Evaluate The Significance Of Germany In The Origins Of The Cold War

Evaluate the significance of Germany in the origins of the Cold War.

`What is wrong with Germany is that there is too much of it'. This is an ample conclusion by A.J. P. Taylor, as the economic and geo-political potential of a united Germany would mean 'a victory for one of the Cold War camps'. Indeed the historian Mark Mazower's conclusion, 'even in defeat Germany held the key to Europe's fate', demonstrates the importance of Germany in the Cold War. The precise origins of the Cold War are inexplicably impossible to determine, as distrust could reach back, 'beyond the hiatus of the 1941-5 wartime alliance to the legacy of 1917'. However, Taylor, Mazower and many other prominent historians see Germany's paralyzed post war settlement, as an outcome of the Cold War, rather than a cause. Many, such as Thomas Hammond, believe that Eastern Europe was the 'most important factor in triggering the Cold War'. This essay shall investigate the significance of Germany in the origins of the Cold War. Demonstrating that German post war disagreement was the cause, rather than an outcome, of disputes in Eastern Europe, the Marshal plan and the eventual outbreak of hostile relations between the US and USSR.

Germany's importance was imperative to the international system's balance of power, due to her geopolitical position. The historian Louis Halle's opinion is that the Cold War occurred due to the collapse of Germany as a power bloc, which had previously been the 'principal' power to 'contain' Russia. The Allied decision to utterly destroy Germany created, in the years 1945-47, a crisis in the balance of powers, leaving only Russia capable of filling the vacuum. 'This new challenge to the balance of power, and the reaction of the Atlantic world under American leadership represented the genesis of the Cold War'. Halle illustrates how Germany was instrumental in creating the conditions that brought the United States and USSR into confrontation with one another. Rejecting opinions stating that ideology was a deciding factor in the eventual dichotomy between the two super powers, believing it to be 'in its essence mythical'. Rather it was power politics, or realism that drove the protagonists, 'what the United States actually set out to do in 1947 was simply defend what was left of Europe against an expanding Russia'. Germany was significant as this was where the two protagonist's spheres of influence eventually collided. As distrust grew over unilateral actions by both sides in occupied territories, namely Italy and Eastern Europe, neither was willing to compromise on a settlement for a united Germany. This can primarily be attributed to the importance of Germany, after it became obvious that the atomic bomb had failed to 'tip the balance decidedly in favour of the Western powers'. Indeed, if anything the bomb led to increased Soviet stubbornness, as Stalin himself stated '[the West] want to force us to accept their plans. Well that's not going to happen'. The bomb did, as Stalin also noted, destroy the balance but this was offset by Stalin's possession of Eastern Europe. Daniel Yergin states that only two factors could have decidedly 'shifted the balance of powers', one being Germany the other nuclear weapons. It was for this reason that for stability to emerge both protagonists had to have their own Germany and eventually for the USSR, their own atomic arsenal. Thus, Halle and Yergin illustrate that Germany was significant in the origins of the Cold War, as neither side could cooperate in a policy to establish a united Germany, as both feared her ability to tip the balance of power. Thus 'the problem of Germany, which in 1941 had created the Grand Alliance, now shattered what remained of that alliance'.

Many historians believe that disagreement over the future of Eastern Europe was the real catalyst towards the Cold War, rather than Germany. Geir Lundestad argues that 'free elections were the largest obstacle', as it was in blatant contradiction of the Yalta agreements. The failure to implement the agreements was hard to account for to the electorates in the US and Britain. Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, for whom Britain had entered the war for, created a growing sense among the allies that they could not trust him. Both the United States and Britain realised that the Soviets primary aim was to acquire friendly states on its border. However, 'they did not want to leave the countries of that region entirely to Stalin's mercy'. Martin McCauley believes that 'one of the reasons for friction was that the decision-makers who had tacitly acknowledged Soviet primacy in the region were no longer there'. Indeed, it does appear 'American policy had stiffened with the defeat of Japan and Truman's accession to power'. Although, the West's stance had changed towards Soviet actions, the West was 'not willing to use force' and it did not lead to any drastic policy change towards Moscow. What can be ascertained from the disagreement over Eastern Europe is that it was primarily heated rhetoric on behalf of the West. The West had already demonstrated as early as 1944, with the Churchill-Stalin agreement, how little the region in 'realist' terms meant to them. Indeed, the historian Louis Halle, states the West 'were adverse to committing their power too far east'. The West accepted that Eastern Europe had to be abandoned for the West to have unilateral control over Italy and Japan. It is for this reason when Stalin broke off relations with the Polish Government in exile there was a 'weak allied response'. Roosevelt knew that 'it would be necessary to make considerable concessions to the Soviet Union to continue cooperation'. These concessions came reluctantly, but they did eventually come. What this demonstrates is that Eastern Europe was not as significant as Germany in the origins of the Cold War. Indeed, Soviet desire for Eastern Europe was driven by fear of future German aggression. If Eastern Europe had been important the West would not have recognised the pro-Soviet government of Poland, in July 1945. Headley Bull's synopsis that 'the two super powers recognised one another's rights to a sphere of influence only in the sense of rights that are conferred by rules of the game', demonstrates the actions of the US and USSR in this period. Although, spheres of influence had been created this did not entail the beginning of the Cold War as they continued to cooperate in other aspects. Germany ended this cooperation and thus is more pertinent in the origins of the Cold War.

The Marshall Plan and the communisation of Eastern Europe were acts by both protagonists to strengthen their control over their sphere of influence. Germany was the cause of these polarisation policies. Germany was the cause as with no agreement towards uniting Germany, first the US and later the USSR sought to strengthen their position. The inability, between not only the US and USSR but also France, on an agenda towards a united Germany and policy of reparations meant the international system became increasingly uncertain and fragile. Indeed, the situation, prior to June 1947, for the US was dire. Increased communist support in Western European democracies, most prominently France and Italy, due to socio-economic conditions, exacerbated by the cold winter of 1946-47, gave the impression of Soviet plans for expansion into the West. It did not appear implausible to Western observers that what had occurred in Eastern Europe could also occur in Italy or even France. The US fearing in equal measure further Russian expansion and communism, sought to contain this power. This is made evident by George Kennen's 'long telegram' in February 1946 and subsequent Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey. The relationship between the US and USSR increasingly became to be seen through the prism of ideological confrontation, but this does not constitute the dichotomy which would constitute the Cold War, as cooperation and talks continued to proceed. Germany was perilously important for both parties, united she held the key to expanding their respective spheres of influence.

Moves by both parties in Germany led to the programs of Marshall Aid and Cominform. Both made early moves to consolidate their power in Germany. The Soviets increased suspicions in February 1946, when they forced the Social Democrat Party (SPD) and Communist Party (KPD) to merge into the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East Germany. This is significant as the West became increasingly fearful of a united Germany that may swing into the Soviet orbit. Secretary Marshall observed, in the same month as the establishment of the SED, that a Soviet Germany would constitute the 'greatest threat to security of all Western nations, including the US'. By 1947 it became increasingly obvious that Europe could not economically recover without the reconstruction of Germany. In January 1947 the United States aligned its zone with the British, to create Bizonia, this was seen as a necessary prelude to any attempt for German recovery. The economic recovery of Europe was vital to American interests, not only to provide a consumer market for US products but to avert the rise of communism in Western Europe. The Western zones of Germany would thus play an important role in the success of the Marshall plan. Stalin soon 'grasped that it would resuscitate Germany and undermine his Eastern Europe hegemony'. The Soviet reaction was the establishment of Comiform in September 1947 and to solidify Soviet control of Eastern Europe, which meant the end of 'people's democracies' and full communisation. This was most clearly demonstrated in the Prague coup in February 1948. The Marshal Plan and retaliation of communisation marked the consolidation of both powers sphere of influence, thus splitting Europe into two blocs. However, it was the issue of Germany that created, as Daniel Yergin states, the 'great divide' that turned those two blocs into hostile adversaries.

Fear of a resurgent West Germany lead to the origins of the Cold War. Relations had clearly become strenuous by the Council of Foreign Minister meeting in December 1947, as the ministers became unable to amalgamate their policies together for a viable German unification settlement. However, the eventual break of relations between the West and USSR and the outbreak of Cold War occurred with the joining of the French zone with Bizonia, in March 1948.The subsequent termination of the Four Power Control Council and blockade of Berlin marked the start of hostile relations. This was due to the fact 'for the first time force was used to promote changes in an area where Western Troops were stationed'. This act completely dispelled the idea that talks on Germany could continue, and discarded the façade of international cooperation between the US and USSR globally, significantly turning the blocs of sphere's exposed by the Marshal Plan into hostile antagonists. Hence the reaction of the USSR, to end diplomacy and rhetoric, resorting instead to methods of force, to Western plans over the economic revival of Western Germany, demonstrates the significance to Germany in the origins of the Cold War.

In conclusion, the inability of the victors to agree on a post-war German settlement created a security dilemma for the Soviet Union, which was unwilling to compromise on Eastern Europe until it knew the outcome for Germany. This in turn created a security dilemma for the United States of America, which saw Soviet unilateral decisions in Eastern Europe and other nations on its borders as a threat to their national interest, which was the protection of Western Europe. The distrust that emerged from the protagonist's actions, in the mist of post war negotiations, made them realize that a united Germany was capable of disrupting the balance of powers. So they took measures to consolidate their zones, preferring division, rather than the risks associated with an independent united German settlement. Daniel Yergin's proposition of a 'Great Divide' constituting the end of all post war cooperation and the outbreak of the Cold War is significant, as it embraces the time span from the last Four Power meetings to agree on what to do with Germany, in March 1948, to the end of Berlin blockade in June1949. This is pertinent as the Berlin Blockade and partition of Germany did more than just divide Europe into two spheres of influence, as Marshall Plan and the Churchill-Stalin agreement did, but turned them into hostile blocs. For this reason Germany was significant in the origins of the Cold War, as her defeat brought about a power vacuum which turned the US and USSR into antagonists as her potential unity could unbalance the power equilibrium between the US and USSR.

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