even if they are experiencing the same event. This suggests that the mind is a physical substance with non-physical properties.

If physicalism is true, then something’s physical properties determines its’ functional qualities. To that extent, a physical duplicate of you is also an exact functional duplicate of you as physicality determines function. Furthermore, physicalism would suggest that phenomenal consciousness can be fully analyzed in terms of functional and physical properties, that there are no qualia. The reason why this claim may not seem persuasive is because we lack a complete analysis of the consciousness but given that analysis, we would say that consciousness can be completely explained in these terms. So, a physical and functional duplicate of you would also have a consciousness. Therefore, it is illogical to imagine an identical physical duplicate without conscious, similar to refusing to accept the conclusion of a deductive argument. When one conceives of a philosophical zombie you conceive it as having identical functions, to function a certain, highly complex way, is consciousness. So, it is inconceivable to imagine zombies that are physically identical but are without consciousness.

This objection requires a complete functional and physical analysis of the consciousness. We can reply by saying that this analysis of consciousness in physical properties does not provide an analysis of how something feels, what it is like to experience something. These phenomenal properties are qualia they cannot be analyzed in terms of functional and physical. So therefore, we can know all about somethings structure and function without being able to account for its consciousness and so we can conceive of the same physical thing without phenomenal consciousness. This suggests that the mind is a physical substance with non-physical properties.

In evaluation, the reply to the problem of whether a zombie world is metaphysically possible is inadequate as it is begging the question, in that the response assumes that physicalism can be ruled out as wrong. To that end, a zombie world does appear to be metaphysically impossible, so, another argument in favour of property dualism must be suggested. At this point it appears that that the mind is not a physical substance with non-physical properties.

Another argument in favor of property dualism is Jackson’s Mary argument. There is a neuroscientist Mary who has been confined to a black and white room all her life, she has never seen any colour except black or white. However, she knows everything she can know about the physical aspects of colour, the wavelengths speed of light etc. One day, she is led outside the room and sees a ripe red tomato. Despite the fact that she knew all the physical properties of the colour red Mary still learns something new when she sees the colour red. She learns what is like to experience the colour red, thus inferring that not all facts are physical as it is possible to know about the physical properties of the brain involved in having an experience and still not yet know about the qualia until it is experienced itself. Mary not only has a current human understanding of neuroscience and physics she has a completed understanding of neuroscience and so has worked out all the causal and functional facts that are entailed as physicalism would suggest. Because physicalism claims that the world is entirely physical, it also claims to have complete physical knowledge is to have complete knowledge of everything in general. But no amount of physical information could prepare Mary to see the ripe tomato. So, there must be non-physical properties existing in the world, namely qualia (subjective qualities of consciousness). Thus, this suggests that property dualism is true and that the mind is non-physical property of a physical substance.

Suppose that to see red is a physical property of a visual experience which itself is a physical process of neurons firing, eyeballs rotating etc. So, the phenomenal property of what it is like to see red is some property in the brain. Mary knows all about this physical property before she leaves the room. However, she is not acquainted with the property as her brain has never directly had this property. When Mary sees the red tomato, her brain becomes acquainted with the property. Therefore, whilst Mary has gained new Acquaintance knowledge, she hasn’t learnt any new fact, she already knew all about this property before seeing the tomato.

Jackson responds by saying that the objection misunderstands the argument agreeing that Mary doesn’t have acquaintance knowledge of what it is like to see red. She would need to have direct experience of seeing red. The argument is not about Mary’s experience directly it is that Mary didn’t know everything about other people’s experiences before she left the room as she had not shared their experience, she did not know what it was like to experience red. This is a fact about experiences that Mary doesn’t know. When Mary leaves the room, she realizes she knows little about peoples colour experiences so there are facts about other people’s experiences of seeing red that Mary learns. Therefore, maintaining the Mary argument, and property dualism, as correct.

In conclusion, the most crucial argument is that the mind is a physical substance with non-physical properties. The property dualists argument fails under the zombie argument as it is metaphysically impossible for the philosophical zombies to exist. However, the Mary argument succeeds in arguing in favour of property dualism and so it can be concluded that property dualism is the correct theory of mind.