To What Extent Did Technological Developments Fuel The Nuclear Arms Race And Perceptions Of The Strategic Balance Between The United States And The Soviet Un Ion During The 1960s And 1970s?

The 1960’s and the 1970’s were perhaps the period when Cold War diplomacy was at its most transformative. At the turn of the 1960’s, icy relations between the Soviet un ion and the United States of America had barely begun to defrost from Khrushchev’s ultimatum to American forces to evacuate Western Berlin communism was gripping the shores outside of America’s doorstep in the form of the Cuban Revolution and later Cuban missile crisis and it seemed in the light of Vietnam that Washington’s policy of containment was failing. It was in these dark years that one of the most iconic surviving pictures of the Cold War, the 1964 black comedy Dr Strangelove directed by Stanley Kubrick and starring Peter Sellers would emerge. More worryingly, the Sino-Soviet split and 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia showed the West not only the intrinsic instability in the Communist world system, but represented a total moral failing of the Western world to aid those fighting for what was ultimately viewed as the Western struggle for diplomacy. As the Soviet un ion reached nuclear parity with the United States by 1970, tensions began to cool under détente, albeit a few minor crises coming from the position of Third World and Middle Eastern states position in the Cold World order. The 1970’s saw a marked change in the attitude of Cold War diplomacy, a handful of the major diplomatic breakthroughs reached by the powers include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): 1968, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM): 1972, Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement: 1973, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties I & II (SALT I & II): 1972 / 1979. Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, technological developments fuelled the nuclear arms race and perceptions of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet un ion during the 1960s and 1970s – it is no coincidence that the period of relative calm between the two world colossi came at a point when they were perhaps the most equal, with both sides achieving a second strike capability that amounted to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). President Kennedy was elected on the premise of fixing a perceived technological gap in military hardware (deployment of the liquid fuelled ICBM R-7 Semyorka) which was ultimately non-existent[1], and the role of technological rivalry between the Soviet un ion and the USA would continue to exacerbate tensions throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s even during ‘détente’ as both sides struggled for technological superiority in its nuclear arms in a sphere above the diplomatic one. However, the thesis of this essay will show that once an invulnerable second strike capability had been reached by 1962 on both sides with the completion of the Soviet nuclear triad through the introduction of the ‘Hotel class’ submarine carrying Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), all technological developments in themselves had very little impact in actuality as none could challenge the accepted situation of MAD. MIRV, increases in accuracy, tactical nuclear weapons and ICBM build up on both sides, all key technological advances of the 1960’s and 1970’s may have guaranteed a better first strike capability (tactical superiority in the case of nuclear field munitions), yet thanks to the predominance of SLBM their utilisation would have amounted to suicide. What was important was not the non-existent increase in the likelihood of nuclear war thanks to second-strike parity, but the ways in which these technological advances were perceived inside the shifting doctrines of massive retaliation, to flexible response and later to counter force under MAD. The only technological advance which threatened to tip the strategic balance was the Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) as only this technology could challenge what McNamara would call the “stable balance of terror in an assured second strike capability.”[2] If MAD had been challenged through the possibility of absorbing an SLBM second strike through a large ABM capacity, first strike would have again been a viable option for the first super power to develop adequate ABM, logically leading to a nuclear war through technological superiority.

Methodology

In order to address the question ‘To what extent did technological developments fuel the nuclear arms race and perceptions of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet un ion during the 1960s and 1970s,’ this essay will split the topic into three conceptual spheres. Firstly, the concept of ‘perceptions’ will be addressed with special attention given to the Killian report of 1955 and the Gaither report of 1957. Although these two reports in-fact fall outside of the chronological boundaries being analysed, they are crucial for the understanding of how technological advancements were perceived by the successive American governments of the 1960’s and 1970’s and the implementation of said technologies in established balance of peace through mutual deterrence. Secondly, the key ‘technological developments’ of the 1960’s and 1970’s will be analysed to address the extent that specific technological developments fuelled the nuclear arms race and challenged the existing strategic balance in both the heated relations of the 1960’s and the era of détente in the 1970’s. In this sphere special attention will be given to the role of technological advancements under SALT 1 & 2, to show that even in an era categorised by a warming of relations, that technological advances on both sides were utilised to attempt to gain both strategic and tactical supremacy. Finally, the conceptual sphere of ‘strategic balance’ will be addressed to show that the majority of technological developments did not in fact threaten to destabilise strategic balance, however the ‘perception’ in both the USA and the Soviet un ion was that supremacy, even if irrelevant due to the invulnerability of the SLBM, had to be achieved over each other’s rival as a subsequence of social and military-industrial pressure. Special attention will be given in this final conceptual sphere to the ABM systems deployed over Moscow and their subsequent limitation in the Anti-Ballistic Missile-Treaty of 1972 as only this specific technological advance had the capability of significantly shifting the strategic balance.

Perceptions

Technology throughout the Cold War can be perceived as both a source of tension and a source of calm between the USA and the USSR. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 can be viewed as a highpoint of technological tensions where the Soviet un ion demonstrated both its superiority in aerospace and ICBM technology’s[3]. Similarly, Apollo–Soyuz signposted a degree of technological parity between the USA and Soviet Union. Although many historians point towards the election of JFK as the starting point in what has been described as the ‘Missile Age’, the perceptions which viewed technological developments as crucial for military success and therefore sparked an arms race were in fact a product of the late 1950’s. The Killian Report, presented to the NSC in February 1955 stated that the “USA lacked multi megaton yields and an early warning system, as well as defensive capabilities”. Moreover, it predicted that Russia would have ICBM’s by 1958 which could lead to a real strategic disadvantage and was as far-reaching as to predict before the advent of SLBM that “eventually a surprise attack would be meaningless due to second strike.”[4] The Gaither report, presented to NSC in 1957 shared the Killian report’s anxiety over the race to deploy ICBM’s and the vulnerability of the US deterrent “The current vulnerability of SAC (Strategic Air Command) to surprise attack during a period of lessened world tension, and the threat posed to SAC by the prospects of early Russian ICBM capability, we call for prompt remedial action.”[5] The crucial factor here is that in terms of nuclear strategy, both reports identified that in terms of a model offence-defence duel in a pre-existing nuclear stalemate that the ability to launch a sudden, disarming counter force attack taking out more offensive weapons than were being used to execute the attack would constitute a success, and some method of at least partially absorbing a second strike which would no doubt be aimed at civilian populations with “active defence measures” or “civil defences”[6] would be required to ‘win’ a nuclear war. It was in the conceptual framework of these two reports that the later arms race from at least the American perspective would stem from. Increases in accuracy, MIRV and solid fuelled ICBM’s would ensure that even the most hardened missile silos could be easily demolished rapidly with pin-point accuracy. MIRV especially fits into the Gaither-Killian model as it effectively cut down on the cost of a counter-force attack – it was widely believed that it would take at least two missiles to destroy one soviet missile due to limitations in accuracy and the super-hardening of Silos.[7] Attaching multiple warheads to a single missile, especially if they could be independently targeted to a high degree of accuracy would make a strike far more cost effective and viable. Similarly, civilian defence measures such as ‘duck and cover, in the USA and the extensive construction of fallout shelters in the Soviet Union, later to be superseded by ABM technology follows the same defensive suggestions as presented by the Gaither-Killian model. The belief throughout the 1960’s that a truly disarming first strike could be effective in the nuclear age or a system could be developed to defend an area from nuclear attack, first formally presented by Gaither-Killian, is what allowed technological developments to fuel the nuclear arms race in the hope of tipping the strategic balance in favour of the nation with the technological advantage.

Throughout the early 1960s, increasingly excessive emphasis was placed on technological change by key American decision makers the shift from Dulles to McNamara to Kissinger saw a gradual adaptation of how technological developments were viewed, and the extent in which these developments were allowed to influence the perception of the strategic balance between the two super powers. A retrogressive tendency was introduced under Dulles in the era of massive retaliation when he stated “it is feasible to place reliance upon deterrence than of vast retaliatory power,”[8] resulting in an exaggerated appreciation of both the evolving offensive technology and its impact on the strategic balance. It came to be assumed that the series of startling innovations of the past two decades would set a pattern for the future if sufficient funds and ingenuity were applied to any given problem it could be solved the results of the growing expenditure and scientific talent being applied to military problems could be spectacular and also that any improvement in technology would result in a corresponding improvement in the state of the strategic art. This major misunderstanding of the role technology could play was first challenged by McNamara in his white house statement of 1964 “leaders in the administration feel that past US weapon developments actually aggravated the arms race and contributed to destabilise in deterrence, the USA not deploying un-stabilizing weapons would lead to comparable restraint in the Soviet Union.”[9] It was at this point in the height of tensions between the Soviet un ion and the USA that technology began to be realised as not a factor to gain a strategic advantage, but a false construct due to the accepted phenomenon of MAD already acquired through the SLBM’s. The technological arms race was something of a paradox, fuelling tensions between the superpowers and pleasing public opinion without in fact ever significantly tipping the strategic balance. Although it is obvious that McNamara came to the realisation that the technological advances fuelling nuclear arms race of the mid to late 1960’s had to in some way be curbed due to their massive costs and relatively poor tactical advantages, it was not until Kissinger’s term as the 56^th Secretary of State in 1973 that developments in Soviet and American technology, at least in the American perspective, began to be de-coupled from conceptions of the strategic balance which had been so instrumental in fuelling the arms race. Indeed, Kissinger viewed the Soviet ICBM build up in his time as National Security Advisor in the late 1960’s with relative calm,[10] realising that his government could deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the US or its allies by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor – even after absorbing a surprise first strike[11]. This marked change in the ‘perception’ of technology was a fundamental factor in the warming of American – Soviet relations in the early 1970’s, if the ideology of Kennedy had survived under Ford and Carter, technology would have continued to be the main destabilising factor fuelling the arms race between the superpowers.

Technological Developments

Advancements in offensive missile technology throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s helped fuel the nuclear arms race through the perception that significant development would help shift the strategic balance over to the power which had technological superiority. Both early American Thor and Jupiter (IRBM), as well as the Soviet Union’s SS-6 and SS-7 were liquid fuelled and therefore required a long spin up time. In the case of Thor and Jupiter, their proximity to the USSR made them vulnerable targets to bomber attack, due to a lack of protection and slow reaction time[12]. The Soviet Union’s early ICBM’s, while being clearly overrepresented in the American mind-set of the missile-gap and being exploited publically by Khrushchev “were turning out missiles like sausages,”[13] were extremely vulnerable to both bombing if used in a time of heightened tensions as a first strike weapon due to their forty minute fuelling time, and alarmingly inaccurate. In this early age of transition between the bomber and the ICBM, the first mentions of Mutually Assured Destruction would begin to surface from the American army “it would seem that we will have a stalemate just so long as both sides retain the capacity to destroy a large segment of the other side’s homeland whether or not the enemy attacks first with surprise.[14]” Technology was pursued however as a means to break this early conception of nuclear deadlock as it was believed to have the capability to shift the strategic balance. Throughout the first half of the 1960’s where the doctrine of massive retaliation was followed by the US government Kissinger would openly state that he considered the destruction of 33% of the Soviet civilian population and 50-75% of their industrial capacity[15] a necessity to achieve in terms of destruction. Before the advent of Soviet SLBM’s, it was widely believed amongst the hawks in the American administration that a hugely disarming nuclear strike of this magnitude would be a sufficient to end the Cold War.[16] American research funds and interests were subsequently poured into the Minuteman ICBM, a missile which not only had the range to be placed far outside the danger zone of Soviet bomber aircraft and thus circumventing the problems of Jupiter and Thor, but could also be launched rapidly due to its solid propellant, therefore maintaining the element of surprise and improving on earlier liquid fuelled American Titan and Atlas ICBM’s. The advent of such increasingly lethal methods to deploy nuclear warheads had to be matched with a parity in Soviet technology to maintain the strategic balance. A major cause of the instability stemming from the nuclear arms race was therefore the very rate of technological change as the SS7 was widely considered inferior to the Minuteman. Both superpowers were in many ways slaves to the volatility of technology and the advantage of a surprise attack. Both the Soviet un ion and the USA were living the nightmare that even if they put forth their best efforts, their survival may be jeopardized by a technological breakthrough on behalf of one’s opponent. Technological change therefore in the first half of the 1960’s fuelled the nuclear arms race through the perception that technology would directly contribute to overwhelming strategic supremacy.

In order to create a nuclear stalemate under the conditions of nuclear parity it was necessary for both sides to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces. The advent of SLBM systems, unlike their offensive ground based counterparts, was an example of a technology which came online in the mid 1960’s which would in fact cool the nuclear arms race by cementing the strategic balance in Mutually Assured Destruction. Polaris submarines were an invulnerable deterrent and a comparably cheap retaliatory system. Admiral Burke, the Chief of US Naval Operations would state “it won’t be necessary to maintain large residual forces of Polaris submarines against the possible destruction of a surprise attack”[17]. Indeed, a force of invulnerable submarines carrying nuclear weapons could guarantee deterrence, releasing resources to prepare for limited war, a much more plausible eventuality than all-out nuclear exchanges. Nuclear submarines did have their contemporary critics, which mainly stemmed in the American field from inter force rivalry or questions surrounding how long anti-submarine warfare techniques would need to catch up with submarine technology “if the Soviets were able to devise a way to localise, identify and trail all our Polaris submarines around the Soviet periphery, they might be able to destroy them all nearly simultaneously.[18]” Despite huge increases in the accuracy of SLBM’s throughout the 1970’s and the advent of MIRV, SLBM would still be considered a retaliatory weapon, and as no real ASW techniques would be developed. A paradox in the Cold War 1970’s era was the continuing development of first-strike style ICBM’s by both sides despite the invulnerability of the Polaris and Hotel SLBM submarines. It was because of the SLBM that the Soviet missile build up in 1966-1970 was viewed by McNamara with remarkable lack of alarm, numbers in themselves made little difference, all that mattered was whether or not destruction was assured even by 1970 when the Soviet un ion had achieved a superiority in ICBM numbers[19]. Instead of technology offering new ways out of the nuclear dilemma, it was compounding the stalemate.

The impact of technology in the 1970’s turned out to be similar to other changes in the strategic environment, yet it introduced new uncertainties and complexities as strategic thinking continued to stall. The continuing paradox of attempting to attain a superior first strike capability despite the invulnerability of the second strike SLBM deterrent would continue into the era of SALT 1 and SALT 2. Technological developments were fuelling the nuclear arms race despite the accepted dominance of SLBM this push for numerical superiority was driven by public opinion and popular paranoia rather than a logic based on strategic balance[20]. The USA completed its MIRVING of ICBM and SLBM in the mid 1970’s, around the time the USSR was developing the same technology. Despite American technological advantage, public opinion felt that the Soviet un ion was seizing the strategic initiative.[21] This misconception is best shown by analysing the SALT 1 Agreement - under SALT 1, the USA was allowed 1054 ICBM and 656 SLBM, the Soviet un ion 1409 ICBM and 960 SLBM with a sub limit of 308 heavy ICBM. The Soviet SS-22 ICBM was believed to be dangerous to the USA due to its exceptionally high throw weight, it was expected that it could carry both higher single and MIRV yields than its American counterpart, the Minuteman (and indeed by 1977 the SS-22 carried 15MIRV’s as opposed to the Minuteman’s 6[22]). The Soviet un ion and American decisions to pursue MIRV technology in its ICBM capacity is an example of a push for technological supremacy driving the nuclear arms race despite its limited effects on the strategic balance. This paradox is only further compounded by a 1974 CIA report which stated that doubling the number of American MIRV warheads with large 1 megaton yields from 400 to 800 would have only damaged the Soviet industry by 9% extra and the population by 1%[23]. Increases in accuracy, multiple warheads from single missiles and larger weapon yields may have seemed like progress on paper, yet if the purpose of SALT1 and 2 was to achieve a warming of Cold War relations these technological developments stand testament to the fact that both sides continued to struggle for dominance in a qualitative sense as opposed to a quantitative one. Technological developments therefore continued to fuel the nuclear arms race in a push for dominance, yet in praxis they had almost no effect on altering the strategic balance between the Soviet un ion and the USA.

Strategic Balance

By 1966, the American Chief of Air Command General Donald Quarles articulated a doctrine of sufficiency, “by 1960 both sides had developed a significant second strike capability, therefore the amassing of conventional forces or air defence was insignificant in the case of missile attack.”[24] Indeed, throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s the manned bomber showed few signs of revival and ballistic missiles reigned supreme, with the submarine based force ensuring that the nuclear deterrent remained invulnerable. The situation in the early 1960’s was too dogmatic, ABM’s, MIRV’s, satellites and pin point accuracy had yet to be invented. Nevertheless, a form of stalemate was created, perhaps because many developments neutralized each other. The ongoing process of the nuclear arms race was directly driven by technological advancements in this early period, McNamara in 1964 would articulate in front of the American congress “The missiles in turn will be made more sophisticated to avoid destruction and there will be a continuing race between the offense and the defence. Neither side can afford to lag or fail to match the others efforts, there will be no end to the technical moves or countermoves.”[25] While each side clearly could not afford to fail to match each other’s efforts in the offensive, paradoxically, one of the most potentially destabilizing elements which had the greatest chance to permanently shift the strategic balance was the possibility that one of the rival powers might develop a successful antimissile defence. Such a system, truly airtight and in the exclusive possession of one of the powers, would effectively nullify the deterrent force of the other, exposing the latter to a first attack which it could not retaliate. There were issues with the concept of ABM technology: with the potency of each offensive missile no failures could be tolerated, especially with the advent of MIRV and decoy technology the defensive technology may well have been susceptible to attack and the attacker would still have the surprise attack advantage. Another serious downside was the cost of developing this system, calculated by Reagan in 1978 to be as much as the entire of America’s defence budget for one year.[26] The Soviet un ion had been developing its own ABM systems since 1960, however it is extremely telling of the mind-set of both American and Soviet leaders that both sides were willing to give up on ABM defence. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 limited both the USA and USSR to 200 ABM systems split over two key areas of each nations choosing[27]. ABM was recognised to be a major destabilising factor as this technology alone could have triggered a nuclear war due to the surprise first strike style attacks it encouraged. What made ABM yet more dangerous was the advances in offensive technology up to the time of the ABM Treaty of 1972. Of these advancements the most significant was the relentless improvement in guidance systems. During the 1970’s accuracies improved from CEPs of half a mile to under a sixth of a mile[28]. This high accuracy combined with MIRV made an initial strike utilised by either side to almost guarantee a disarming attack, even with the increasing prevalence of super-hardened silos. A lesser retaliatory attack in numerical terms from SLBM’s, even if incorporating MIRV technology, could then be destroyed in space utilising high yield X-ray atmospheric explosions or even the more modern cruise missiles developed by the USA from 1975 destroyed by last resort kinetic countermeasures. The development of ABM systems were perceived by both sides to be a serious destabilising technology which had the capability to shift the strategic balance while both sides wished to increase their geo-political pull through ICBM sabre-rattling, the existence of the ABM Treaty of 1972 can only be explained that neither side seriously considered disputing the security offered by SLBM technology and the Mutually Assured Destruction they guaranteed.

Conclusion

This essay has shown that the ‘perceptions’ behind the role that technology would serve in the Cold War is what allowed technological advancements to fuel the nuclear arms race in the hope to tip the strategic balance. These conceptions were widely born in the late 1950’s, with the Killian and Gaither reports exemplifying the type of thinking seized by key decision makers facilitating the military-industrial complex to spiral out of control. The second chapter has argued that ‘technological developments’ in the 1960’s and 1970’s were perceived by both American and Soviet leaders as a way of breaking the nuclear stalemate, therefore fuelling the arms race. While weaponry certainly did get more deadly over the period studied, no developments that were seriously pursued by either government had the potential to significantly shift the strategic balance in once sides favour. With the dominance of SLBM technology and the invulnerability of the marine deterrent, both the Soviet un ion and the USA continued to attempt to reach first strike superiority even under the guidelines of SALT 1 & 2 utilising newer MIRV technology and accuracy improvements. The American government’s lack of alarm at the Soviet missile build up throughout the late 1960’s and 1970’s was a product of the existing doctrine of MAD and the ongoing belief that submarine technology would remain invulnerable. Finally, this essay has controversially argued that while only ABM technologies had the serious potential to significantly shift the strategic balance, the fear of disrupting retaliatory parity led to the banning of ABM in the 1972 Treaty. The implications of this ban, if one considers that only ABM could destroy the strategic balance, is that by 1972, no side seriously wanted to gain a significant nuclear advantage – MAD was considered by both sides to be the best solution to guarantee peace between the two super-powers. Looking forward from the 1980’s, on December 13, 2001, George W. Bush gave the six month notice stipulated in the ABM Treaty to Russia that it was leaving the ABM Treaty, arguing that it was a necessity to test and build a national missile defence to protect the United States from nuclear blackmail by rogue states.[29] In a post-Cold War world where not only America and Russia are armed with nuclear weapons and ICBM delivery systems, America’s withdrawal from a treaty so fundamental for peace in the 1970’s and 1980’s may have dire consequences of the nuclear security of today’s world. Already India, China and Russia have declared their own intension to develop ABM[30] as it is a required necessity to maintain a semblance of strategic balance even in 2016. With the Cold War over, yet the very treaty which helped maintain peace removed in a still existing nuclear climate, tensions are only beginning to unfold as the USA races to be the world’s first nation with comprehensive ABM defence.

[1] Christoph Bluth ‘Soviet strategic arms policy before SALT’ (Cambridge, 1992) P. 153.

[2] Benjamin S. Lambeth ‘Deterrence in the Mirv Era’ (Washington, 1972) P. 62.

[3] Richard Crockatt ‘The fifty years war: the United States and the Soviet un ion in world politics, 1941-1991’ (London, 1995) P. 86.

[4] David Snied ‘Eisenhower and the Gaither Report: The Influence of a Committee of Experts on National Security Policy in the Late 1950s’ (Virginia, 1997) P. 153.

[5] Killian report at: Foreign relations of the United States 1955-1957 Volume XIX, National Security Policy, Document 9

[6] ibid

[7] Raymond L. Garthoff ‘Detente and confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan’ (Washington, 1994) pp. 223-240.

[8] John Foster Dulles ‘Challenge and response in US policy’, foreign affairs, XXXVI:1 (October, 1957)

[9] Willian M. Kaufmann ‘The McNamara Strategy’ (New York, 1964) P. 49.

[10] Henry Kissinger ‘Arms control, inspection and surprise attack’ Foreign affairs, xxxvIII (April 1960) P. 557.

[11] Henry Kissinger ‘Necessity for Choice’ (New York, 1961) P. 15.

[12] Lawrence Freedman ‘The evolution of nuclear strategy’ (London, 2002) P. 215.

[13] Richard Ned Lebow ‘Was Khrushchev Bluffing in Cuba?’ (Princeton, 1988) pp. 41-42.

[14] Multiple Authors ‘The meaning of stalemate’ (USArmy, 1958)

[15] Henry Kissinger ‘Necessity for Choice’ (New York, 1961) P. 16.

[16] Lawrence Freedman ‘The evolution of nuclear strategy’ (London, 2002) P. 311.

[17] National Policy implications of atomic Parity, Naval warfare group study, Number 5, 1960

[18] Glenn Herald Snyder ‘Deterrence and defence: toward a theory of national security’ (Princeton, 1961) P. 88.

[19] Lawrence Freedman ‘The evolution of nuclear strategy’ (London, 2002) P. 346.

[20] Fredrik Logevall, Andrew Preston ‘Nixon in the world: American foreign relations, 1969-1977’ (New York, 2008) pp. 133-141.

[21] Ibid P. 143.

[22] Gretchen Heefner ‘The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland’ (Harvard, 2012) P. 410.

[23] CIA documents archive at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/

[24] Lawrence Freedman ‘The evolution of nuclear strategy’ (London, 2002) P. 157.

[25] Willian M. Kaufmann ‘The McNamara Strategy’ (New York, 1964) pp. 111-112.

[26] Raymond L. Garthoff ‘Detente and confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan’ (Washington, 1994) P. 61.

[27] Anti-Ballistic missile treaty, 1972: http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html

[28] Lawrence Freedman ‘The evolution of nuclear strategy’ (London, 2002) P. 150.

[29] George Bush Presidential archive: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html

[30] Ghazala Yasmin ‘Missile Defence in South Asia: Implications for the Region’ (India, 2006)