A Level Exemplar Work

'The British bombing offensive of 1942-45 failed to inflict crucial damage on Germany war machine' How far do you agree? The effectiveness of the bombing offensive in damaging the German war machine has been the subject of major controversy both in terms of its morality as well as its effectivity in inflicting crucial damage to the militarily productivity and vital output of raw material necessary for a war economy. In 1945 Air Chief Marshall Author Harris was the only senior military figure not to be offered a peerage, this support the argument that the bombing offensive failed to meet its aims, or it may be possible that Harris was mistakenly not recognised as significant contribution to British success. The inflicting damage from the offensive led to the eventual collapse of German production around the time the Bombing strategy improved, when the statistics of collapsing German production are placed into the correct context, it provides a valid dispute to this statement. Harris's naïve approach that the 'bomber will always get through' taken from Douhet has been the target of critics. None of the Major campaigns of World War Two proved Douhets theory that by its self the bomber could defeat the enemy. The costs of the bombing offensive illustrate this, the bombing offensive absorbed 25% of British production whilst resulting in the death of 55,000 British command crew. These resources would have been better use else were such as the coastal command, where early allocation of four engine aircrafts for defence would have been valued on a much higher level, as well as the anti U boat patrol to attack the U boats recharging at night. Of the 110,000 aircrew in Bomber Command, 56,000 were killed, a loss rate of 51 percent, the highest casualty rate of any of the Commonwealth`s armed forces in the war. As the USA penetrated further into the centre of Germany the result were heavier casualties, despite the formation of the Boeing B-17 flying fortress. This question whether the strategic bombing could justify such losses. Whilst the cost of the strategic bombing doesn't directly supports view that it inflicted no crucial damage, it is clear that whilst damaging the British's own war machine we were aiding the Germans success before the turn of the tides. During the early years of the war, bombing accuracy was poor, fighters couldn't afford to fly straight for long enough to aim as anti-aircraft defence improved in Germany. The bombing error over Gelsenkirchen was underestimated at 300 yards, when in reality it was found to be 5,000 yards, reducing the chance of hitting expected targets such as oil refinements. This also meant that factories were off target as well as war installations essential for the German war economy. Those often hit were of less use to the German machine such as goods factories. Area bombing reduced clean bombing which the USAAF desired, resulting in half a million casualties. Thus the strategic bombing offensive of 1942-45 failed to inflict crucial damage on the Germany war machine, instead resulting in a high civilian death rate. Though it may be argued that lowering German morale had crucial effect on the German war machine, Overy argues that bombing didn't "drive a wedge between people and regime." Rather, it increased their dependence on the state for protection and welfare. There are several campaigns that demonstrates the ill effect that the strategic bombing had on morale, the Ruhr steel industry was heavily bombed, damaging up to three quarters of it, however this didn't have an effect on the willingness of workers to carry on and so production continued. Between 1943- 44 the killing of thousands in Berlin and 50,000 in Dresden only resulted in more Germans conforming to the capacity to wage war. In Hamburg one of the strongholds of Anti-Nazi movements 40,000 civilians were killed. Furthermore, after the Tokyo raid, Doolittle told his crew that he believed the loss of all 16 aircraft, coupled with the relatively minor damage to targets, had rendered the attack a failure, and that he expected a court-martial upon his return to the United States, the Japan restored it's self shortly without a collapse of morale. The Axis attitude too stood as 'we can take it' as Goebbels used the Strategic bombing offensive as a propaganda mechanism to strengthen the social cohesion within Germany, thus limiting it's effectivity as means of inflicting damage. Conversely to this, there is evidence to support the view that the British bombing offensive of 1942-45 did inflict crucial damage on Germany was machine to a degree. Improvements were made in order to correct the inefficiency of the offensive, to overcome the vulnerable American day time bombing the Mustang p-51 powered by an Anglo-American Rolls Royce packed version of a Merlin engine was created, which had a highly stressed internal combustion piston engines, this meant that the USAAF`s Eighth Air Force could escort bombers in raids over Germany, to reach targets needed to combat the German war machine. By the end of 1943, the Bomber command was a transformed force, much more powerful both in numbers and in the higher quality of its new bombers. It had 1249 operational long range bombers. 1008 were of new types, such as the 573 Lancaster, 363 Halifax, 72 Mosquito. The navigation system to improve accuracy went from Gee to Oboe, this meant that area targeting occurred less and more specific targets where the heart of the German war machine lied could be destroyed, this included oil production and armament factories. Diesel production stood at 100,000 tonnes in the space of a year this was reduced to 39,000 due to strategic bombing of oil refinements. Moreover, this led to the reduction in overall German production, Albert Speer stated that it held down over all production by 40% steel production in the Ruhr was cut by 80%, this counter argues the Ruhr production levels being 'unaffected' by the strategic bombing. Railway movement was restricted to an extent, preventing vital materials reaching the destinations needed for the German war economy to continue. Although it wasn't until 1944 that crucial damage was inflicted on German production, it resulted in a heavy decline which in no doubt effected the German war machine. There was also direct military effects of the strategic bombing which cannot be dismissed. 47,000 sea mines where created, preventing U-boats leaving ports during the early years of the war, as well as in the Baltic sea hindering the war supplies from Sweden from reaching Germany. Submarine production was also effected by the strategic bombing, as well as communication links, having a direct influence on the outcome of the battle of the Atlantic. The offensive also fragmented German militancy weakening its front line, creating a diversion of 2 million men from the front instead assigned to anti-aircraft defence. It also generated a diffusion of the Luftwaffe away from the eastern front, supporting the USSR's air supremacy. Though not always direct, the strategic bombing offensive certainly inflict crucial damage on Germany was machine, through reducing armament production and troops from the front line of battles; which were being closed in on from the east and west, eventually leading to defeat. Though axis morale may not have been weakened, change in morale is still a significant success of the strategic bombing. The allies morale was boosted each time a campaign occurred, high censorship of the papers from the ministry of information, meant that the British morale would be uplifted from hearing about the bombings of major German cities. The Tokyo raid was the first offensive of the Americans after Pearl Harbour and raised American determination to fight back, shifting their involvement into the war. Although Doolittle expected a court-martial, he arrived back in the US to find the raid bolstered American morale to such an extent that Doolittle was awarded the Medal of Honour by President Roosevelt, and was promoted two grades to brigadier General. From a Churchillian attitude the spirit of morale was key to winning the war. Although lowing enemy morality may not have been a failure, boosting allied morale was also means of inflict crucial damage on Germany was machine, by accelerating the peoples war efforts overall. It is problematic to estimate the damage to German war machine from strategic bombing. It may be argued that the overall cost of the strategic bombing outweighed the benefits, however there is no doubt that without it the production would not have been reduced to the amount that it did. It may be more accurate to suggest that it did not inflict crucial damage at the start until improvements were made to bombers improving accuracy and therefore resulting in heavier damage. Most importantly the Germans were starved out of oil due to the bombing offensive, this hindered the chance of German victory in crucial battles in the east and west in 1944, such as weakening the German war machine air supremacy during the D day landings. As Harris assisted such efforts he deserved his peerage as a significant military figure in 1945, the bombing offensive did inflict damage, though not crucial.