‘the Conscience Is A Reliable Guide.’ Discuss.

Newman and Butler would argue that the conscience is an infallible moral authority and guide. Butler commented had it strength as it had right, had it power as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world , meaning that it cannot be wrong, though we can choose to ignore it. Both argued that the conscience was God-given& for Newman it was a direct line through which God speaks moral guidance to us& for Butler it is a faculty of reflection and a natural guide given by God for discerning right from wrong. Both reflect the Augustinian view that it is turning to reflect upon the mind s conscience that we meet with God .

If this model were right, the conscience must be the most reliable moral guide. It doesn t, however, account for why some people appear to have no conscience, like psychopaths, or why Christians might argue their conscience gives them different answers on dilemmas like euthanasia or abortion. It could be argued that we do not hear God clearly but this only raises the further question as to why he would leave room for misunderstanding. Augustine himself noted that some people hear their own passions as though it is the conscience& how then can we trust what we believe to be the conscience?

A different model which much better accounts for these problems is the Thomist view that conscience is reason making right decisions. Aquinas believed the conscience involved innate capacity to apprehend first principles (or the primary precepts) and the application of those principles to situations. In this way the influence of Aristotle s ethic and the centrality of prudence is clear.

Aquinas model is one where conscience is both innate and develops over time as our experience enables more prudential decision making. This accounts well for differences of opinion and errors in judgement& suggesting that some people simply are reasoning incorrectly. As such, the conscience is a reliable guide to the primary precepts but that it is not necessarily infallible in their application to secondary principles. It does, however, become more reliable over time.

Aquinas does seem to choose somewhat arbitrarily to believe in the innate knowledge of first principles, perhaps as a result of his theism. Perhaps his view of human nature is overly positive. Freud argues that our moral compass is entirely formed from the values of others. He believes the super-ego, our internalisation of perceived cultural or societal values, works as the conscience to manipulate us, through guilt and shame, to act in a way conforming to what others want. It shapes and restricts the action of the ego in its regulation of the id.

In this way it acts not as a source of morality but of conformity. Thus is reliable perhaps for the latter, if not the former. However, we could even question whether it truly helps us to conform. In modern British society, homosexuality is generally accepted but one might still feel guilt, which is misplaced. Perhaps we can internalise the values of others incorrectly, we are influenced by sources of authority in society with biases which do not reflect the general will of the community.

Freud s model has, however, been adapted by subsequent psychologists. Piaget and Kohlberg both propose models which move beyond Freud s thinking. What Freud calls the conscience might be labelled the immature conscience in Neo-Freudian circles. Piaget argues that as we develop, we move from a heteronomous morality to an autonomous morality. Kohlberg identifies six levels of development from conforming due to fear of punishment through to the final stage of Universal Principles where one is willing to stand against society by adhering to their own moral code. In this way we become capable of moralising independently of others, checking and evaluating their instruction or influence and in doing so, reach more reliable ethical conclusions. This is explicated by Fromm who acknowledges the authoritarian conscience & that which led Nazi officers to complicity in the holocaust despite their own misgivings& but argues for the existence of the humanistic conscience beyond that. This enables us to disobey authority and therefore is more reliable at discerning moral action. Of the authoritarian conscience he comments the paradoxical and tragic situation of man is that his conscience is weakest when he needs it most but identifies the humanistic conscience as self-actualisation or becoming. Between these Neo-Freudian models, however, is the suggestion that not everyone will reach the lofty ambition of true autonomous morality: Kohlberg suggests only 10-15% of people reach the final level of post-conventional morality. How then can we say that it is a reliable guide for the rest of us?

In conclusion, Fromm argues that it is this humanistic conscience which makes us human. Much as Kant advocates moral agency as that which makes us distantly human, and Aristotle before him, Fromm points to reason as the true conscience. Fromm s two-part model accounts for misplaced guilt in a way that Freud does not and permits moralising beyond conformity. It does also lead back to the thinking of Aquinas. The question remains for Fromm, however, as to whether the reasoning we do is reliable, especially when we stand against society as Kohlberg suggests we should be ready to. At least for Aquinas, God has guaranteed the universal understanding of objective primary precepts. lt;/p>

All in all, a model of conscience that involves reasoning will always be less reliable than one where the answers are plainly delivered by the conscience. However, when one cannot be certain that the conscience is a reliable source and that I m hearing it right, reason seems like the better option.