Does Democracy Require Participation In Deliberation On The Part Of The Citizens?

A cursory look at the question gives rise to immediate demands for clarification. Indeed the process of evaluating a constitutive or necessary part of democracy, in this case deliberation, cannot take place without a preliminary attempt at clarification. Such is the weighty stigma now attached to `democracy`, such its transformation from a method of government to a stand- alone ideal with weighty and emotive adjuncts, that refinement is necessary before inspection of its parts.

The word itself has been so variously attributed to substantive and hypothetical systems of government that perhaps a root definition is now unobtainable if not in a purely etymological sense. By 1960, J.L Talmon could talk of `Totalitarian Democracy` in what was more than pure cynicism, the elucidation of the already serious propositions of Joseph Schumpeter 1. That the union of totalitarianism and democracy was more than a pointed paradox shows how far `democracy` has mutated to a much bigger concept than its humble origins. Although we might deny this association on a conceptual level, there must be weight in the empirical fact that is has been attempted. The power of the demos - the inhabitants of a geographically defined state is the humble definition of the Athenians. This concept becomes a very difficult concept to deploy indirectly, if not an impossible one, when transposed to a population beyond a certain size. In any case, the vast array of understandings and possibilities for the evidently pliable notion of `democracy` requires a fixed conception for the purposes of discussion. A strict definition here will necessarily prove as elusive as unifying the broad church under a single banner, but fundamental tenets might be observed. In any case, it is clear that for something simply to be termed a democracy in the modern world, deliberation is not a necessary feature. It follows that the discussion will proceed to identify democracy in an ideal way, as the paradigm of system of government with certain fundamental democratic aims. The nominally democratic systems in which these do not substantively obtain will not feature.

Peeling away the interim period in which the concept of democracy may well have mutated significantly, it is logical to begin with etymological definition as touched upon. From the word itself, and entirely at the core of the ideal interpretations since, is power for the people. In a strict sense, we might differentiate this power as sovereign power, as opposed to influence, for example. A tenet closely linked with this is the central ideal of unanimity, but the practical concession of some form of majority rule. With these two cornerstones in place, there follow other principles, objectives and consequences that are attendant to the notion of democracy. There is, naturally, a heavy overlap with the liberal values of the individual; if we are to value the voice of the populace as a whole, we necessarily value the constituent individuals. The equivocation of the majority with the people as a whole is an uneasy one, but its practical difficulties not of concern here in the ideal sketch. We might also say that this assent is explicit, and the opportunity to give it, by a vote, however loosely defined, is shared equally with reasonable exceptions. Systems constructed from this platform can safely be deemed democratically motivated; the mandate for decision making in the democratic entity is, at some point, reliant on the people`s voice for legitimacy. Does this at any point necessitate deliberation? I argue that it does not, but that of course a well-defined deliberative system would be beneficial in refining this concept of the `will of the people`, however great the difficulties are of deploying it.

1. J.L Talmon: The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy; J. Schumpeter: `Two Concepts of Democracy` in A. Quinton (ed.) Political Philosophy (1967)

It must be clear then, what this process of deliberation is that could benefit the overall democratic framework, and thereby of what benefit it could be. Democratic doctrines that make substantive assumptions about the individual, that of Rawls for example, drastically reduce the deliberative process. The unanimity or consensus which lies at the very core of the democratic institution, for Rawls, is founded upon the reliable rationality and unity of purpose of members in the Original Position. Behind the veil of ignorance, members are to `deliberate` and thereby produce principles of justice. Yet a close look at the deliberative method in question reveals it to be a simply economic preference ranking exercise 2. With his conception of the individual as equally rational, and equally autonomous in the discussion in the original position, the arguments would have unanimous appeal. Rawls supposes a referee through whom would be introduced the preference options available to the `deliberators`, but is hardly a desirable demonstration of the deliberative method we might value in democracy. We might look elsewhere in Rawls` work for his admission of principles of justice that are reasonable to all to get closer to the sort of deliberation in question.

In line with Cohen, himself building on the work of Rawls, we should hope for an ideal situation, but not a hypothetical one. We should construct a deliberative ideal that could conceivably be applied 3. The deliberative process, as above, aims for the consensual legitimacy by which decisions might be made on behalf of the community as a whole. Cohen sketches apt conditions for the sort of deliberation that would be appropriate. The procedure would be universally open to all, and participated in by all ideally. This public forum would allow for the participation of all members in equal capacity, all able to bring proposals before the scrutiny of the other members of the public forum. Thus the liberal idea of the `free market of ideas` concerning the conception of the good would obtain, this deliberation would be that sort that the advocates of neutrality would advocate. The benefit of this public space in which to test ideas and trial individual convictions would be argumentative, that is to say that speakers not only voice their convictions, but also hope to put arguments in favour of their position before the people. This argumentative aspect is integral to the deliberative process, for there is no value in a forum for individuals to simply divulge their personally held views. Schumpeter more than adequately warns us of the discrepancy in rationality behind an individual`s convictions in his personal sphere and in the political world 4. The necessity to put forward arguments for one`s own position originates itself from the idea that individuals enter into this deliberation with a view to divining some positive common good or will. A deliberative process which values appeals to pure reason alone is clearly beneficial in the democratic sense, since desires and prejudices which could not be rationalised would be excluded from the decision making process. Jurgen Habermas summarises this importance aptly: "No force except that of the better argument is exercised" 5. The congeniality of proposals appealing to reason alone in the public domain is clear, but there is significant benefit to the individuals at the same time. As was the clear belief of Plato`s Socrates, the debate and argumentation in line with reason via the elenctic method is a crucial means to the constant re-evaluation of one`s own principles. As the deliberative process hopes to divine some will as the sum of the individual wills, then the mutual amelioration of both will be achieved in this deliberative format. This is the free and ideal deliberation which is in question when we consider it as part of democracy.

However, unlike Cohen who feels the binding nature of the agreements made in the ideal deliberation to constitute the validity of the process itself, it is clear that the process is productive if the conclusions reached are not intrinsically motivating of political decisions. While this deliberation is undoubtedly fruitful and desirable in the selection of either an electoral candidate, or voting in a referendum on a key issue, it is by no means necessary. Returning to the central tenets

2. J. Rawls: Theory of Justice. P.139-42 3. J. Cohen: Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy (Estlund.2002). 4. J. Schumpeter: `Two Concepts of Democracy` (A. Quinton. 1967) 5. J. Habermas: The Legitimation Crisis of Late Capitalism (Transl.T McCarthy. P. 108)

outlined above, it is clear that the source of legitimacy for decision making being a majority decision by the people does not entail prior deliberation. At its bare minimum, we might satisfy the ideals of democracy in the election of representatives alone. In this sense, while initiatives undertaken by a dictator might uphold many liberal principles, be based on a unanimous vote in favour of the measure even, we should hesitate to call it `democratic`. The legitimisation the dictator lacks is in the nature of his instalment itself. Without a claim to quasi-contractual legitimacy of a popular vote, the ostensibly democratic results of his programme are coincidental. Democracy, then, requires an assurance that at some point the result of a popular expression of will be final and absolutely binding. This may only be in the selection of representatives at a national level, but it may, in smaller and subordinate cooperatives, be more direct, and more frequent. This is clearly the case in the United Kingdom. The 1997 referendum on Scottish devolution, a manifesto pledge by the incoming Labour government of the same year, produced a 70% majority of agreement with the statement "I agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament". Nonetheless in proposing a referendum, the government was not legally bound in any way to accept the results. That moment in which the democratic qualification of our system, and indeed any others must, surely, be found in our incontrovertible, binding preference for leadership. It is this seemingly timeless qualification that is one possible but definitive stamp of democracy upon any society. It was recognised by the Greek hostage Polybius as he observed the Roman system from within, in his evaluation of Rome as a mixed constitution: "It is the people that bestow office; the people have the power of approving or rejecting laws...here again one might say that the people`s share in the government is greatest, and that the constitution is a democratic one" 6.

It is clear that informed decisions are preferable in such instances in which the members of a democracy directly have control over the decision making process. It is also clear that uninformed choices through a failure to deliberate and poorly disseminated impartial facts might gravely thwart the resulting decisions. Nevertheless it does not follow from either that deliberation is a necessary condition of democracy. Taking one defining characteristic of democracy to be a moment of genuine sovereignty posited in the expression of the people, it cannot be. In reality, the problems of implementing such ideals are intractable and vast. Satisfactory voting systems, and apathy in the populace make expressions of the common will wildly overstated. Thankfully, there is a degree of concomitant deliberation when elections and referenda are proposed. It cannot be said, though, that it is along the lines of the unobtainable ideal kind that Cohen advocates. Not only do logistical constraints make universal participation impossible, but, as Descartes so aptly put it, "the actions of life brook for no delay". In an ideal democracy, pure rational deliberation would be invaluable, but it being necessary or even compulsory would defeat it the process as a concept. Democracy requires participation, in the form of an election of representatives, but this need not be in participation.

6. Polybius: Histories Book VI. 14.8-12.