The Great Patriotic War

This discussion will ultimately ask whether the political consequences of victory over fascism can possibly justify the catastrophic social consequences suffered by the Soviet un ion during and after the Great Patriotic War. With regard to social impact, the essay will discuss industrial, and their associated demographic, changes and Soviet mentality. As for political impact, the essay will discuss the population’s relationship to Stalin, and his own role in the war. Ultimately, it is remarkable that a regime which collapsed under less pressure in 1916 withstood the vast majority of land warfare in the Second World War, and while it is remembered that victory over fascism had to be achieved at any cost, it is hard to believe that victory could not have been achieved at a slightly lesser Soviet expense. While the political and ideological impact of victory was valuable to the Soviet un ion in the short term, the social impact is more tangible, significant and lasting.

The first impact of the war was a dramatic change in the priorities of the Soviet authorities. Almost overnight, the economy had to be placed on a ‘war footing’. Millions of soldiers were needed immediately at the front, while millions more were needed in factories to increase military production output. But there was a massive labour shortage, as the increasing resources for the war effort were having to be found within a rapidly diminishing total.[1] Alongside the millions of young, able-bodied men who were departing to and dying at the front, the working population, factories and fertile land in German occupied territories were also lost.[2] Therefore, women, pensioners, children, disabled ex-servicemen and evacuees went to work to compensate for this shortfall. Consequently, employment in the production of civilian goods and services reduced dramatically, as all available workers were directed towards defence plants, heavy industry, construction, transport and agriculture.[3]

The necessity of increased military output pushed different social groups into new surroundings and occupations, but legislation also obliged them to work harder than ever before. The minimum working week was increased from 41 to 48 and later 54-5 hours (as of June 1941). Coercive measures were in force as per the June 1940 legislation, which enforced strict penalties for lateness, absenteeism and quitting without official sanction.[4] On June 26 1941, new legislation abolished normal holidays and introduced up to three hours of compulsory overtime each day. Agricultural labour also became far more labour intensive as the countryside was deprived of power. The supply of agricultural machinery ceased until 1944, as tractor factories began to manufacture tanks any tractors, lorries or cars were commandeered by the Red Army, there were no spare parts or fuel anyway, and horses and oxen were also in short supply.[5] In this way, workers were sacrificing more than ever in their contribution to the war effort, while children gave up their education and pensioners their retirement.

It should not be forgotten that these changes required the breaking down of established social constraints, at a time when living standards were in serious decline due to the complete transfer of resources from consumption to production. The psychological strain on the population should not be underestimated, considering this social upheaval was taking place in an environment of violence, bereavement, malnutrition, hunger and disease. Rationing, for example, emerged in July-November 1941 in Moscow, Leningrad and the surrounding towns. Rations depended on age, occupation and location, but were sufficient for no-one except combat soldiers and manual workers in hazardous occupations.[6] This was particularly difficult for the rural population, who were not accounted for by rationing, but in this case the dictates of Soviet ideology were paused.[7] A ‘neo-NEP’ market emerged, in which local resources produced in the sideline farms of factories and institutions, allotments of urban residents and collective farmers’ private plots were acceptable. Local resources were a lifeline, but did not dramatically alter the grinding poverty experienced by millions.

The above-mentioned changes all entailed unprecedented levels of mobility of the population. For a time, the boundaries between urban and rural society were crossed constantly, as well as social boundaries, as new demographic groups arrived in the workplace. The war signalled the decline of the peasant class, as many never returned to the countryside. Simultaneously, new strains were placed on the family. After a surge of marriages in the summer of 1941, marriages declined and informal, temporary relationships became typical of the mobile, wartime population.[8] In the large absence of men, with working women having less incentive and opportunity to have children (unless society was prepared to take on more responsibility for housework and childcare) and with poor nutrition reducing fertility, the birth rate also declined until the spring of 1944 – though the pre-war birth rate would never be re-attained in the Soviet Union.[9] The government recognised that long-term population growth was of the highest priority and on 8^th July 1944 passed a decree to encourage the rate. Orders and grants became available for mothers with more than seven children, and a tax was imposed on couples with less than three children, while a heavier tax was reserved for bachelors over the age of 25.[10]

How did the Soviet mentality withstand this unprecedented hardship and upheaval, and not descend into collapse? In one notable case, order was temporarily lost. The Moscow Crisis of 15-19 October 1941 was triggered by the highly visible departure of members of the elite, the sudden reduction or cessation of normal services and the disappearance of the police from public view.[11] But despite the chaos of mass departure, looting and attacks, life went on with a semblance of normality. Perhaps one fifth of the population attempted to flee, and only 1-2% of the Moscow party membership were expelled for abandoning their posts.[12] Part of the reason order was quickly and lastingly restored on 19^th October was that most of the state apparatus and rank and file of the party continued to function. In fact, the civilian population proved themselves capable of more than coping, but performing admirably. The summer and autumn of 1941 were characterised by civilian mobilisation, both enforced and spontaneous. Drafted at short notice, hundreds of thousands of city inhabitants (able-bodied men aged between 18 and 45, and women aged between 18 and 40 who were not already employed) were ordered to work eight hours a day on defence construction and dispatched to dig trenches or erect barricades.[13] The extent of the people’s contribution went beyond what the law obliged them to do. The majority of the population must have been motivated by more than simple fear of punishment, but patriotism, hatred of the enemy, desire for revenge and the will to survive – alongside their familiarity with harsh conditions and the fight for survival from more than two decades of revolution, civil war, industrialisation, collectivisation and purges. These motivations in coordination with the government’s tight censorship to influence perception of the war ensured that military failures and the steep decline in living conditions did not push social stability over the brink.[14] According to Barber and Harrison, it was this ‘collective will and initiative of tens of thousands of local communities’,[15] often without direction, that decided the outcome of the war.

Certain groups were not part of this optimistic picture of collective sacrifice for a higher goal. In the Baltic states and parts of Ukraine, the Nazis were welcomed as liberators. In the Caucasus, for example, where de-collectivisation occurred, a degree of religious and cultural autonomy was permitted and minimal use was made of forced labour, there were high levels of recruitment to national units of the German Army and lower levels of partisan activity.[16] Elsewhere, Barber and Harrison do not doubt that peasant loyalty, already shaken by the upheaval of collectivisation, would have been considerably strained had the Germans returned land to them.[17] In any event, the political impact of national and anti-regime groups was limited by the fact that Nazi ideology was incompatible with their aims. They were pushed back into the arms of the regime by the greater of two evils. The Nazis racial theory was clear: the Soviet people were to be exterminated or enslaved for the benefit of the Aryan race.[18]

Stalin’s position as a political leader could appear at once ridiculous and sublime during the war. On the one hand, he proved himself incapable as a military tactician. Khrushchev remembers how Stalin refused to authorise reinforcements to make a stand against the German invasion to the north of Kharkiv, believing that received intelligence was a trick.[19] As a result, the front was broken, thousands of soldiers were taken prisoner, and the Germans moved as far as Stalingrad and Makhachkala. On the other hand, however, Stalin was a vital psychological talisman and symbol of unity for the Soviet people. The General Secretary represented toughness, will and the hope that the war could be won, which had a substantial impact on morale.[20]

Finally, it must be stated that the Nazi defeat at the battle of Stalingrad was the greatest psychological turning point of the war across Europe. The victory carried huge symbolic value as an enemy directly opposed to communism and with intentions of annihilation was defeated for the first time. A defeat of fascism was for everyone to celebrate, and a victory for socialism meant a political and ideological boost for the regime. However, the turning point in the war cannot be disassociated with the ‘grotesquely misshapen interiors of what had once been shops, offices, houses and factories [where] hundreds of miniature but horrifyingly savage battles were fought for cellars, rooms, staircases and corners of walls… [where] the ground is slippery with blood.’[21] How can historians come to terms with a battle which saw more Soviet deaths than the entire British and French war effort combined? Is it not conclusive proof of a ‘persistent and ignorant profligacy with these once enormous armies and an almost soulless indifference to their fate’?[22] The at least 20 million Soviet deaths during the Great Patriotic War are incommensurable with the defeat of Nazi fascism.

In conclusion, the social impact of the Great Patriotic War on the Soviet un ion entailed unprecedented demographic fluctuation and individual mobility. The social consequences of a shortage of men and the deeply-engrained values of encouraging the birth rate via strong marriages and families remain to this day in the Russian Federation and the CIS. Politically, the resurgence of patriotism during the war provided a certain unifying force, and may have helped to consolidate the so-called ‘cult of personality’ surrounding Stalin. But the Soviet Union’s irreplaceable contribution the Allied victory did not change the regime’s standing on the international scene, with the foundations for the Cold War being laid. While centralised decision-making played an important role in a war of resources, the civilian contribution ultimately decided the outcome. Public order not only failed to collapse, but banded together, often without instruction and perhaps thanks to the ‘formative experiences’ of previous decades.

1815 words

Bibliography

Erikson, J. The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany. 1975.

Khrushchev, N. Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. 1990.

Barber, J. & Harrison, M. The Soviet Home Front 1941-45: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II. 1991.

Barber, J. The Moscow Crisis of October 1941, in J. Cooper, et al., eds. Soviet History 1917-53: Essays in Honour of R. W. Davies. 1995.

Andreyev, K. Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement. 1987.

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[1] J. Barber & M. Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941-45: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II, 1991, 190.

[2] It has been estimated that the military disasters of 1941-42 reduced the working population from 85 to 53 million. J. Barber & M. Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941-45: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II, 1991, 147.

[3] Barber & Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941-45, 1991, 148.

[4] Ibid, 163.

[5] Ibid, 100-1.

[6] Ibid, 82.

[7] Ibid, 102.

[8] Barber & Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941-45, 1991, 91.

[9] Ibid, 93.

[10] Ibid, 90-3.

[11] J. Barber, The Moscow Crisis of October 1941, in J. Cooper, et al., eds. Soviet History 1917-53: Essays in Honour of R. W. Davies, 1995, 201.

[12] J. Barber, The Moscow Crisis of October 1941, 1995, 210.

[13] Barber & Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941-45, 1991, 60-3.

[14] Ibid, 64-7.

[15] Ibid, 205.

[16] Ibid, 114.

[17] Ibid, 104.

[18] K. Andreyev, Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement, 1987, 199.

[19] N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, 1990, 58.

[20] Barber & Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941-45, 1991, 72.

[21] J. Erikson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany, 1975, 393.

[22] Ibid, 222.